IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION BEFORE A TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 5 OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN AND THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY ON DELIMITING ABYEI AREA

- and -

THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION OPTIONAL RULES FOR ARBITRATING DISPUTES BETWEEN TWO PARTIES OF WHICH ONLY ONE IS A STATE

- between -

THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN

- and -

THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY

________________________________________

FINAL AWARD

________________________________________

The Arbitral Tribunal:
Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy (Presiding Arbitrator)
H.E. Judge Awn Al-Khasawneh
Professor Dr. Gerhard Hafner
Professor W. Michael Reisman
Judge Stephen M. Schwebel

Registry:
Permanent Court of Arbitration

The Peace Palace, The Hague
July 22, 2009
#### AGENTS, COUNSEL, AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES

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<th><strong>Government of Sudan</strong></th>
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<td>• Ambassador Dirdeiry Mohamed Ahmed, Dirdeiry &amp; Co., Khartoum, Sudan, as Agent</td>
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</table>
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- Professor Yousif Fadl Hasan, Professor of Arab and Islamic History, Former Vice Chancellor, University of Khartoum
- Dr. Hasan Abdin, Associate Professor of African History, University of Khartoum, Former Under-Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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- Mr. Scott Edmond, President, International Mapping
- Mr. Alex Tait, Vice-President, International Mapping
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GLOSSARY OF NAMES

This Glossary contains key terms used in the Award. Some place names, geographic features, and locations have varied spellings; these are also identified below.

1898 Gleichen Handbook
“Handbook of the Sudan” compiled in the Intelligence Division, War Office by Captain Count Gleichen (1898)

1905 Gleichen Handbook

ABC
Abyei Boundaries Commission

ABC Experts or Experts
The five experts nominated by the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the IGAD to the ABC (Ambassador Donald Patterson, Dr. Kassahun Berhanu, Prof. Shadrack B.O. Gutto, Dr. Douglas H. Johnson, Prof. Godfrey Muriuki)

ABC Experts’ Report or Report
Report presented by the ABC Experts to the Sudanese Presidency on July 14, 2005

Abyei Appendix or Abyei Annex
Appendix to the Abyei Protocol relating to the Parties’ “Understanding on Abyei Boundaries Commission”

Abyei Area or Formula
the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905

Abyei Protocol
Protocol on “The Resolution of Abyei Conflict” signed by the Parties on May 26, 2004

Abyei Referendum
A referendum to be held among the residents of Abyei (simultaneously with the referendum of Southern Sudan) allowing them to vote on whether Abyei shall retain its special administrative status in the north or become part of Bahr el Ghazal

Abyei Road Map
“Road Map for the Return of IDPs and Implementation of Abyei Protocol” signed by the Parties on June 8, 2008

Abyei Town
Town of Abyei located north of the Bahr el Arab river

Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (or Condominium)
Joint British and Egyptian government of Sudan (1899-1956)

Arbitration Agreement
Arbitration Agreement between the GoS and the SPLM/A on delimiting the Abyei Area signed on July 7, 2008

Babanusa
Sandy area in southern Kordofan, north of Muglad

Baggara
Arab nomadic tribes of Western Sudan (southern Kordofan and Darfur) and Eastern Chad
Bahr el Arab
Also referred to as Kir in Dinka, Bahr ed Deynka, Bahr el Homr, Bahr el Jange, Chonyan or Gurf; river that runs from Southern Darfur through Southern Kordofan, and flows into the Bahr-el-Ghazal river in the Upper Nile Province.

Bahr el Ghazal
Also known as Bahr el Gazal or Nam; river that runs through the Upper Nile Province; Province of Sudan bordering the southwest corner of Kordofan.

Bahr el Ghazal Annual Reports
Any of the “Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan, Annual Report Bahr El Ghazal Province,” including those published from 1902 to 1905.

Bahr el Homr
A reference to either the Bahr el Arab or the Ragaba ez Zarga in the early 20th century.

Bayldon, Sub-Lieutenant R.N.
Military officer who explored a portion of the Bahr el Arab in early 1905.

Boulnois, W.A.
Governor of Bahr el Ghazal Province (1904-1905).

CivSec or Civsec
A reference to the Sudan Civil Secretary’s files in Khartoum during the period of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.

Community Mapping Project
Community mapping project conducted in a portion of the Abyei region with the involvement of a professional community mapping expert, Dr. Peter Toole, and members of the Ngok Dinka community.

CPA
Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Parties on January 9, 2005.

Cunnison, Professor Ian
Professor of social anthropology who lived with and wrote about the Baggara Humr in the 1950s.

Dar
Arabic word for homeland or tribal region.

Darfur
Province of Sudan bordering the west of Kordofan.

Dinka
Also known as Jange; a collection of tribes of Nilotic origin including, inter alia, the Ngok, the Rueng and the Twic.

Dupuis, Inspector C.J.
District Commissioner of West Kordofan in 1921.

GoS
Government of Sudan.

Goz
Sandy area of transit south of Muglad.

Governor of Darfur Province from 1949-1953.

Howell, P.P.
Anthropologist and District Commissioner at Nahud (Kordofan) in 1948.

Humr
Also known as Homr; cattle-owning nomadic Arab tribe of southern Kordofan, subgroup of the Messiriya.
Humr omodiya
Administrative term referring to a sub-group of Humr under a tribal headman (omda)

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development or IGAD
Regional African organization comprised by the seven countries in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and Eritrea)

Interim National Constitution
Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan adopted on July 6, 2005

Khartoum
Capital of Sudan, located in the north of Sudan

Kordofan
Also referred to as Kurdufan; Western Province of Sudan bordering Darfur in the west, Bahr el Ghazal in the southwest and Upper Nile in the southeast

Kordofan Annual Reports
Any of the “Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan, Annual Report Kordofan Province,” including those published from 1902 to 1905

Lloyd, Captain H.D.W. (1872-1915)
Governor of Kordofan Province (1908)

Mahdiyya
Time of Mahdist rule of the Sudan (1885-1898)

Mahon, B.T. (1862-1930)
Governor of Kordofan Province (1901-1906)

March 1905 SIR
The Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 128 (March 1905)

Mardon, H.W.
author and cartographer who wrote “A Geography of Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan” (1906)

MENAS Expert Report
“The Boundaries and Hydrology of the Abyei Area, Sudan” by Menas Borders Ltd. (February 2009; expert report commissioned by the SPLM/A for this arbitration)

Misseriya
also known as Messeria or Messiria; nomadic tribe of Baggara Arabs

Muglad
Home and cultivation area of the Humr, south of the Babanusa and north of the goz

Nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms
Abyior, Achaak, Achueng, Alei, Anyiel, Bongo, Diil, Manyuar, Mareng

Nuers
a nilotic tribe

O’Connell, J.R.
Governor of Kordofan in 1906

Parties
GoS and the SPLMA, collectively

PCA
Permanent Court of Arbitration

PCA Financial Assistance Fund
a fund established by PCA Member States that helps developing countries meet part of the costs involved in international arbitration or other means of dispute settlement offered by the PCA.

Percival, Captain C.
British officer who traveled to the Abyei region in 1904 and 1905

Ragaba
also spelled regaba or regeba; seasonal watercourse
Ragaba ez Zarga
also known as Ragaba ez-Zarga, Ngol, Ragaba Zarga; also referred to, in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, as Bahr el Arab due to geographic confusion; watercourse located north of the Bahr el Arab and the Ragaba Umm Biero

Ragaba Umm Biero
also known as Nyamora, Yamoi, Umm Rebeiro, Umm Bieiro, Umbieiro, Umm Bioro; watercourse located north of, and flowing into, the Bahr el Arab

Rizeigat
Also referred to as Rezeigat; Baggara tribe located mostly in the Province of Darfur

Robertson, J.W. (1899-1983)
District Commissioner of Western Kordofan (1933-1936); Civil Secretary (1945-1953)

Rules of Procedure
Rules of procedure prepared by the ABC Experts pursuant to Section 4 of the Abyei Appendix and agreed to by the Parties on April 11, 2005

Sheikh Rihan Gorkwei
also known as Sultan Rihan; chief of the Twic Dinka in 1905

SPLM/A
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army

Sultan Rob
Paramount Chief Arop Biong; chief of the Ngok Dinka of southwest Kordofan in 1905

Terms of Reference
Terms of reference adopted by the Parties on March 12, 2005

Territorial Interpretation
the GoS interpretation of the Formula (see paras. 232 \textit{et seq.})

Tibbs, Michael
Assistant District Commissioner of the Western Kordofan District (1952-1953); District Commissioner of the Dar Messeria District (1953-1954)

Tribal Interpretation
the SPLM/A interpretation of the Formula (see paras. 232 \textit{et seq.})

Turkiyya
period of Turkish-Egyptian rule of Sudan (1821-1881)

Upper Nile
Province of Sudan bordering Kordofan in the east and the southeast

Wilkinson, Major E.B.(1864-1946)
Governor of Gezira Province (1903); Governor of Kassala Province (1903-1908); Governor of Berber Province (1908-1910)

Wingate, Sir. R. (1861-1953)
Governor-General of Sudan (1899-1916)

Wingate’s 1904 Memorandum
Report entitled “Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan, Memorandum by Major General Sir R. Wingate” published in 1904

Wingate’s 1905 Memorandum
Report entitled “Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan, Memorandum by Major General Sir R. Wingate” published in 1905
CHAPTER I – PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

1. On July 7, 2008, the Government of Sudan (“GoS”) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (“SPLM/A,” and together with the GoS, the “Parties”) signed the “Arbitration Agreement between The Government of Sudan and The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army on Delimiting Abyei Area” (“Arbitration Agreement”).

2. As stated in the Arbitration Agreement, a dispute has arisen between the Parties regarding whether or not the experts (“ABC Experts” or “Experts”) of the Abyei Boundaries Commission (“ABC”), established pursuant to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Parties on January 9, 2005 (“CPA”), exceeded their mandate as per the provisions of the CPA, the Protocol signed by the Parties on May 26, 2004 on the Resolution of Abyei Conflict (“Abyei Protocol”), the appendix to the Abyei Protocol (“Abyei Appendix” or “Abyei Annex”)¹, and the ABC’s terms of reference (“Terms of Reference”) and rules of procedure (“Rules of Procedure”).

3. Under Article 1.1 of the Arbitration Agreement, the Parties agreed to refer their dispute to final and binding arbitration under the Arbitration Agreement and the PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of Which Only One is a State (“PCA Rules”), subject to such modifications as the Parties agreed in the Arbitration Agreement or may agree in writing. Under Article 1.2, the Parties agreed to form an arbitration tribunal (“Tribunal”) to arbitrate their dispute.

4. In accordance with Article 12.1 of the Arbitration Agreement, on July 11, 2008, the Parties deposited the Arbitration Agreement with the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”).

5. Under Article 1.3 of the Arbitration Agreement, the Parties agreed that the International Bureau of the PCA is to act as registry and provide administrative support in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement and the PCA Rules. Pursuant to Article 1.4, the Parties designated the Secretary-General of the PCA as the appointing authority for the proceedings.

¹ The Parties use the terms interchangeably to refer to the same instrument.
6. Under Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement, the issues to be determined by the Tribunal are the following:

   (a) Whether or not the ABC Experts had, on the basis of the agreement of the Parties as per the CPA, exceeded their mandate which is ‘to define (i.e. delimit) and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905’ as stated in the Abyei Protocol, and reiterated in the Abyei Appendix and the ABC Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure.

   (b) If the Tribunal determines, pursuant to Sub-article (a) herein, that the ABC Experts did not exceed their mandate, it shall make a declaration to that effect and issue an award for the full and immediate implementation of the ABC Report.

   (c) If the Tribunal determines, pursuant to Sub-article (a) herein, that the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate, it shall make a declaration to that effect, and shall proceed to define (i.e. delimit) on map the boundaries of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905, based on the submissions of the Parties.

B. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL

7. Under Article 5 of the Arbitration Agreement, the Parties agreed that the Tribunal shall be composed of five arbitrators, that each Party shall appoint two arbitrators, and that the four Party-appointed arbitrators shall appoint the fifth arbitrator. The Parties agreed not to designate persons other than current or former members of the PCA or members of tribunals for which the PCA acted as registry. Party-appointed arbitrators were to be independent, impartial, highly qualified, and experienced in similar disputes.

8. On July 16, 2008, in accordance with Article 5.3 of the Arbitration Agreement, the Secretary-General of the PCA provided the Parties with a full list of current or former members of the PCA or members of tribunals for which the PCA acted as registry ("PCA Arbitrators List").

9. On August 14, 2008, in accordance with Articles 5.2 and 5.4 of the Arbitration Agreement, the GoS appointed as arbitrators His Excellency Judge Awn Al-Khasawneh and Professor Dr. Gerhard Hafner.

10. On August 15, 2008, in accordance with Articles 5.2 and 5.4 of the Arbitration Agreement, the SPLM/A appointed as arbitrators Professor W. Michael Reisman and Judge Stephen M. Schwebel.
11. Before August 22, 2008, in accordance with Article 5.6 of the Arbitration Agreement, each of the four Party-appointed arbitrators signed declarations of independence, impartiality, and commitment, and such declarations were immediately communicated by the PCA to the Parties.

12. On September 6, 2008, in accordance with Article 5.7 of the Arbitration Agreement, the four Party-appointed arbitrators met in The Hague, The Netherlands to consider candidates for the fifth arbitrator. Article 5.8 of the Arbitration Agreement provides that the fifth arbitrator might be selected from or outside the PCA Arbitrators List, and shall be a “renowned lawyer of high professional qualifications, personal integrity, and moral reputation” with experience in similar disputes.

13. On September 24, 2008, in accordance with Article 5.9 of the Arbitration Agreement, the four Party-appointed arbitrators communicated to the Parties, through the Secretary-General of the PCA, an identical list of five candidates for the fifth arbitrator, attaching full curricula vitae of the candidates.

14. On October 12, 2008, in accordance with Article 5.10 of the Arbitration Agreement, the Parties returned the candidates list after having deleted the name or names to which they objected and numbered the remaining candidates in order of preference. All the candidates on the list were objected to by either Party or by both Parties. Article 5.12 was then triggered, requiring the Secretary-General of the PCA to appoint, in consultation with the four arbitrators, within fifteen days of receiving the objections, the fifth arbitrator from outside the candidates’ list, having due regard to Article 5.8 of the Arbitration Agreement.

15. The Secretary-General of the PCA consulted with the four Party-appointed arbitrators in accordance with Articles 5.8 and 5.12 of the Arbitration Agreement and, on October 27, 2008, the Secretary-General appointed Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy as the fifth and presiding arbitrator (“Presiding Arbitrator”).

16. On October 30, 2008, in accordance with Article 5.13 of the Arbitration Agreement, the Presiding Arbitrator signed a declaration of independence, impartiality, and commitment which was then immediately communicated by the PCA to the Parties.
C. **COMMENCEMENT AND TIMING OF ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS**

17. Pursuant to Article 4.1 of the Arbitration Agreement, the arbitration process was deemed to have commenced on June 8, 2008.

18. Article 4.2 of the Arbitration Agreement provides that the arbitration proceedings “shall commence on the date of the formation of the Tribunal which shall start its work as soon as it is constituted.” For purposes of Article 4.2, the date of the formation of the Tribunal was October 30, 2008, the date on which the declaration of the fifth and presiding arbitrator was signed and communicated to the Parties.

19. According to Article 4.3 of the Arbitration Agreement, the Tribunal “shall endeavor to complete the arbitration proceedings including the issuance of the final award within a period of six months from the date of the commencement of arbitration proceedings subject to three months extension.” Article 9.1 refers specifically to the award, stating: “Subject to Article 8(7) … the final award shall be rendered by the Tribunal within a maximum of ninety days from the closure of submissions.”

20. Article 8.7 of the Arbitration Agreement provides that notwithstanding Article 4.3, the Tribunal shall be empowered to extend for good cause the periods established for the arbitration proceedings on its own motion or at the request of either Party. The total cumulative extension of the periods granted by the Tribunal at the request of either Party could not exceed thirty days for each Party.

D. **PRELIMINARY PROCEDURAL MEETING**

21. On November 24, 2008, the Tribunal held a preliminary procedural meeting with the Parties at the Peace Palace in The Hague.

22. Present at the Preliminary Procedural Meeting were:

Tribunal:  
Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy  
Judge Awn Al-Khasawneh  
Professor Dr. Gerhard Hafner  
Judge Stephen M. Schwebel  
Professor W. Michael Reisman

For the GoS:  
Professor James Crawford SC
23. The Parties and Members of the Tribunal signed the Terms of Appointment at the Procedural Meeting.

24. Pursuant to the Terms of Appointment, the Parties confirmed, among other things, that the members of the Tribunal had been validly appointed in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement and the PCA Rules, and that the Parties had no objection to the appointment of each member of the Tribunal on the grounds of conflict of interest or lack of independence or impartiality.

25. The Parties further confirmed that the PCA would serve as Registry and that the Tribunal may appoint a member of the PCA International Bureau to act as Registrar for the proceedings, and for this purpose the Tribunal appointed Ms. Judith Levine, PCA Legal Counsel, as Registrar. From March 13, 2009, Mr. Aloysius Llamzon, PCA Legal Counsel, was designated as Acting Registrar.

26. At the Preliminary Procedural Meeting, the Tribunal (in consultation with the Parties) set a schedule for the written and oral phases of the proceedings consistent with the timelines set by Article 8 of the Arbitration Agreement. At the request of the GoS, an extension of 14 days for the submission of Counter-Memorials was granted pursuant to Article 8.7 of the Arbitration Agreement.

27. In accordance with Article 8.6 of the Arbitration Agreement, shortly after the Preliminary Procedural Meeting, copies of the Terms of Appointment, Transcript of Proceedings, and the schedule for the written and oral phases of the proceedings were published on the PCA’s website (www.pca-cpa.org).
E. DEPOSITS AND THE PCA FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FUND

28. Article 11 of the Arbitration Agreement provides:

1. The Presidency of the Republic of Sudan shall direct for the payment of the cost of the arbitration from the Unity Fund regardless of the outcome of the arbitration.

2. The Government of the Sudan shall apply to the PCA Financial Assistance Fund and the Parties may solicit additional assistance from the international community.

29. On July 11, 2008, the Presidency of the Republic of Sudan submitted a request to the PCA Secretary-General for financial assistance from the PCA Financial Assistance Fund.

30. A preliminary deposit of EUR 40,000 was requested from the Parties on August 28, 2008 for purposes of covering the expenses associated with the meeting in The Hague pursuant to Article 5.7 of the Arbitration Agreement. The Presidency of the Republic of Sudan duly paid this amount on September 6, 2008.

31. On November 24, 2008, in accordance with Article 41 of the PCA Rules and pursuant to paragraph 7.1 of the Terms of Appointment, the Tribunal requested that the Presidency of the Republic of Sudan establish an initial deposit of EUR 1,000,000.00 (equivalent to EUR 500,000 for each Party) as an advance on costs of the arbitration.

32. Shortly thereafter, on December 4, 2008, the PCA transmitted the request for financial assistance from the Presidency of the Republic of Sudan to the Board of Trustees of the PCA Financial Assistance Fund. On December 18, 2008, the Board of Trustees approved an allocation of EUR 400,000 to be made from the PCA Financial Assistance Fund towards the deposit in this case. The remaining portion of the initial deposit, EUR 600,000, was received by the PCA from the Presidency of the Republic of Sudan on January 15, 2009.

33. In accordance with Article 41(2) of the PCA Rules and Paragraph 7.3 of the Terms of Appointment, the Tribunal requested a supplementary deposit of EUR 750,000 on March 10, 2009. By letter dated April 13, 2009 addressed to the PCA, the GoS confirmed that the requested supplementary deposit had been transferred to the PCA to meet the expenses of the Tribunal. The PCA acknowledged receipt of EUR 750,000 on April 17, 2009.

34. On May 8, 2009, the Tribunal, in further reliance on Article 41(2) of the PCA Rules and Paragraph 7.3 of the Terms of Appointment, and in view of the work already completed and
currently anticipated in relation to the proceedings, requested a supplementary deposit of EUR 500,000. By letter dated June 3, 2009 addressed to the PCA, the GoS confirmed that the requested supplementary deposit was transferred by wire on that date. The PCA acknowledged receipt of EUR 500,000 on June 9, 2009.

35. As of the date of this Award, Norway, The Netherlands, and France have made Financial Assistance Fund contributions towards the financing of part of the costs of these proceedings.

F. WRITTEN PLEADINGS PHASE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

36. In accordance with Article 8.3(i) of the Arbitration Agreement and the schedule set by the Tribunal, the Parties filed written Memorials on December 18, 2008, accompanied by witness statements, expert reports, maps, documentary evidence and legal authorities.

37. The GoS made the following formal submissions in its Memorial:

   For the reasons set out in this Memorial, the Government of Sudan respectfully requests the Tribunal to adjudge and declare:

   (a) pursuant to Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement, that the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate as stated in the Abyei Protocol, and reiterated in the Abyei Appendix and the ABC Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure;

   (b) pursuant to Article 2(c) of the Arbitration Agreement, that the boundaries of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905 are as shown on Figure 17 (page 159), being the area bounded on the north by the Bahr el-Arab and otherwise by the boundaries of Kordofan as at independence.

38. The map referenced in paragraph (b) of the GoS Submission is:
39. The SPLM/A made the following formal submissions in its Memorial:

For the reasons set forth in this Memorial, the SPLM/A respectfully requests that the Arbitral Tribunal make an Award granting the following relief:

(a) A declaration that the ABC Experts did not, on the basis of the agreement of the Parties as per the CPA, exceed their mandate which is “to define (i.e. delimit) and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905” as stated in the Abyei Protocol, and reiterated in the Abyei Annex and the ABC Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure;”

(b) On the basis of relief in the terms of sub-paragraph (a) above, a declaration that the boundaries of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905 are as defined and delimited by the ABC Experts in the ABC Report, and that definition and delimitation, and the ABC Report shall be fully and immediately implemented by the Parties;

(c) In the alternative, if the Tribunal determines that the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate and makes a declaration to that effect, a declaration that the boundaries of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905 are the current boundary of Kordofan and Bahr el-Ghazal to the south extending to 10°35’N latitude to the north and the current boundary of Kordofan and Darfur to the west extending to 32°15’E longitude to the east;
(d) A declaration that the Tribunal’s Award is final and binding on the Parties;

(e) Costs, including the direct costs of the arbitration, as well as fees and other expenses incurred in participating in the arbitration, including but not limited to, the fees and/or expenses incurred in relation to the Tribunal, solicitors and counsel, and any ABC Experts, consultants and witnesses, internal legal costs, the costs of translations, archival research and travel; and

(f) Such additional or other relief as may be just.

40. In accordance with Article 8.3(ii) of the Arbitration Agreement and the schedule set by the Tribunal, the Parties filed their respective Counter-Memorials on February 13, 2009, accompanied by witness statements, expert reports, maps, documentary evidence and legal authorities.

41. In its Counter-Memorial, the GoS, for the reasons set out in its Counter-Memorial, “and rejecting the arguments contained in the Memorial of the SPLM/A […] reaffirm[ed] the Submissions appearing in its Memorial.” Similarly, the SPLM/A reaffirmed the formal submissions and request for relief made in its Memorial.²

42. In accordance with Article 8.3(iii) of the Arbitration Agreement and the schedule set by the Tribunal, the Parties filed their respective Rejoinders on February 28, 2009.

43. The GoS, for the reasons set out in its Rejoinder, “and rejecting the arguments contained in the Memorial and Counter-Memorial of the SPLM/A […] reaffirm[ed] its previous Submissions.” On its part, the SPLM/A similarly reaffirmed the formal submissions and request for relief made by it in its Memorial.³

44. In accordance with Article 8.6 of the Arbitration Agreement, copies of the Parties’ pleadings were published on the PCA’s website (www.pca-cpa.org).

45. Summaries of the Parties’ written pleadings are found infra in Chapter III.

² Notably, the SPLM/A modified submission (c) of its Memorial. In both its Counter-Memorial and Rejoinder, SPLM/A’s submission (c) reads: “In the alternative, if the Tribunal determines that the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate and makes a declaration to that effect, a declaration that the boundaries of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905 are the current boundary of Kordofan and Bahr el-Ghazal to the south extending to 10°35’N latitude to the north and the current boundary of Kordofan and Darfur to the west extending to 29°32’15”E longitude to the east.”

³ See note 2 above.
G. **Tribunal’s Request for Certain Documents; Access to the Archives of Sudan**

46. On March 17, 2009, the following communication from the Tribunal was conveyed by the PCA to the Parties:

The Tribunal notes the statements made by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (“SPLM/A”) in its Rejoinder of February 28, 2009 (“Rejoinder”) that the Government of Sudan (“Government”) has had full access to archives containing the sketch maps and cartographic records prepared by or for Messrs. Wilkinson, Percival, Hallam, and Whittingham, while the SPLM/A has not, in its view, been fully provided with or given access to these documents. *(see, for example, paragraphs 432(g), 458, 460, 485, 564, 569, 571-72, and 574-76 of the Rejoinder).*

The Tribunal appreciates that the Government has disclosed portions of the aforementioned maps in its written pleadings. The Tribunal also acknowledges that the Parties were entitled to submit extracts of documents in the exhibits to their written pleadings *(see Transcript of the Nov. 24, 2008 Procedural Hearing, pp. 34-35).*

However, in light of the potential importance of these contemporaneous documents, and recalling the need for a final and peaceful settlement of this dispute and the principle of equality that the Tribunal has a duty to accord to the Parties (as reflected in Article 15(1) of the PCA Rules):

1. The Tribunal requests, pursuant to Article 24(3) of the PCA Rules, that the Government of Sudan provide the Tribunal and the SPLM/A, by March 30, 2009, with copies of the full sketch maps/records prepared by or for Messrs. Wilkinson, Percival, Whittingham, and Hallam that are within the Government’s possession or control, including specifically the full sketch maps and cartographic records relating to the following maps found in Volume III of the Government’s Counter-Memorial:
   a. Map 13b (Wilkinson’s Sketch Map);
   b. Map 14a (Percival 1904 Route Map – Lake Leilak to Wau)
   c. Map 14b (Percival’s Sketch Map – River Kir to Wau);
   d. Map 16b (Hallam’s Sketch Map); and
   e. Map 18b (Wittingham’s Sketch Map).

2. The Tribunal is prepared to hear from both Parties as to the necessity of granting the SPLM/A full access to relevant archival documents within the Government’s control (including access to the Sudan Survey Department), through the following process:
   a. the SPLM/A may, by March 27, 2009, send a written request (“Request”) to the Government, with a copy to the Tribunal, containing a reasonably specific description of documents, maps and/or cartographic records sought.
   b. The Government may either: (i) facilitate full and timely access to the archival documents sought in the Request, or (ii) file before the Tribunal, with a copy to the SPLM/A, by April 6, 2009, a written objection to the Request (“Objection”), containing its specific grounds for objection.
   c. The Tribunal will then consider the Request and Objection, and may issue the appropriate order.
47. By letter to the PCA on the same date, the SPLM/A stated that it had previously made requests for access to both the Sudan Survey Department (“Survey Department”) and the Sudan National Records Office (“NRO”) and was granted access to the NRO on March 2, 2009. The SPLM/A reiterated its request for “full and unhindered access to the SPLM/A and [its] counsel to the relevant archival documents at the Survey Department, including those specified in the [correspondence enclosed with this letter] to the Survey Department and the NRO.”

48. On March 19, 2009, Mr. Bakri Hasan Salih, the Minister of the Presidency of the Republic of Sudan, by letter addressed to the PCA, explained that the Presidency and the Government of National Unity of the Republic of Sudan are composed of both the National Congress Party and the SPLM/A as main partner-parties, and both are responsible for all Government Departments in the Sudan, including the NRO and the Survey Department. He further explained that “the archives in Sudan, be they in the NRO, the Survey Department or any other Department, are open to the public. There is no requirement of obtaining prior access to any of them.” He rejected the allegation that the SPLM/A was denied access to the NRO and the Survey Department and maintained that the SPLM/A’s counsel were welcome to visit the NRO, the Survey Department and any other archive unit in the country.

49. By letter dated March 19, 2009 addressed to the PCA, the SPLM/A explained that although the NRO itself may be open to the public (subject to first obtaining necessary permits and passes), access to the documents within those archives is not straightforward. The SPLM/A remained deeply concerned that its representatives would not be granted full or proper access to the materials it required. It also requested “written confirmation from the [GoS] that [it] will make the necessary arrangements to ensure the security of [the SPLM/A’s] legal team [during] their visit to Khartoum.” The SPLM/A further requested the GoS to provide complete copies of: (1) the 1903 Wilkinson sketch map; (2) the 1904 Percival sketch map segment from the Bahr el Arab/Kir to Keilak; (3) the 1905 Percival sketch map segment from “Golo” to Taufikia; (4) the 1910 Whittingham sketch maps and route notes; and (5) the 1907 Hallam sketch map and route notes.

50. In reply to the Tribunal’s communication dated March 17, 2009, the GoS, by letter dated March 19, 2009, stated that “the [GoS] has always sought to cooperate with the SPLM/A fully in the conduct of this arbitration. This is evidenced by the fact that it provided a number of documents promptly in spite of the additional burden this represented at the time of finalization of the Rejoinder. If some documents and maps were not supplied following
the SPLM/A’s requests, this was simply because they had not been found.” The GoS noted that when the SPLM/A formally applied for access to the Survey Department and the NRO by two letters dated February 19, 2009, it was already after the February 13, 2009 exchange of Counter-Memorials and nine days before the filing of the Rejoinders. According to the GoS, “it was no longer appropriate at [that] point for any of the Parties to file any new documents without the specific leave of [this] Tribunal.” The GoS also alleged that representatives of the SPLM/A were expected to visit the NRO on February 28, 2009 but failed to appear, and that “it is significant that the date coincides with the filing date of the Rejoinder, in which the SPLM/A complained of not having had access to the Sudan Archives, while it had only sought access on February 19, 2009 and had not thereafter followed up on its request.”

51. Noting that the GoS would be providing access to the Survey Department archives, the SPLM/A stated through its letter dated March 20, 2009 that it did not consider it necessary for the Tribunal to hear the Parties any further on point two of the Tribunal’s communication dated March 17, 2009, but requested the opportunity to make further submissions on the issue following its inspection of the NRO and Survey Department archives. The SPLM/A also expressed surprise that the GoS had been unable to locate complete copies of certain records and thus reiterated its request for an order from the Tribunal instructing the GoS to produce the full and complete sketch maps, cartographic records and route reports relating to the requested maps and records, or to procure that the Sudan Survey Department produce them. Further, it sought an order from the Tribunal instructing the GoS to provide complete copies of the full sketch maps, cartographic records and route reports prepared by or for Mr. Percival in relation to his 1905 trek from River Pongo to Taufilia, or to arrange for the Sudan Survey Department to produce them.

52. On March 23, 2009, the GoS accused the SPLM/A of “attempt[ing] to seek leave to embark on an unfettered fishing expedition” and noted that “SPLM/A’s own failure to exercise due diligence is no justification for a late request to seek access to such a potentially wide array of documents.”

53. On March 24, 2009, the Tribunal sent the following communication to the Parties through the PCA:

The Tribunal thanks the Parties for the following letters in response to its communication of March 17, 2009 (“Communication”):
From the Government of Sudan (“GoS”)
1. Letter dated March 19, 2009 from the Minister of the Presidency of the GoS
2. Letter dated March 19, 2009 from the Agent of the GoS
3. Letter dated March 23, 2009 from the Agent of the GoS

From the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (“SPLM/A”)
1. Letter dated March 17, 2009
2. Letter dated March 19, 2009
3. Letter dated March 20, 2009

The Tribunal expresses its appreciation at the GoS’ assurances that the SPLM/A continues to enjoy full access to the Archives of Sudan (last paragraph, p. 3, letter of the Agent of the GoS dated March 19, 2009; first paragraph, p. 5, letter of the Agent of the GoS dated March 23, 2009). The Tribunal also takes note of the SPLM/A’s statement that, “[a]t the present, the SPLM/A does not consider it necessary for the Tribunal to hear the Parties any further on point two of the PCA’s letter dated 17 March 2009.” (third paragraph, p.1, letter of the SPLM/A dated March 20, 2009). In view of the positions expressed by the Parties, the Tribunal shall take no further action at this time in relation to Point 2 of its Communication.

On Point 1 of its Communication, where the Tribunal requested that the GoS provide it and the SPLM/A with copies of the full sketch maps/records listed therein, the Tribunal notes that “the Government of Sudan will respond further by 30 March 2009.” (last paragraph, p.4, letter of the Agent of the GoS dated March 23, 2009) The Tribunal requests that the additional documents sought by the SPLM/A in the penultimate paragraph of its March 20, 2009 letter (i.e., the “full sketch map(s), cartographic records and route reports prepared by or for Mr. Percival in relation to his 1905 trek from River Pongo to Taufikia.”) be considered a further document to be provided by March 30, 2009 under Point 1 of the Tribunal’s Communication.

The Tribunal looks forward to the GoS’ response to Point 1, and expects that the GoS will provide these maps/records or, if necessary, provide satisfactory reasons for the unavailability of those documents not produced. The Tribunal is thankful for the spirit of cooperation the GoS has demonstrated in this matter.

54. On March 26, 2009, the SPLM/A sent a letter to the GoS (with copies to the Tribunal and the PCA) noting that “the statements in your letters regarding the past accessibility of the NRO and Sudan Survey Department archives are inaccurate. In fact, both the SPLM/A and its expert have prior experience in the NRO of being denied access to documents. […] As for the Sudan Survey Department archive, as soon as the SPLM/A legal representatives became aware that there existed a separate archive of documents outside of the NRO that contained additional (and previously unseen) historic records directly relevant to the issues in dispute in this arbitration, to which the [GoS’s] expert has been granted apparent unfettered access, the SPLM/A directly requested the same. The SPLM/A’s requests in February 2009 were simply ignored.” The SPLM/A also alleged that its legal representatives sent to the Survey Department in Khartoum have been “wholly obstructed from viewing a single relevant document” and have been “prohibited from carrying out any of their own independent research.” It further alleged that these documents have been
removed and deliberately withheld from them. In a letter dated March 27, 2009 addressed to the Agent for the GoS (copying the Tribunal and the PCA), the SPLM/A requested confirmation that its legal team would be granted free access to the Survey Department archive, including to those documents allegedly removed by the GoS from the archive.

55. In a letter dated March 30, 2009 addressed to the PCA, the GoS, with reference to the Tribunal’s requests dated March 17, 2000 and March 24, 2009 for complete copies of certain sketch maps/records that are within the GoS’s possession or control, provided certain sketch maps requested by the Tribunal, noted that full sketch maps of certain journeys had already been provided, and explained that certain other sketch maps could not be located.

56. In a letter dated April 1, 2009 addressed to the PCA, the GoS denied the allegations made by the SPLM/A that it did not enjoy free access to the archives and was not afforded full assistance and cooperation by the staff of the NRO and the Survey Department. The GoS explained that all documents requested by SPLM/A’s legal team at the Survey Department archives were made available to them as soon as possible and that no documents were removed from the archives.

57. The SPLM/A, by letter dated April 3, 2009 addressed to the PCA, alleged the denial of access to a significant number of documents held by the Survey Department that fall squarely within the relevant geographic area and time period central to these proceedings. It further stated that “it is impossible to determine the extent to which other materials, also directly relevant to the issues in these proceedings, continue to be withheld.” The SPLM/A then stated that it will be inviting the Tribunal to infer from the GoS’s failure to make available this allegedly relevant evidence and to provide satisfactory explanation for such failure, that such evidence would be adverse to the interests of the GoS in these proceedings.

58. On April 4, 2009, through a letter from the PCA, the Presiding Arbitrator requested that the GoS respond to each point contained in the April 3, 2009 SPLM/A letter no later than 1:00PM (The Hague time), April 7, 2009.

59. On April 7, 2009, the GoS, by letter addressed to the PCA, stated that “there has been no denial of access to the SPLM/A to the archives and nothing has been withheld. Requests could and would have been handled in time had the SPLM/A acted in a timely fashion and
not made unreasonable, last-minute demands on archive staff.” It emphasized that “no fact has come to light in the sketches that the SPLM/A has supplied that would justify [inferring that] the [GoS] deliberately suppress[ed] such evidence.” In addition, the GoS noted that as to the introduction of new documentary evidence, “[t]he proper way under the agreed procedure for the SPLM/A to produce the new sketch maps attached to their letter would have been first to seek the leave of the Tribunal to do so. The [GoS] has no objection to the introduction of these materials which in no way advance the SPLM/A’s case. The [GoS] will respond as necessary to the substance of the materials filed during the oral hearings. However, the [GoS] would hope that the agreed procedure for introducing late documents will be respected.”

60. In a letter dated April 8, 2009 addressed to the PCA, the SPLM/A alleged that the GoS’s account of the factual occurrences between March 25 and 31, 2009 in its letter dated April 7, 2009 was inaccurate. It claimed that the GoS’s conduct gave rise to certain inferences, and that “the SPLM/A will indicate in the course of its oral presentations where such inferences should be drawn.”

61. On April 11, 2009, the Tribunal issued the following communication to the Parties through the PCA:

The Tribunal thanks the Government of Sudan (“GoS”) for its letter dated April 7, 2009 pursuant to the Presiding Arbitrator's request for comment (contained in the PCA's letter dated April 4, 2009), and acknowledges with thanks the letter dated April 8, 2009 from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (“SPLM/A”). Both these letters relate to allegations that the SPLM/A continues to be denied full access to the Archives of Sudan, that “it is impossible to determine the extent to which other materials, also directly relevant to the issues in these proceedings, continue to be withheld,” and that the SPLM/A “will be” inviting the Tribunal to draw certain adverse inferences from the GoS’ alleged conduct (pp. 2-3, SPLM/A letter dated April 3, 2009; see also p. 2, SPLM/A letter dated April 8, 2009).

The Tribunal notes that the SPLM/A is not asking the Tribunal to issue a ruling now and to draw any adverse inferences on account of the GoS’ alleged conduct. In effect, the SPLM/A has put the GoS on notice about the adverse inferences that the former will seek from the Tribunal over the course of their argument during the oral pleadings. Accordingly, at this juncture in the proceedings, the Tribunal will take all the arguments made thus far by the Parties under advisement and has decided to remain seized of the issue. In light of the arguments presented at the oral pleadings, the Tribunal will decide, in the fullness of these proceedings, whether any adverse inferences or other appropriate conclusions should be drawn.
62. At the oral pleadings, the GoS reiterated its commitment to ensuring that the Tribunal is given access to all the documentary records the Tribunal may require. It repeated its assertion that it did not fail in disclosing relevant documents.\(^4\)

\section*{H. ALLEGATIONS OF WITNESS INTIMIDATION}

63. The GoS, by letter dated March 30, 2009 addressed to the PCA, informed the Tribunal that a news item on March 29, 2009 in the Sudanese daily newspaper \textit{Al-Ayam} alleged that one of the Ngok Dinka witnesses for the GoS, Mr. Majid Yak, Secretary of Local Administration of Abyei, was threatened with being “physically eliminated” by members of the SPLM/A if he were to leave for The Hague to testify at the hearings. In addition to Mr. Yak, the GoS further claimed that, upon inquiry, its other Ngok Dinka witnesses, Messrs. Zakaria Atem, Majak Matit and Ayom Matit admitted to being repeatedly harassed by SPLM/A members either to deter them from testifying at the hearings or to convince them to change their testimony.

64. The SPLM/A, by a letter of the same date addressed to the PCA, denied such allegations but nevertheless endeavored to investigate the allegations further and to inform the Tribunal as soon as relevant information became available.

65. On April 14, 2009, the SPLM/A issued a letter to the PCA stating that it had investigated the allegations reported by the Sudanese press and found these to be without basis. To substantiate its claim, the SPLM/A attached to its letter a report from Lt. Col. Mayen Tap Mayen, the Chief Executive Officer of the National Security and Intelligence Organ of the Abyei Security Unit who investigated the incident, and a letter from Nyol Pagout Deng Ayei, Chief of the Bongo Chiefdom.

66. At the oral pleadings, a member of the Tribunal, H.E. Judge Awn Al-Khasawneh, asked four witnesses of the GoS to testify whether they were intimidated by agents of the SPLM/A. The witnesses Mr. Zakaria Atem Diyin Thibek Deng Kiir,\(^5\) Mr. Majid Yak Kur,\(^6\) Mr. Ayom Matit Ayom,\(^7\) and Mr. Majak Matet Ayom\(^8\) gave varying answers.

\(^4\) See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 19/04-21/05.

\(^5\) The pertinent portion of Mr. Zakaria’s testimony is as follows:

\begin{quote}
JUDGE AL-KHASAWNEH: [...] First, there have been allegations that you had been intimidated and threatened. Those allegations have been denied. Could you briefly tell us the truth or otherwise of those allegations?
\end{quote}
I. REQUEST FOR FUNDING

67. By letter to the PCA dated April 7, 2009, the SPLM/A informed the Tribunal that the
Presidency of the Republic of Sudan had allegedly not yet provided any portion of a US$1,000,000 sum previously requested as funding for the SPLM/A’s costs. Further, the SPLM/A stated that on March 24, 2009, it was informed by the Presidency of the Republic of Sudan that only US$200,000 of the requested US$1,000,000 would be allocated to it, and to date, it had not received any portion of this allocated amount. In view of the impending hearings, the SPLM/A requested that the Tribunal order, pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement, that the GoS “direct the Presidency [of the Republic of Sudan] to approve and transfer the funding required by the SPLM/A as a matter of urgency.”

68. Through the PCA’s letter of April 8, 2009, the Presiding Arbitrator requested that the GoS comment on the allegations contained in the SPLM/A letter dated April 7, 2009 by April 9, 2009.

69. Replying to the Presiding Arbitrator’s request, the GoS, by letter addressed to the PCA on April 9, 2009, explained that the Parties had previously agreed on the procedure to be used for the allocation of funds, i.e., “joint requests [had to be made by] the Parties to the Presidency [of the Republic of Sudan].” The GoS maintained that this procedure should be followed by both the SPLM/A and the GoS for any further requests for disbursements. The GoS also asserted that it had already provided a $200,000 allocation to the SPLM/A.

70. On April 11, 2009, the Tribunal issued the following communication:

The Tribunal thanks the Government of Sudan (“GoS”) for its letter dated April 9, 2009 pursuant to the Presiding Arbitrator's request for comment (contained in the PCA's letter dated April 8, 2009) on the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army's (“SPLM”) request "that the Tribunal order pursuant to the Abyei Arbitration Agreement that the Government of Sudan [ ] direct the Presidency to approve and transfer the funding required by the SPLM/A as a matter of urgency (p. 2, SPLM/A letter dated April 7, 2009).

The Tribunal recalls the obligation of the Presidency of Sudan to fund the "cost of arbitration from the Unity Fund” on behalf of both Parties (Article 11(1), Abyei Arbitration Agreement) and is conscious of its own obligation to ensure that the parties are treated with equality and that at any stage of the proceedings, each party must be given a full opportunity to present its case (Art. 15, PCA Rules). To realize this, and to ensure the integrity of this arbitral process, the Tribunal believes that adequate funding on the part of both Parties is critical. Considering the complexity of this case, its compressed schedule and lengthy submissions, and the critical stage that these proceedings are currently in (among other factors), the Tribunal believes that the amount of US$1,000,000 requested by the SPLM/A is reasonable and should immediately be released. The Tribunal therefore expects that the GoS will facilitate and ensure the immediate release by the Presidency of the Republic of Sudan of the US$1,000,000 in funding sought by the SPLM/A on or before April 14, 2009, and to
confirm to the Tribunal no later than April 13, 2009 that the process of transmitting the funds has begun.

71. By letter dated April 13, 2009 addressed to the PCA, the GoS confirmed that the requested US$800,000 had been transferred to the account of SPLM/A while reiterating that US$200,000 had previously been transferred.

72. On April 14, 2009, the SPLM/A wrote to the GoS, claiming that it had not received any part of the US$1,000,000 allocated to them, and that such funds were needed “as a matter of urgency.”

73. On April 15, 2009, the GoS wrote the SPLM/A, attaching the bank transfer note for US$800,000 dated April 13, 2009. The GoS explained that the US$200,000 was also previously transferred, and the bank transfer note “is being currently traced.”

J. APPOINTMENT OF EXPERTS

74. By letter dated March 10, 2009, the PCA informed the Parties that:

Mindful of the stringent time limitations established by Article 4.3 and Article 9.1 of the Arbitration Agreement, the Tribunal has requested, without prejudice of any kind, that the PCA make enquiries as to the availability of possible cartographers and geographers in the event that their assistance might be required for preparation of the Award. Arranging beforehand for the possibility of such assistance (which is envisaged under Article 27 of the PCA Rules) would enable the Tribunal to operate within the prescribed time limits, were it to make a determination under Article 2(c) of the Arbitration Agreement. Such an outcome can in no way be predicted at this stage of proceedings, but such enquiries are being made only out of prudent caution in light of the time restrictions imposed by the Parties’ Arbitration Agreement.

75. On April 2, 2009, the PCA sent the following communication to both Parties:

As indicated in […] the PCA’s letter dated March 10, 2009, the PCA has, at the Tribunal’s request, made enquiries as to the availability of experts in the event and to the extent that their assistance might be required for the preparation of the Award (which can in no way be predicted at this stage). Having reviewed a number of potential candidates, the Tribunal has decided to appoint Messrs Bill Robertson and Douglas Vincent Belgrave to serve as experts in this arbitration. The CVs of Messrs Belgrave and Robertson are attached for your information.

The experts were appointed at this stage in the proceedings to enable the Tribunal to operate within the time limits prescribed by the Parties’ Arbitration Agreement.

The Tribunal has instructed the PCA to circulate to the Parties the attached draft Terms of Reference, which articulates the role the Tribunal envisages for the experts within this Arbitration. The Tribunal invites the Parties to submit any comments they may have on the draft Terms of Reference no later than April 8, 2009.
76. After receiving responses from both Parties, on April 9, 2009, the PCA communicated to both Parties that it had received no comments on the draft terms of reference.

77. On April 16, 2009, the Tribunal issued Procedural Order No. 2, the operative part of which provides:

THE TRIBUNAL UNANIMOUSLY ORDERS:

That Messrs. Douglas Vincent Belgrave and Bill Robertson be appointed to serve as experts and provide assistance to the Arbitral Tribunal in this arbitration;

That the attached Terms of Reference for the experts be adopted.

EXPERTS’ TERMS OF REFERENCE

... 

THE EXPERTS

2.1 Messrs Bill Robertson and Douglas Vincent Belgrave (the “Experts”) shall serve as experts to assist the Tribunal in accordance with these Terms of Reference.

2.2 The Experts hereby declare that they will, as directed by the Tribunal, perform their duties honorably and faithfully, impartially and conscientiously, and will refrain from divulging or using, outside the context of the tasks to be performed by them in this arbitration, any confidential documents, files and information, including the deliberations of the Tribunal, which may come to their knowledge in the course of the performance of their task.

SCOPE

3.1. The Experts shall assist the Tribunal, should it determine that the ABC experts exceeded their mandate pursuant to Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement, in defining (i.e. delimiting) on a map the boundaries of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905, in accordance with Article 2(c) of the Arbitration Agreement.

3.2. The Experts will also make themselves available to assist the Tribunal as required by it in the preparation of the Award.

3.3 The Experts shall perform their duties according to best international practices in their fields of expertise.

...
K. ORAL PLEADINGS PHASE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

78. On April 7, 2009, the Tribunal issued Procedural Order No. 1, setting forth the time and place of oral pleadings, the procedure to be followed, the witnesses to be examined, and the daily agenda. The schedule allocated equal time as between the issues specified in Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement and allocated equal time as between the Parties.

79. On the matter of Arabic/English and Dinka/English translation, on April 8, 2009, the Tribunal issued the following communication following consultation with the Parties:

The Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) acknowledges electronic receipt of letters dated April 6 and April 7, 2009 from the Government of Sudan (“GoS”), and a letter dated April 7, 2009 from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (“SPLM/A”), all relating to the Parties’ commitment to determine the appointment of Dinka and Arabic interpreters for the oral pleadings.

On Arabic-English and English-Arabic interpretation, the PCA notes that the Parties have agreed to the appointment of Mr. Yahia Mo’lla Mofarih as interpreter. The PCA would appreciate being furnished with a copy of Mr. Mofarih’s CV and contact details.

On Dinka-English and English-Dinka interpretation, the PCA notes that the Parties have not agreed to any appointment. The GoS proposes Mr. Abingo Akok Kshwal, while the SPLM/A proposes Messrs. Charles Deng Majok and Kwaja Yai Kuol Arop.

After consultations with the Presiding Arbitrator, the PCA has determined that each Party may employ its own Dinka-English/English-Dinka interpreter(s) for the examination of its witnesses (for example, Dinka interpretation for each of the relevant GoS witnesses’ direct, cross, re-direct, and re-cross examinations shall be conducted by Mr. Abingo Akok Kshwal). Any corrections to the Court Reporter’s transcription arising from a perceived error in translation may be brought to the Tribunal’s attention no later than one week from the conclusion of the oral pleadings, i.e., April 30, 2009.

80. On April 16, 2009, the PCA issued the following press release concerning the availability of a live webcast of the oral pleadings for interested members of the public:

In the matter of an arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army on Delimiting Abyei Area, oral pleadings will be held at the Peace Palace in The Hague from April 18 to April 23, 2009. The oral pleadings will be open to the public and the media, and will be webstreamed live on the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) website beginning at 9:30 am (CET) on April 18, 2009 (http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?page_id=1306).

The PCA International Bureau is acting as Registry and providing administrative support to the Arbitral Tribunal, which is composed of the following members:
The Parties have agreed to make the pleadings, transcripts, decisions and certain other documents public. These are available at the PCA website.

The PCA was established by treaty in 1899 and is the oldest intergovernmental organization devoted to the peaceful resolution of disputes through arbitration in the world. Its seat is at the Peace Palace, The Hague, The Netherlands. Further information on the PCA is available at http://www.pca-cpa.org.

81. Pursuant to Article 8.4 of the Arbitration Agreement, public hearings were held from Saturday, April 18, 2009 until Thursday, April 23, 2009 at the Great Hall of Justice, the Peace Palace, The Hague. The attendees were:

**The Tribunal:**
1. Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy
2. Judge Awn Al-Khasawneh
3. Professor Dr. Gerhard Hafner
4. Judge Stephen M. Schwebel
5. Professor W. Michael Reisman

**For the Registry:**
1. Mr. Aloysius Llamzon
2. Mr. Paul-Jean Le Cannu
3. Mr. Dirk Pulkowski
4. Ms. Catherine Quinn
5. Ms. Genevieve Reyes
6. Ms. Evelien Pasman
7. Ms. Gaëlle Chevalier
8. Ms. Willemijn van Banning
9. Mr. Paulo Perassi
10. Mr. Thomas Levi

**For the GoS:**

**Agent:**
1. Ambassador Dirdeiry Mohamed Ahmed

**Co-Agents:**
2. Dr. Faisal Abdel Rahamn Ali Taha
3. Dr. Abdelrahman Ibrahim Elkhalifa

**Counsel and Advocates:**
4. Professor James Crawford SC
5. Professor Alain Pellet
6. Mr. Rodman R. Bundy
7. Ms. Loretta Malintoppi
8. Prof. Nabil Elaraby

Legal Advisors:
9. Ms. Angelynn Meya
10. Mr. Jacques Hartmann
11. Ms. Céline Folsché
12. Mr. Paul Baker
13. Mr. Charles Alexander

Witnesses & Expert:
14. Ayom Matet Ayom
15. Zakaria Atem Diyiin Thibek Deng Klir
16. Mukhtar Babu Nimir
17. Majak Matit Ayom
18. Majid Yak Kur
19. Mr. Alastair MacDonald

Technical Advisors:
20. Mr. Martin Pratt
21. Ms. Eleanor Scudder

Other:
Representatives of the Government of Sudan
22. General [Rtd] Mahdi Babo Nimir Ali, Former Chief of Staff
23. Fathi Khalil Mohamed, Chairman Sudan Bar Association
24. Abd Elgadir Monim Mansour Mohamed, MP, Hamar Paramount Chief
25. Mohamed Aldoreek Bakht, Commissioner
26. Fadalla Burma Nasir, Deputy Chairman, Umma Party
27. Elkehir Elfahim Elmaki Hamid, Chairman, Kordofan Reconciliation Committee
28. Mariam Elsadig Elsiddig Almahdi, Political Secretary, Umma Party
29. Safiedlin Galaleldin Gibreil Omer, Member, CPA Evaluation Commission
30. Siddig El Hindi, Secretary General UDP
31. Hasan Kantabai, Political Bureau, East Sudan Front
32. El Bagir Ahmed Abdalla, Political Bureau, UDP
33. Dr. El Tayeb Haj Atia, All Sudan Initiative
34. Hussein Braima Elnour Aigozuli
35. Azhari Mohamed Summo Shaaeldin
36. Sami Eldai Bushara Goda

Interested Persons And Non-Testifying Witnesses
37. Herika Iz-Aldin Humeda Khamis, Former Governor
38. Ahmed Assalih Sallouha, Former Governor
39. Rahma Abdel Rahman El-Nour, Abyei D/Chief Administrator
40. Yahia Hussain Babiker, Director, Unity Fund
41. Salman Suliman El-Safi, State Minister
42. Prof Abdalla El Sadig, Director Survey
43. Kabbashi Eltom Kabbashi
44. Ashahab Elsadig Daif Allah
45. Mohammed Mahmoud Rajab Elradi
46. Deng Balaieel Bahar Hamadedan
47. Mohamed Basheir Adam Elmoalim
48. Saeed Mohammed Bakkar Degais
49. Khalid Ibrahim Ali Ibrahim
50. Maria Mayut Ayoak Gweing
51. Ahmed Abdalla Adam
52. Abdelrahman Mukhtar Hassab Alla
53. Hamadi Ad’dood Ismael Hammad
54. Abd Elgaleel Bakkar Ismail Elsakin
55. Shummo Hurgas Marida
56. Ali Hmdan Kir
57. Alsadig Ibrahim Ahmed Ibrahim
58. Hamid Bushra Godat Mohamed
59. Mohamed Elnil Mohamed
60. Hassan Mohamed Ibrahim
61. Daoud Mohamed Abdalla
62. Bashahtana Mohammed Salem Suliman
63. Yagoub Abuelgasim Touri Yagoub
64. Adil Hassan Abdelrahman Mohamed
65. Abdelmonom Musa Elshiiwen Aldaif
66. Ismail Hamdean Humaidan
67. Elnazir Gebreil Elgouni Abdelaziz
68. Ogeil Godtalla Abdelhamid Khamis
69. Gadim Mohamed Azaz Gamaella
70. Abdelrahman Hasen Omer
71. Abdulrahman Salih El Tahir
72. Dr. Hassan Abdin
73. Prof. Yousuf Fadl
74. Mr. Abdel Rasoul Elnour
75. Mr. Mahdi Babo Nimir
76. Dr. Sulumin Eldabalo

Members of the Media
77. Hassan Makki Mohamed Ahmed, Political Analyst
78. Elhindi Omer, Columnist
79. Ishag Ahmed Fadl Allah Elfahal, Columnist
80. Sarra Taha Mohi Aldin Mohamed, TV Crew
81. Mahgoub Mohamed Salah, Editor in Chief
82. Awad Elkarim Ahmed Mustafa, TV Crew
83. Tarig Eltegany Ballal, Journalist
84. Asma El-Suhaili, Political Analyst
85. El Tayeb Zainalabdin, Editor-in-Chief
86. Khalid El Tigani, Editor-in-Chief
87. Adil El Baz, Journalist
88. El Sir Sidahmed, Journalist
89. Adil El Biali, Journalist
90. El Sadig El Rizaigi, Journalist
91. Khalid El Mubarak, Journalist

Staff from the Embassy of the Sudan
92. H.E. Ambassador A. A. Shikh Idris
93. Minister plenipotentiary Sayed. A. Ahmed
94. Mr Chol Ajongo, Counselor
95. Mr Baha Aldien Mohamed Khamis, Agricultural Counselor
96. Mr. Abbas Mohamed Alhaj, Counselor
97. Mr Abd Alrahman Abdalla Abd Alrahman, Second Secretary
98. Miss Nada Awad Omer, Administrative Attaché
99. Mrs Awatif Osman, Financial Attaché

For the SPLM/A:
Agents
1. Dr. Riek Machar Teny
2. Dr. Luka Biong Deng

Counsel and Advocates

3. Mr. Gary Born
4. Ms. Wendy Miles
5. Dr. Paul Williams
6. Ms. Vanessa Jiménez

Legal Advisers

7. Hon. Deng Arop Kuol
9. Hon. Arop Madut Arop
10. Ms. Bridget Rutherford
11. Mr. Anand Shah
12. Ms. Courtney Nicolaisen
13. Mr. Charlie Caher
14. Ms. Kate Davies
15. Ms. Anna Holloway
16. Ms. Daisy Joye
17. Ms. Inken Knief
18. Mr. Timothy Lindsay
19. Mr. Oliver Spackman
20. Ms. Anna-Maria Tamminen
21. Ms. Lisa Tomas
22. Mr. Kevin Motttram
23. Mr. Daniel Harris

Technical Advisors and Assistants

24. Mr. Alex Tait
25. Mr. Scott Edmonds
26. Ms. Joanne Gilpin
27. Ms. Kathleen Kundt
28. Mr. Shakeel Sameja

Witnesses & Experts:

29. Mr. Deng Chier Agoth
30. Mr. Ring Makuac Dhel Yak
31. Professor J. A. Allan
32. Dr. Peter Poole
33. Professor Martin Daly
34. Mr. Richard Schofield

Observers

35. Mr. Paul Mayom Akec, Observer
36. Mr. Deng Alor Kuol
37. Mr. Michael Makuei Lueth
38. Mr. Ambrose Riny Thiik
39. Mr. Kuol Deng Mijok Kuol
40. Mr. Nyol Pagout Deng
41. Mr. Kuol Alor Makuac
42. Mr. Ajak Malual Beliu
43. Mr. Akonon Ajuong Deng
44. Mr. Arop Kuol Kon
45. Mr. Bagat Makuac Abiem
46. Mr. Mijok Kuol Lual
47. Mr. Belbel Chol Akuei
48. Mr. Chol Por Chol  
49. Mr. Jacob Madhol Lang  
50. Hon. Benjamin Majak Dau  
51. Hon. Peter Beshir Obandi  
52. Hon. James Luol Deng Kuel  
53. Hon. Zakaria Bol Deng  
54. Hon. Mary Nyaulang  
55. Hon. Kom Kom  
56. Mr. Victor Akok Anei Magar  
57. Mr. Juac Agok Anyaar  
58. Mr. Edward Abyei Lino  
59. Mr. Chol Changath Chol  
60. Hon. Charles Abyei Jok  
61. Hon. Nyankuac Ngor  
62. Hon. Nyianawut Miyan  
63. Ms. Asha Abbas Akwai  
64. Dr. Zakaria Bol Deng  
65. Hon. Bol Gatkuoth  
66. Hon. Charles Abyei Kon  
67. Mr. Michael Majak Abiem  
68. Mr. Mathew Oturomoi Martinson  
69. Mr. Biong Deng Kuol  
70. Mr. Mangok Atem Piyin  
71. Mr. Luka Chen Chen Atem  
72. Mr. Ezekiel Lol  
73. Ms. Apuk Ayuel  
74. Mr. Daniel Jok  
75. Mr. Victor Bullen Baba  
76. Mr. Gordon Morris  
77. Mr. Alfred Taban  
78. Dr. Francis G. Nazario  
79. Mr. Wilson Deng Peter  
80. Mr. Akoc Wol Akoc  
81. Mrs. Florence A. Andrew  
82. Mr. Arkanjelo Ngoth  
83. Mr. William Vito Akwar  
84. Mr. Thomas Wako  
85. Mr. Christopher Brale  
86. Mr. Salvatore Ali  
87. Mr. Majok Mading  
88. Mr. Deng Biong Mijak  
89. Mr. Stephen Kang Elario  
90. Mr. Jeremiah Swaka Moses  
91. Mr. Bella Kodi  
92. Mr. Peter Makoi  
93. Mr. Ali Alfred  
94. Mr. Ater Andrew  
95. Mr. Robert Lenny  
96. Ms. Pani Lado  
97. Mr. Nicknora Gongich  
98. Nyanyol Mathiang  
99. Mr. Miyong G. Kuon  
100. Ms. Elizabeth Carlo
82. As notified by the PCA on March 20, 2009 and March 30, 2009, and as revised in accordance with the Tribunal’s instructions that “[…] all the witnesses of the GoS that have not been identified for cross-examination by the SPLM/A or inquiry by the Tribunal […] may be excused,” the GoS presented the following expert and witnesses for cross-examination by the SPLM/A:

Mr. Alastair MacDonald
Mr. Zakaria Atem Diyin Thibek Deng Klir
Mr. Mukhtar Babu Nimir

83. Pursuant to Procedural Order No. 1, the GoS presented the following witnesses to answer questions propounded by the Tribunal:

Mr. Ayom Matet Ayom
Mr. Majak Matit Ayom
Mr. Majid Yak Kur

84. As notified on March 20, 2009 and March 30, 2009, the SPLM/A presented the following experts and witnesses for direct examination and for cross-examination by the GoS:

Mr. Deng Chier Agoth
Professor J. A. Allan
Dr. Peter Poole
Professor Martin Daly
Mr. Richard Schofield

85. In addition to the Parties’ representatives, members of the public, diplomatic corps and media were in attendance at the hearings in accordance with Article 8.6 of the Arbitration Agreement. A live webcast of the oral pleadings was made available at the PCA website. Along with the webcast of the oral pleadings, transcripts of the hearing were made publicly available on the PCA’s website immediately after each day of the hearing.

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9 Procedural Order No. 1, para. 3.8
10 Procedural Order No. 1, para. 3.7 stated:

The GoS intends to cross-examine each of the six witnesses and experts to be presented by the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A intends to cross-examine Zakaria Atem Diyin Thibek Deng Kiir, Mukhtar Babu Nimir, and Alastair MacDonald. In addition, the Tribunal wishes to propound questions to Ayom Matet Ayom, Majak Matit Ayom, and Majid Yak Kur.

11 In its March 20 and March 30, 2009 communications, the SPLM/A notified the Tribunal that Mr. Ring Makuac Dhel Yak would be presented as a witness at the hearings. However, Mr. Ring was not called upon to testify at the hearings.

12 The webcasts and pleadings continue to be available at http://www.pca-cpa.org.
86. At the conclusion of the oral pleadings on April 23, 2009, the Tribunal declared closure of submissions in accordance with Article 8.9 of the Arbitration Agreement.

L. RENDERING OF THE FINAL AWARD

87. Under Article 9(1) of the Arbitration Agreement, the Tribunal is required to render its final award “within ninety days from the closure of submissions,” i.e., on July 22, 2009. The Tribunal is also required, under Article 9(3) of the Arbitration Agreement, to “communicate the final award to the [agents] of the Parties on the day of its rendering,” and to “make public the award as of the same day.”

88. By a letter dated June 30, 2009 addressed to the PCA, the SPLM/A requested that “the [T]ribunal consider providing the [P]arties with at least one week notice of the date that the [T]ribunal intends to communicate the Award to the [P]arties” in order to allow the Parties “to put in place arrangements for communication of the Award in Abyei and wider Sudan,” to “immediately implement the award,” and to “educate the people of the Abyei area prior to the award, facilitate dissemination of the award, and take steps to prevent violence, enhance security, and consolidate peace in and around Abyei area at the time the award is communicated.”

89. On July 1, 2009, the Tribunal requested that the GoS provide any comments it may have on the SPLM/A’s letter. The GoS, by letter dated July 7, 2009 addressed to the PCA, was “of the view that, as is normal practice, the Tribunal or the PCA [should] provide appropriate notification of the rendering of the award to the Agents of the Parties so as to enable the actual communication of the award to be made to the [Parties] in The Hague on the day of its rendering.” The GoS also stated that it does not subscribe to the views expressed in the SPLM/A’s letter, as the “implementation of the award is not contingent on the Parties receiving advance notice of its rendering,” and that neither Party is authorized to take unilateral steps in connection with the security situation in the Abyei area. It noted that one of the points of agreement between the Parties at their recent talks in Washington, D.C. was that “the Parties agree[d] to develop a plan with assistance from [the United States of America] to facilitate dissemination of the arbitration decision at the local level in anticipation of the decision,” and it was of the opinion that “it would be appropriate for such a plan to be developed and agreed, and for the agreed substantiation of [the United Nations Mission in Sudan] to be effected, with the view [of paving] the way for rendering the award in these proceedings in a conducive atmosphere.”
90. On July 9, 2009, the SPLM/A, by letter addressed to the PCA, stated that “[i]n the present context the SPLM/A does not consider it appropriate to respond to the majority of the matters raised by the [GoS] in its letter,” as the purpose of its letter was “merely to propose that advance notification of the award would be helpful to the [P]arties.” It explained that “the SPLM/A would be agreeable to the Tribunal convening a small meeting in the Hague at which the Award would be communicated to the [Parties] if such a meeting [would not] delay the communication of the Award.”

91. On July 10, 2009, the Presiding Arbitrator, through the PCA, issued the following communication to the Parties:

Having considered the SPLM/A’s letter of June 30, 2009, the Government of Sudan’s (“GoS”) comments of July 7, 2009, and the SPLM/A’s reply of July 9, 2009, the Presiding Arbitrator has instructed the PCA to inform the Parties of the following:

• Pursuant to Article 9(1) of the Arbitration Agreement, the final award “shall be rendered within a maximum of ninety days from the closure of submissions,” i.e., no later than July 22, 2009. While Article 8(7) of the Arbitration Agreement empowers the Tribunal to extend this period for good cause, the Tribunal has not done so at present.

• The Arbitration Agreement does not explicitly provide for any ceremony or meeting at the rendering of the final award. Nevertheless, after receiving comments from the Agents of both Parties, the Tribunal finds it appropriate to conduct a formal event at the Peace Palace in The Hague on the day the award is rendered.

• Consistent with Paragraph 10.3 of the Terms of Appointment, the Tribunal invites the Parties to confer and jointly propose a date for the ceremony, together with any other particulars they may deem appropriate. The Parties are requested to report to the Tribunal on the outcome of their discussions no later than 8:00 PM (CET) on Monday, July 13, 2009. In the absence of an agreement, the Tribunal will decide the matter in due course.

92. On July 13, 2009, both Parties informed the Tribunal that they were unable to reach agreement on this matter. The GoS, by letter dated July 13, 2009 addressed to the PCA, proposed that “the award rendering ceremony be held on [August 21,] 2009, after a reconciliation ceremony that the Government of Sudan has asked the Government of the Netherlands to organize in conjunction with the reading of the award on [August 19-20, 2009].” It explained that it is essential that the chiefs of both the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities be invited and be given an opportunity “to listen to the award in person,” and that logistical constraints would render it impracticable to have an award ceremony before
August 10, 2009. The SPLM/A, on the other hand, by letter dated July 13, 2009 addressed to the PCA, stated that “it does not wish for the communication of the Award to be delayed in any way,” and that “if any delay was to result from convening a meeting in the Hague then the SPLM/A would strongly prefer that the Award simply be communicated to the Agents and their legal counsel by email.”

93. On July 14, 2009, the following communication from the Tribunal was sent by the PCA to the Parties:

Having considered the Parties’ positions, the Presiding Arbitrator has instructed the PCA to inform the Parties of the following on behalf of the Tribunal:

- Due to the inability of the Parties to agree on a new date for the rendering of the award, the Tribunal considers that it must adhere to the 90-day period provided under Article 9(1) of the Arbitration Agreement. The Tribunal will therefore render its Award in a short ceremony on July 22, 2009, 10:00a.m., at the Great Hall of Justice, The Peace Palace, The Hague. The Tribunal has instructed the PCA to issue a press release today to inform members of the public accordingly.

- Consistent with Article 9(3) of the Arbitration Agreement, the Tribunal invites the Agents and counsel of the Parties to be present at the award-rendering ceremony, along with any number of party representatives they deem appropriate. While the Parties are free to compose their respective delegations as they see fit, the Tribunal extends a particular invitation to the chiefs of the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities to be present at the ceremony. The Parties are requested to inform the PCA of the composition of their respective delegations no later than 1:00PM (CET), Monday, July 20, 2009.

- Consistent with Article 9(4) of the Arbitration Agreement, the Tribunal has also instructed the PCA to invite representatives of the States and other entities who witnessed the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and a representative of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, to attend the ceremony.

- Consistent with Article 8(6) of the Arbitration Agreement and the practice followed in these proceedings, the award-rendering ceremony will be made open to the public and will be webstreamed live at the PCA website. The Tribunal authorizes the Parties to invite members of the Sudanese and international media to be present at the ceremony. The Tribunal has also instructed the PCA to prepare a press release, in both English and Arabic, designed to provide a short summary of the most critical aspects of the Tribunal’s award. The Press Release will be issued immediately after the ceremony.

- The Tribunal will be represented at the ceremony by the Presiding Arbitrator, who will give a brief statement summarizing the Award.
94. On July 14, 2009, the PCA issued a press release concerning the rendering of the final award, which provides in part:

In the matter of an arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement Between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army on Delimiting the Abyei Area, the arbitral Tribunal will render its final award (“Award”) on July 22, 2009, 10:00a.m. (CET; GMT +2), at the Peace Palace, The Hague.

During this ceremony, the Presiding Arbitrator will personally deliver the Award to representatives from both Parties and deliver a brief statement summarizing the Award. The ceremony will be webstreamed live on the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) website beginning at approximately 10:00 am (CET; GMT +2) on July 22, 2009 (http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1306). Representatives of the States and other entities who witnessed the signing of the Parties’ Comprehensive Peace Agreement have been invited to attend the ceremony. Members of the Sudanese and international media are also invited to be present.

Immediately after the ceremony, the Award will be made public through the PCA website. The PCA will also issue a press release (in both English and Arabic), which will provide a short summary of the most critical aspects of the Award.

The PCA emphasizes that until the Award is rendered at the ceremony on July 22, 2009, its contents will continue to be absolutely confidential. No person or entity has or will be given advanced notice of the Tribunal’s decision.

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CHAPTER II – INTRODUCTION

95. The GoS and the SPLM/A agreed in 2004 to define the “Abyei Area” in the following terms: “The territory [of the Abyei Area] is defined as the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905.” (In appropriate instances, this phrase is also referred to in this Award as the “Formula”). However, the Parties do not agree on the boundaries of the Abyei Area that the application of that Formula should produce. It is this disagreement that constitutes the essence of the dispute submitted for arbitration to the Tribunal.

A. GEOGRAPHY

1. The Republic of Sudan

96. The Republic of Sudan (“Sudan”) is located in north-east Africa, situated between latitudes 3°53′N and 21°55′N and longitudes 21°54′ E and 37°30E. It borders Egypt to the north, Chad, Libya and the Central African Republic to the west, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Kenya to the south, and Ethiopia and Eritrea to the east. The largest country in Africa, it comprises 2,376,000 square kilometers of land and 129,810 square kilometers of water. Below is a map of Sudan and its international boundaries:

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13 Abyei Protocol, section 1.1.2
14 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 69.
15 Id.
16 Source: United Nations Cartographic Section.
Sudan is divided into twenty-five states, of which fifteen are located in northern Sudan ("Northern Sudan") and ten in southern Sudan ("Southern Sudan"). Northern Sudan comprises the states of Blue Nile, Gezira, Gadarif, Kassala, Khartoum, Northern, North Darfur, North Kordofan, Red Sea, Nile, Sinnar, South Darfur, South Kordofan, West Darfur
Southern Sudan comprises Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Unity, Upper Nile, Warab, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Western Equatoria.  

98. Sudan has some 40 million inhabitants with an average population density of approximately 14 persons per square kilometer. There are 19 major ethnic groups and almost 600 subgroups, amounting to more than 100 languages and dialects spoken. In a census on ethnicity in 1956, it was reported that Arabs constituted 39 percent and Africans 61 percent of the population. Generally, the Arabs are located in Northern Sudan while the Africans are located in the South. At 12 percent of the national population, the Dinka was at that time the largest single group from Southern Sudan. 70 percent of the population reportedly follow Islam while the remainder, predominantly in Southern Sudan, follow local faiths (25 percent) or Christianity (5 percent).  

99. The climate is arid in the north, whereas the south-west is characterized by tropical wet and dry seasons. Temperatures do not vary greatly throughout the year. However, the length of the dry season differs in various regions, dependent upon the flows of the dry, north-easterly winds from the Arabian Peninsula and moist south-westerly winds from the Congo River basin.  

2. Northern Sudan  

100. North Sudan constitutes three-quarters of the surface area of Sudan and is inhabited by the same proportion of its population, approximately 31 million people. The majority are Muslim, and Arabic is the dominant language. As much of North Sudan is desert, the majority of its population lives in just over 15 percent of the land. Some Arab tribes such

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18 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 77.  
19 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 70.  
20 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 72.  
21 Id.  
22 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 71.  
23 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 83.  
24 SPLM/A Memorial, paras. 81-82.
as the Baggara are nomadic while others, including Ja’aliyyin and Danagla, farm along the Nile and further south.\textsuperscript{25}

3. Southern Sudan

101. Southern Sudan has an estimated population of 8.99 million and a surface area of 640,000 square kilometers.\textsuperscript{26} It is a predominantly rural, subsistence economy and is fertile throughout the year. It is served by a number of major river systems and dense tropical evergreen forests, which sustain a wide range of cereals, vegetables and tree crops.\textsuperscript{27} The largest group in South Sudan is the Dinka, comprising 12 percent of the national population, followed by the Azande and Nuer.\textsuperscript{28} The most widely-spoken languages are Dinka, Juba Arabic, Nuer and English. The SPLM/A political party holds a distinct majority in the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly.

4. The Abyei Location, the Ngok Dinka, and the Misseriya

102. The Abyei location is located between the north and the south of Sudan. It has been referred to by the Parties as “a bridge between the north and the south, linking the people of Sudan.”\textsuperscript{29}

103. The township of Abyei (“Abyei Town”) is located north of the river Bahr el Arab/Kir.\textsuperscript{30} This river runs through the adjoining provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Darfur and Kordofan.\textsuperscript{31} The Bahr el Arab is known by other names, attributable to the different tribes living along its course.\textsuperscript{32} Thus, the Ngok Dinka refer to the Bahr el Arab as the Kir\textsuperscript{33} or the Gurf.\textsuperscript{34}
while other references (including by Arabic speakers) identified the same river as “the Bar el Jange” or the “Bahr ed Deynka.”

104. The Bahr river basin contains the Bahr el Arab/Kir, the Ngol/Ragaba ez Zarga, the Nyamora/Umm Rebeiro, and the Nam/Bahr el Gazal. To the south of this is the Sudd, one of the world’s largest swamps. The clay plains of the Abyei region are characterized by thick forest, bushes, and vegetation, which combined with the extreme wet and dry seasons support the many fruits and plants which can be found there. There are three major oilfields in the area, whose 2005 to 2007 revenues were estimated in the region of US$1.8 billion.

105. As described by the SPLM/A, Abyei Town is the ancestral homeland of the Ngok Dinka. However, the GoS alleges that there is no documentary evidence that Abyei existed as a settlement in 1905, and claims that the earliest map that shows Abyei in its present location dates from 1916.

106. The Ngok Dinka, one of the 25 tribes which comprise the Dinka people, are reportedly a highly cohesive tribal unit of an estimated 300,000 people, with a well-defined, centralized political structure. They are divided into nine Chiefdoms, under a single “Paramount Chief”: Abyior, Achaak, Achueng, Alei, Anyiel, Bongo, Diil, Mareng and Manyuar. Each Chiefdom has an area of permanent habitation and seasonal grazing areas. They cultivate the land and, through tribal law and custom, grant individuals and families exclusive right to use certain lands. The Ngok are said to have a spiritual connection with

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35 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 91.
36 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 89.
37 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 96.
38 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 98.
39 SPLM/A Memorial, paras. 109-110.
40 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 85.
42 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 115.
43 SPLM/A Memorial, paras. 111-112.
44 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 150.
45 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 152.
46 SPLM/A Memorial, paras. 176.
47 SPLM/A Memorial, paras. 171-172.
the land through their tribes’ ancestors. The present-day Abyei Town is the centre of their political and commercial affairs.

107. Living to the north of the Ngok Dinka are the Misseriya, Arab nomads who have their base in the region of Muglad. The Misseriya are said to be cattle-herders whose nomadic existence takes them across a wide territory, ranging from the area around Muglad in the north, where they spend much of each year, to the Bahr river system of the Abyei region during parts of the dry season.

B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

1. First and Second Civil Wars

108. Sudan obtained independence on January 1, 1956. Soon thereafter civil war erupted between Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan. By 1965, the Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka were said to be participating in the civil war, with the former allied with Northern Sudan and the latter with Southern Sudan. In 1972, the civil war was ended by the Addis Ababa Agreement, which provided for a referendum to allow “any other areas that were culturally and geographically a part of the Southern Complex” to choose to remain in Northern Sudan or to join a new autonomous Southern Sudan.

109. However, subsequent disputes over power, resources, religion, and self-determination led in 1983 to a second civil war. The Abyei Area is said to be at the geographical center of this civil war, which is the longest running conflict in Africa and has caused some two million deaths, significant economic destruction and untold suffering, particularly for the people of Southern Sudan.

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48 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 168.
49 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 217.
50 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 218.
51 SPLM/A Memorial, paras. 381-405.
52 SPLM/A Memorial, paras. 424.
53 CPA, Preamble, p. xi, para. 2.
2. Negotiations for Peace

(a) Machakos Protocol 2002

110. On July 20, 2002 the Parties signed the Machakos Protocol (“Machakos Protocol”). The Machakos Protocol provided that a peace agreement was to be implemented in accordance with the sequence, time periods, and processes set out therein. It also provided for an internationally monitored referendum, organized jointly by the GoS and the SPLM/A, entitling the people of Southern Sudan to vote on whether to secede from Sudan.

111. The referendum was to be preceded by two transition phases. The first phase, the “Pre-Interim Period”, would last for six months and would establish, among others: (i) a constitutional framework for the peace agreement; (ii) mechanisms to implement and monitor the Peace Agreement; (iii) if not already in force, a cessation of hostilities with appropriate monitoring mechanisms; and (iv) preparations for the implementation of a comprehensive ceasefire.

112. The next phase, the “Interim Period,” would commence at the end of the Pre-Interim Period and last for six years. During this time, the institutions and mechanisms established during the Pre-Interim Period were to operate in accordance with the arrangements and principles set out in the peace agreement, and if not already accomplished, the negotiated ceasefire was to be fully implemented and put into operation.

(b) The Abyei Protocol

113. The Abyei Protocol (“Abyei Protocol”) was signed on May 26, 2004 and provided for agreed principles in administering the Abyei Area upon signing of the peace agreement. Notably, Section 1.1.2 of the Abyei Protocol defined the territory as “the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905.” The Abyei Area was to be accorded special administrative status and was to be administered by a local executive

54 Machakos Protocol, Part B.
55 Machakos Protocol, Article 2.5.
56 The Pre-Interim Period commenced on January 9, 2005, the day the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed.
57 Machakos Protocol, Article 2.1.
58 Machakos Protocol, Article 2.2.
59 Machakos Protocol, Article 2.3.
council elected by the residents of the Abyei Area. These residents were to be dual citizens of Western Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal, with representation in the two legislatures. Residents were defined as members of the Ngok Dinka community and other Sudanese residing in the Abyei Area.

114. The Abyei Protocol also provided for the establishment of the ABC, which was given the task of “defin[ing] and demarcat[ing]” the Abyei Area.

(c) The Abyei Appendix

115. On December 17, 2004, the Parties signed an “Understanding on Abyei Boundaries Commission” (“Abyei Appendix”), which determined the composition of the ABC as follows:

(a) one representative from each of the GoS and the SPLM/A;
(b) “five impartial experts knowledgeable in history, geography and any other relevant expertise” nominated by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (“IGAD”);
(c) two nominees of the GoS and two nominees of the SPLM/A “from the present two administrations of the Abyei Area;”
(d) two nominees of the GoS from the Messiriya; and
(e) two nominees of the SPLM/A from the “neighboring Dinka tribes to the South of the Abyei Area.”

116. In determining the Abyei Area, the ABC was required “to listen to representatives of the people of Abyei Area and their neighbours, [as well as to] listen to presentations of the two Parties” and to “consult the British Archives and other relevant sources on Sudan wherever they may be available, with a view to arriving at a decision that shall be based on scientific analysis and research.” The ABC Experts were also required to determine the rules of procedure of the ABC.

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60 Abyei Protocol, sections 2.1-2.2.
61 Abyei Protocol, section 1.2.1.
63 Abyei Protocol, section 5.1.
64 See Abyei Appendix, section 2.
65 Abyei Appendix, section 3.
66 Abyei Appendix, section 4.
67 Id.
117. The Abyei Appendix further prescribed that the ABC should present its report to the Presidency before the end of the Pre-Interim Period, and that the “report of the [ABC Experts], arrived at as prescribed in the ABC rules of procedure” would be “final and binding on the Parties.”

(d) Comprehensive Peace Agreement

118. On January 9, 2005, the Parties signed the Peace Agreement (the “Comprehensive Peace Agreement” or “CPA”) that initiated the Pre-Interim Period. They reconfirmed their commitment to the following instruments previously agreed upon, which were integrated into the CPA: the Machakos Protocol, the Protocol on Security Arrangements of September 25, 2003, the Protocol on Wealth-Sharing of September 25, 2003, the Protocol on Power-Sharing of May 26, 2004, the Protocol on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile States of May 26, 2004 and the Abyei Protocol (with its annex, the Abyei Appendix).

(e) Interim National Constitution

119. Subsequently, on July 6, 2005, the Sudanese National Assembly adopted the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan (“Interim National Constitution”). This Constitution recognized the commitment of Sudan to comply with the CPA and to give constitutional support to the Abyei Protocol.

3. ABC Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure

120. The Parties met in Nairobi between March 10-12, 2005 to draw up the Terms of Reference, which documented a “joint understanding [of] all the issues” by the Parties. The Terms of Reference contain the Parties understanding of the “Mandate,” the “Structure” of the ABC, the “Functioning of the ABC,” the “Program of work” and “Funding.”

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68 Abyei Appendix, section 5.
69 CPA, Chapeau, p. xii., para. 1.
70 CPA, Preamble, p. xi., para. 6.
71 See Interim National Constitution, Preamble.
72 Article 183(1) of the Interim National Constitution provides:
   Without prejudice to any of the provisions of this Constitution and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area shall apply with respect to Abyei Area.
73 See Terms of Reference, Preamble.
121. The Rules of Procedure were drawn up by the ABC Experts\textsuperscript{74} and approved by the Parties on April 11, 2005. The Rules of Procedure set forth, among other matters, the schedule to be followed by the ABC Experts and the method to be followed for public meetings and field visits. The Rules of Procedure also provided that the ABC Experts would “examine and evaluate all the material they have gathered and will prepare the final report.”\textsuperscript{75} They also state that “[the] Commission will endeavour to reach a decision by consensus,” but if “an agreed position by the two sides is not achieved, the [ABC Experts] will have the final say.”\textsuperscript{76}

4. ABC Experts’ Report

122. The ABC Experts officially presented their report (“ABC Experts’ Report” or “Report”) to the Sudanese Presidency on July 14, 2005. The ABC Experts’ Report was signed by the ABC Experts, namely, Ambassador Donald Petterson (as Chair), Professor Kassahun Berhanu, Professor Shadrack B. O. Gutto, Dr. Douglas H. Johnson and Professor Godfrey Muriuki.

123. The ABC Experts’ Report notes that the ABC Experts listened to presentations from the GoS and the SPLM/A and heard testimony from “Sudanese in Abyei Town, areas to the northeast and northwest of there, Agok and Muglad” as well as to “a group of Ngok Dinka living in Khartoum and a group of Twich Dinka residing there.”\textsuperscript{77} The formal testimonies of 104 persons (47 Dinka and 57 Misseriya) were given under oath in public meetings. Witnesses and a large non-witness audience were reportedly able to listen to the testimony as they were being given.\textsuperscript{78}

124. In the Preface to the ABC Experts’ Report, the ABC Experts explained their process of research:

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No map exists showing the area inhabited by the Ngok Dinka in 1905. Nor is there sufficient documentation produced in that year by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium government authorities that adequately spell out the administrative situation that existed in that area at that time. Therefore, it was necessary for the [ABC Experts] to
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{74} See Abyei Appendix, para. 4.
\textsuperscript{75} Rules of Procedure, para. 13.
\textsuperscript{76} Rules of Procedure, para. 14.
\textsuperscript{77} ABC Experts’ Report, Part 1, pp. 3-4.
\textsuperscript{78} ABC Experts’ Report, Part 1, p. 9.
avail themselves of relevant historical material produced both before and after 1905, as well as during that year, to determine as accurately as possible the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms as it was in 1905.\(^79\)

125. Further noting that the GoS and SPLM/A presentations and oral testimony “largely contradicted each other and did not conclusively prove either side’s position,” the ABC Experts sought to obtain as much evidence as they could from archives and sources in Sudan, the United Kingdom, South Africa and Ethiopia, concentrating on records contemporaneous with or referring to the period of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (\(i.e.\) 1899-1956).\(^80\) Thus, the ABC Experts reviewed historic documents at the Sudan National Records Office, maps at the Sudan National Service Authority, and additional documents at the University of Khartoum library.\(^81\) Three of the ABC Experts traveled to England to examine additional maps and documents at the Rhodes House Library and the Bodleian Library at Oxford University, as well as at the Sudan Archive of the University of Durham. They also met former District Commissioner Michael Tibbs in Sussex and anthropologist Ian Cunnison in Hull.\(^82\) The two other ABC Experts undertook additional research in Addis Ababa and Pretoria.\(^83\)

126. The ABC Experts state that they analyzed the material applying “the generally accepted historical method of comparing oral with written material,” as well as “established legal principles in determining land rights in former British-administered African territories, including the Sudan.”\(^84\)

127. In conducting their research, the ABC Experts were mindful of what the official United States Government proponents of the Formula for the “Abyei Area” stated: “[I]t was clearly our view when we submitted our proposal that the area transferred in 1905 was roughly equivalent to the area of Abyei that was demarcated in later [years].”\(^85\) They maintain that

\(^79\) ABC Experts’ Report, Part 1, p. 4.  
\(^80\) ABC Experts’ Report, Part 1, p. 11.  
\(^81\) ABC Experts’ Report, Part 1, p. 4.  
\(^82\) Id.  
\(^83\) ABC Experts’ Report, Part 1, p. 5.  
\(^84\) ABC Experts’ Report, Part 1, p. 12; see also ABC Experts’ Report, Appendix 2.  
\(^85\) ABC Experts’ Report, Part 1, p. 4.
“[t]his position was, according to the American participants, conveyed to the two sides at the Naivasha talks.”

128. The GoS and the SPLM/A representatives made final presentations to the ABC on June 16-17, 2005. The ABC Experts’ Report states:

The Government of Sudan’s position is that the only area transferred from Bahr el-Ghazal to Kordofan in 1905 was a strip of land south of the Bahr el-Arab/Kir; that the Ngok Dinka lived south of the Bahr el-Arab/Kir prior to 1905, and migrated to the territory north of the river only after coming under the direct administration of Kordofan. Therefore the Abyei Area should be defined as lying south of the Bahr el-Arab/Kir, and excluding all territory to the north of the river, including Abyei Town itself. This is opposed by the SPLM/A position which is that the Ngok Dinka have established historical claims to an area extending from the existing Kordofan/Bahr el-Ghazal boundary to north of the Ragaba ez-Zarga/Ngol, and that the boundary should run in a straight line along latitude 10°35’N.

129. The ABC Experts completed their deliberations on June 20, 2005. The ABC Experts’ Report was presented to the Sudanese Presidency on July 14, 2005.

130. The ABC Experts made the following determinations in the “Conclusions” section of the ABC Experts’ Report:

- In 1905 there was no clearly demarcated boundary of the area transferred from Bahr el-Ghazal to Kordofan;
- The GoS belief that the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms placed under the authority of Kordofan in 1905 lay entirely south of the Bahr el-Arab is mistaken. It is based largely on a report by a British official who incorrectly concluded that he had reached the Bahr el-Arab when in fact he had only come to the Ragaba ez-Zarga/Ngol. For several years afterwards maps, some of which were cited by the GoS in its presentation to the ABC Experts, manifested this error;
- The Ngok claim that their boundary with the Misseriya should run from Lake Keilak to Muglad has no foundation;
- The historical record and environmental factors refute the Misseriya contention that their territory extended well to the south of the Bahr el-Arab, an area to which they never made a formal claim during the Condominium period;
- Although the Misseriya have clear “secondary” (seasonal) grazing rights to specific locations north and south of Abyei Town, their allegation that they have ‘dominant’ (permanent) rights to these places is not supported by documentary or material evidence;

86 Id.
87 ABC Experts’ Report, Part 1, p. 11.
88 ABC Experts’ Report, Part 1, p. 5.
There is compelling evidence to support the Ngok claims to having dominant rights to areas along the Bahr el-Arab and Ragaba ez-Zarga and that these are long-standing claims that predated 1905;

There is no substance to the Misseriya claim that because the Abyei Area was included in ‘Dar Messeria’ District, it belongs to the Misseriya people. The Ngok and the Humr were put under the authority of the same governor solely for reasons of administrative expediency in 1905. After that action, the Ngok retained their identity and control over their local affairs and maintained a separate court system and hierarchy of chiefs;

The administrative record of the Condominium period and testimony of persons familiar with the area attest to the continuity of Ngok Dinka settlements in, and use of, places north of the Bahr el-Arab between 1905 and 1965, as claimed by the Ngok and the SPLM/A;

The ABC Experts considered the presentation by the SPLM/A that their dominant claim lies at latitude 10°35’ N, but found the evidence in support of this to be inconclusive; and

The border zone between the Ngok and Misseriya falls in the middle of the Goz, roughly between latitudes 10°10’ N and 10°35’ N.89

131. The “Final and Binding Decision” of the ABC Experts’ Report is as follows:

1) The Ngok have a legitimate dominant claim to the territory from the Kordofan-Bahr el-Ghazal boundary north to latitude 10°10’ N, stretching from the boundary with Darfur to the boundary with Upper Nile, as they were in 1956;

2) North of latitude 10°10’ N, through the Goz up to and including Tebeldia (north of latitude 10°35’N) the Ngok and Misseriya share isolated occupation and use rights, dating from at least the Condominium period. This gave rise to the shared secondary rights for both the Ngok and Misseriya;

3) The two Parties lay equal claim to the shared area and accordingly it is reasonable and equitable to divide the Goz between them and locate the northern boundary in a straight line at approximately latitude 10°22’30” N. The western boundary shall be the Kordofan-Darfur boundary as it was defined on 1 January 1956. The southern boundary shall be the Kordofan-Bahr el-Ghazal-Upper Nile boundary as it was defined on 1 January 1956. The eastern boundary shall extend the line of the Kordofan-Upper Nile boundary at approximately longitude 29°32’15” E northwards until it meets latitude 10°22’30” N;

4) The northern and eastern boundaries will be identified and demarcated by a survey team comprising three professional surveyors: one nominated by the National Government of the Sudan, one nominated by the Government of the Southern Sudan, and one international surveyor nominated by IGAD. The survey team will be assisted by one representative each from the Ngok and Misseriya, and two representatives of the Presidency. The Presidency shall send the nominations for this team to IGAD for final approval by the international ABC Experts;

5) The Ngok and Misseriya shall retain their established secondary rights to the use of land north and south of this boundary.90

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132. A map of the Abyei Area, as delimited by the ABC Experts, is reprinted below:

5. Abyei Road Map and Arbitration Agreement

133. Upon the delivery of the ABC Experts’ Report, disagreements arose between the Parties as to whether the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate.

134. On June 8, 2008, the Parties signed “The Road Map for Return of IDPs and Implementation of Abyei Protocol” (the “Abyei Road Map”) in Khartoum. Through the Abyei Road Map, the Parties committed, among other matters, to refer this dispute to arbitration, and to “abide by and implement the award of the arbitration tribunal.” They also agreed, without

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91 ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, Map 1.
92 Abyei Road Map, Section 4.
prejudice the outcome of the arbitration, on interim boundaries for the Abyei Area for administrative purposes.\textsuperscript{93}

135. The Abyei Road Map’s agreement to arbitrate was implemented shortly thereafter through the Arbitration Agreement, which was signed on July 7, 2008.

\textsuperscript{93} See Abyei Road Map, Section 3 and SPLM/A Map Atlas vol. 1, Map 58 (Abyei Area: Area Calculations).
CHAPTER III – SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

136. Consistent with Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement and the Parties’ presentations at the oral pleadings, this chapter is organized into two sections: (1) the Parties’ arguments on whether the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate, and (2) the Parties’ arguments concerning the delimitation of the Abyei Area.

A. EXCESS OF MANDATE

137. This section summarizes the Parties’ arguments relating to whether the ABC Experts had “exceeded their mandate.” As the GoS claims such excess of mandate and the SPLM/A’s arguments on this matter are mostly cast in response to the GoS’s contentions, the summary will be primarily organized using the framework contained in the GoS Memorial.94

1. “Excess of Mandate” Conceptions

138. Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement provides that the Tribunal is to determine, at the outset:

[w]hether or not the ABC Experts had, on the basis of the agreement of the Parties as per the CPA, exceeded their mandate which is “to define (i.e. delimit) and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905” as stated in the Abyei Protocol, and reiterated in the Abyei Appendix and the ABC Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure. (emphasis added)

139. There is disagreement between the Parties on the content and meaning of “excess of mandate” within the context of these proceedings. The GoS contends that the phrase should be interpreted in its ordinary meaning, given that the Parties did not agree on any special meaning.95 The GoS would liken the phrase to the concepts of “excess of jurisdiction,” decisions taken ultra vires or decisions involving an excess of power (excès de pouvoir).96 The GoS maintains that excès de pouvoir has always been interpreted as including all...

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94 GoS Memorial, paras. 192-276. While this summary is arranged in accordance with arguments as presented in the GoS Memorial, the GoS later re-classified its arguments, and as per the Rejoinder, the headline arguments for Excess of Mandate were (a) Gross Breaches of Applicable Procedural Rules and (b) Misinterpretation and Misapplication of the Substantial Mandate. The GoS explains that it “deemed it clearer to group together [the] grounds in a more systematic way in [its] counter-memorial and in [its] rejoinder, if only not to have to repeat the same explanations when they apply to several grounds.” GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 70/16 - 71/02.

95 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 73/21-25.

96 GoS Memorial, para. 135.
serious misuses of jurisdiction as well as gross violations of procedural rules.\textsuperscript{97} The GoS thus asserts that “if the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate in any respect, this is sufficient to trigger Article 2(c) of the Arbitration Agreement.”\textsuperscript{98}

140. The SPLM/A, on the other hand, contends that an “excess of mandate” is a specific, identifiable type of defect,\textsuperscript{99} which is already particularly defined by Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement by reference to that category of disputes which the Parties submitted to the ABC ("their mandate WHICH IS…").\textsuperscript{100} Taking this definition into consideration, an “excess of mandate” would be narrower than the GoS’s conception (which includes an \textit{excès de pouvoir})\textsuperscript{101} and would be confined to a decision \textit{ultra petita}, i.e., a decision that went beyond the ambit of the issues argued by the parties. The SPLM/A also believes that this reading would be in line with the more contemporary understanding of “excess of mandate.”\textsuperscript{103}

2. **Procedural Excess of Mandate Arguments**

(a) Preliminary Argument: Procedural Excesses as a Basis for Claiming Excess of Mandate

(i) GoS Arguments

141. The GoS places emphasis on the fact that the Parties took care in drafting Terms of Reference according to which the ABC Experts were obliged to carry out their mandate. The ABC Experts also drew up Rules of Procedure to guide their proceedings. If the ABC Experts materially deviated from the Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure in carrying out the task conferred on them, the GoS maintains that this would be inconsistent with the conditions laid down for the exercise of their mandate.\textsuperscript{104} The specific inclusion by the Parties of the Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure in Article 2(a) of the

\textsuperscript{97} GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 74/10-13.
\textsuperscript{98} GoS Memorial, para. 95.
\textsuperscript{99} SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 165.
\textsuperscript{100} SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 100.
\textsuperscript{101} SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 19, 2009, Transcr. 43/10.
\textsuperscript{102} SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 19, 2009, Transcr. 37/12-20.
\textsuperscript{103} SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 19, 2009, Transcr. 43/10-44/16.
\textsuperscript{104} GoS Rejoinder, para. 100.
Arbitration Agreement\textsuperscript{105} is said to be evidence of the importance the Parties placed on these instruments, and confirms their intention to incorporate any serious procedural violation within the Tribunal’s mandate.\textsuperscript{106}

142. The GoS also contends that the ABC Experts were not endowed with broad procedural discretion. Citing Section 5 of the Abyei Appendix,\textsuperscript{107} the GoS maintains that the Parties premised the final and binding character of the ABC Experts’ Report on the proper application of the Rules of Procedure.\textsuperscript{108} The GoS also emphasizes that the procedural rules apply to the ABC as a whole, not to the ABC Experts in isolation. The fact that the essential tasks were assigned to the Commission as a whole and not to the ABC Experts alone was a guarantee of transparency and of equality in the Parties’ treatment. Insofar as the ABC Experts worked separately without notice to the Parties, these guarantees have been ignored and a fundamental rule of procedure has been violated.\textsuperscript{109} Such serious procedural irregularities are grounds for an excess of mandate, as recognized by numerous international conventions and instruments.\textsuperscript{110}

(ii) SPLM/A Arguments

143. The SPLM/A rejects any reading of Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement\textsuperscript{111} that would permit the ABC Experts’ Report to be challenged based on purported violations of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{105}Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement provides:}

\begin{quote}
\ldots

The issues that shall be determined by the Tribunal are the following:

Whether or not the ABC Experts had, on the basis of the agreement of the Parties as per the CPA, exceeded their mandate which is “to define (i.e. delimit) and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905” as stated in the Abyei Protocol, and reiterated in the Abyei Appendix and the ABC Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure.

\ldots
\end{quote}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{106}GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 87/07-18.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{107}Section 5 of the Abyei Appendix provides:}

\begin{quote}
The ABC shall present its final report to the Presidency before the end of the Pre-Interim Period. The report of the [ABC Experts], arrived at as prescribed in the ABC rules of procedure, shall be final and binding on the Parties.
\end{quote}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{108}GoS Rejoinder, para. 104.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{109}GoS Rejoinder, para. 106.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{110}See GoS Memorial, paras. 180-84, \textit{citing} the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Article V(1)(d); ICSID Arbitration Rules, Article 50(1)(c)(iii); UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 36(1)(a)(iv).}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{111}Supra note 105.}
“procedural conditions” or procedural rights, as the scope of the Tribunal’s review pursuant to Article 2(a) is narrowly defined; the “mandate” of the ABC, which the Tribunal must analyze for purported excess, is “to define (i.e. delimit) and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905.” Further, the formulation makes no reference to violations of the ABC Rules of Procedure or any other arbitration procedures and reading these into the provision would be impermissible.

Moreover, the SPLM/A asserts that the ABC was a sui generis body with a unique set of procedures intended to give the ABC Experts the freedom to conduct the proceedings as they thought fit; there were very few mandatory procedural restrictions on the ABC Experts. The ABC Experts were recognized by both Parties as experts in history, geography, culture, and African law and were called upon to apply the procedures of “scientific analysis and research.” They were not international arbitration practitioners and were not subject to rules of procedural conduct based on arbitral principles.

Citing a number of authorities, the SPLM/A also contends that a dispute regarding “jurisdiction” or excess of mandate does not extend to procedural complaints. The SPLM/A further emphasizes that a party seeking to invalidate an arbitral award or other adjudicative decision on procedural grounds must show serious prejudice, such that the Tribunal would have decided otherwise had the Tribunal not made the particular mistake. It contends that the GoS has not satisfied its burden of proof in this respect.

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112 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 162-71.
113 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 167-68.
114 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 234.
115 These were listed in the SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 239-40 (“The foregoing provisions of the Parties’ agreements imposed very few, and very limited, constraints on the ABC Experts’ procedural discretion. In particular, the Parties’ procedural agreements provide only for: (a) the constitution of a tribunal of ABC Experts with specified expertise; (b) a time limit for submission of the ABC’s final report; (c) presentations by the Parties of their respective positions; (d) hearing representatives of the people of the Abyei Area; and (e) consultation of the British Archives and other relevant sources wherever available.”).
116 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 236-37.
117 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 234.
118 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 146, citing Appeal from a Judgment of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (The Peter Pázmány University v. Czechoslovakia) Ser. a/B 61, 208, 222 (P.C.I.J 1933); SPLM/A Exhibit-LE 24/6. Nonetheless, the SPLM/A states in its Counter-Memorial that for an allowable procedural excess of mandate to have occurred, there must be a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure. See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 287-88, citing ICSID Convention, Article 52(1)(d).
119 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 19, 2009 Transcr. 86/02-11.
120 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 309-10.
(b) The ABC Experts Allegedly Took Evidence from Ngok Dinka Informants without Procedural Safeguards and without Informing the GoS

(i) GoS Arguments

146. The GoS maintains that the ABC Experts arranged three unscheduled meetings with Ngok Dinka informants at the Hilton Hotel, Khartoum without informing it.121 Because the Terms of Reference were said to be unusually detailed and specific with respect to the ABC Experts’ conduct in relation to oral testimony,122 and carefully distinguished between acts of the ABC as a whole and that of the ABC Experts, those terms must be taken seriously.123

147. The GoS points out that a meeting could have been arranged in Khartoum either with or without the Parties (i.e., by the ABC Experts alone), provided that the Parties consented and appropriate safeguards were instituted. However, instead of approaching the Parties prior to holding meetings in Khartoum, the ABC Experts allegedly took it upon themselves to convene meetings without the knowledge of the GoS. On April 21, 2005, the ABC Experts had a “secret meeting” with Ngok Dinka informants at the Hilton Hotel, Khartoum. This meeting was followed by two additional unscheduled meetings on May 6 and 8, 2005.124 At these meetings, the GoS alleges that the ABC Experts obtained maps and other documents that were never shown to the Parties, even though some of these materials were used in the preparation of the ABC Experts’ Report.125

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121 GoS Memorial, paras. 71-79.

122 Section 3 of the Terms of Reference provides in part:

Functioning of the ABC

…

3.2 The ABC shall thereafter travel to the Sudan to listen to the representatives of the people of Abyei Area and the neighbors as indicated hereunto:

A. The ABC shall conduct one meeting in Abyei Town with 54 representatives of the Nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms (five from each plus nine chiefs)

B. One meeting in Muglad Town with 45 Messiriya representatives (25 from Muglad sub tribes, 15 from Fulla and five from Lagawa, however the ABC shall make field visits to (Dambaloya/Dak Jur), (Pawol/Fawol), (Abugazala/Mabec) etc.

C. One meeting to be held in Agok with 30 representatives of the neighbors of Abyei to the South (Twich, Goral West, Aweil East, Biemnhum and Panaraou), which shall be represented by six each.

123 GoS Memorial, para. 199.

124 These meetings are mentioned in Appendix 4.2 of the ABC Experts’ Report, but not in their summary of their work. GoS Memorial, para. 201.

125 GoS Memorial, para. 73.
148. The GoS also claimed that on April 25, 2005, the ABC Experts issued a note to the Commission detailing the testimony they obtained during their field visits and informed the Commission of their decision to stop collecting oral testimony and to resort to archival research. The GoS found it disturbing that the note did not mention the Hilton meeting on April 21, 2005, nor did their alleged decision deter them from scheduling the subsequent May 6 and May 8 meetings.  

149. By arranging interviews without the knowledge of the Parties, the GoS argues that the ABC Experts not only deliberately circumvented the agreed work program, they also demonstrated a propensity to side with the SPLM/A and thus deprived the GoS of the right to a fair procedure. This is especially so since no information of these meetings was provided to the GoS until the final presentation of the ABC Experts’ Report. Because a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure constitutes, in the view of the GoS, a ground for finding an excess of mandate, the taking of evidence by the ABC Experts without procedural safeguards and without informing the GoS constitutes an excess of mandate.  

(ii) SPLM/A Arguments  

150. The SPLM/A asserts that the agreed framework regarding the ABC proceedings imposed no prohibition on meetings between the ABC Experts and additional members of the public. On the contrary, Section 7 of the ABC Rules of Procedure is said to expressly ensure that the ABC members – and not just the entire Commission - would be able to conduct such meetings if they chose without any prior notice requirement. The Parties’ express contemplation was to allow the ABC Experts to conduct their own independent investigations, and to consult “other relevant sources,” rather than being dependent on the

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126 GoS Memorial, paras. 74-76.  
127 GoS Memorial, para. 208.  
128 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 315.  
129 Section 7 of the Rules of Procedure provides:  
As occasions warrant, Commission members should have free access to members of the public other than those in the official delegations at the locations to be visited. The Commission will accept written submissions.  
130 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 316.  
131 The SPLM/A relies on Section 4 of Abyei Appendix which provides:  
In determining their findings, the [ABC Experts] in the Commission shall consult the British Archives and other relevant sources on Sudan wherever they may be available, with a view to arriving at a decision that shall be based on specific analysis and research. The [ABC Experts] shall also determine the rules of procedure of the ABC.
Parties to present testimony or information to them. The SPLM/A also maintains that, in fact, the GoS was informed about the ABC Experts’ meetings with both Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka members in Khartoum, that no objections were raised, and that this objection should be thus considered waived.

151. Even assuming that a violation of procedural rules did occur, the SPLM/A maintains that any such breach does not rise to the level of a “serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure.” In their view, any breach of procedure needs to be considered within the context of the ABC Experts’ broad, independent investigative authority and the ABC Experts’ wide procedural discretion, and the deliberately informal and non-technical nature of the ABC proceedings. At most, any violation would have been an unintentional omission inconsistent with implied provisions of the ABC Experts’ own procedural rules, which they were free to alter or amend.

152. Finally, the SPLM/A believes that these meetings caused no prejudice to the GoS because they did not alter the outcome of the ABC Experts’ decision. Quoting the GoS’s acknowledgment that procedural breaches must be material, both in themselves and as to the result reached, the SPLM/A maintains that the person who arranged the meeting and the witnesses interviewed in Khartoum were likely to be supporters of the GoS’s position on the Abyei Area or to testify on Dinka matters that had little to do with the question at hand. Moreover, the only map that was recorded as being given to the ABC Experts during the meetings (described as a copy of a sketch map) was not relied upon in the final decision. Finally, the SPLM/A sought to clarify that the April 25, 2005 note on testimony

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132 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 317.
133 The SPLM/A further claims that the meeting held on May 8, 2005 was with the Twic Dinka, and not the Ngok Dinka. See SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 19, 2009, Transcr. 122/24-123/02.
134 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 342.
135 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 353.
136 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 330.
137 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 332.
138 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 333.
139 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 364, citing GoS Memorial, para. 193.
140 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 368-73.
141 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 377.
issued by the ABC Experts related to field visits between April 14 and April 20, 2005, before the contentious meetings took place.\(^{142}\)

(c) The ABC Experts Allegedly Unilaterally Sought and Relyed on the Millington E-mail, without Notice to the GoS, to Establish Their Interpretation of the Formula

(i) GoS Arguments

153. The GoS alleges that, to establish their interpretation of the Formula, the ABC Experts unilaterally sought and then relied on an e-mail from an official at the Embassy of the United States of America in Nairobi, Mr. Jeffrey Millington. The response in question from Mr. Millington, which purportedly set out the US Government’s understanding of the Formula, was:

It was clearly our view when we submitted our proposal [that] the area transferred in 1905 was roughly equivalent to the area of Abyei that was demarcated in later years.\(^{143}\)

154. The GoS argues that such unilateral actions involved a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure in three distinct ways:

(a) The ABC Experts were not authorized to consult the US Government nor any other third party.\(^{144}\) Mr. Millington’s e-mail allegedly had nothing to do with the “independent investigations and scientific research” that the ABC Experts were supposed to conduct.\(^{145}\)

(b) The Parties were given no notice of the request or the response and thus had no opportunity to comment. This was, in the GoS’s view, a clear failure of due process and a patent breach of Section 14 of the Rules of Procedure.\(^{146}\)

(c) The ABC Experts failed to see that Mr. Millington’s response raised more questions than it resolved. The GoS sees no relation between “the area of the nine Ngok Dinka

\(^{142}\) SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 20, 2009, Transcr. 64/16-65/05.

\(^{143}\) ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, p. 4.


\(^{145}\) GoS Rejoinder, para. 127.

\(^{146}\) GoS Memorial, para. 211. Section 14 of the Rules of Procedure provides:

The Commission will endeavour to reach a decision by consensus. If, however, an agreed position by the two sides is not achieved, the [ABC Experts] will have the final say.
Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905” and “the area of Abyei that was demarcated in later years.”

155. The GoS contends that Mr. Millington’s e-mail affected the outcome of the ABC decision, as it strengthened the ABC Experts’ manifestly wrong interpretation of the substance of their mandate: in the ABC Experts’ Report, mention of the disputed e-mail immediately succeeds the interpretation of the Formula by the ABC Experts, from which the word “transferred” had been carefully deleted.

(ii) SPLM/A Arguments

156. In the SPLM/A’s view, the Parties’ procedural agreements and the Rules of Procedure granted the ABC Experts broad procedural discretion and investigatory powers, including the power independently to conduct such research as they deemed appropriate, without imposing any prohibitions against interviews with third parties such as Mr. Millington. In fact, there are other third parties who assisted the ABC Experts and who are acknowledged at the beginning of the ABC Experts’ Report, but their participation was not objected to by the GoS in any way.

157. Further, even if one assumed that the Millington e-mail was inconsistent with the Parties’ procedural agreements, the SPLM/A argues that this breach was not a serious violation of a fundamental procedural guarantee. Any such violation would at most have been an inadvertent misunderstanding of the limits of the ABC Experts’ investigative authority, no different in character than contacts with other third parties against which the GoS has not protested. In any event, the SPLM/A believes that the GoS does not identify any procedural injury arising from the Millington e-mail, much less the sort of grave prejudice

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147 GoS Memorial, para. 213. The GoS observes that no such later demarcation ever took place.
148 GoS Rejoinder, para. 129. The GoS refers to a statement in the Preface of the ABC Experts’ Report which provides in relevant part:

…Therefore, it was necessary for the [ABC Experts] to avail themselves of relevant historical material produced before and after 1905, as well as during that year, to determine as accurately as possible the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms as it was in 1905. In doing this the [ABC Experts] are mindful that the drafters of the American proposal which was incorporated into the Abyei Protocol have stated: “It was clearly our view when we submitted our proposal that the area transferred in 1905 was roughly equivalent to the area of Abyei that was demarcated in later [years]. . .”

149 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 394-403.
150 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 398.
151 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 404-407.
required to set aside an adjudicative decision. The Millington e-mail, in SPLM/A’s view, was a single communication, barely a line long, which, at most, did nothing but conform to the interpretation that the ABC Experts had previously reached.152

(d) The ABC Experts Allegedly Failed to Act through the Commission, and to Seek Consensus, in Reaching Their Decision.

(i) GoS Arguments

158. The GoS claims that Section 14 of the Rules of Procedure153 was violated when the ABC Experts did not endeavor to reach a decision by consensus. Instead, the ABC Experts purportedly made no attempt to reach a consensus among the members of the ABC as a whole.154 While the ABC Experts were to prepare the ABC Experts’ Report and had the “final say,” the ABC Experts’ Report was to be the report of the entire Commission and not just the ABC Experts.155 In the GoS’s view, the proper procedure set out in the Parties’ procedural agreements was first to submit the (draft) Report to the ABC, after which the ABC as a whole would present the Report to the Presidency.

159. Further, the GoS argues that is was neither informed nor consulted on the final outcome of the ABC Experts’ Report despite the clear language and intent of the Abyei Protocol and the Rules of Procedure. No meeting was ever called to try to reconcile the views of the Parties. By excluding other ABC members from the decision-making process and by presenting the ABC Experts’ Report to the Presidency without any consultation, the GoS asserts that the ABC Experts changed the very spirit of the special mechanism of dispute resolution that the ABC was supposed to embody.156 The GoS also emphasizes that it had consistently expressed its objection to this way of proceeding; in fact, following the presentation of the Report to the Presidency, the head of the GoS delegation immediately

152 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 408-418.
153 Section 14 of the Rules of Procedure, text supra at note 146.
154 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 198.
155 Section 5.3 of the Abyei Protocol states that:

[t]he Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) shall present its final report to the Presidency as soon as it is ready. Upon presentation of the final report, the Presidency shall take necessary action to put the special administrative status of Abyei Area into immediate effect.

156 GoS Rejoinder, para. 134.
made clear its protest against the manifest violation of the ABC’s mandate by the ABC Experts. Hence, the GoS argues that no waiver can be implied from their conduct.\footnote{GoS Rejoinder, para. 150.}

160. In response to the SPLM/A’s allegations that the GoS itself thwarted attempts at achieving a consensus by not agreeing to compromise during the ABC proceedings, the GoS contends such refusal to “compromise” did not entail a principled objection to achieving a “consensus,” to which it was not opposed. According to the GoS, refusing a negotiated political “compromise” is clearly different from achieving a “consensus” on reasonable scientific findings.\footnote{GoS Rejoinder, paras. 144-145.}

\textit{(ii) SPLM/A Arguments}

161. The SPLM/A maintains that the Parties’ procedural agreements specifically provided that the ABC Experts were to prepare the final ABC Experts’ Report, without restricting the ABC Experts’ discretion as to when and how they might seek to achieve consensus. In its view, Section 14 of the Rules of Procedure merely contemplates that the ABC Experts shall make reasonable efforts to that effect (“will endeavor”), and does not prescribe any particular mandatory procedural steps. The SPLM/A claims that the Rules of Procedure left no room, as a practical matter, for the various procedural steps that the GoS suggests should have occurred.\footnote{SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 423-438.}

162. The SPLM/A also maintains that the Parties repeatedly discussed the presentation of the ABC Experts’ Report to the Presidency during the weeks before that presentation occurred. Throughout those discussions, the GoS purportedly did not object or state that the course being adopted by the ABC Experts was improper (or that the GoS preferred a different approach). On the contrary, the SPLM/A argues that the GoS made it clear that it expected no further efforts to achieve a consensus and that such efforts would have been futile.\footnote{See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 439-54.}

Thus, the SPLM/A believes that the GoS waived any possible objection to the ABC Experts’ approach towards achieving consensus and manner of presenting the final ABC Experts’ Report to the Presidency, as it had not raised any objections at any point when it
Moreover, the SPLM/A argues that any distinction made by the GoS between “compromise” and “consensus” is “empty and desperate” semantics.

163. Assuming however that the ABC Experts’ efforts to achieve a consensus (or any lack of such efforts) was inconsistent with the Parties’ procedural agreements, any failure was not, in the SPLM/A’s view, a “serious violation of a fundamental procedural guarantee” that would allow the ABC Experts’ Report to be set aside. In its reading of Section 14 of the Rules of Procedure, only reasonable efforts by the ABC Experts to achieve consensus were contemplated; further, the requirement in Section 14 to endeavor to reach consensus was prescribed by the ABC Experts themselves. Any violation of such a provision would thus at most be an inadvertent misunderstanding of the ABC Experts’ own Rules of Procedure.

3. Substantive Excess of Mandate Arguments

(a) Introduction

(i) GoS Argument

164. Broadly, the GoS submits that the ABC Experts misinterpreted and misapplied their mandate by (i) using manifestly inadmissible justifications, (ii) deciding ultra petita, and (iii) deciding infra petita.

165. Specifically, the GoS argues that an excess of mandate under Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement occurred when the ABC Experts acted ultra petita, by deciding on matters outside the scope of the dispute submitted by the Parties. The ABC Experts were also said to have substantively exceeded their mandate when they decided infra petita, by not

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161 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 472-75.
162 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 19, 2005, Transcr. 152/11-17.
163 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 455-71.
164 While this this ground (“using manifestly inadmissible justifications”) appears in the GoS Rejoinder, it was later merged with discussions on decisions ultra petita. See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 136/25 et seq. This will be discussed in the next Section 4 ‘Violation of Mandatory Criteria’ in keeping with the original structure of the GoS’s Arguments.
165 See GoS Rejoinder, paras. 151-152.
166 See supra note 105.
167 See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 137/04-09.
answering the questions asked to it by the Parties. The GoS claims that the ABC Experts decided *ultra petita* by purporting to confer rights on the Ngok Dinka outside the Abyei Area and by limiting the Misseriya’s traditional rights, and they decided *infra petita* by: (i) refusing to decide the question asked, (ii) answering a different question than that asked, and (iii) ignoring the stipulated date of 1905.

(ii) **SPLM/A Arguments**

166. The SPLM/A does not agree with the GoS’s claims that the ABC Experts acted *ultra petita* by purporting to confer rights on the Ngok Dinka outside the Abyei Area and by limiting the Misseriya’s traditional rights. It asserts that the GoS’s claim that the ABC Experts acted outside their mandate rests on implausible and distorted readings of the ABC Experts’ Report; the SPLM/A claims that the ABC Experts were merely making explicit that they had delimited the Abyei Area’s territorial boundaries without purporting to affect the retained rights of usage of the Ngok or the Messiriya. Further, assuming *arguendo* that the ABC Experts did indeed confer or limit such rights, they still would not have exceeded their mandate.

167. The SPLM/A further asserts that the grounds put forward by the GoS to support its *infra petita* claims are in truth substantive disagreements with the ABC Experts’ interpretation of the Abyei Area definition in Section 1.1.2 of the Abyei Protocol. As such, these are not grounds for challenging the ABC Experts’ Report as an excess of mandate. While consistently asserting that the ABC Experts’ interpretation of the Abyei Area is correct, the SPLM/A contends that errors of law or interpretation do not give rise to an excess of mandate, nor are factual and evidentiary disagreements with the ABC Experts’ conclusions valid grounds for claiming an excess of mandate. The SPLM/A also submits

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168 GoS Rejoinder, paras. 209, 211.
169 See GoS Rejoinder, para. 195.
171 See SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 19, 2009, Transcr. 197/20-198/03.
172 See SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 19, 2009, Transcr. 185/18-186/13.
173 Section 1.1.2 of the Abyei Protocol provides: “The territory is defined as the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905.”
174 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 488.
175 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 577-586.
176 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 599-608.
that the ABC Experts’ interpretation of their mandate is entitled to a substantial presumption of correctness and accordingly could only be invalidated in a rare and exceptional case.\(^{177}\) Moreover, even assuming that the ABC Experts incorrectly interpreted their definition of the Abyei Area, the SPLM/A argues that an excess of mandate can only be sustained where the adjudicatory authority purported to act beyond its authority in a glaring, manifest, or flagrant manner.\(^{178}\)

(b) The ABC Experts Allegedly Refused to Decide the Question Asked

(i) GoS Arguments

168. The premise of this GoS argument is its rejection of the ABC Experts’ interpretation of the Formula: instead of interpreting the definition of the Abyei Area as referring to the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chieftains transferred to Kordofan in 1905 (which it calls the “territorial interpretation”), the GoS believes that the ABC Experts interpreted the Formula as referring only to the area the nine Ngok Dinka chieftains used and occupied in 1905 (which it calls the “tribal interpretation”).\(^{179}\)

169. The GoS contends that the mandate of the ABC Experts was clear, \textit{i.e.}, to define an area transferred in 1905. However, the ABC Experts, according to the GoS, allegedly declined to answer the question they were charged with answering.\(^{180}\) Instead, they “sought to determine as accurately as possible the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms as it was in 1905.”\(^{181}\) By deviating from the question of defining “the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905” to that of “the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms as it was in 1905” – the transfer being left aside – the ABC Experts allegedly decided in excess of their mandate. Put differently, the ABC was tasked to find the “lines” constituting the boundary of the area transferred to Kordofan in 1905, and not to define the territory that the Ngok Dinka used and occupied in 1905.\(^{182}\) The GoS submits that the question of an area transferred at a given date is different from that of an area occupied by

\(177\) SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 613.

\(178\) SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 622.

\(179\) See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 25/07-17. For a more expansive treatment of these respective interpretations of the mandate, see infra at para. 232 et seq.

\(180\) GoS Memorial, para. 230.


\(182\) GoS Rejoinder, para. 223.
particular peoples or chiefdoms at the same date. The ABC Experts thus effectively substituted their question for that agreed and asked by the Parties.\footnote{GoS Rejoinder, para. 215.}

(ii) SPLM/A Arguments

170. In the SPLM/A’s view, the ABC Experts clearly defined and demarcated the Abyei Area, doing so both with specific latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates, and by delimiting the same coordinates on Map 1 of the ABC Experts’ Report, thus showing the Abyei Area boundaries. The SPLM/A asserts that this was precisely the task that the ABC Experts were mandated to perform.\footnote{SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 504.} Moreover, the SPLM/A submits that the definition of the Abyei Area as interpreted by the ABC Experts, (\textit{i.e.}, by reference to the entire historic territory of the Ngok Dinka people in 1905), was consistent with the ABC Experts’ explanations during the ABC’s proceedings which had been received without objection by the Parties.\footnote{SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 497.} It further asserts that the ABC Experts’ interpretation of the Abyei Area is the natural, grammatically correct meaning.\footnote{SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 20, 2009, Transcr. 70/03-18.}

171. The SPLM/A repeatedly states that the ABC Experts’ interpretation of the Abyei Area definition was a matter of substantive interpretation of the Abyei Protocol, which cannot form the basis of an excess of mandate claim.\footnote{SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 285.} It submits that the real complaint of the GoS is with the substance of the answer, rather than a failure to provide an answer.\footnote{SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 506.}

(c) The ABC Experts Allegedly Answered a Different Question Than That Asked

(i) GoS Arguments

172. Instead of determining “the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905” (which the GoS posits to be a question of fact), the GoS submits that the ABC Experts reformulated the question in terms of dominant and secondary rights by the Ngok
Dinka and the Misseriya over the territory. For this reason, the GoS criticizes the ABC Experts’ consideration of “territorial occupation and/or use rights” and “population dynamics” in determining the Abyei Area.

173. In the GoS’s view, it was not necessary to determine the nature of the established land or territorial occupation and/or use rights by all nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms in order to delimit and demarcate the boundaries of the transferred area. The ABC Experts had at their disposal official documents that would have allowed them to determine the transferred area, but they allegedly set these aside in favor of the disputed methodology.

174. Further, even assuming that the ABC Experts were entitled to consider land use rights, the failure of the ABC Experts to consider the land use rights of any of the Humr omodiyas is for the GoS an indication of the partisan nature of their inquiry.

(ii) SPLM/A Arguments

175. For the SPLM/A, this line of argumentation is simply the converse or mirror image of the previous argument that the ABC Experts refused to answer the question that was addressed to them. It reiterates that the argument does not actually point to an excess of mandate, but rather to a substantive disagreement with the ABC Experts’ reasoning and factual appreciation of the evidence.

176. In the SPLM/A’s view, the ABC Experts could hardly determine what the boundaries of the Abyei Area were without determining what was included in the ‘area of the nine Ngok

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189 The GoS claims that this reformulation of the question is evident from the primary conclusion of the ABC Experts:

1) The Ngok have a legitimate dominant claim to the territory from the Kordofan-Bahr el-Ghazal boundary north to latitude 10°10’N, stretching from the boundary with Darfur to the boundary with the Upper Nile, as they were in 1956. (ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, p. 21, SM Annex 81)

The GoS also claims that it is evident from the reasoning of the ABC Experts:

It is therefore incumbent upon the [ABC Experts] to determine the nature of established land or territorial occupation and/or use rights by all the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms, with particular focus on those in that northern-most areas the formed the transferred territory. (ABC Experts’ Report, Appendix 2, p. 21 (SM Annex 81)

See GoS Memorial, paras. 235-237.

190 GoS Memorial, para. 241.

191 GoS Rejoinder, para. 217.

192 GoS Rejoinder, paras. 222-223.

193 GoS Memorial, para. 238.

194 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 516.

195 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 278.
Dinka Chiefdoms.” Thus, in order for them to determine the boundaries of the Ngok Dinka that were transferred for administrative reasons in 1905, they needed to determine the nature of the established land or territorial occupation and/or use rights by all the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms.  

177. The SPLM/A also contests the assertion that the ABC Experts did not consider “any of the Humr omodiyas,” arguing that the ABC Experts considered “with great care and diligence the land use of the Misseriya.”

   (d) The ABC Experts Allegedly Ignored the Stipulated Date of 1905

   (i) GoS Arguments

178. The GoS maintains that the ABC Experts virtually ignored the agreed date for determining the transferred area (i.e., 1905). In particular, they allegedly did not provide any information as to the position of tribes in 1905 which would warrant a line anywhere north of the Bahr el Arab, still less one as far north as latitude 10°22’30"N. Instead, they purportedly made reference to other wholly irrelevant dates, ignoring that their mandate was restricted to determining what area was transferred in 1905. The GoS points out that despite repeated references to “1905” in the ABC Experts’ Report, the critical date does not appear once in the “Final and Binding Decision.”

179. The GoS takes specific exception to the ABC Experts’ reliance on the 1965 Peace Agreement between the Messiriya Humr and the Ngok Dinka. The GoS notes that the 1965 agreement was superseded by the Abyei Agreement of 1966, and that the ABC Experts were not empowered to refer to the 1966 agreement at all “except as [it] may have shed light on the position in 1905.” The GoS contends that the 1966 Agreement does not do this. Further, the GoS claims that the 1965 agreement was only used to provide absolute evidence of “the continuity of Ngok Dinka settlements in, and use of, places north

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196 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 518.
197 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 522.
198 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 534, referring to GoS Memorial, para. 238(d).
200 See GoS Memorial, paras. 242-243.
201 GoS Rejoinder, para. 224.
203 GoS Memorial, para. 246.
of the Bahr el-Arab between 1905 and 1965” which, even if it were true, would still not be relevant to the question which the ABC Experts were mandated to answer.\textsuperscript{204}

(ii) SPLM/A Arguments

180. According to the SPLM/A, the ABC Experts’ Report makes perfectly clear that the ABC Experts in no way ignored the 1905 date; instead, they based their determination of the Abyei Area’s boundaries precisely on their assessment of the extent of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms in 1905.\textsuperscript{205} Counting 48 separate references to the 1905 date in the 45-page ABC Experts’ Report, it asserts that “[i]t is impossible to read the ABC Experts’ Report and conclude that the ABC Experts somehow ‘ignored’ or ‘virtually ignored’ the 1905 date.”\textsuperscript{206}

181. In the SPLM/A’s view, there were evidentiary difficulties in determining the extent of the Ngok Dinka territory in 1905. It was thus necessary for the ABC Experts to avail themselves of materials produced both before and after 1905, as well as during that year. The materials from earlier and later periods were considered only to determine circumstantially and indirectly what the territory of the Ngok Dinka had been in 1905.\textsuperscript{207}

182. The SPLM/A also notes that the GoS itself cited and relied on events occurring after 1905 as evidence of the location of the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya in 1905,\textsuperscript{208} and that the GoS used these in its presentations before the ABC as well.\textsuperscript{209}

\textsuperscript{204}GoS Rejoinder, para. 225.
\textsuperscript{205}SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 546.
\textsuperscript{206}SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 556.
\textsuperscript{207}SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 548-550.
\textsuperscript{208}SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 567, referring to GoS Memorial, paras. 385-396.
\textsuperscript{209}SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 568, citing GoS First Presentation, dated April 10, 2005, at p. 24 (citing Dupuis’ Report, “Note on the Ngok Dinka of Western Kordofan” (1922); “in 1922, Dupuis was able to locate them at Khor Alal, north of Lol River…”); and at p. 36 \textit{et seq.} (citing post 1905 maps), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/2; GoS Final Presentation, dated June 16, 2005, at p. 27 (citing Cunnison (1954)), at p. 28 (citing excerpts from Willis, “Notes on Western Kordofan Dinkas” (1909), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/18); GoS Additional Presentation, dated June 17, 2005, at p. 16 (citing a letter from the Governor of Bahr el-Ghazal dated July 21, 1927), at p. 14 (citing a report of the District Commissioner of Western Kordofan from 1950), p. 20 (citing Kordofan Province Monthly Diary, 1951), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/17; Transcript of Ambassador Dirdeiry, Taped Recording GoS Final Presentation, File 1, at p. 2, (“the second area of focus is how the contemporary maps since 1908 and up to 1936 had reflected the 1905 transfer”), at p. 5 (“maybe you recall Mr Chairman that during our first presentation we had made a presentation of a report written in 1922 indicating the nine Ngok Dinka chieftains”), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 19/15; Ambassador Dirdeiry, transcript of Oral Evidence Submitted to the ABC April 14 to 21, 2005, at p. 21, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/5a.
183. The GoS submits that the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate by purporting to allocate secondary grazing rights to the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya. In the GoS’s view, the ABC’s mandate was strictly limited to drawing the line constituting the border of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905, and this task cannot be interpreted as encompassing any findings regarding allocation or limitation of grazing rights.\textsuperscript{210} By making a pronouncement regarding grazing or other secondary rights, the decision clearly exceeded the ABC Experts’ mandate.\textsuperscript{211}

184. The GoS asserts that the recognition of such secondary rights is a clear “decision” on the part of the ABC Experts, and could not have been a mere “rationale” for the ABC Experts’ boundary delimitation. The GoS contends that if the allocation had been mere rationale, it would not have been included in the “Final and Binding Decision” featured at the end of the Report.\textsuperscript{212} Moreover, even if the allocation were mere rationale, it would confirm that the ABC Experts’ decision was based not on the territorial transfer that occurred in 1905, but on the “arbitrary or equitable division of tribal rights.”\textsuperscript{213}

185. The GoS rejects the argument that the allocation was a justifiable exercise of incidental or ancillary authority derived from the ABC Experts’ primary mandate.\textsuperscript{214} It asserts that while “the purpose of incidental or ancillary powers is to provide for the full and orderly settlement of disputes submitted by the parties,” the allocation of secondary rights was not part of the dispute submitted to the ABC, and a pronouncement on this matter was not necessary to provide for the “orderly settlement of all matters in dispute.”\textsuperscript{215}

186. The GoS also argues that this pronouncement cannot simply be brushed aside as an unintentional or minor excess that does not affect the remainder of the Report. As an
alleged excess of mandate, the allocation supposedly triggers the operation of Article 2(c) of the Arbitration Agreement.\textsuperscript{216}

187. In addition, the GoS argues that the ABC Experts exceeded the geographical scope of their mandate by conferring on the Ngok secondary rights to land outside the Abyei Area and by limiting the Missiriya’s traditional grazing rights to the southern part of the shared area.\textsuperscript{217} The GoS submits that there is no trace in the applicable instruments – whether the Abyei Protocol, the Abyei Appendix or the Terms of Reference of the ABC – of any mandate given to the Commission or to its ABC Experts to ascertain, attribute, regulate or share grazing rights on both sides of the alleged boundary.\textsuperscript{218}

\begin{quote}
\textbf{(ii) SPLM/A Arguments}
\end{quote}

188. In response, the SPLM/A contends that the ABC Experts did not commit an excess of mandate by purporting to confer rights on the Ngok Dinka outside the Abyei Area.\textsuperscript{219} For the SPLM/A, the ABC Experts’ Report merely set forth in summary form the ABC Experts’ historical conclusions, which in turn provided the rationale for their subsequent boundary delimitation. The SPLM/A believes that the ABC Experts simply sought to make clear, for the avoidance of any doubt, that their decision only defined the Abyei Area’s territorial boundaries and did not affect other pre-existing rights which either the Ngok or the Missiriya already possessed and retained.\textsuperscript{220} The SPLM/A claims that the ABC Experts, during their public meetings, encountered popular misconceptions about the effect that setting a boundary would have. This supposedly led the ABC Experts to emphasize the limited scope of their territorial decision in order to assuage popular misconceptions about traditional rights.\textsuperscript{221}

\textsuperscript{216} See GoS Rejoinder, paras. 202-208. Article 2(c) of the Arbitration Agreement provides:

c. If the Tribunal determines, pursuant to Sub-article (a) herein, that the [ABC Experts] exceeded their mandate, it shall make a declaration to that effect, and shall proceed to define (i.e. delimit) on map the boundaries of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905, based on the submissions of the Parties. (emphasis in original)

\textsuperscript{217} GoS Memorial, paras. 249-253.

\textsuperscript{218} GoS Rejoinder, para. 196.

\textsuperscript{219} SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 626.

\textsuperscript{220} SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 19, 2009, Transcr. 187/03-10.

\textsuperscript{221} SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 19, 2009, Transcr. 196/15-198/03
189. In the alternative, the SPLM/A argues that even if there were some ambiguity as to the meaning of the ABC Experts’ Report or in its treatment of the issue of grazing rights, the ABC Experts’ statements regarding the Ngok Dinka’s retention of their rights are to be interpreted consistently with the ABC Experts’ mandate, and not as overstepping that mandate. Accordingly, if there is some doubt, the ABC Experts’ decision should be read in a manner that does not purport to alter or affect the rights of the Ngok Dinka or Misseriya outside the boundaries of the Abyei Area. Also, even if the ABC Experts were considered to have attempted to confer rights on the Ngok Dinka outside Abyei Area proper, the SPLM/A submits that this would merely be a valid “exercise of incidental or ancillary authority, which was included in the ABC Experts’ primary mandate.”

190. The SPLM/A also maintains that an excess of mandate only exists where the adjudicatory authority purported to act beyond its authority in a glaring, manifest or flagrant manner. It submits that any findings by the ABC Experts in relation to Ngok Dinka grazing rights would not have been such an egregious excess of mandate, and that the rights would have affected “only a very specific and limited right of usage” due to the seasonal conditions there.

191. Finally, even assuming the ABC Experts did exceed their mandate by purporting to confer grazing rights they were not permitted to grant, the SPLM/A contends that this portion of the Report would be severable from the remainder of the ABC Experts’ Report.

4. Violation of Mandatory Criteria in carrying out the Mandate

(a) Introduction

192. In its Memorial, the GoS submits that as a general principle of law, the failure of a panel charged with deciding a dispute to state any reasons on the basis of which its decision can be supported, constitutes an excess of mandate. It identified four acts by the ABC Experts which allegedly violated “mandatory criteria” in carrying out their mandate: (i)

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222 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 644.
223 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 645.
224 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 654.
225 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 655-656.
226 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 661.
227 GoS Memorial, para. 254.
failure to give reasons; (ii) rendering a decision based on “equitable division” or taken *ex aequo et bono*, (iii) applying unspecified “legal principles in determining land rights,” and (iv) attempting to allocate oil resources under the guise of the transferred area.

193. In its Counter-Memorial, the SPLM/A responds that none of the violations of supposed “mandatory criteria” alleged by the GoS fall within the definition of an excess of mandate. It argues that the GoS derives its “mandatory criteria” from sources external to the Parties’ agreements,228 including the ICSID Convention, UNCITRAL Model Law, and various institutional arbitration rules.229

194. In its later pleadings, the GoS merged its discussion of the four alleged violations with its substantive excess of mandate arguments, arguing that the ABC Experts decided *ultra petita*.230 The SPLM/A continues to assert that there is nothing in the Parties’ agreements forbidding the four alleged violations; as such, there is, in its view, no conceivable way to characterize these as “*ultra petita*” of what was agreed between the Parties.231

(b) The ABC Experts Allegedly Failed to Provide Reasons Capable of Forming the Basis of a Valid Decision

(i) GoS Arguments

195. For the GoS, it is a general principle in modern systems of law that an adjudicative decision be motivated (that is, supported by reasons). In its view, a decision can be provided without disclosing the reasons behind it only when the parties to a dispute have expressly waived this requirement.232 Thus, the GoS does not request that the Tribunal determine whether the

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228 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 678.
229 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 680.
230 The GoS Rejoinder divided its substantive excess of mandate arguments into three categories, (i) use of manifestly inadmissible justifications, (ii) decisions *ultra petita* and (iii) decisions *infra petita*. The four acts originally alleged as “violations of mandatory criteria” were discussed under the category “use of manifestly inadmissible justifications.” At the oral hearings, however, this specific category was not discussed separately and distinctly, but was instead discussed with the GoS arguments relating to decisions *ultra petita*. See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 135/01 et. seq. and supra note 94.
231 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 121.
232 GoS Rejoinder, para. 154. At the oral pleadings, the GoS further explains:

The Experts’ Report had mandatorily to be reasoned “because it was an adjudicative body, because the object of the dispute was of a nature that it is simply unthinkable that it could have been otherwise, and it had mandatorily also to be established on the basis agreed by the parties, mandatorily too, not at the good will of the [ABC Experts].”

GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 80/24 – 81/05.
ABC Experts were right or wrong, but only whether they had given any reasons in support of their decision.\textsuperscript{233}

196. The GoS cites decisions by the ABC Experts that purportedly lacked justification: (a) the rejection of the Bahr el Arab as the southern boundary of Kordofan; (b) the assertion that latitude 10°10'N constitutes the southern boundary of Misseriya rights/northern boundary of Ngok rights;\textsuperscript{234} and (c), following from (b), the assertion that latitude 10°35’N constitutes the northern boundary of Ngok Dinka rights.\textsuperscript{235} The GoS asserts that these were three absolutely crucial decisions of the ABC Experts that were unsupported by reasoning.\textsuperscript{236}

197. With respect to decision (a) above, the GoS notes the ABC Experts found that the “Ragaba ez-Zarga/Ngol, rather than the river Kir, which is now that Bahr el-Arab, was treated as the province boundary [between the provinces of Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal], and that the Ngok people were regarded as part of the Bahr el Ghazal Province until their transfer in 1905.”\textsuperscript{237} The GoS argues that assuming arguendo this is true (it later argues that it is not), the transferred area should have been south of the Ragaba ez Zarga. Instead, the GoS alleges, the ABC Experts fixed the northern boundary of the Abyei area further north (and not south) of the Ragaba ez Zarga without providing any reason.\textsuperscript{238}

198. With respect to decision (b) above, the GoS observes that the ABC Experts fixed “Ngok claims to permanent rights southwards roughly from 10°10’N [latitude] and of Ngok secondary rights extending north of that line.”\textsuperscript{239} However, while this latitude is mentioned several times in the ABC Experts’ Report, the GoS contends there is nothing in the Report explaining how this latitude was arrived at and why Ngok Dinka dominant rights were fixed here.\textsuperscript{240}

\textsuperscript{233} GoS Rejoinder, para. 156.

\textsuperscript{234} GoS Memorial, para. 255.

\textsuperscript{235} The GoS Memorial initially referred only to items (a) and (b), but item (c) was cited as a third example of an unmotivated decision during later pleadings. See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 149/03 et seq.

\textsuperscript{236} GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 149/09-12.

\textsuperscript{237} ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, p. 39.

\textsuperscript{238} See GoS Memorial, paras. 256-259 and GoS Rejoinder, para. 158.

\textsuperscript{239} GoS Memorial, para. 260.

\textsuperscript{240} See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 149/13 – 151/12.
199. With respect to decision (c) above, the GoS notes that the ABC Experts fixed the 10°35’N latitude as the northern limit of the Misseriya rights. Again, the GoS argues that other than noting that the line corresponds more or less with Dinka names on certain maps, there is no justification as to how this latitude was fixed.\(^{241}\)

(ii) SPLM/A Arguments

200. In response, the SPLM/A submits that the GoS arguments ignore the following: (i) nothing in the Parties’ agreements or applicable law required the ABC Experts to give reasons;\(^{242}\) (ii) even where reasons are required, international and national arbitration instruments permit arbitral awards to be invalidated only in rare and exceptional cases;\(^{243}\) (iii) the ABC Experts’ Report provided extensive, well-considered, and erudite analysis which fully satisfy any conceivable requirement for reasons;\(^{244}\) (iv) the GoS’s two “illustrations” of inadequate reasoning are misconceived and irrelevant;\(^{245}\) and (v) the GoS’s complaints about the ABC Experts’ reasons are nothing more than objections to the substance of the ABC Experts’ Report.\(^{246}\)

201. For decision (a), the SPLM/A argues that: for the ABC Experts, the decisive issue was determining the territory of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms as they stood in 1905, and not the location of the putative provincial boundary. They thus defined the Abyei Area as “the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms as it was in 1905,” and the location of the Kordofan/Bahr el Ghazal boundary (whether at the Bahr el Arab or the Ragaba ez Zarga) was not determinative of the question of the territory of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms.\(^{247}\)

202. For decisions (b) and (c), the SPLM/A argues that the ABC Experts found evidence showing that Ngok villages were located widely throughout the Bahr river basin, extending up to the southern boundary of the goz at 10°10’N. The GoS claim that there is no reference to this latitude (other than as a decision) is said to ignore the fact that the ABC Experts’ Report expressly equates latitude 10°10’N with the southern boundary of the goz, while the

\(^{241}\) See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 152/01-12.

\(^{242}\) SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 707-730.

\(^{243}\) SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 731-743.

\(^{244}\) SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 744-754.

\(^{245}\) SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 755-759.

\(^{246}\) SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 760.

\(^{247}\) SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 19, 2009, Transcr. 232/09-234/22.
northern boundary was found to be at 10°35’N. The ABC Experts’ Report accepted the existence of both Ngok and Misseriya secondary rights to the area between 10°10’N and 10°35’N and explained why the character of the goz, not being occupied by either tribe, made it an appropriate boundary strip. Reasoning that this gave the Parties’ equal secondary rights in the goz, the ABC Experts found it appropriate to divide that area equally between the Parties with the boundary drawn at 10°22’30”N.  

(c) The ABC Experts Allegedly Decided Based On “Equitable Division”/Taken Ex Aequo Et Bono

(i) GoS Arguments

203. The ABC Experts found that in the goz (the area between the latitudes 10°10’N and 10°35’N) the Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka communities exercised equal secondary rights to use of the land on a seasonal basis. They concluded that “[t]he two Parties lay equal claim to the shared areas and accordingly it is reasonable and equitable to divide the Goz between them,” and bisected equally the band between latitudes 10°10’N and 10°35’N at latitude 10°22’30”N. The GoS submits that the ABC Experts completely disregarded and thereby exceeded their mandate by dividing the goz on an “equitable” basis in this way. It claims that the ABC Experts were not mandated to establish shared areas and, moreover, they were not mandated to divide the shared area by way of a decision taken ex aequo et bono. Because of this determination (and in particular, the choice of the 10°22’30”N latitude), the GoS argues that the conclusion of the ABC Experts on the delimitation of the Abyei Area is illegitimately based on pure equity. The GoS asserts that an adjudicative body can only decide ex aequo et bono when it is expressly authorized to do so, and this requirement is particularly cogent when a sovereign state is involved.

204. The GoS also refutes the allegation that the ABC Experts acted upon the “legal principle of the equitable division of shared secondary rights,” as this legal principle does not appear to

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248 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 19, 2009, Transcr. 239/01-241/07.
250 GoS Memorial, para. 265.
251 Id.
252 GoS Rejoinder, para. 185.
exist. Further, should such a principle exist, the GoS contends that the ABC Experts were instructed to decide based on “scientific analysis and research,” which excludes reliance on the alleged legal principle.

(ii) SPLM/A Arguments

205. The SPLM/A rejects the argument that the ABC Experts decided *ex aequo et bono*. According to the SPLM/A, where two parties enjoy “equal” rights to the same territory, it is not a decision *ex aequo et bono* to divide the territory “equally” between them. Rather, it is said to simply be a decision made on the basis of the two parties’ respective, and equal, historical use of and rights to the same territory.

206. The SPLM/A emphasizes that the ABC Experts relied on “the legal principle of the equitable division of shared secondary rights” in mandating this equal division. Thus, even if they erred in their understanding or application of those legal principles, the SPLM/A argues that the ABC Experts plainly did not render a decision *ex aequo et bono*. Instead, they applied what they took to be the law to a very carefully defined circumstance of shared and equal secondary rights in a specific territory.

207. In the alternative, the SPLM/A asserts that even if the decision was based on principles of equity, it would not amount to a decision *ex aequo et bono*. For the SPLM/A, equity is a general principle of law, distinguishable from a decision *ex aequo et bono*, which may properly be applied by an international tribunal even without express or specific consent by the Parties. Further, even assuming that the decision was taken *ex aequo et bono*, it argues that there is nothing in the Parties’ agreements or in any general principles of law that forbids a decision *ex aequo et bono*. Nor is there a need for the Parties to consent before a decision *ex aequo et bono* can be made.

254 GoS Rejoinder, para. 167.
255 GoS Rejoinder, para. 169.
256 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 795.
257 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 797.
258 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 803.
259 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 814.
(d) The ABC Experts Allegedly Applied Unspecified Legal Principles In Determining Land Rights

(i) GoS Arguments

208. In dividing the goz between the latitudes 10°10’N and 10°35’N,” the ABC Experts based their decision on the “legal principle of the equitable division of shared secondary rights.” The GoS alleges that despite such reliance, the ABC Experts failed to identify with precision what this principle was or where it came from.

209. Moreover, the GoS submits, the ABC Experts were supposed to base their decision on “scientific analysis and research,” and not on legal principles for determining land rights in former British-administered African territories, as they purported to have done.

(ii) SPLM/A Arguments

210. Preliminarily, according to the SPLM/A, the GoS makes no effort to reconcile its claim that the ABC Experts rendered their decision *ex aequo et bono* with its complaint that the ABC Experts’ decision wrongly relied on legal principles; nor does the GoS cite any legal authority that might establish the mandatory principles on which it relies. In the SPLM/A’s view, there was nothing in the Parties’ agreements that forbade the ABC Experts from considering legal principles – indeed, the logical predicate for the GoS *ex aequo et bono* argument is that the ABC Experts were required to consider legal principles. Moreover, nothing in the Parties’ agreements required the ABC Experts to specify the source of the legal principles they applied or to write a lengthy description of what those alleged legal principles were.

211. In any event, the SPLM/A submits that the ABC Experts identified the legal principles that they referred to as applicable in “former British colonies and protectorates, including Sudan (a Condominium)” and “Sudan” at the “time of the Condominium” and moreover cited a number of secondary sources about Sudanese and British colonial law. For the SPLM/A, the GoS’s objections to the accuracy of the legal analysis is not relevant to the excess of

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261 GoS Memorial, para. 268. See also discussion at paras. 204 and 206.
262 GoS Memorial, para. 268.
263 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 159.
265 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 839.
mandate question, while its objections to supposedly undefined legal principles are unfounded because the terms of the ABC Experts’ Report identified the sources of the legal principles the ABC Experts relied upon.\(^{266}\)

\[\text{(e) The ABC Experts Allegedly Took into Account the Location of Oil Fields in Deciding on the Transferred Area}\]

\[\text{(i) GoS Arguments}\]

212. The GoS observes that the northern boundary determined by the ABC Experts makes a perfect straight line, and the eastern boundary runs southwards in a perfect 90° angle to that northern boundary. As a consequence, all the major oilfields of Sudan are “conveniently” included in the Abyei Area.\(^{267}\) The GoS alleges that the ABC Experts took into full consideration the “Wealth Sharing” provisions in the CPA and Section 3 of the Abyei Protocol, which they strictly had no competence to take into account.\(^{268}\) According to the GoS, this constituted an obvious excess of mandate.\(^{269}\) The GoS also claims that, as admitted by the SPLM/A, the eastern boundary of the Abyei Area was “created” by the 90° southern turn, and the “created” eastern boundary was an excess of the ABC Experts’ mandate, which was merely to define the boundary resulting from an executed transfer.\(^{270}\)

213. The GoS also argues that evidence of partiality on the part of the ABC Experts is found in an interview given by Dr. Douglas Johnson, one of the ABC Experts, to the \textit{Sudan Tribune} on May 29, 2006,\(^{271}\) as well as in the fact that Dr. Johnson was later engaged as an expert

\(^{266}\) SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 840.


\(^{268}\) See GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 155-156.

\(^{269}\) GoS Memorial, paras. 270-271.

\(^{270}\) GoS Oral Pleadings, April 20, 2009, Transcr. 18/06-16.

\(^{271}\) The quoted text reads:

The other aspect is that the Abyei area is contained within one of the oil blocks, and there has been quite a lot of exploration and drilling of oil wells in the area. Now, we were not shown a map of where these oil wells were. We were told our mandate was to define the area in 1905 – of course there were no oil wells in 1905. There was no mechanised farming; there was no railway; there were no towns. If we had taken into consideration these developments since 1905, we would have been violating our mandate.

But there is a lot of oil there – the Abyei Protocol stipulates that the oil revenues that come from the sale of oil in the Abyei area be divided between the Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka, the government and the SPLM. If the boundary is defined one way, it puts quite a lot of oil in the Abyei area, and therefore more of that oil revenue has to be shared. If we had accepted the government’s claim that the boundary was the river, there would have been no oil revenue to share.
consultant by the Government of South Sudan. The ABC Experts allegedly knew about the location of the oil fields in Abyei at the time they wrote the report, as such information was already available in 2005. Because of such purported lack of impartiality, the GoS argues that its fundamental right to equal and impartial treatment was violated. Further, such considerations are also allegedly indicative of the fact that the ABC Experts did not decide on the basis of “scientific analysis and research.”

(ii) SPLM/A Arguments

214. For the SPLM/A, the ABC Experts’ Report explains in detail the reason for the choice of borders, and the suggestion that the north-east turning point was motivated by partiality cannot be sustained. While the ABC Experts accepted the specific co-ordinates of the eastern boundary proposed by the SPLM/A, the SPLM/A notes that these co-ordinates were not challenged by the GoS, which offered no evidence and made no claims regarding where the eastern boundary of the Abyei Area should lie if the ABC Experts concluded that the northern boundary was above the River Kir.

215. The SPLM/A also attempts to show how, in its view, the ABC Experts selected the eastern boundary (and the north eastern turning point): as a result of the Abyei Protocol, the southern and western boundaries of the Abyei Area were expected to follow existing boundaries, and only the northern and eastern boundaries remained to be identified, defined and demarcated by the ABC. After determining the northern boundary at approximately the 10°22’30"N latitude, the ABC Experts were purportedly faced with the situation in which no natural “cut-off line” existed to create an eastern boundary, as this latitude continues


As quoted in GoS Memorial, para. 274.

GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 98/02.
GoS Rejoinder, para. 191.
GoS Rejoinder, para. 190.
GoS Rejoinder, para. 193.
See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 843-847.
SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 848.
uninterrupted by other internal boundaries all the way to the Kordofan-Upper Nile boundary (approximately 260 kilometers further east than the point at which the north-east corner of the boundary as determined by the ABC Experts lies). According to the SPLM/A, the ABC Experts had little alternative but to draw a “dog-leg” extending south from the northern boundary to some appropriate place in order to complete the Abyei Area. The “dog-leg” chosen extended the existing line of the Kordofan-Upper Nile boundary at 29°32’15”N longitude (where the boundary makes an approximate 60° turn east) due northwards to meet latitude 10°22’30”N (this appears as a perpendicular line). Further, the SPLM/A asserts that the ABC Experts had been presented with evidence that the Ngok Dinka were located in 1905 in areas very close to 29°32’15”N.279

216. Finally, the SPLM/A submits that Dr. Johnson’s interview could not be evidence that the ABC Experts acted partially. On the contrary, as he explained in the interview, the ABC Experts were not shown a map of where the oil wells were.280

5. **Admissibility of Excess of Mandate Claims**

217. As a counter to the GoS’s claims that the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate, the SPLM/A raises a number of claims of its own, contending that: (a) that the GoS excluded or waived any rights to claim that the ABC exceeded their mandate, and (b) the ABC Experts’ Report is entitled to presumptive finality.

   (a) **The GoS Allegedly Waived its Objections to the ABC Experts’ Report**

   (i) **SPLM/A Arguments**

218. The SPLM/A submits that the GoS waived its objections to the ABC Experts’ Report by agreeing that the Report would be final and binding and would be given immediate effect without any possibility for appeal or other challenge.281 The SPLM/A notes that this agreement was recorded specifically in the Abyei Appendix, the Abyei Protocol, the Terms of Reference and the Rules of Procedure; none of these instruments provides that the ABC

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279 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 848-854.
280 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 855 and 856.
281 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 322. See e.g. Section 5 of the Abyei Appendix, text *supra* at note 107.
Experts’ Report would be subject to any sort of review or possible delay in implementation by either Party.\(^{282}\)

219. Furthermore, the SPLM/A believes it well-settled that jurisdictional and procedural objections must be raised at the earliest opportunity; otherwise they are waived. For the SPLM/A, the GoS raised no objections at any time during the ABC’s work (instead, it actively participated); moreover, the GoS repeatedly and explicitly affirmed that the ABC’s decision would be final and binding.\(^{283}\)

220. The SPLM/A also posits that it cannot be prevented (or estopped) from claiming that GoS waived its rights to claim an excess of mandate, as the choice of law clause in the Arbitration Agreement allowed the application of general principles of law and practice, such as the rules of waiver and exclusion, to govern this dispute.\(^{284}\)

(ii) GoS Arguments

221. In response, the GoS argues that it was precisely because there were serious doubts about respect for their mandate by the ABC Experts that both Parties agreed, pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement, to submit the present dispute to the Tribunal. Since it has agreed to these proceedings, it is the SPLM/A that is now estopped from raising objections against the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.\(^{285}\)

222. The GoS also asserts that it had fully and completely complied with the requirement that jurisdictional objections must be raised at the earliest opportunity. It immediately objected to the ABC Experts’ Report when it was presented to the Presidency on the ground that the ABC Experts failed to respect their mandate. As for other procedural violations, the GoS claims that it protested as soon as such violations were brought to its knowledge.\(^{286}\) A

\(^{282}\) SPLM/A Memorial, para. 798.

\(^{283}\) SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 323. The SPLM/A quotes the GoS’s Ambassador Dirdeiry:

When a decision is agreed and accepted before hand to be final and binding, it is not acceptable by anybody to deny the right of that committee or body to issue that decision. And, its unmanly of any person not to accept that decision and respect it.

\(^{284}\) SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 329.

\(^{285}\) GoS Rejoinder, para. 73. \textit{See also} GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 54/13 – 56/07.

\(^{286}\) GoS Rejoinder, para. 74.
waiver of rights by a State cannot be presumed lightly, and the GoS argues that it expressly and vigorously protested as soon as it came to know of violations of its rights.287

(b) The GoS is Allegedly Bound by the Principles of Presumptive Finality

(i) SPLM/A Arguments

223. For the SPLM/A, the ABC conducted itself in the manner of an adjudicative body and rendered an adjudicative decision, leaving no doubt that the principles of finality and res judicata were applicable to the ABC Experts’ Report.288 Moreover, the presumptive finality and validity of international adjudicatory decisions is especially compelling where boundary determinations are at issue.289 The principle of presumptive finality and validity means that an adjudicative decision or an award can be set aside solely in rare, narrow and exceptional circumstances,290 such as when the relevant parties agree.291 Here, SPLM/A submits that the Arbitration Agreement has not set aside the ABC Experts’ Report and the principle of presumptive finality and validity still applies.292

(ii) GoS Arguments

224. The GoS agrees that, in principle, boundary settlements enjoy a particular stability and permanence. However, the GoS maintains that the boundary has not been definitely settled in this case. According to it, the Tribunal has been charged by the Parties with determining whether there has been an excess of mandate, and, if the answer is in the affirmative, with defining the boundaries of the Abyei Area. It is only after the Tribunal has performed its duty that principles of res judicata and finality will apply.293

B. Delimitation of the Abyei Area

225. If, as a result of its “excess of mandate” inquiry under Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement, the Tribunal were to decide that the ABC Experts did exceed their mandate, then it would “proceed to define (i.e. delimit) on map the area of the nine Ngok Dinka

287 GoS Rejoinder, paras. 75-76.
288 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 729.
289 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 132.
290 See SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 19, 2009, Transcr. 63/22.
291 See SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 19, 2009 Transcr. 66/05-16.
292 Id.
293 GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 122-123.
Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905” in accordance with Article 2(c) of the Arbitration Agreement. Within the ambit of Article 2(c) inquiry, the GoS submits that “the boundaries of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905 are as shown on Figure 17 on page 159 of the GoS Memorial, being the area bounded on the north by the Bahr el-Arab and otherwise by the boundaries of Kordofan as at independence.”

226. According to the GoS, the question of delimiting the Abyei Area must first be answered by determining what the provincial boundary between Bahr el Ghazal and Kordofan was before the 1905 transfer, as the transfer to Kordofan could not have included any areas previously located in Kordofan. Second, delimitation must include an identification of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms which previously fell within the province of Bahr el Ghazal and which was transferred to Kordofan in 1905.

227. By contrast, the SPLM/A submits that the putative boundary between Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal, which it claims was indefinite and indeterminate, does not define the Abyei Area. In the SPLM/A’s view, if the Tribunal were to decide that the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate, then it “should go on to define the Abyei Area to encompass all of the territory occupied and used by the Ngok Dinka in 1905” and declare that “the boundaries of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905 are the current boundary of Kordofan and Bahr el-Ghazal to the south extending to 10°35’N latitude to the north and the current boundary of Kordofan and Darfur to the west extending to 29°32’15’E longitude to the east.”

1. The scope of the Tribunal’s mandate under Article 2(c) of the Arbitration Agreement

(a) GoS Arguments

228. According to the GoS, if the Tribunal determines pursuant to Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement that the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate, then it must, under Article 2(c), decide de novo and reach its own conclusion on the delimitation of the Abyei Area based on

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294 GoS Memorial, p. 160 (“Submissions”). See also GoS Counter-Memorial, last page and GoS Rejoinder, p. 162. A reproduction of that map is found supra at para. 37.

295 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 383.

296 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 869.

297 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 885; SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1601.
the Parties’ submissions.\footnote{See GoS Rejoinder, para. 4. See also GoS Oral Pleadings, April 23, 2009, Transcr. 29/15-30/01.} The GoS insists that the triggering of Article 2(c) should occur once the Tribunal finds an excess of mandate “in any respect.”\footnote{See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 20, 2009 Transcr. 104/13-25.}

229. Accordingly, as to the probative value of the ABC Experts’ Report under Article 2(c) inquiry, the GoS maintains that the Tribunal may take information contained in the Report into account, but only as mere evidence.\footnote{See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 20, 2009 Transcr. 104/02-08, 105/12-13. See also GoS Memorial, para. 278.}

(b) SPLM/A Arguments

230. By contrast, the SPLM/A submits that in the event that elements of the ABC Experts’ Report are found to be in excess of mandate, any portions of the ABC Experts’ Report that are not so vitiated must, under general principles of law, remain final and binding on the Tribunal.\footnote{See SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 133/08-21.}

231. Moreover, the SPLM/A maintains that the Tribunal is not a \textit{de novo} decision-maker under Article 2(c) of the Arbitration Agreement. Consequently, if the Tribunal were to hold that the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate under Article 2(a), then “it would be appropriate for the Tribunal to rely upon the Commission’s determinations concerning the scope of the Abyei Area.”\footnote{See SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1198. See also SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1201.}

2. The interpretation of the definition of the Abyei Area as set out in the Abyei Protocol and the Arbitration Agreement

232. The GoS argues that the definition of the Abyei Area contained in Section 1.1.2 of the Abyei Protocol and Article 2(c) of the Arbitration Agreement should be interpreted as referring to the 1905 administrative transfer of a specific, territorially-defined area that previously formed part of the province of Bahr el Ghazal to the province of Kordofan (the “Territorial Interpretation”).\footnote{See GoS Counter Memorial, para. 90. Notably, in the GoS’s view, the issue of interpretation of the mandate should be addressed under both Article 2(a) and Article 2(c) of the Arbitration Agreement. See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 24/13-16.} In contrast, the SPLM/A contends that these provisions should be understood as referring to the transfer of the Ngok Dinka people as a whole, \textit{i.e.} not merely some of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms or some of their territory (the “Tribal
Interpretation”). To support their respective positions, both Parties rely on (a) the plain language and grammatical meaning of the Formula, (b) the purposes underlying the definition chosen by the Parties, and (c) the drafting history of the Abyei Protocol.

(a) The plain language and grammatical interpretation of the Formula set out in Section 1.1.2 of the Abyei Protocol and Article 2(c) of the Arbitration Agreement

(i) GoS Arguments

233. For the GoS, the plain meaning of the Formula is clear and does not require recourse to any supplementary sources of interpretation. The Formula has a temporal dimension: it refers to a “documented historical event” that took place in 1905, the “critical date […] as of which the facts relating to the transfer fall to be assessed.” It also has an obvious territorial dimension: it refers to “an area transferred at a defined time and not an area populated or used at some other, undefined time.” The GoS thus contends that “the only reasonable and defensible interpretation of the text is that it mandates [this] Tribunal to ‘confirm’ on map the boundaries of the area of the [sic] transferred in 1905.”

234. Examining the grammatical structure of the Formula, the GoS argues that in ordinary English, the word “transferred” is equally capable of qualifying the noun “area” as the phrase “nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms.” Read in context – a transfer between two provinces – the phrase “transferred to Kordofan” is in fact more likely to refer to “the area” rather than “the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms.” The SPLM/A’s application of a self-serving grammatical rule of proximity, instead of relying on euphony, is in the GoS’s view utterly artificial. More importantly, the SPLM/A’s interpretation allegedly ignores

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304 See SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1095. Notably, the SPLM/A considers the ABC Experts’ and the Tribunal’s interpretation of the mandate as a “matter of substance.” Thus, under the SPLM/A’s theory, the Tribunal only address this issue as part of its Article 2(c) inquiry (see SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 19, 2009 Transcr. 175/10 et seq.).

305 See GoS Memorial, para. 23; GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 115.

306 GoS Rejoinder, para. 10.

307 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 100.

308 GoS Memorial, para. 24.

309 GoS Memorial, para. 25. See also GoS Memorial, para. 29.

310 GoS Rejoinder, para. 32.

311 GoS Rejoinder, para. 32.

312 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 31/14-17.

313 GoS Counter Memorial, para. 106. See also GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 31/08 et seq.
the preposition “to” after the verb “transferred.” Even if the SPLM/A’s grammatical construction were correct and “transferred” could only relate to “chiefdoms,” the GoS maintains that the Formula could not possibly be interpreted as referring to all of the territory of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms, including the territory of chiefdoms already in Kordofan in 1905.

235. In addition, the SPLM/A purportedly adds words that do not appear in the Formula when it argues that Section 1.1.2 of the Abyei Protocol “referred to all of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms that were transferred in 1905” or “the area inhabited and used by the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms.” The words “all” and “that were” are _ex post facto_ additions to the Formula that alter its plain meaning. For the GoS, the words “inhabited” and “used” introduce a demographic dimension otherwise absent from the Formula.

236. The GoS further submits that the SPLM/A misconstrues the language appearing in the 1905 transfer documents in order to corroborate its grammatical analysis and to conclude that all of the territory occupied and used by the Ngok Dinka was transferred to Kordofan in 1905.

237. Contrary to the SPLM/A’s assertions, the GoS emphasizes that none of the relevant transfer documents refer to a transfer of the Ngok Dinka “people.” Nor do they employ the words “inhabited and used” in referring to the transfer. Instead, they refer to “the country” or “the territories” of Sultan Rob, or the “districts” of Sultan Rob and Sheikh Rihan. The GoS relies in particular on Governor-General Wingate’s statement that:

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314 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 108.
315 GoS Rejoinder, para. 28 quoting SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1512.
316 GoS Rejoinder, para. 21 quoting SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 76.
317 GoS Rejoinder, para. 23.
318 GoS Counter Memorial, para. 513 _et seq._
319 GoS Rejoinder, para. 16.
320 GoS Rejoinder, para. 24.
321 Sudan Intelligence Reports, No. 128 (March 1905), p. 3 (SM Annex 9).
324 GoS Rejoinder, paras. 16, 24.
The districts of Sultan Rob and Okwai, to the south of the Bahr el-Arab and formerly a portion of the Bahr el-Ghazal Province, have been incorporated into Kordofan.  

238. For the GoS, Wingate’s Memorandum does not contain any reference to the Ngok Dinka “people” or the area “inhabited and used” by them, and clearly locates the “districts of Sultan Rob and Sheikh Rihan” “to the south of the Bahr el-Arab,” purportedly the then provincial boundary, thus establishing a “specific geographic limitation to the districts that were transferred.”

239. Finally, the GoS contends that the SPLM/A’s own submissions before the ABC show that prior to adopting its new tribal reading of the Formula, the SPLM/A considered that the “area” or “territory” was the key criterion to the understanding of Section 1.1.2 and the 1905 transfer documents. Referring to the passage of the March 1905 SIR) concerning the transfer, the GoS points to the SPLM/A’s argument before the ABC that

[… the reasons for the transfer of the two areas and not the people are explicitly stated – the occasional raids by the Southern Kordofan Arabs.

240. The GoS concludes that the focus of the Formula in Section 1.1.2 of the Abyei Protocol is on the area transferred to Kordofan, not the people, as contended by the SPLM/A in its declarations before the ABC. In its view, this was also the focus of the Condominium officials in the 1905 transfer documents. The GoS thus submits that the Tribunal should conform to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement by giving full effect to the plain and ordinary language of the Formula, which refers to the transfer of a specific area.

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326 GoS Rejoinder, para. 25.
327 GoS Rejoinder, para. 34 quoting SPLM/A Preliminary Presentation on the Boundaries of the Abyei Area (First SPLM/A Presentation) p. 2, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/1, and para. 36 quoting SPLM/A Preliminary Presentation on the Boundaries of the Abyei Area (First SPLM/A Presentation) p. 4, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/1.
328 GoS Rejoinder, para. 37 quoting SPLM/A Final Presentation on the Boundaries of the Abyei Area, p. 27, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/13.
330 GoS Rejoinder, para. 39.
332 GoS Rejoinder, para. 59.
(ii) SPLM/A Arguments

241. The SPLM/A’s reading of the Formula differs. It argues that the phrase “the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905” should be read in light of the “grammatical rule of proximity” whereby a “post-modifying construction in a noun phrase [relates] to the immediately previous noun.” The SPLM/A contends that the grammatically correct reading of Section 1.1.2 is to relate the phrase ‘transferred to Kordofan’ to the noun of ‘chiefdoms.’ The latter, and not the “area,” must be understood to have been transferred to Kordofan.

242. For the SPLM/A, the use of the phrase “area” in turn “serves to describe quantitatively the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms being transferred, indicating that the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms are capable of being properly defined and demarcated.” Otherwise, the draftsmen of the Abyei Protocol would have opted for the phrase “that part of the area … that was transferred…” In addition, it is clear for the SPLM/A that Section 1.1.2 refers to all of the area in question, since the Formula includes the terms “nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms.” Submitting that three of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms are located entirely to the north of the Kir River, the SPLM/A argues that interpreting Section 1.1.2 in such a way as to exclude certain chiefdoms from the Abyei Area would contradict the plain language of the Section.

243. The SPLM/A goes on to argue that Section 1.1.2 refers to “a transfer of the Ngok Dinka from the administration of Bahr el-Ghazal to the administration of Kordofan.” Therefore, contrary to the GoS’s allegation, the SPLM/A’s interpretation does take into account the phrase “transferred to Kordofan.”

333 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1105.
334 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1107. See also SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 1505-1509 and Professor David Crystal Expert Report, Appendix A to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial.
335 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1510. See also SPLM/A Memorial, at p. 263, para. 1108.
336 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1511.
337 See SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1110; SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1512.
338 See SPLM/A Map Atlas vol. 1, Maps 15 (Achaak Chiefdom, 1905), 17 (Alei Chiefdom, 1905) and 19 (Bongo Chiefdom, 1905).
339 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 1513-1514.
340 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 835.
341 Id.
244. The SPLM/A also contends that its interpretation finds further support in the language of
the 1905 transfer documents, which refer to a transfer of the Ngok Dinka Paramount Chief
and/or his territories, not merely some sub-chief or some portion of his territories.  

245. The 1905 Wingate Memorandum, which the GoS sees as a crucial document, merely
describes the “general location of the Ngok and the Twic” in “an ex post facto and
general summary of the earlier 1905 transfer decision (as he understood it).” Much more
significant for the SPLM/A is the March 1905 SIR, whose plain language shows that the
Condominium intended to transfer Sultan Rob, Sheikh Rihan and their people. 

It has been decided that Sultan Rob, whose country is on the Kir river, and Sheikh
Rihan of Toj … are to belong to Kordofan Province. These people have, on certain
occasions, complained of raids made on them by southern Kordofan Arabs, and it has
therefore been considered advisable to place them under the same Governor as the
Arabs of whose conduct they complain. 

246. In the SPLM/A’s view, the words “these people” obviously refer to the Ngok Dinka and
the Twic people in their entirety, and not merely to two individuals (Sultan Rob and Sheikh
Rihan). According to the ABC Experts, this document also provided “[…] the official
principal reason for the transfer of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms […]”. It is the same
document that the GoS clearly interpreted as registering a transfer of people when it
referred before the ABC to “The Decision to Transfer the Ngok and Twij to Kordofan,” and
“The Reason [for] Transferring the Ngok and the Twij to Kordofan.” The SPLM/A also

342 See SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1112 and SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at pp. 375-376, para. 1545 both quoting
Sudan, 1905, Province of Bahr el-Ghazal, p. 3, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/13, and Sudan Intelligence Report,
No. 128, March 1905, p. 3, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/8. See also SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 857; SPLM/A Oral

343 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 860.

344 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 212/25 et seq.


346 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 213/05 et seq.

347 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 219/19-22 quoting the ABC Experts’ Report, Part II, App. 2, at
pp. 22-23, Appendix B to SPLM/A Memorial.

348 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 216/16 et seq. quoting GoS First Presentation to the ABC,
Slide 31, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/2. See also the GoS reference to “The Decision to Transfer the Ngok and the
Twij To Kordofan” in GoS first Presentation to the ABC, Slide 32, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/2.
notes that the GoS acknowledged in its Memorial that the transfer recorded in the March 1905 SIR was a transfer of “groups,” “the Ngok and the Twic.”

247. Lastly, the SPLM/A emphasizes the fact that during the ABC proceedings, the GoS never objected to the ABC Experts’ unanimous interpretation of the definition of the Abyei Area, which reflects the natural meaning and purposes of Section 1.1.2. of the Abyei Protocol.

248. The SPLM/A thus concludes that the natural meaning and structure of the text in Section 1.1.2 of the Abyei Protocol can only be interpreted as referring to the transfer of the entire Ngok Dinka people.

(b) The purposes underlying the definition of the Abyei Area set out in Section 1.1.2 of the Abyei Protocol and Article 2(c) of the Arbitration Agreement

(i) GoS Arguments

249. Having stated that “the context and object and purpose of the arbitration agreement provide the guideline for the interpretation,” the GoS focuses on the object and purpose of the 1905 transfer, which is also clear: “[i]t was an administrative decision to transfer an area from one province to another to enable better administrative control over tensions between Baggara Arab and Dinka tribes.” The SPLM/A’s reliance for its interpretation on other factors that are alien to the way the Condominium officials viewed the situation in 1905 is ill-founded.

250. Thus, the SPLM/A’s argument that the GoS’s reading of the Formula would arbitrarily divide the territory of the Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms is misplaced. The GoS insists that “[t]here was no intent by Sudanese Government officials at the time to ‘arbitrarily divide’ the Ngok Dinka.” To the extent that there were any Ngok Dinka north of the Bahr el

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350 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1549 quoting GoS Memorial, paras. 357, 359. See also SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 805.
351 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 115.
352 GoS Rejoinder, paras. 41-42.
353 GoS Rejoinder, para. 46.
Arab, the provincial boundary in 1905, they were already in Kordofan and did not need to be transferred.\textsuperscript{356}

251. Similarly, the SPLM/A’s complaint that the GoS’s interpretation would exclude three of the nine Chiefdoms (the Alei, the Achaak and the Bongo) from the Abyei Area finds no support in the contemporary documents.\textsuperscript{357}

252. Further, the SPLM/A’s contention that the GoS’s interpretation would also exclude Abyei from the Abyei Area is at odds with both the contemporary evidence and the intention of the Anglo-Egyptian administrators at the time.\textsuperscript{358} The GoS points out that Abyei Town did not exist in 1905 and “played no role whatsoever in the thinking of Sudanese officials in 1905 when they decided the transfer […],”\textsuperscript{359} pointing further to Section 7 of the Abyei Appendix which contemplates that Abyei Town may not be located in the Abyei Area.\textsuperscript{360}

253. Lastly, the GoS dismisses as being “based on present day demographics” the SPLM/A’s argument that the purpose of the Abyei Area’s definition is to uphold the Ngok Dinka’s right to self-determination, a concept that was not referred to in the Formula or taken into account in transferring the Ngok Dinka districts to Kordofan in 1905.\textsuperscript{361} Invoking the principle of self-determination now “is in effect to re-open the negotiated settlement of the Abyei Protocol for the benefit of one of the parties and to the detriment of the other.”\textsuperscript{362}

254. In sum, “it is by reference to the events that took place in 1905 relating to the area that was transferred that the resolution of the present dispute should be based,” not by reference to other factors irrelevant in 1905.\textsuperscript{363}

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\textsuperscript{356} GoS Rejoinder, para. 46.
\textsuperscript{357} GoS Rejoinder, para. 48.
\textsuperscript{358} GoS Rejoinder, paras. 52-53.
\textsuperscript{359} GoS Rejoinder, para. 53. \textit{See also} GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 40/15 \textit{et seq}.
\textsuperscript{360} GoS Rejoinder, para. 55 referring to Abyei Appendix, attached to the ABC Experts’ Report, paragraph 7 (SM Annex 81).
\textsuperscript{361} GoS Rejoinder, para. 57.
\textsuperscript{362} GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 39/11-16. \textit{See also} GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 89.
\textsuperscript{363} GoS Rejoinder, para. 59.
(ii) SPLM/A Arguments

255. The SPLM/A argues that its Tribal Interpretation of the Formula is in accordance with “the central purpose of the definition of the Abyei Area [which] was to specify that region whose residents would be entitled to participate in the Abyei Referendum.” The Abyei Referendum being designed to permit the Ngok Dinka to vote on whether or not to be included in the South, the SPLM/A contends that it would be absurd to define the Abyei Area as including only some of the Ngok Dinka territory or some of the nine Chiefdoms. Such a definition would be contrary to the “basic principles of self-determination underlying the Abyei Protocol.”

256. The SPLM/A maintains that, instead of addressing this issue, the GoS addresses the dissimilar question of the purpose of the 1905 transfer, which is “completely irrelevant to the purposes of the GoS and the SPLM/A in concluding the 2005 Abyei Protocol.” The GoS’s interpretation of Section 1.1.2 of the Abyei Protocol, which reduces the Abyei Area to a 14-mile wide strip of swamp land along the Bahr el Arab’s southern bank, runs counter to the fundamental purpose of the Abyei Protocol and the CPA -- resulting in the exclusion of the majority of territory occupied and used by the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms, including three chiefdoms in their entirety, and arbitrarily dividing Ngok Dinka lands on the basis of what was an uncertain, provisional and approximate boundary in 1905. Similarly, if the Abyei Area were to be limited to territory south of the Bahr el Arab/Kir, it would not be the “bridge” between the north and the south, as contemplated by Section 1.1.1 of the Abyei Protocol.

257. Further, the GoS’s interpretation of the Formula excludes Abyei Town, which has been “the undisputed center of Ngok Dinka political, cultural and commercial life for more than a century,” from the Abyei Area. The SPLM/A further argues that this inconceivable result

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364 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1124. The SPLM/A refers to Section 8 of the Abyei Protocol.
365 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 202/22 et seq.
366 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1125; see also paras. 111-113, paras. 133-136 and paras. 206-216. See also SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1519.
367 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 849.
368 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 1523, 1530-1531.
369 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 81, 1538, 1543-1544.
370 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1129.
371 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1126.
would be incompatible with Section 7 of the Abyei Appendix. The GoS’s argument that Abyei town did not exist in 1905 misses the point; it is a fact that the Ngok Dinka Paramount Chief resided in Burakol at the time, near present day Abyei Town.

258. The SPLM/A goes on to argue that the witness testimony of the individuals involved in the drafting of the Abyei Protocol (Lieutenant General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, Mr. Jeffrey Millington and Minister Deng Alor Kuol) confirms that the purpose behind the definition of the Abyei Area was to encompass the entirety of Ngok Dinka territory and all of the nine Chiefdoms.

259. Lastly, the SPLM/A stresses that the composition of the ABC, as contemplated in the Abyei Annex, included specialists “with complementary expertise precisely tailored to the task before them – defining the area used and occupied by the Ngok Dinka in 1905”. In the same way, the Parties “provided a set of procedures that were equally well-tailored to the same task.”

260. The SPLM/A concludes that “the obvious purposes of Section 1.1.2 and the other provisions of the Abyei Protocol and Abyei Appendix require defining the Abyei Area to include all of the territory of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms in 1905.”

(c) The drafting history of the Abyei Protocol

(i) GoS Arguments

261. According to the GoS, the negotiating history of the Formula confirms that the 1905 transfer was not a transfer of people and thus supports the GoS’s Territorial Interpretation.
262. During the 1999-2005 peace talks, Southern Sudan was granted the right to self-determination and, in January 2000, the SPLM/A requested that this right be exercised in a referendum that would include, *inter alia*, “the District of Abyei whose population is of Ngok Dinka.”

The GoS rejected the SPLM/A’s request, arguing that Abyei was not part of the South and that the 1956 boundaries were “sacrosanct.” The SPLM/A maintained that the boundary should be drawn further north to include “all the land allegedly inhabited by Ngok Dinka before the Abyei Agreement of 1966.”

263. The GoS goes on to observe that it was the SPLM/A that introduced the concept of an area “annexed to the north for administrative purposes” for the first time in 2000. The GoS then notes that Dr. Douglas Johnson presented a paper at a workshop organized by IGAD in 2003 in which he explicitly referred to the passage of the March 1905 SIR concerning the transfer of Sultan Rob to the province of Kordofan. The GoS insists that “it was precisely this passage which led to the formulation of the ABC’s mandate and that of the Tribunal […].” Indeed, on March 19, 2004, the US Special Envoy to Sudan, Senator Danforth, broke the deadlock with a proposal entitled “Principles of Agreement for Abyei” containing the agreed Formula. All attempts by the SPLM/A to qualify the Formula by reference to later dates so as to recuperate Ngok territorial gains subsequent to 1905 were rejected. The Formula was eventually enshrined in the Abyei Protocol and regarded as “self-explanatory” by the Parties.

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380 GoS Memorial, paras. 45-49 referring to First Meeting of the Political Committee between Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Nairobi, 15th-20th January, 2000, p. 3. See also Second Meeting of the Political Committee between Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Nairobi, 26th February, 2000, p. 7.
381 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 36/01-03.
383 GoS Memorial, para. 50 referring to Second Meeting of the Political Committee between Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Nairobi, 26th February, 2000, p. 8.
384 GoS Memorial, para. 51 referring to Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 128 (March 1905), p. 3 (SM Annex 9).
385 GoS Memorial, para. 359.
386 GoS Memorial, para. 53.
387 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 23, 2009, Transcr. 23/13 et seq. See also Witness Statement, para. 23 (SCM WS 2).
388 GoS Memorial, para. 53.
389 GoS Memorial, para. 54.
264. The GoS concludes that the drafting history of the Formula warrants a Territorial Interpretation on at least three grounds:

1. The Abyei Protocol constituted an exception to the territorial principle of the *uti possidetis* of 1956, repeatedly affirmed in the CPA.

2. The territorial integrity of Kordofan was upheld against a claim to an extensive tribal boundary of 1966.

3. But an exception was made for an area administratively added to Kordofan in 1905. That area, once identified, could in principle be returned to Bahr el-Ghazal if the inhabitants preferred that course of action.\(^{390}\)

(ii) SPLM/A Arguments

265. The SPLM/A contends that its Tribal Interpretation of Section 1.1.2 of the Abyei Protocol is fully corroborated by the drafting history of the Abyei Protocol.\(^{391}\)

266. When the peace negotiations resumed between the Parties, the SPLM/A consistently emphasized in a number of papers that the Ngok Dinka had a right to self-determination\(^{392}\) and constituted a “single cultural unit,” which “up to 1905 […] was administratively and politically a part of the South,”\(^{393}\) before its annexing to Kordofan.\(^{394}\) The GoS was for its part primarily concerned by the alleged Ngok Dinka northern expansion following 1905.\(^{395}\) It argued that the Abyei Area should only include the “traditional Abyei,”\(^{396}\) without putting forward an actual definition of the Area.\(^{397}\)

\(^{390}\) GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 36/24-37/08. See also GoS Oral Pleadings, April 23, 2009, Transcr. 22/15 et seq.

\(^{391}\) See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1565.

\(^{392}\) SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1161; see also paras. 1156-1160.


\(^{394}\) See SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1167 quoting Draft Agreement between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA) on the Three Areas of Abyei, The Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile (FUNJ Region), dated 21 October 2003, at p. 1, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 10/40; See also SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1168 quoting Witness Statement of Minister Deng Alor Kuol, para. 41 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 1).

\(^{395}\) See SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1149.


267. In its written submissions and at the hearings, the SPLM/A agreed however with the GoS that while the key passage from the March 1905 SIR – a document which clearly demonstrates that the 1905 transfer was the transfer of the Ngok Dinka people – was examined by the negotiators in 2003 and “led to the formulation of the ABC’s mandate,” the Wingate Memorandum was not considered.  

268. The SPLM/A goes on to note that, in March 2004, U.S. Senator Danforth presented to the Parties a U.S. proposal entitled “Principles on Agreement on Abyei,” which defined Abyei as the “area of the nine Ngoc [sic] Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905,” thereby reproducing an important aspect of the SPLM/A’s proposed formulation in its previous draft agreements. Further discussions eventually led to the production of a joint draft which mirrored the Danforth proposal and became Section 1.1.2 of the Abyei Protocol.

269. In the SPLM/A’s analysis, it is clear that the final text was tailored to give effect to the unity of the Ngok Dinka people and its aspiration to self-determination, and not to truncate the Ngok Dinka traditional homeland by reference to the 1905 provincial boundaries of Sudan.

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398 GoS Memorial, para. 359; SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1547; SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 804. See also SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 208/11 et seq.

399 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 208/11 et seq.


402 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1184.

403 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1189.
3. The relevance of the Kordofan/Bahr el Ghazal boundary to the delimitation of the area transferred in 1905

(a) Did the Bahr el Arab constitute a precise and proclaimed provincial boundary between Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal and the northern limit of the area transferred in 1905?

270. The GoS argues that the Condominium administration was present in the Abyei region and explored it prior to and in 1905. Despite limited and short-lived uncertainty surrounding the location of the Bahr el Arab, it is clear that there was a precise boundary between Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal on that river prior to the transfer and that the highest-ranking official, who knew where the Bahr el Arab was, considered it to be both the provincial boundary and the northern limit of the transferred area in 1905.\(^{404}\)

271. In contrast, the SPLM/A contends that, in 1905, at a time when there was virtually no administration in Southern Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal, there was widespread and prolonged confusion as to the location of the Bahr el Arab. Contrary to the GoS’s position, the provincial boundary between Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal was indeterminate in 1905 and irrelevant to a transfer that concerned a people as opposed to a specific area.

(i) The state of Condominium knowledge and administration of the Abyei region in 1905

(x) GoS Arguments

272. The GoS submits, relying on the writings of Francis Deng, that the remoteness of the Abyei region, and its inaccessibility to government officials in the early twentieth century, is greatly exaggerated.\(^{405}\) As indicated in the report of one of the GoS’s experts for these proceedings, Mr. Alistair Macdonald, the early 20\(^{th}\) century was, on the contrary, a period of exploration designed to give the Condominium a better understanding of the Abyei area.\(^{406}\) Bayldon was expressly sent by Wingate\(^{407}\) to the region with the instructions to explore the Bahr el Arab, and his progress was monitored closely by Governmental officials.\(^{408}\) It is

\(^{404}\) GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 468, 471, 479, GoS Rejoinder, paras. 341, 387.


\(^{406}\) GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 363; See Macdonald Report, paras. 3.2-3.28, discussing the exploratory journeys in the first decade of the 20\(^{th}\) century, and referring to Saunders, Wilkinson, Percival, Bayldon, Lloyd, Lyons, Comyn, Huntley-Walsh (Appendix to GoS Memorial).

\(^{407}\) GoS Memorial, para. 313 referring to Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan, Annual Report (1904), p. 8 (SM Annex 23); GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009 Transcr. 9/20 et seq.

\(^{408}\) GoS Rejoinder, para. 323; GoS Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 189/15-20 et seq.
obvious that the authorities wanted to elucidate the “river situation.”\footnote{GoS Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 190/13-19; \textit{See also} April 21, 2009, Transcr. 10/10-20.}

In opposition to the view of Professor Martin Daly, one of the SPLM/A’s experts for these proceedings, that “British knowledge of the Ngok was based on a few hours’ path crossing,”\footnote{Daly Expert Report, p. 43, Appendix to SPLM/A Memorial.} the GoS notes that between 1901 and 1904, Sultan Rob was visited at least once a year by British officials who even bestowed on him a Second Class Robe of Honor.\footnote{GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 250. The GoS refers to visits by Mahon, Wilkinson and Bayldon.} Other important evidence of administration is the fact that the 1905 transfer itself was officially recorded in the Annual Reports for both the provinces of Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal.\footnote{See \textit{Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan}, Annual Report (1905) Report for Bahr el-Ghazal Province (GoS Annex 24); \textit{Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan}, Annual Report (1905) Report for Kordofan Province (GoS Annex 24).}

(y) **SPLM/A Arguments**

273. The SPLM/A submits that there was no effective administration of the regions of northern Bahr el Ghazal and southwestern Kordofan before the transfer in 1905.\footnote{SPLM/A Memorial, paras. 280-296, SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1463, quoting the MENAS Report, para. 76 (Appendix to Counter-Memorial).}

274. In the early twentieth century, the region of southwestern Kordofan and northern Bahr el Ghazal was extremely remote and difficult to access, especially in the rainy season.\footnote{Daly Expert Report, p. 4, Appendix to SPLM/A Memorial.} Even in 1908, after the transfer, Condominium officials reported that the “whole Dinka country is difficult to traverse at any time.”\footnote{Sudan Intelligence Report 171, October 1908, at Appendix D, at p. 60, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 3/5 (emphasis added). \textit{See also} Notes on the Military Situation in the Southern Sudan and British East Africa, War Office 5 (1905) SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/10.} As stated by Professor Daly in his Report, the Sudan Government at that time was under-staffed and devoted most of its resources to more populous and accessible areas, such as Khartoum and the Nile Valley.\footnote{See Daly Expert Report, p. 5, Appendix to SPLM/A Memorial.} The local tribes, including the Ngok Dinka, were under some form of self-governance, and “were in effect sovereign”\footnote{SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 99/02-03.} and “left on their own.”\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 103/8-9.} The British made no effort to effectively administer them.\footnote{See SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 101/18-102/24.} The officials did not establish any permanent post, schools or health
clinics in the Abyei area. Their role was limited to “pacification” and maintaining order between the tribes. Therefore, “there was […] no point in delimiting a boundary” since “provincial boundaries simply did not matter.” Even if some British officials were sent on expeditions in this area, the goal was not to explore or establish administrative control but to inform the local population that the British were now in charge of Sudan.

(ii) The extent of the confusion regarding the location of the Bahr el Arab

(x) GoS Arguments

275. The GoS acknowledges that Wilkinson, who traveled from El Obeid to Sultan Rob’s in 1902, mistook the Ragaba ez Zarga for the Bahr el Arab. His mistake was reflected on the 1904 Sudan Intelligence Office Map and repeated by Percival.

276. The GoS further notes that the ABC Experts extensively relied upon Wilkinson’s account to reject the Bahr el Arab as the northern boundary of Bahr el Ghazal and conclude that the Ragaba ez Zarga was treated as the provincial boundary in 1905. However, the GoS submits that the confusion was short-lived and ended before the transfer in February 1905 with Bayldon’s report. The GoS cites to other contemporaneous reports and maps that

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420 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 101/12-16, 103/5-7.
421 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 99/24-100/7, 103/10-13. See also Daly Expert Report, pp. 33-34, Appendix to SPLM/A Memorial.
422 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 102/02-03.
424 Id. at 104/4-10. See also Second Daly Expert Report, p. 18, Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial.
425 See GoS Memorial, para. 317 and Macdonald Report, paras. 3.7-3.9 (Appendix to GoS Memorial).
426 See GoS Memorial, para. 317; Macdonald Report, para. 3.9 (Appendix to GoS Memorial); GoS Memorial Map Atlas, Map 7 (The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1904). See also GoS Oral Pleadings, April 20, 2009, Transcr. 110/20 et seq. (Macdonald presentation).
427 See GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 272 and Macdonald Report, paras. 3.8-4.4 (Appendix to GoS Memorial) and Percival, A., Route Report: Keilak to Wau, December 1904 (SCM Annex 26).
428 GoS Memorial, para. 314 et seq.
430 See GoS Memorial, para. 318 referring to Macdonald Report, paras. 3.20-3.28 (Appendix to GoS Memorial).
432 See GoS Memorial, para. 318. referring to Comyn, D, The Western Sources of the Nile (1907) 30 THE GEOGRAPHICAL JOURNAL, p. 524 (GoS Memorial, Annex 50) and Comyn’s map (Map 9 in GoS Memorial Map Atlas); GoS Memorial, para. 319 referring to Walsh’s report in the Sudan Intelligence Reports, No. 1605 (November 1907) Appendix B., p. 5 (SM Annex 15) and Sudan Intelligence Reports, No. 140, (March 1906),
promptly corrected Wilkinson’s mistakes and showed the Bahr el Arab at the right location. The GoS therefore agrees with Mr. Macdonald’s conclusion that: “a true understanding of which river was the Bahr el-Arab had been reached in published form in 1907, although men such as Comyn had determined this a year or two earlier.”

277. The GoS further insists that the very document on which the ABC Experts relied to demonstrate the confusion between the Ragaba ez Zarga and the Bahr el Arab, the 1905 Gleichen Handbook, contains a reference to Bayldon’s correction of Wilkinson’s mistake.

278. In addition, while much was known about the Bahr el Arab, the Ragaba ez Zarga was unknown both before and in 1905 and did not appear on a map before 1907. Given its indeterminate and seasonal nature, it could not have formed the boundary between Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal up to the boundary with Darfur. Indeed, maps and travel accounts of the period all indicate that there was a tripoint on the Bahr el Arab between the provinces of Darfur, Bahr el Ghazal and Kordofan.
Finally, the GoS suggests that even if the ABC Experts were correct in determining that the Ragaba ez Zarga was the provincial boundary between Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal before 1905, this would mean that the areas located north of the Ragaba ez Zarga were already part of Kordofan at the moment of the transfer, and as such could not have formed part of the area transferred. Therefore, the ABC erred in allocating areas to the Ngok Dinka that were north of the Ragaba ez Zarga.  

(y) SPLM/A Arguments

The SPLM/A first points out that the Ragaba ez Zarga and the Bahr el Arab, which shared many of the same features and characteristics, were easily confused with each other. These similarities are confirmed by the historical record, and in particular the observations of Percival, Wilkinson and Lloyd, Cunnison, witness evidence and modern expertise.

In addition, the SPLM/A argues that, contrary to the GoS’s assertions, the confusion regarding the location of the Bahr el Arab was neither isolated, nor quickly resolved. Indeed, even though certain Condominium officials may have known where the real Bahr el Arab was, there was no general agreement as to its location. The confusion created by

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438 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 388.
439 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 1400 et seq.
440 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1410.
446 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1408 quoting the MENAS Expert Report, para. 122, Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial; SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1409 quoting the MENAS Expert Report, para. 125, Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial; see also SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 758. See also SPLM/A Rejoinder, paras. 757, 759, 773-775.
447 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 777.
Wilkinson, who mistook the Ragaba ez Zarga for the Bahr el Arab, was shared by other officials such as Mahon, Percival, Boulnois, O’Connell, and Lloyd and reflected on maps, including the 1904 official Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Intelligence Office map reproduced in the 1905 Gleichen Handbook. It was also included in the 1906 Annual Report for Kordofan.

282. The SPLM/A further argues that the confusion was “in full force exactly at the time of the 1905 transfer of the Ngok Dinka.” Contrary to the GoS’s claim that Bayldon’s correction of Wilkinson’s mistake occurred in February 1905, the SPLM/A maintains that the documentary record clearly shows that the error “was not corrected until 1907 or 1908, two or three years after the 1905 transfer of the Ngok Dinka.” The SPLM/A notes that the Bayldon report was not available in February 1905 as it was clearly dated 20 March 1905, and that Wingate’s 1905 Memorandum indicates that “much of the course of these
rivers is still unknown [...] and doubt still exists as to the correct names of the intricate waterways which intersect this part of the Sudan.”

283. The SPLM/A thus argues that the conclusion of the ABC Experts as to when the confusion about the Bahr el Arab was resolved (i.e. 1908) “is not materially different from the GoS’s view that ‘a true understanding of which river was the Bahr el-Arab had been reached in published form in 1907’.”

284. The SPLM/A further notes that the GoS misinterprets the conclusions that the ABC drew from the confusion surrounding the Bahr el Arab. The GoS indeed contends that the ABC Experts concluded that “the southern boundary of Kordofan before 1905 was the Ragaba ez-Zarga” when, in reality, the ABC Experts considered, on the basis of the administration’s understanding, that the Ragaba ez Zarga “was treated” as the provincial boundary.

285. The SPLM/A also dismisses the GoS’s criticism of the ABC Experts’ decision to include in the Abyei Area a large area north of the Ragaba ez Zarga. This criticism is in fact based on the wrong premise that the Abyei Area’s northern boundary should necessarily be the Kordofan/Bahr el Ghazal boundary. Instead of attempting to infer what the Condominium authorities transferred to Kordofan by reference to this putative border, the GoS should have examined what the authorities considered they had transferred.

(iii) The Bahr el Arab as the alleged definitive boundary between Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal prior to 1905

(x) GoS Arguments

286. The GoS submits that a number of pre-1905 documents describe the Bahr el Arab as the provincial boundary between Bahr el Ghazal and Kordofan, including: Frank Lupton’s 1884

459 Reports on Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan in 1905; Memorandum of Major General Sir R. Wingate; Province of Bahr el-Ghazal, Province of Kordofan, p. 10, SPLM/A Memorial, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/13.


461 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1466 quoting GoS Memorial, at para. 324(b).


463 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1477.

464 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 1481-1482.

465 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1484.
writings;\textsuperscript{466} an 1884 report by the Intelligence Branch of the War Office;\textsuperscript{467} the 1898 first edition of the 1898 Gleichen Handbook;\textsuperscript{468} Mardon’s 1903 revised map (first issued in 1901);\textsuperscript{469} the 1902 to 1904 Bahr el Ghazal Annual Reports,\textsuperscript{470} the 1904 Kordofan Annual Report (which states that “the Darfur Frontier […] runs southwards, west of Dar Homr to the Bahr el-Arab which is the northern boundary of the Bahr el-Ghazal Province”),\textsuperscript{471} the 1905 Bahr el Ghazal Annual Report (which no longer refers to the provincial boundaries as being “vaguely defined”);\textsuperscript{472} and the 1905 Gleichen Handbook\textsuperscript{473} which includes two maps showing the Bahr el Arab as the northern border of the Bahr el Ghazal.\textsuperscript{474}

287. According to the GoS, it is clear from the contemporary record that the boundary between Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal before the 1905 transfer was the Bahr el Arab.\textsuperscript{475} The fact that the provincial boundaries were not prescribed in any kind of constitutional, legislative or executive document is immaterial, as no such legal requirement existed.\textsuperscript{476} Contrary to

\textsuperscript{466} See GoS Memorial, para. 292, referring to “Mr. Frank Lupton’s (Lupton Bey) Geographical Observations in the Bahr-el-Ghazal Region: With Introductory Remarks by Malcolm Lupton. Read at the Royal Geographical Society 10 March 1884,” (1884) 6 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY 245, p. 245 (SM Annex 57). See also Lupton’s 1884 Map which shows the Bahr el Arab (called “Bakara el Homr”) (GoS Memorial, Figure 7, p. 105; GoS Memorial Map Atlas, Map 2, The Province of Bahr el Ghazal, The Royal Geographic Society, 1884). The GoS also refers to the writings of Naum Shoucair, an historian who served as Chef-de-bureau of the Sudan Agent General in Cairo: see GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 21-22, 440-442, 446 SHOUCAIR, N., HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY OF THE SUDAN, (1903), p. 71 (SCM Annex 1).

\textsuperscript{467} See GoS Memorial, para. 293; Report of the Egyptian Province of the Sudan, Red Sea, and Equator (1884), p. 91 (SM Annex 28).


\textsuperscript{469} See GoS Memorial, para. 304; GoS Memorial Map Atlas, Map 5 (The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, drawn by H.W. Mardon, 1901 rev. 1903, in 1905 Gleichen Handbook); Figure 9 on p. 111 of GoS Memorial. The GoS also refers to the 1898 Carte du Bahr el Ghazal by Marchand; see GoS Memorial, para. 295 and GoS Memorial Map Atlas, Map 4 (Carte du Bahr el Ghazal, Bulletin du Comité de l’Afrique française, 1898).

\textsuperscript{470} GoS Memorial, paras. 299-302; Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan, Annual Report Bahr el-Ghazal Province (1902), p. 230 (SM Annex 21); Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan, Annual Report Bahr el-Ghazal Province (1902), p. 315 (SM Annex 21); Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan, Annual Report Bahr el-Ghazal Province (1903), p. 71 (SM Annex 22); Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan, Annual Report Bahr el-Ghazal Province (1904), p. 3 (SM Annex 23).


\textsuperscript{472} See GoS Memorial, para. 299, GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 436; Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan, Annual Report Bahr el-Ghazal Province (1902), 230 (emphasis added) (SM Annex 21).


\textsuperscript{474} See GoS Memorial, para. 321 referring to one map (Map 8 of the GoS Memorial Map Atlas, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Intelligence Division, War Office, 1905).

\textsuperscript{475} GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 452.

\textsuperscript{476} GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 450-451. See also GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 30/05 et seq.
Professor Schofield’s position, what mattered was that Condominium officials, including Governor-General Wingate, considered the Bahr el Arab to be the boundary.477

(y) SPLM/A Arguments

288. According to the SPLM/A, when the Bahr el Arab was referred to in the documentary record as the provincial boundary prior to and during 1905, “the Anglo-Egyptian administrators simply did not have a clear or common understanding of where that boundary was in fact located.”478

289. The GoS itself acknowledges “that the location and course of the Bahr el-Arab was ‘ill-defined,’ ‘vaguely-defined,’ ‘uncertain,’ and ‘bewildering.’”479 More generally, the GoS concedes that “‘provincial boundaries at this period [1902-1922] were not laid down or recorded in any very formal way, and they were often stated to be approximate’”480 and fails, for want of adequate documentary support, in its attempt retrospectively to “create” a clear or official boundary between Bahr el Ghazal and Kordofan prior to 1905.481

290. The SPLM/A also relies on Professor Schofield to argue that the three requirements for boundary delimitation, namely allocation, delimitation and demarcation, were never fulfilled.482 Since the references to the Bahr el Arab in 1905 were only approximate, there cannot have been any definitive identification of a boundary.483 There was never any governmental act identifying geographically a specific boundary line capable of being demarcated and mapped.484 Even references in official documents to the general term “Bahr el-Arab,” the specific location of which was unclear, could not have constituted “a

477 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 128/22 et seq. (Cross-examination of Professor Schofield)
478 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1448. See also MENAS Expert Report, at paras. 50-51. Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial.
479 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1442.
480 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1440 quoting GoS Memorial, at para. 368. See also Second Daly Expert Report, pp. 33-37, Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, for the proposition that Darfur’s and Kordofan’s pre-1905 southern boundaries were similar, as the GoS alleges, but only in so far as they did not exist (Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial).
481 Second Daly Expert Report, p. 12, Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial. See also Id. pp. 9-12, pp. 13-24, pp. 54-57, p. 59 (Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial).
482 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 121/07 et seq.
483 Id. at 122/12-22.
484 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 322.; See also SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 122/07-11.
central defining action by the Condominium government allocating or establishing a boundary.”

291. The SPLM/A goes on to contend that the cartographic evidence confirms that the boundary was indefinite and indeterminate in 1905. The SPLM/A contends that there “was no official Sudan Government map as of 1905 that delimited a provincial boundary between Kordofan and Bahr el-Ghazal; on the contrary, the only official map that existed (i.e., the 1904 Anglo-Egyptian Sudan map prepared by the Intelligence Office in Khartoum) omission conspicuously omitted any such boundary, while identifying the boundaries of other Sudanese provinces.” The 1901 Mardon map relied upon by the GoS does not purport to show the boundary. Mardon himself noted in 1906 that “the exact limits of the provinces, especially those in the south, are not yet definitely fixed.”

(iv) The alleged description in the 1905 transfer documents of the provincial boundary as the northern limit of the transferred area

(x) GoS Arguments

292. The GoS places great emphasis on the 1905 transfer documents, namely the March 1905 SIR and the 1905 Annual Reports of the Kordofan and Bahr el-Ghazal provinces, both of which no longer mention the Bahr el Arab as the boundary of the two provinces, and the 1905 Memorandum by Governor-General Wingate, the senior government official in Sudan at the time.

485 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 122/19-123/7.
486 See Map 36 of SPLM/A Map Atlas vol. 1 (The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Intelligence Office Khartoum, 1904, in 1905 Gleichen Handboke).
487 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1452. See also Appendix B to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial.
489 See SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 20, 2009, Transcr. 166/14 et seq. See also SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1454; Second Daly Expert Report, pp. 14-15, Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial.
492 See GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 461-463.
493 See GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 466; Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan, Memorandum by Major General Sir R. Wingate (1905), p. 24 (SM Annex 24).
293. According to the GoS, the relevant passage of the Wingate Memorandum indicates that the northern limit of the transferred area was the Bahr el Arab. Wingate, who the GoS maintains knew the exact location of the river, unequivocally states that the tribal districts that were incorporated in Kordofan were located south of the Bahr el Arab and had been formerly part of Bahr el Ghazal. There is no reference in his report to an area north of the Bahr el Arab being transferred.

294. The GoS also stresses that the reference to the transfer in the Wingate Memorandum is under a section entitled “Changes in Provincial Boundaries and Nomenclature” while in the 1905 Annual Reports of both Bahr el Ghazal and Kordofan, the transfer is discussed under the sections entitled “Provinces Boundaries.”

295. The GoS concludes that the four transfer documents make it clear that Condominium officials transferred a territory from one province to another, bounded to the north by the Bahr el Arab.

(y) SPLM/A Arguments

296. According to the SPLM/A, the analysis of the transfer documents demonstrates that Governor-General Wingate himself considered that there was still uncertainty surrounding the course of the Bahr el Arab in 1905. He did not state that it was the provincial boundary and he “certainly did not purport to fix ‘the northern limit of the area that was transferred in 1905.’” His reference to the “Bahr el-Arab” was “merely a general geographic description, and not the delimitation or definition of a boundary.” Indeed, the

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494 See supra para. 237 et seq.
496 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 468; Rejoinder, para. 342.
497 See GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 416.
499 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 464; See Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan, Annual Report, Bahr el Ghazal Province, (1905), p. 3 (SM Annex 24); Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan, Annual Report, Kordofan Province (1905), p. 113 (SM Annex 24).
500 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 20, 2009, Transcr. 175/03-20, 188/19-190/22.
501 See supra para. 282. See also SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 126/04 et seq.
502 See supra para. 244.
503 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 861.
504 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 861.
provincial boundary was irrelevant to the delimitation of the northern limit of the transferred area. What occurred was a transfer of people, not territory, from the Bahr el Ghazal administration to the Kordofan administration. This is evidenced, in particular, by the March 1905 SIR.

297. It is obvious that the transfer of the Ngok and Twic people entailed territorial consequences. However, the boundaries of Kordofan were not extended in the years following the transfer precisely because the Condominium officials, who did not know what territory the Ngok Dinka inhabited, transferred the administration of a people rather than a specific area.

298. The SPLM/A therefore agrees with the ABC Experts’ conclusion that “the Ngok people were regarded [by the Anglo-Egyptian administration] as part of the Bahr el-Ghazal Province until their transfer in 1905” and that “the government’s claim that only the Ngok Dinka territory south of the Bahr el-Arab was transferred to Kordofan in 1905 is therefore found to be mistaken.”

(b) Post-1905 depictions of the alleged boundary and transferred area

(i) GoS Arguments

299. The GoS points to the first description of the post-1905 boundary in a 1908 report issued by Captain Lloyd, then Governor of the province of Kordofan. While this report still identifies the Bahr el Arab as the southern boundary of Kordofan, a map published by

505 See supra para. 243. See also SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 247/12 et seq.
506 See supra para 245.
507 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 221/15 et seq.; See also SPLM/A Rejoinder, paras. 807-811.
508 See SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 222/17 et seq. See also supra para. 243.
511 See GoS Memorial, para. 372; Sudan Intelligence Reports, No. 171, October 1908, Appendix D, pp. 32-35 (SM Annex 18).
Lloyd in 1910\textsuperscript{512} shows the border between the Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal provinces to be south of the Bahr el Arab.\textsuperscript{513}

300. Between 1905 and 1909, no other changes were recorded regarding the location of the boundaries in the Annual Reports for the provinces of Bahr el Ghazal and Kordofan, except a minor change in the Darfur/Kordofan boundary in 1908. Only the 1905 transfer can therefore justify the curved line in Lloyd’s 1910 map.\textsuperscript{514} The only reason this map (and the whole series of Sheet-65 maps) labels the boundary as “approximate” is that the “southern limits of the transferred areas were not defined in 1905, either in Wingate’s Memorandum or elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{515}

301. The GoS also relies on the 1911 and 1912 editions of the Anglo-Egyptian Handbook.\textsuperscript{516} The former notes that the northern boundary of the Bahr el Ghazal province was not yet delimited, but indicates that “the boundary divides certain tribal districts to Lake No,”\textsuperscript{517} instead of following the Bahr el Arab. The latter describes the southern border of Kordofan, “somewhat indefinitely,”\textsuperscript{518} as following a watercourse ten miles to the east of Ghabat el Arab, as shown on the 1914 Ghabat el Arab Office Map.\textsuperscript{519} The GoS submits that subsequent maps produced either by Sudan’s War or Survey Office all show the transferred area in the same way.\textsuperscript{520} The boundary is shown as a curved line, never more than 25 km

\textsuperscript{512} See GoS Memorial, para. 372 referring to Map 11 in GoS Memorial Map Atlas (\textit{The Sudan Province of Kordofan, The Sudan Survey Department, Khartoum, 1910}).

\textsuperscript{513} See GoS Memorial, para. 373; Figure 13, p. 143, GoS Memorial; Map 11 in GoS Memorial, Map Atlas \textit{The Sudan Province of Kordofan, The Sudan Survey Department, Khartoum, 1910}).

\textsuperscript{514} See GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 283-288.

\textsuperscript{515} GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009 Transcr. 33/11 \textit{et seq}.


\textsuperscript{518} GoS Memorial, para. 378.

\textsuperscript{519} See GoS Memorial, para. 379 and GoS Memorial Map 13 (\textit{Ghabat el Arab Sheet 65-L, Survey Office Khartoum, 1914}).

\textsuperscript{520} See GoS Memorial, para. 380 and Figure 14, p. 146. See also GoS Memorial Map Atlas, Map 13 (\textit{Ghabat el Arab Sheet 65-L, Survey Office (Khartoum) 1914}); Map 14 (\textit{Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Geographical Section (Intelligence Division) War Office, 1914}); Map 15 (\textit{Achwang Sheet 65-K, Survey Office (Khartoum) 1916}); Map 16 (\textit{Darfur, Geographical Section (Intelligence Division), War Office, 1916}); Map 17 (\textit{Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Geographical Section (Intelligence Division), War Office, 1920}); Map 18 (\textit{Abyor Sheet 65-K, Survey Office (Karthoum) 1922}); Map 19 (\textit{Ghabat el Arab Sheet 65-L, Survey Office (Khartoum) 1922}); Map 20 (\textit{Twic Dinka Sheet 65-K, Survey Office (Khartoum) 1925}); Map 21 (\textit{Ghabat el Arab Sheet 65-L, Survey Office (Khartoum) 1925}); Map 22 (\textit{Ghabat el Arab Sheet 65-L, Survey Office (Khartoum) 1929}); Map 23 (\textit{Abyei Sheet 65-K, Survey Office (Khartoum) 1925}).
from the Bahr el Arab, following the course of the river until it is depicted as a straight-line in 1925 to account for, inter alia, the modification of the Darfur boundary in 1924 and the re-transfer of the Twic Dinka to Bahr el Ghazal.521

(ii) SPLM/A Arguments

302. The SPLM/A contends that Sudan Government maps did not identify any definite provincial boundary between Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal until well after 1905.522 The Survey Office’s 1907 map of northern Bahr el Ghazal523 thus omits the depiction of the boundary between the two provinces.524 Further, Lloyd’s 1910 map, an unofficial map relied on by the GoS, clearly describes the boundary between Bahr el Ghazal and Kordofan to be approximate.525 It is not until 1913 that the Sudan Government itself attempted to identify the boundary in a map of Kordofan which still contained a number of inaccuracies.526

303. The SPLM/A refers the Tribunal to Figure 14 in the GoS Memorial and Map 60 in the SPLM/A Map Atlas vol. 2, which both show the wide and continuing variations in the boundary in the first decades of the 20th century and illustrate its indeterminate nature. The SPLM/A finally argues that “even when a Kordofan/Bahr el-Ghazal boundary was depicted between 1914 and 1930, the boundary was consistently labeled ‘Approx. Province Bdy.’”527

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521 GoS Memorial, para. 381; See also Figure 14 on p. 146 of GoS Memorial; GoS Counter-Memorial para. 499.
522 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1459-1460 See also Appendix B to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial. The SPLM/A thus observes that both the Survey Department’s 1907 map of “The White Nile and Kordofan” (Map 42 of SPLM/A Map Atlas vol. 1) and the Survey Office’s 1907 map of northern Bahr el-Ghazal (Map 40 of SPLM/A Map Atlas vol. 1) omit the depiction of the boundary between the two provinces.
524 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1460 and Appendix B, para. 50. See also Map 42 of SPLM/A Map Atlas vol. 1 (White Nile and Kordofan, Survey Department Cairo, 1907).
525 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, Appendix B, p. 399. See also Second Daly Expert Report, pp. 37-43, Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, for a critical review of the material relied upon by the GoS in depicting the allegedly transferred area.
526 Map 48 of SPLM/A Map Atlas vol. 1 (Kordofan Province, Survey Office Khartoum, 1913). The SPLM/A notes that it labels the Regaba ez Zarga as the “Bahr el Homr,” the Regaba Umm Bieiro is marked as the Bahr el Arab later in its course, and the Bahr el Arab is named the “Lol” for part of its course. See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, Appendix B, p.400.
527 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1462, Appendix B to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, pp. 401-402; SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 791.
4. The location of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms in 1905

304. The GoS’s position remains that the Abyei Area must be delimited by determining the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms that previously fell within the province of Bahr el Ghazal and that were transferred to Kordofan in 1905. However, assuming for the sake of argument that the SPLM/A’s Tribal Interpretation is right, the GoS warns that determining the area occupied and used by the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms in 1905 is a very complicated question of anthropological fact. In any event, the SPLM/A fails in its attempt to prove any significant Ngok Dinka presence north of the Bahr el Arab/Kir in 1905.

305. For its part, SPLM/A maintains that the “area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905” is proved to encompass all of the territory occupied and used by the Ngok Dinka people in 1905 extending north to 10°35’N. Both Parties examine the location of the Ngok Dinka prior to, and after, the 1905 transfer.

(a) The location of the Ngok Dinka prior to 1905

(i) The migration to, and settlement in, the Abyei region of the Ngok Dinka in the 18th and 19th century

(x) GoS Arguments

306. The GoS acknowledges that there might have been a limited presence of Ngok Dinka ancestors north of the Bahr el Arab before the 1905 transfer, but insists that this situation was short-lived. In this regard, the GoS relies, inter alia, on the research of scholar Stephanie Beswick and submits that there was never any permanent Ngok presence around the Ragaba ez Zarga, since the Dinka tribes who migrated north of the Bahr el Arab in the 18th century were pushed back south by the Baggara before the end of that century.

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528 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 63/09 et seq.
529 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 95/10 et seq.
530 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 345.
531 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 218.
533 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 221.
307. The SPLM/A’s reliance on Henderson and Deng to defend its claim to a pre-1905 permanent Ngok Dinka settlement around the Ragaba ez Zarga and to a boundary at 10°35’N is misplaced and fails to quote Henderson’s and Deng’s relevant passages regarding the Ngok Dinka’s movement southwards.\footnote{See Henderson, K.D.D., \textit{A Note on the Migration of the Messiria Tribe into South West Kordofan} \textbf{(1939)} 22(1) \textit{SUDAN NOTES AND RECORDS} 49, p. 58 (SM Annex 52); quoted in SPLM/A Memorial, para. 885; Deng, F., \textit{War of Visions: Conflicts of Identities in the Sudan} \textbf{(1995)}, p. 254, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 8/13.}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{y) SPLM/A Arguments}
\end{itemize}

308. The SPLM/A stresses that Beswick, contrary to the GoS’s claim, confirms that the Ngok Dinka were present well to the north of the Bahr el Arab and the Ragaba ez Zarga.\footnote{SPLM/A Rejoinder, at para. 375. SPLM/A refers to S. Beswick, \textit{Sudan’s Blood Memory: The Legacy of War, Ethnicity, and Slavery in Early South Sudan}, p. 52 \textbf{(2004)}, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 12/18.} Beswick’s indication that, after their mid-1800s alliance with the Misseriya, the Ngok Dinka “returned with their herds to the Kir/Bahr el Arab River region for grazing”\footnote{SPLM/A Rejoinder, at para. 376 quoting S. Beswick, \textit{Sudan’s Blood Memory: The Legacy of War, Ethnicity, and Slavery in Early South Sudan}, p. 156 \textbf{(2004)}, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 12/18.} in no way suggests that the Ngok Dinka abandoned the territories north of the Bahr el Arab/Kir, but corroborates the “undisputed locations of the Ngok Dinka’s dry season activities.”\footnote{SPLM/A Rejoinder, at para. 376.}

309. Further, while Deng did write that the Alei were pushed southwards under Arab pressure,\footnote{SPLM/A Rejoinder, at para. 393 quoting F. Deng, \textit{War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan} \textbf{254} \textbf{(1995)}, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 8/13.} the GoS fails to mention Deng’s indication that “most of the Ngok settled on the Ngol River” and that the Alei, who remained further north, were therefore moving south from Muglad towards the Ngol/Ragaba ez Zarga.\footnote{SPLM/A Rejoinder, at para. 394 quoting F. Deng, \textit{War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan} \textbf{254} \textbf{(1995)}, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 8/13. \textit{See also} SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statement of Belbel Chol Akuei Deng, Tab 15 at p. 2.}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{ii) The effects of the Mahdiyya on the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya}
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{x) GoS Arguments}
\end{itemize}

310. The GoS dismisses as purely speculative the SPLM/A’s claim that “…the asymmetric effects of the Mahdiyya\footnote{The Mahdiyya is the time of the Mahdist rule of the Sudan \textbf{(1885-1898)} (\textit{See} GoS Memorial, p. vii).} on the Ngok and the Misseriya enabled the Ngok to expand their
historic territories at the end of the 19th century.\textsuperscript{541} Contrary to Professor Daly’s position,\textsuperscript{542} Collins and Peel show that the slave and cattle raids that had started during the Turkiyya continued during the Mahdiyya.\textsuperscript{543}

311. In addition, the GoS notes that during this period, the Baggara were not the only ones threatening the territory of the Ngok Dinkas. Indeed, there were inter-Dinkas wars and repeated raiding by the Nuers to the East.\textsuperscript{544} The GoS therefore submits that the claim that the relatively small impact of the Mahdiyya on the Ngok Dinka allowed them to migrate north has no substance.

(y) SPLM/A Arguments

312. The SPLM/A submits that Ngok Dinka demography and occupation of the Abyei region were little affected by the Mahdiyya, while the Misseriya suffered heavy casualties in the conflict with the Anglo-Egyptian forces,\textsuperscript{545} in part because the Misseriya sided with the Mahdists.\textsuperscript{546} The SPLM/A cites Henderson\textsuperscript{547} and Deng who, relying on Henderson’s conclusions, explained that “[a]lthough the Mahdiyya was one of the most violent chapters in southern history, it was a relatively peaceful period for the Ngok.”\textsuperscript{548} The SPLM/A infers from this that the “the Ngok would not have retreated from prior settlements in the Bahr region and that the Misseriya would have been in no position to expand at the expense of the Ngok” in the years preceding the transfer of the Abyei Area.\textsuperscript{549}

\textsuperscript{541} SPLM/A Memorial, para. 898.
\textsuperscript{542} Daly Expert Report, pp. 48-49, Appendix to SPLM/A Memorial.
\textsuperscript{545} See SPLM/A Memorial, at paras. 897-903. See also SPLM/A Memorial, at paras. 128-132.
\textsuperscript{546} SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 180/06-07.
\textsuperscript{547} See SPLM/A Rejoinder, at para. 411 quoting Henderson, “A Note on The Migration of the Messiria Tribe into South West Kordofan,” 22 (1) SNR 69, 71 (1939), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 3/15. See also SPLM/A Memorial, at para. 231.
\textsuperscript{548} SPLM/A Rejoinder, at para. 404 quoting F. DENG, THE MAN CALLED DENG MAJOK: A BIOGRAPHY OF POWER, POLYGyny AND change, p. 47, n. 20 (1986), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 7/4; See also SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 180/18-181/03. See also Daly Expert Report, p. 26, Appendix to SPLM/A Memorial.
\textsuperscript{549} SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 915; See also SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 180/10-17.
313. The SPLM/A submits that the GoS’s reliance on Peel and Collins is misplaced. In fact, Collins even contradicts the GoS’s position.

(iii) *The location of the Ngok Dinka from the late 19th century through 1905*

(x) Alleged limitations affecting the pre-1905 documentary record

(1) GoS Arguments

314. The GoS disagrees with the SPLM/A’s claim that the pre-1905 documentary record is limited by such factors as the lack of British knowledge in the region, the limited expeditions in the area and the remoteness of the zone.

315. In response to the SPLM/A’s claim that no negative inferences can be drawn from the fact that certain British explorers did not observe any Ngok Dinka when they went to the region, the GoS argues that although it is fair not to draw negative inference based on a single visit, “the comprehensive absence of evidence” in this case becomes “evidence of absence.” According to the GoS, “[t]here are parts of the [region] that remain, even today, permanently uninhabited. That doesn’t mean they’re terra nullius.”

(2) SPLM/A Arguments

316. The SPLM/A submits that the pre-1905 documentary record is affected by many limitations and shortcomings. Firstly, the record is meager and sparse and while it does attest to Ngok Dinka presence extending north from the Bahr el Arab to, and beyond, the Ragaba ez Zarga, its reliability and comprehensiveness should not be exaggerated.

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551 See SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 415.

552 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 250.

553 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 89/11-17; See also GoS Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 169/14-23; See also GoS Rejoinder, paras. 271-281.

554 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 118/24-119/01.

555 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 920.


557 SPLM/A Memorial, paras. 908-912.

558 See SPLM/A Memorial, at paras. 908-912; SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 919; SPLM/A Rejoinder, at para. 432(c).
317. The SPLM/A thus points out that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the contacts of the few Anglo-Egyptian administrators with the region “were in the nature of exploratory treks,” all made during the dry season, when the Ngok Dinka would move to the south of the region to graze their cattle herds. They were therefore unable to observe the Ngok Dinka’s occupation and use of land in the wet season. The officials followed very limited routes and “virtually never ventured to the north of the Ngol/Ragaba ez-Zarga, save along a single corridor extending from Fauwel to Keilak covered by Mahon’s, Wilkinson’s, and Percival’s treks.” The SPLM/A also emphasizes the Anglo-Egyptian officials’ lack of personnel, the language barrier, and inaccessibility of the region.

318. The SPLM/A identifies other factors accounting for this lack of knowledge, such as the efforts of the Ngok Dinka to conceal the location of their villages for fear of slave-raiding.

319. Therefore, one should not infer from the reports of the Anglo-Egyptian officials that the Ngok Dinka were located only in the places where they were observed, particularly when the GoS fails to provide complete copies of potentially relevant maps.


(y) Location of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms in the documentary record from the late 19th century through 1905

(1) GoS Arguments

320. The GoS submits that the Ngok Dinka were considered to be living around and south of the Bahr el Arab before and in 1905.\(^{568}\) The GoS refers in particular to the reports of Mahon, Wilkinson, and Percival.\(^{569}\) In those reports, there is no indication of Ngok Dinka permanent presence around and north of the Ragaba ez Zarga.\(^{570}\) They only refer to the existence of Arab settlements in this otherwise uninhabited area\(^{571}\) and contend that it was the Baggara Arabs who were using the area to the north of the Bahr el Arab on a seasonal basis.\(^{572}\) This is also consistent with the seasonal grazing patterns of the Ngok Dinka, who were observed by Percival (on his way south from the Ragaba ez Zarga) driving their cattle in a southerly direction.\(^{573}\)

321. In addition, the northernmost areas where officials reported on the presence of Ngok Dinka were at Etai (9°29'N 28°44'E), located around five kilometers north of the Bahr el Arab, and at Bongo/Bombo (9°32'N 28°49'E), both uninhabited during the dry season.\(^{574}\)

322. Further, the GoS asserts that the evidence indicates that Sultan Rob’s country was on and south of the Bahr el Arab before and in 1905.\(^{575}\) Sultan Rob, the Paramount Chief of the

\(^{568}\) GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 281.

\(^{569}\) GoS Memorial at paras 312-321; GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 252-277; GoS Rejoinder, paras. 412-418


\(^{571}\) GoS Counter-Memorial at para. 273; GoS Rejoinder para. 415, referring to Percival, A., Route Report: Keilak to Wau, December 1904, p. 2. (SCM Annex 26); See also GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 91/02-12

\(^{572}\) GoS Memorial, para. 355.

\(^{573}\) GoS Counter-Memorial at para. 275, referring to Percival, A., Route Report: Keilak to Wau, December 1904, p. 2 (SCM Annex 26); See also GoS Counter-Memorial para. 257, referring to Gleichen, Handbook of the Sudan, Vol. I (1905), p. 155 (SM Annex 38)

\(^{574}\) GoS Memorial, para. 316, GoS Counter-Memorial para. 257; Gleichen, Handbook of the Sudan, Vol. I (1905), p. 155 (SM Annex 38); GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 88/14-90/05 and April 22, 2009, Transcr. 184/16-25; GoS Counter-Memorial para. 281, referring to Index Gazetteer of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (Sudan Survey Department, Khartoum. 1931) p. 102 (SCM, Annex 28) and Percival’s Sketch Map, Figure 5, p. 105 and Map 14(b) in GoS Counter-Memorial Map Atlas (Percival Sketch Map, River Kir to Wau, 1904).
Ngok Dinka, was observed residing south of the Bahr el Arab, at his old village of Mithiang, in 1902 and in 1903, and in Burakol (located two miles north of the Bahr el Arab/Kir) in 1904. The GoS notes that Sultan Rob’s presence in Burakol does not mean that he had abandoned his old village. In any event, Burakol is not in the same location as modern day Abyei town and cannot be equated with it.

In addition, the GoS insists that according to Sultan Rob himself, there were only Arabs west of his country which was bounded by the Shilluks to the east, the Chak Chak to the west and to the north by the Bahr el Arab, Sultan Rob’s “Arab frontier.”

(2) SPLM/A Arguments

The SPLM/A preliminarily notes that the GoS fundamentally changed its case. While the GoS originally claimed that the Ngok Dinka were located entirely to the south of the Bahr el Arab/Kir, it now concedes that “they were instead indisputably located in villages extending at least as far north […] as ‘Bombo,’ ‘Etai,’ ‘Burakol,’ ‘Achak,’ an unidentified location near the Ngol/Ragaba ez-Zarga, and ‘Bongo … at 9.32’N.”

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575 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 276-277 referring to Percival, A., Route Report: Keilak to Wau, December 1904, p. 3 (SCM Annex 26) and Percival, A., Route Report: Pongo River to Taufikia, March/April 1905, p. 2, SCM Annex 27; Percival’s Sketch Map (1904), Figure 5 in GoS Counter-Memorial on p. 105 and Map 14a in GoS Counter-Memorial Map Atlas. See also GoS Memorial, para. 352 referring to Comyn D., The Western Sources of the Nile (1907) 30 THE GEOGRAPHICAL JOURNAL 1524 at. 529 (SM, Annex 50) and GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 290, referring to Comyn’s Sketch Map of 1906 (Figure 6 on p. 110 of GoS Counter-Memorial); GoS Memorial, para. 353 and GoS Rejoinder, para. 425, referring to Lloyd, W., Some Notes on Dar Homr (1907) 29 THE GEOGRAPHICAL JOURNAL pp. 649-654 (SM Annex 54).


577 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 265-267, quoting Mahon in Sudan Intelligence Reports, No. 104 (March 1903), p. 19 (SM Annex 5); Macdonald Report, para. 25 (Appendix to GoS Memorial); Third Macdonald Report, para. 70 (GoS Rejoinder, Appendix I).

578 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 276; referring to Percival, A., Route Report: Keilak to Wau, December 1904, p. 3 (SCM Annex 26); See also Percival’s Sketch Map (1904), Figure 5 in GoS Counter-Memorial on p. 105 and Map 14a in GoS Counter-Memorial Map Atlas.

579 GoS Counter-Memorial at para. 275, referring to Percival, A., Route Report: Keilak to Wau, December 1904, p. 3-4 (SCM Annex 26).

580 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 276; cf. SPLM/A Memorial, para. 997.


582 GoS Memorial, paras. 349-350 and GoS Counter-Memorial at para. 421, referring to Percival’s report in Sudan Intelligence Reports, No. 130 (May 1905), Appendix A, p. 4 (SM Annex 10).

583 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 191/23-192/07.

584 SPLM/A Rejoinder, at para. 426. See also SPLM/A Rejoinder, at para. 428.
325. In spite of the above-noted reservations regarding the pre-1905 Condominium record, the SPLM/A argues, relying on the pre-1905 trek reports of Mahon, Wilkinson and Percival, that “the Ngok Dinka were located well above the Bahr el-Arab/Kiir, with permanent villages extending north up to the Ngol/Ragaba ez Zarga and further north.”

326. According to the SPLM/A, the evidence suggests that there was Ngok Dinka presence between the Ngol/Ragaba ez Zarga and the Bahr el Arab/Kir in the form of villages and permanent settlements, in places such as Achak, Bombo (uninhabited during the dry season) and Etai, as well as dura cultivation (consistent with the Ngok Dinka’s agricultural practices).

327. There are also indications of Ngok Dinka presence on the Ragaba ez Zarga in the dry season. While Percival may have found no trace of inhabitants on the river, the SPLM/A noted that he traveled with the Arab Mounted Infantry who would certainly have frightened

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585 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 932.
586 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial 1029; SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 25/03-11; SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1201, see Map 72 of SPLM/A Map Atlas vol. 2 (Map of Darfur, Browne, 1799); SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 1202-1203, see Maps 73 and 73a of SPLM/A Map Atlas vol. 2 (Sources du Nil, Speke and Grant, 1863; Sources du Nil, Speke and Grant, 1863 – Overlay); SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 1204-1205, see Maps 77 and 77a of SPLM/A Map Atlas vol. 2 (Eastern Equatorial Africa, Ravenstein, 1883; Eastern Equatorial Africa, Ravenstein, 1883 - Overlay); SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 1206-1207 and SPLM/A Memorial, paras. 979-980, referring to Map 30, Map 30a and Map 31 (The Egyptian Sudan, War Office, 1883; The Egyptian Sudan, War Office, 1883 – Detail; The Egyptian Sudan, War Office, 1883 – Overlay); SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1208, citing GoS Memorial, para. 292; GoS Memorial Map 2 (The Province of Bahr el Ghazal, The Royal Geographic Society, 1884); SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1209, referring to Map 78a of SPLM/A Map Atlas vol. 2 (Carte du Bahr el Ghazal, Marchand, 1898 – Overlay); SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1210, see Maps 79 and 79a of SPLM/A Map Atlas vol. 2 (Mission Marchand de 1896 à 1899; Mission Marchand de 1896 à 1899 - Overlay).
587 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 999 quoting Percival, Keilak to Wau (1904) in E. Gleichen, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan: A Compendium Prepared by Officers of the Sudan Government Vol. II, 25 (1905), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 17/13.); The SPLM/A further observes that Percival’s own Sketch Map, only partially produced by the GoS, identifies “many more Ngok settlements above the Kiir/ Bahr el-Arab than below.” See SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 459; Percival Sketch Map (GoS Counter-Memorial Map Atlas, Map 14b); SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 04/19-23, 17/08-19/12.
588 SPLM/A Memorial, paras. 917-928; SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 953-972, (paras. 964-965 in particular); SPLM/A Rejoinder, paras. 442-446; Wilkinson, El Obeid to Dar El Jange (1902) in E. Gleichen, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan: A Compendium Prepared by Officers of the Sudan Government Vol. II, 151-157 (1905) (SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/15). The SPLM/A notes that, bearing in mind the Ngok’s seasonal grazing movements, the Ngok presence would have been even more obvious in the rainy season: see SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 959.
589 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 926.
590 The SPLM/A refers to Mahon’s 1902 and 1903 trek reports. See SPLM/A Memorial, at para. 913 and SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 945, referring to Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 92, dated March 31, 1902, Appendix F, at p. 19 (SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 1/16). Mahon puts Sultan Rob’s country on the Bahr el Homr, approximately two days from Lake Ambady. The SPLM/A maintains that this is certainly a reference to the Ragaba ez Zarga. See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 945; SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 195/13-22.
the Ngok Dinka villagers who feared Arab slave raiders. In addition, when Sultan Rob stated that the river was uninhabited, he probably referred to the dry season desertion of the Ngol/Ragaba ez Zarga or tried to conceal the location of Ngok villages to protect them from potential danger. The conclusion that Sultan Rob’s “Arab frontier” was on the Bahr el-Arab should be understood, given the confusion with the Ragaba ez-Zarga at the time, as merely referring to “the southern extent of dry season grazing by the Misseriya.”

328. There is also strong, albeit indirect, evidence of Ngok Dinka presence north of the Ragaba ez Zarga in the form of small villages made up of three or four huts at El Jaart and Um Gerên, which the SPLM/A contrasts with the “badly built” tukls used by the Homr Arabs in this area. Similarly, the description of grass fires and cattle tracks near the Ragaba ez Zarga and that of the Ngok Dinka driving cattle south as hard as they could in Amokok is consistent with the Ngok’s seasonal movements and suggests that the Ngok Dinka’s permanent villages were located to the north of that river.

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592 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at paras. 1004-1005, referring to Percival, Keilak to Wau (1904) in E. Gleichen, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan: A Compendium Prepared by Officers of the Sudan Government Vol. II, 25 (1905), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 17/13; SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 14/21-17/07. The SPLM/A refers to Hunley Walsh’s complaints that Sultan Rob had deliberately and repeatedly sought to mislead expeditions sent to explore the region: See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at paras. 1006-1007; Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 140, dated March 1906, at p. 14; SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 17/22; SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 15/12-16/08.

593 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 467; See also SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at paras. 1014-1018, referring to quoting Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 130, dated May 1905, Appendix A, at p. 4, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 17/16 and to GoS Memorial, at para. 349.

594 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 968-969, referring to Wilkinson, El Obeid to Dar El Jange (1902) in E. Gleichen, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan: A Compendium Prepared by Officers of the Sudan Government Vol. II, 151-157 (1905) (SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/15); See also Map 29 of SPLM/A Map Atlas vol. 1 (Wilkinson’s Route 1902) and GoS Counter-Memorial Map 13b (Wilkinson’s Sketch Map 1902); See also SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 200/08-203/08. The SPLM/A further notes that Wilkinson’s dry season descriptions are also consistent with the Ngok’s seasonal migrations and the centralized character of their political structure: See SPLM/A Memorial, at paras. 206-212, 917-918 and SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 953. See SPLM/A Rejoinder, at paras. 442-3 and SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 959 quoting Wilkinson, El Obeid to Dar El Jange (1902) in E. Gleichen, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan: A Compendium Prepared by Officers of the Sudan Government Vol. II, 155 (1905) (SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/15); SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 197/07-198/19.

329. Finally, the pre-1905 Condominium record demonstrates that there was Ngok Dinka presence on both sides of the Bahr el Arab/Kir. Sultan Rob’s old village was located on the southern bank at Mithiang as noted by Wilkinson in 1902, and his new village north of the river at Burakol as noted by Mahon in 1903, Percival in 1904, and Bayldon in 1905. There were also Ngok Dinka settlements west of Burakol, as shown by the location of the Abyior and Achueng Chiefdoms. When Sultan Rob told Percival that there were no Dinkas west of Burakol, he clearly meant that “there were Humr Arabs directly to the west.”

(iv) Alleged Centrality of Abyei Town Prior to the 1905 Transfer

(x) GoS Arguments

330. The GoS argues that modern-day Abyei town did not become the centre of Ngok Dinka until well after 1905. The sources relied upon by the SPLM/A in no way establish the centrality of the Abyei town as a political, cultural or administrative Ngok Dinka centre before the 1920s. Similarly, the SPLM/A’s witness Kuol Deng Kuol Arop concedes that Abyei did not exist, nor did it have a central role in 1905 when it refers to a settlement


597 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at paras. 977-979; MENAS Expert Report, paras. 27-29, Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial; SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 449; Map 40 of SPLM/A Map Atlas, Vol. 1 (Northern Bahr el Ghazal: Sheet 65, Survey Office, Khartoum, 1907); SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 02/11-03/18.


599 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1026. See also Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 128, dated March 1905, Appendix C, at p. 11, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/8.

600 See Map 13 of SPLM/A Map Atlas vol. 1 (Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms, 1905).

601 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1003; See also SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 1002-1004, referring to Percival, Keilak to Wau (1904) in E. Gleichen, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan: A Compendium Prepared by Officers of the Sudan Government Vol. II, 25 (1905), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 17/13).

602 GoS Rejoinder, paras. 487-488.

603 GoS Rejoinder, para. 487.
“known now as Abyei town” which became the seat of government “after the wars,” thus later in the 20th century.\textsuperscript{604}

331. According to the GoS, Whittingham’s route map of 1910 is the first document that refers to “Abyia” but locates it in a different place than Burakol and modern-day Abyei Town.\textsuperscript{605} It is only in 1920 that Abyei was shown on an official map for the first time.\textsuperscript{606} G.W. Thitherington’s sketch map of 1924 also indicates that Sultan Kwal Arob moved to Abyei in 1918.\textsuperscript{607} However, as late as 1933, the Paramount Chief was located in Naam, 15 km north of Abyei.\textsuperscript{608} Abyei only became the centre of a Native Administration Unit in 1938, the event which provided a basis for its subsequent political history.\textsuperscript{609}

332. Having observed that Wilkinson, Percival and Whittingham each located the Ngok Paramount Chief in a different place,\textsuperscript{610} the GoS concludes that there was movement in this area before and after 1905 and that Abyei Town was not the centre of anything in 1905.\textsuperscript{611}

(y) SPLM/A Arguments

333. The SPLM/A argues that Abyei Town has been “the center of Ngok Dinka political, commercial and cultural life for nearly two centuries.”\textsuperscript{612} Abyei Town became the home of the Paramount Chief, the location of the burial sites of the Chiefs\textsuperscript{613} and the seat of the “central government” by the middle to late 1800s.\textsuperscript{614} A wide range of historical evidence\textsuperscript{615}

\textsuperscript{604} GoS rejoinder, para. 490 referring to Witness Statement of Kuol Deng Kuol Arop, para. 30 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 5).

\textsuperscript{605} See GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 299-306; GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 93/17 et seq. See also Map 18a of GoS Counter-Memorial Map Atlas and Figure 9 of GoS Counter-Memorial, p. 116 (Whittingham 1910 Route Map).

\textsuperscript{606} See GoS rejoinder, para. 493; GoS Memorial Map 17 (Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, War Office, 1914 rev. 1920).

\textsuperscript{607} GoS rejoinder, para. 493; See GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 313 and Map 38 of GoS Counter-Memorial Map Atlas (Additions and Corrections to Sketch of Dinka Country, 1924); See also Figure 13 of GoS Counter-Memorial, p. 125.

\textsuperscript{608} See GoS rejoinder, para. 493; See also GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 314.

\textsuperscript{609} GoS rejoinder, para. 493; See also GoS Memorial Map 27 (Native Administrations of Kordofan Province, Sudan Survey Department, 1941).

\textsuperscript{610} GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 303.

\textsuperscript{611} See GoS oral pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 94/12 et seq.

\textsuperscript{612} SPLM/A Memorial, para. 961. See also SPLM/A Memorial, paras. 951, 961-967, Counter-Memorial, paras. 1000, 1137, 1184-1193, Rejoinder paras. 456, 549.

\textsuperscript{613} SPLM/A Memorial, paras. 894-895.

\textsuperscript{614} SPLM/A Memorial, para. 904, 962; Counteremorial, para. 1190.
describes Abyei town as the “capital” of the Ngok. As Mahon made clear as early as 1902, Abyei (“Rob’s place”) was also considered a great commercial centre for Bahr el Ghazal, especially famous for its ivory trade. In fact, it is uncontested that Paramount Chief Kuol Arop, and his predecessor Sultan Rob, resided in the vicinity of modern-day Abyei Town, whether in Sultan Rob’s old village or in the new village of Burakol.

334. The fact that the British administration formally recognized Abyei town only in 1914 “suggests nothing about the historic importance of the location to the Ngok Dinka.” On the contrary, the historic location of the Ngok Dinka Paramount Chief justified the 1914 decision of the British administration.

(b) The location of the Ngok Dinka after 1905

(i) GoS Arguments

335. Assuming, arguendo, that the Tribal Interpretation is correct, the GoS accepts that post-1905 evidence may be relevant to determining the location of the Ngok Dinka in 1905, “if and to the extent that it can reasonably be inferred that [this later material] would be or might be equally valid for 1905.”

336. The GoS notes that, according to the SPLM/A, the Baggara and Ngok use and occupation of land in the region has not changed at all from 1905 through the inter-war period. While the GoS agrees with this proposition, it goes on to argue that post-1905 maps and trek

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617 SPLM/A Memorial, paras. 915 referring to Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 92, dated 31 March 1902, Appendix F, at p. 20, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 1/16), 964-965; SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 951.

618 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 1188-1189; SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 512. See also SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, Transcr. April 22, 2009, 13/17 et seq.

619 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1187.

620 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1190.

621 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 70/08 et seq.

622 See GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 307.
reports of officials who traveled through the region demonstrate that the Ngok continued to live “on or near the Bahr el-Arab” after 1905.623

337. The GoS thus contends as follows:

- “There is a tendency, documented in the reports themselves, for the Ngok villages to move north over time – thus Naam (Dupuis, 1921) and Lukji (Henderson, 1933).”624

- “But not very far north: Naam and Lukji are both on the Umbieiro.”625

- The Ngok Dinka remain confined to a small sector of south-eastern Kordofan, well south of latitude 10°N;626 when they leave the Bahr el Arab, they migrate south of the river.627

- There is ample evidence of Humr presence along the Ngol/Ragaba ez Zarga and further south towards the Bahr el Arab/Kir.628

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623 GoS Rejoinder, para. 433. See also GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 308. See also GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 95/06 et seq.

624 GoS Rejoinder, para. 432. See also GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 311 and Maps 39a (Dupuis 1921 Route Map) and 39b (Dupuis’ 1921 Sketch) of GoS Counter-Memorial Map Atlas; GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 314-315 and Henderson, K.D.D., Route Report: Muglad to Abeyi, March 1933 (emphasis added) (SCM Annex 38).

625 GoS Rejoinder, para. 432. See also Figure 3 of GoS Rejoinder.

626 See GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 295; See, inter alia, GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 290 and Comyn’s 1906 Sketch Map (Figure 6 of GoS Counter-Memorial, p. 110); GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 294 and Hallam, H., Route Report: Dawas to Dar Jange, December 1907, (SM Annex 31); GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 298 and Willis’ 1909 report in Sudan Intelligence Reports, No. 178 (May 1909), Appendix C, p. 17 (SCM Annex 19); GoS Counter-Memorial at para. 305 and GoS Counter-Memorial Map Atlas, Map 18b (Whittingham 1910 Route Map); GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 310 and Heinekey, G.A., Route Report: Gerinti to Mek Kwal’s Village, March 1918 (SCM Annex 36); See GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 311 and Dupuis’ 1921 Sketch, Figure 12 on p. 123 of GoS Counter-Memorial, Map 39a; GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 317 and GoS Memorial Map Atlas, Map 27 (Native Administrations of Kordofan Province, Sudan Survey Department, 1941); GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 322 and Figure 16 of GoS Counter-Memorial, p. 131 (Cumnion’s 1966 Map of Humr migration routes); GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 324 and GoS Rejoinder, para. 434 and Howell, P.P., “Notes on the Ngok Dinka of Western Kordofan,” (1950) 32 Sudan Notes and Records 239, pp. 241-242 (SM Annex 53); GoS Rejoinder, para. 443 and Figure 16 of GoS Counter-Memorial, p. 155 (Lienhardt’s 1961 Map of Dinka tribal groups); GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 103/19-20 and Figure 5 of GoS Rejoinder (Lebon’s 1965 Map) and Figure 2 of GoS Counter-Memorial, p. 93 (Collins’ 1971 Tribal Districts Map).


628 See, inter alia, GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 293 and Hallam, H., Route Report: Dawas to Dar Jange, December 1907, (SCM Annex 31); GoS Counter-Memorial, at para. 296, and Lloyd’s 1908 report in Sudan Intelligence
By contrast, “[t]here is no contemporary report of permanent Ngok villages on the Ragaba ez-Zarga or north of it;”\textsuperscript{629} the mention of the word “cult”\textsuperscript{630} and the description of a few solitary dugdugs\textsuperscript{631} on certain maps cannot prove Ngok presence in that area.

“Nor is there any record of permanent Ngok villages to the west, in the vicinity of the Darfur boundary – another point specifically confirmed in the reports.”\textsuperscript{632}

338. The GoS places great emphasis on the 1933 Civil Secretary colored sketch map (“CivSee map”),\textsuperscript{633} the “original document in the record from the Condominium office depicting the nine Ngok Dinka tribes.”\textsuperscript{634} It shows that Ngok Dinka presence was limited to the basin of the Bahr el Arab, between the Ragaba Umm Biero and the southern boundary of Kordofan, an area of approximately 500 square miles, twenty times smaller than the area claimed by the SPLM/A.\textsuperscript{635} The northernmost part of the territory occupied by the Ngok reaches only 9°30’N, nowhere near the Ragaba ez Zarga.\textsuperscript{636}

339. The GoS also emphasizes that, in his second Witness Statement, Professor Ian Cunnison indicates with respect to the Ngok northern migration that “there was never, as suggested in the SPLM/A Memorial, any significant collective presence north of the Bahr el-Arab.”\textsuperscript{637} Nor was there ever “any collective presence north of the area [he] refer[s] to as the Bahr,

\textsuperscript{629} GoS Rejoinder, para. 432.

\textsuperscript{630} See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 23, 2009, Transcr. 30/21 et seq. referring to Whittingham’s 1910 Sketch Map.

\textsuperscript{631} See Id. and GoS Oral Pleadings, April 23, 2009, Transcr. 31/12 et seq. referring to Dupuis’ 1921 sketch.

\textsuperscript{632} GoS Rejoinder, para. 432. See also GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 310 and Heinekey, G.A., Route Report: Gerinti to Mek Kwal’s Village, March 1918 (SCM Annex 36).

\textsuperscript{633} See GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 316; Civsec 66/4/35, “Minutes of Meeting,” October 28, 1933, pp. 92-95 (SCM Annex 39); Figure 14 of GoS Counter-Memorial, p. 127, Map 22a in GoS Counter-Memorial, Map Atlas.

\textsuperscript{634} GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 78/10-12.

\textsuperscript{635} See GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 316; GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 83/04 et seq.

\textsuperscript{636} See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 81/15 et seq.

viz. the area centered on the Bahr el-Arab and the Regaba ez Zarga.” 638 The GoS further notes Professor Cunnison’s comment that “the Humr spent most of the year, from early January to late May, by the Bahr,” 639 while “the Dinka [were] with their cattle south of the Bahr el-Arab.” 640

340. The GoS also insists that, contrary to the SPLM/A’s allegation, Professor Cunnison does not agree with the SPLM/A’s analysis concerning the shared rights area. First, he explains that he was informed that “the effect of the ABC’s decision would be to exclude the Humr from their summer grazing and living areas in the Bahr,” which would be “fundamentally unjust.” 641 Secondly, he makes it very clear that he did not observe the goz as an area of shared rights. In reality, the true shared rights area was further south in the Bahr. 642

341. In the GoS’s view, “when no authority on the area […] shows the Ngok on the Ragaba ez-Zarga (let alone at 10°35N), then the only conclusion to be drawn is that they were not there.” 643 The GoS further emphasizes that, because of the alleged limitations of the documentary evidence, the SPLM/A relies extensively on Ngok oral evidence, 644 its only evidentiary source to prove Ngok presence north of the Ragaba ez Zarga. 645 However, the oral evidence produced by the SPLM/A is inaccurate and unreliable 646 and even according to Professor Daly, the SPLM/A’s own expert, “there is no way precisely to delimit the northern border of the Ngok territory in the goz.” 647

342. Assuming arguendo that there is enough information in the file to draw tribal boundaries, the GoS concludes that these boundaries would roughly correspond to the limits of the

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638 GoS Rejoinder, para. 442 quoting second Witness Statement of Ian Cunnison, para. 3 (SCM WS 1).
639 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 323 quoting second Witness Statement of Ian Cunnison, para. 5 (SCM WS 1).
641 Witness Statement of Ian Cunnison, para. 11 (Appendix to GoS Memorial).
642 See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 178/08 et seq. See also Witness Statement of Ian Cunnison, para. 9 (Appendix to GoS Memorial); second Witness Statement of Ian Cunnison, para. 3 (SCM WS 1).
643 GoS Rejoinder, para. 444.
644 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 33.
645 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 109/13 et seq.
646 GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 34 et seq., 326 et seq. See also the GoS’s arguments on the probative value of oral evidence in the next section.
647 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 110/18-20 referring to Professor Daly’s Expert Report, p. 50, Appendix to SPLM/A Memorial.
CivSec map purple area. In contrast to the GoS’s description, the boundaries claimed by the SPLM/A are “incomplete” and “hybrid,” tribal in the north and the east, and administrative in the south and the west. Although the burden of proof weighs on the SPLM/A to establish Ngok Dinka presence in the area claimed and the corresponding tribal boundaries, the SPLM/A does not even attempt to prove Ngok presence south of the Bahr el Arab and has not been able to do so with respect to any area significantly to the north of the river.

(ii) SPLM/A Arguments

343. The SPLM/A contends that the post-1905 record, particularly that from the years nearest to 1905, is particularly helpful in determining the location of the Ngok Dinka that year, because “there was a substantial continuity in the historic territories of the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya, and that the post-1905 locations of the two peoples are highly probative of their pre-1905 locations,” subject to the effects of the civil war and certain government-sponsored agricultural projects.

344. This is precisely the conclusion that the ABC Experts had reached on the basis of a number of sources, including Mr. Tibbs and Professor Cunnison. In particular, the SPLM/A underscores the latter’s comment that “the area of the Bahr to the south of the goz ‘is the traditional land of Dinka.’” Having noted that the GoS initially argued that the Ngok tended to move north of the Bahr el Arab after 1905, the SPLM/A concludes that

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648 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 108/06-09. See also GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 104/10 et seq. for the GoS’s description of the approximate tribal boundaries of the Ngok Dinka.


650 See also GoS Oral Pleadings, April 20, 2009, Transcr. 107/10 et seq.; April 22, 2009, Transcr. 193/04 et seq.

651 See GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 68 et seq., 380; GoS Oral Pleadings, April 23, 2009, Transcr. 29/08 et seq.

652 See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 193/18 et seq.

653 See GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 325; GoS Rejoinder, para. 444.

654 See SPLM/A Memorial, para. 945.

655 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1070. See also SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at paras. 1079-1080.


the GoS has now abandoned its claim and accepts that there is historical continuity in the locations of the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya, in line with the SPLM/A’s position.\footnote{See SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 499 quoting GoS Counter-Memorial, at para. 308; SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 501.}

Arguing that the documentary record should be read in light of the environmental evidence, “profoundly important in the context of this case,”\footnote{See SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 142/19 et seq. See infra paras. 357 to 371 on environmental evidence.} the SPLM/A contends that post-1905 maps and official reports confirm:

- the presence of the Ngok Dinka north of the Bahr el Arab/Kir\footnote{See, inter alia, SPLM/A Rejoinder, paras. 482 and Hallam, Kordofan Routes: Dawas to Dar Jange, December 1907, pp. 1-2. (GoS Counter-Memorial Annex 31); SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 1228-1230, referring to Map 46 (Hasoba: Sheet 65-L, Survey Office Khartoum, 1910) and SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 52/08-09; SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1218, referring to SPLM/A Map 40 (Northern Bahr el-Ghazal: Sheet 65, Survey Office Khartoum, 1907); SPLM/A Memorial, paras. 996-997, referring to Map 50 (Achwang: Sheet 65-K, Survey Office Khartoum, 1916); SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 504 referring to Heinekey’s 1918 Route Reports; SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 507 and Dupuis’ 1921 Sketch; SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1252, referring to GoS Memorial Map Atlas, Map 21 (Ghabat el Arab Sheet 65-L, Survey Office (Khartoum), 1925); SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1266 referring to the 1938 Map of Native Administrations of Kordofan Province; SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 1105-1109 and Howell, “Notes on the Ngork Dinka of West Kordofan,” 32(2) SNR 239, 243 (1951), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 4/3 and SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 34/23 et seq.} and throughout the Bahr\footnote{See, inter alia, SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1092 quoting Kordofan Province Handbook 73 (1912), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 3/8a and Kordofan Province Map, Survey Office Khartoum, 1913 (Map 48 of SPLM/A Map Atlas vol. 1); SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1234, referring to Map 14 of GoS Memorial Map Atlas (Map of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Geographical Section of the War Office, 1914); SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1175 and Witness Statement of G. Michael Tibbs, Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial , para. 22.}; including around and north of the Ngol/Ragaba ez Zarga\footnote{See, inter alia, SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1104 quoting J. Robertson, TRANSITION IN AFRICA: FROM DIRECT RULE TO INDEPENDENCE 51 (1954), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 18/28; SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1181 quoting “The First Peace Agreement Between The Misiriya Humur And The Ngok Dinka, Concluded At Abyei, March 3, 1965,” Appendix 12 to A. D Saeed, The State And Socioeconomic Transformation In The Sudan: The Case Of Social Conflict In Southwest Kordofan (January 1, 1982). ETD Collection for University of Connecticut. Paper AAI8213913, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 18/30. See also SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 35/07 et seq.} up to the goz\footnote{See, inter alia, SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1174 quoting Witness Statement of G. Michael Tibbs, Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 23; SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1327 quoting D. Cole & R. Huntington, BETWEEN A SWAMP AND A HARD PLACE 92, 96 (1997), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 8/14 and SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 51/07-09.} in the form of villages, dugdugs and cultivations.\footnote{See, inter alia, SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1243-1244, referring to Map 85 of SPLM/A Map Atlas, vol. 2 (Lake Keilak: Sheet 65-H, Survey Office (Khartoum) 1911, corr. Dec 1922); SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 1255-1256, referring to SPLM/A Map 92 (1929 Ghabat el Arab Sheet 65-L Map); SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1001 and SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1264, referring to Map 54 of SPLM/A Map Atlas, vol. 1 (Ghabat el Arab: Sheet 65-L, Survey Office (Khartoum), 1936).}
the location of the Ngok western frontier “all the way to the boundary with Darfur” and the northern border between the Ngok and the Misseriya at Tebeldiya on 10°35’N;

the existence of seasonal Arab “camps,” and not “settlements,” north of the Bahr el Arab, in line with the seasonal cattle grazing patterns of the Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka, the latter moving north to the goz in the rainy season.

346. The SPLM/A further argues that a number of maps and trek reports relied upon by the GoS provide little evidence on the actual location of the Ngok Dinka, either on the ground that they are inaccurate, or because they were based on limited, dry season routes and designed merely to record topographical information. The GoS therefore cannot rely on these documents to draw negative inferences from a supposed absence of Ngok Dinka in particular places.

347. More specifically, the 1933 CivSec map relied upon by the GoS is wrong in its depictions of various “waterless areas.” In addition, its purpose was to “indicate claims of the ‘Malwal,’ ‘Rizeigat’ and Humr south of the Bahr al-Arab,” and not to identify the alleged northernmost limit of the area occupied by the Ngok Dinka. Further, the sketch places the Ngok dry season grazing to the north-west of Abyei and describes the Ngok as

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667 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1175 quoting Witness Statement of G. Michael Tibbs, Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial , para. 22.


669 See SPLM/A Rejoinder, paras. 481–483 quoting Hallam, Kordofan Routes: Dawas to Dar Jange, December 1907, pp. 1-2. (GoS Counter-Memorial Annex 31)


671 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1213 referring to Comyn’s 1907 map (Map 9 in GoS Memorial Map Atlas (Sketch Map of the Western Sources of the Nile, The Royal Geographical Society, 1907).

672 See, inter alia, SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 482 referring to Hallam 1907 Route Report; SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 493 referring to Whittingham’s 1910 route (see GoS Counter-Memorial Map Atlas, Maps 18a and 18b); SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 502 referring to Heinekey’s 1918 Route Reports; SPLM/A Rejoinder, paras. 508, 510 referring to Dupuis’ 1921 route (see GoS Counter-Memorial Map Atlas, Map 39a).


674 See SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 526; GoS Counter-Memorial Map Atlas, Map 22a.

675 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 526. (Emphasis in original.)
having significant cattle, twice as much as the Homr.\(^676\) The SPLM/A concludes that only vast permanent settled lands, greater than all of the colored areas on the map, would accommodate all of the Ngok’s cattle.\(^677\)

348. Among the various scholarly works it invokes, the SPLM/A places strong emphasis on the writings of Professor Cunnison, the GoS’s witness, who, like Mr. Tibbs, spent a long time in the region with the people.\(^678\) The SPLM/A thus relies on Professor Cunnison to confirm that “[m]uch of the Bahr has permanent Dinka settlements […] the Nuer and Dinka have permanent homes from which they move for part of the year.”\(^679\) Similarly, when asked by the Sudanese Government whether it makes sense to encourage the Misseriya to cultivate in the Bahr, Professor Cunnison responded that the region was the traditional agricultural land of the Dinka during the rains.\(^680\) This is consistent with Whittingham’s 1910 map showing cultivation.\(^681\)

349. On the basis of Professor Cunnison’s 1954 statistics, the SPLM/A calculates that the Misseriya spent less time inside the Bahr region (142 days) than outside (223 days) in the Muglad (“their home”), Babanusa and the goz.\(^682\) Having noted Cunnison’s comment that “most of the Dinka,” but not all, would migrate south to their dry season areas,\(^684\) the SPLM/A concludes that this is consistent both with pre-1905 reports of uninhabited villages

\(^{676}\) See SPLM/A Rejoinder, paras. 527-529. The SPLM/A quotes a figure of 50,000 to 60,000.

\(^{677}\) SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 529.

\(^{678}\) See SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 184/17 et seq.

\(^{679}\) SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1128 quoting Cunnison, Some Social Aspects of Nomadism in a Baggara Tribe in The Effect of Nomadism on the Economic and Social Development of the People of the Sudan, Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference 11th-12th January 1962, 112, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 4/11. See also SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at paras. 1129-1131 and SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1132 quoting Witness Statement of Ian Cunnison, at p. 1, at para. 6. More generally, see infra in paras. 357 to 371 on environmental evidence, Cunnison’s definitions of the “Bahr” and the “Bahr el-Arab” relied on by the SPLM/A to confirm that a reference to the Ngok living “on the Bahr el-Arab” should be understood as a reference to inhabitation of the area encompassing the Bahr el Arab and the Ragaba ez Zarga.


\(^{681}\) See SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 41/18 et seq.

\(^{682}\) SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1144 quoting Cunnison, The Humr and their Land 35(2) SNR 54-55 (1954), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 4/5.

\(^{683}\) See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at paras. 1149-1150; Witness Statement of Ian Cunnison, at p. 2, para. 9.

\(^{684}\) SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1134; Witness Statement of Ian Cunnison, at p. 1, para. 6.
in the north and Cunnison’s observation of the Misseriya making “brotherhood” and even leaving some of their possessions with those among the Ngok who maintained a presence in the north during the dry season.\footnote{SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1135 quoting Cunnison, \textit{The Humr and their Land} 35(2) SNR 62 (1954), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 4/5; see also SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1136 referring \textit{inter alia} to I. Cunnison, Baggara Arabs – Power and the Lineage in a Sudanese Nomad Tribe 29 (1966), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 4/16.}

350. The SPLM/A goes on to remark that the ABC Experts and Professor Cunnison agree on the definition and extent of the goz, on its role as an area of transit rather than occupation, and on the location and scope of the Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka’s traditional homes.\footnote{SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1157-1160.} In addition, while Cunnison indicates “there was never any \textit{collective presence} [of the Ngok] north of the area I refer to as the Bahr,” and that the Ngok did not occupy the goz “in any relevant sense”\footnote{SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 538(d) quoting Supplementary Witness Statement of Ian Cunnison, at p. 1, ¶7.}, he “does not state that there were \textit{no} Ngok north of the Bahr”\footnote{SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 538(c) quoting Supplementary Witness Statement of Ian Cunnison, at p. 1, ¶3. (emphasis added by the SPLM/A)} and that the Ngok, like the Humr, did not use the goz for transit.\footnote{SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 538(d). See also SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1174 quoting Witness Statement of G. Michael Tibbs, Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 23.}

351. The SPLM/A notes, however, that the GoS has created a point of disagreement between Professor Cunnison and the ABC Experts concerning the “shared rights area.”\footnote{See SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 47/03 et seq.} Professor Cunnison indeed states that he was “informed that the effect of the ABC’s decision would be to exclude the Humr from their summer grazing and living areas in the Bahr.”\footnote{SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 47/06 \textit{et seq} quoting Witness Statement of Ian Cunnison, at p. 3, para. 11. See also SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1155.} The SPLM/A agrees that this would be unjust but points out that, in accordance with Section 1.1.3 of the Abyei Protocol, the ABC Experts stressed that “their decision would have no practical effect on the traditional grazing patterns and the two communities.”\footnote{SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 48/02-04 quoting ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, at p. 9, Appendix B to SPLM/A Memorial. See also SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1166.} Professor Cunnison was in fact misinformed as to the effects of the ABC Experts’ Report.\footnote{See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1166.}
352. Similarly, when Professor Cunnison states that the “real area of sharing was further south, in the Bahr,” his analysis is in reality not different from that of the ABC Experts. The latter not only referred to “shared secondary rights” in the goz, but also to sharing in the Bahr, in specific locations north and south of Abyei town.

353. The SPLM/A concludes that Cunnison’s writings, which describe the presence of Ngok Dinka permanent homes throughout the Bahr, seriously undermine the GoS’s case.

354. Due to the limitations of the documentary record, the SPLM/A, like the ABC, also relies on witness evidence in order to obtain a more detailed and comprehensive description of the locations of the Ngok Dinka in 1905. Having noted that the GoS itself insisted on the relevance of specific witness evidence before the ABC, the SPLM/A argues that the Ngok Dinka witnesses have described with consistency:

[...] permanent settlements with associated agricultural lands throughout the Abyei Area, including:

a. to the north west of Abyei town, inhabiting permanent settlements in the areas between the Ngol/Ragaba ez-Zarga and Kiir/Bahr el-Arab river systems up to the border with Darfur;

b. further to the north-west, inhabiting permanent settlements at Rumthil [Arabic: Antilla], Dhony Dhou and Wun Deng Awak, with their border at Tebeldiya;

c. due north from Abyei town, inhabiting permanent settlements between the Ngol/Ragaba ez-Zarga and Kiir/Bahr el-Arab river systems, and further north to Thuba, Nyama and Thur [Arabic: Turda];

d. to the east and beyond the Ngol/Ragaba ez-Zarga, inhabiting permanent settlements in the upper Ngol region such as Pariang and Ajaj, extending to Miding [Arabic: Heglig]; and

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694 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1161 quoting Witness Statement of Ian Cunnison, at p. 2, para. 9.
695 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1162.
696 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1163 quoting ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, at pp. 16, 19, 20, Appendix B to SPLM/A Memorial.
697 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1164 quoting ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, at p. 21, Appendix B to SPLM/A Memorial.
698 See SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 48/12 et seq.; SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at paras. 1168-1170.
700 The SPLM/A refers to the 26 witnesses who submitted statements in these proceedings and the nearly 70 witnesses who testified during the ABC proceedings (See SPLM/A Memorial, para. 46).
e. north of Miding, inhabiting permanent settlements at Nyadak Ayueng, Michoor and Niag.  

355. The witness evidence coincides with the Community Mapping Project and the Map it produced. The SPLM/A highlights that the Community Map shows approximately 150 permanent settlements, 56 burial sites, 74 cattle grazing sites, 35 cultivation sites, 45 community meeting and court locations, and 11 sacred sites, dating back to 1905 or earlier, in the region centered on the Ngol/Ragaba ez Zarga and Bahr el Arab/Kir. 

356. While the pre- and post-1905 evidence establishes the location of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms in the area claimed, the SPLM/A does not deny that it is difficult to draw precise lines. Given the practical, political and time constraints, the SPLM/A elected “to try to use manageable and practical straight-line boundaries” that provide “a fair representation of the extent of the Ngok Dinka territories in all directions” on the basis of the evidence. 

(c) The relevance of post-1905 demographic, cultural and environmental evidence to the location of the Ngok Dinka in 1905

(i) GoS Arguments

357. Having stated that the cultural evidence that the SPLM/A purports to rely on is in fact absent from its submissions, the GoS first points out that environmental considerations were not in the minds of Condominium officials who made the transfer in 1905, as acknowledged by the SPLM/A’s expert, Mr. Allan. 

358. The GoS further agrees with Mr. Allan that “environmental determinism does not work.” Yet, the SPLM/A took precisely the opposite approach by determining that the Bahr and half the goz belonged to the Ngok Dinka on environmental grounds. While the GoS does

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701 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 46.
703 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1383.
704 See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1376. See also SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at paras. 1387-1388.
705 See SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 134/06 et seq.
707 GoS Rejoinder, para. 505.
708 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 155/08 et seq (Mr. Allan – cross-examination).
710 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 173/14 et seq.
accept that the environment may have an influence on the cattle grazing patterns or agricultural practices of the tribes living in the region, an ability to adapt to local conditions does not entail that the Ngok Dinka were located in any place where they could grow dura (sorghum) or graze their cattle.\(^{711}\)

359. In addition, the SPLM/A does not establish the influence of the environment in 1905. In the GoS’s view, there are many factors, such as the effects of the Madhiyya, which would explain why the Ngok Dinka were further to the south in 1905 than the environmental capacity of their crop and cattle could have allowed them to be.\(^{712}\)

360. While the MENAS Report takes the same deterministic approach as the SPLM/A in its description of the Bahr and the goz, the MENAS Report turns out to show that the geographic dividing line between the Bahr and the goz “does not resemble the ABC Experts’ delimitation or the SPLM/A’s submission,”\(^{713}\) with the Bahr extending to 10°0’N on the west and beyond 10°35’N on the east.\(^{714}\) In addition, the evidence shows that “tribal habitation patterns did not follow geographical features at all.”\(^{715}\)

361. The GoS also relies on the MENAS Report’s concession that neither the goz nor the Bahr could have supported permanent habitation in 1905\(^{716}\) to conclude that the SPLM/A’s claim to the 10°35’N line utterly lacks credibility.\(^{717}\)

362. The SPLM/A’s criticism of the other environment-related arguments put forward by the GoS are, in the latter’s view, equally misguided. The GoS thus asserts that it never argued that the Bahr el Arab/Kir was “impassable,”\(^{718}\) but maintains that it is a traditional dividing line, “ideological and physical.”\(^{719}\) Having contended in its Memorial that the Ngok Dinka

\(^{711}\) Id. See also GoS Rejoinder, para. 506.

\(^{712}\) GoS Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 174/08 \textit{et seq}.

\(^{713}\) GoS Rejoinder, para. 508 referring to the MENAS Report, pp. 37-38, 140, 145, Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial.

\(^{714}\) GoS Rejoinder, para. 512.

\(^{715}\) GoS Rejoinder, para. 512 and Barbour’s and Lebon’s Maps (Figure 4 and 5 of GoS Rejoinder, respectively).

\(^{716}\) GoS Rejoinder, para. 515 quoting MENAS Report, para. 149, Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial.

\(^{717}\) GoS Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 176/03 \textit{et seq}.

\(^{718}\) GoS Rejoinder, para. 499.

\(^{719}\) GoS Rejoinder, para. 503 quoting 	extsc{Bewick}, S., 	extsc{Sudan’s Blood Memory} 156 (2006), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 12/18. See also GoS Rejoinder, paras. 500-504 quoting Wills, J.T., \textit{Between the Nile and the Congo} (1887) 9/5 Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography 285, p. 294 (SM Annex 61); 
\textsc{Warburt}, G., \textsc{The Sudan Under Wingate}, \textsc{Administration in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan} 1890-1916.
moved south in the wet season, the GoS relies on Willis and Wilkinson to maintain that the Ngok “were more congregated together” than the SPLM/A claims and where they went in the wet season at the time of the transfer was “very much in the south.”

363. Turning to the demographic evidence and the size of the Ngok Dinka population in 1905, the GoS argues that the SPLM/A’s figure of 50,000 is a “hopeless overestimate.” The GoS’s approximate figure of 5,000 Ngok Dinka is much more consistent with the area shown on the CivSec Map and later estimates, including the Governor of Kordofan’s estimates of 15,000 in 1934 and 30,000 in 1951, and the 1955 Sudan census which mentions a figure of 31,135 Ngok. The SPLM/A’s figure is based on questionable estimates and would indicate a sharp and implausible decrease in Ngok Dinka population between 1905 and 1934, a period during which the Ngok’s living conditions improved.

(ii) SPLM/A Arguments

364. The SPLM/A argues that environmental, climatic and cultural data regarding the Abyei region further corroborate the evidence drawn from Ngok Dinka and Misseriya oral traditions and the documentary record on the location of these tribes.

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720 See GoS Memorial, para. 359.
722 GoS Rejoinder, para. 454.
723 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 82/23 et seq., 85/14 et seq.
724 See GoS Rejoinder, para. 454 referring to Letter from Newbold to the Civil Secretary, 8 May 1934, Civsec 1/36/97 (SM Annex 89). See also GoS Memorial, para. 339.
725 See GoS Rejoinder, para. 454 referring Letter from G. Hawkesworth (Governor Kordofan) to Editor Kordofan Magazine, dated April 3, 1951, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 18/17. See also GoS Rejoinder, para. 454 referring to the Upper Nile’s District Commissioner’s figure of 20,000-25,000 in 1948 and the Dar Misseriya’s Assistant District Commissioner’s figure of 30,000 in 1952.
726 GoS Rejoinder, para. 454.
727 See Marchand’s estimate of 4 to 5 million Dinka in 1898, against Lienhardt’s estimate of about one million in 1952 (GoS Rejoinder, para. 456); Bey’s estimate of 2 million in 1906 (GoS Rejoinder, para. 457 quoting Letter from Cook to Bayliss (January 30, 1906), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 17/20); Governor’s Lloyd’s estimate of 500,000 which does not expressly refer to the Ngok (See GoS Rejoinder, para. 459 quoting Sudan Intelligence Reports, No. 171 (October 1908), Appendix D, p. 52, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 17/31).
728 GoS Rejoinder, para. 454. See also GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 86/13 et seq.
729 See SPLM/A Memorial, at para. 1005; SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at paras. 1307-1308.
365. The SPLM/A relies on Professor Cunnison’s definition of the Bahr, described as “[t]he southern part of the country,” “characterized by dark, deeply cracking clays and numerous winding watercourses,”730 which include:

a. the Kiir/Bahr el-Arab, being ‘all river beds between the Regeba ez Zerga’ and the Kiir/Bahr el-Arab;

b. the river system of the Ngol/Ragaba ez-Zarga to its border with the northeastern regabas in the neighborhood of Kwak and Keilak;

c. the river system of the Nyamora/Ragaba Umm Biero to its border with the goz; and

d. Lakes Keylak [Keilak] and Lake Abyad.731

366. Professor Cunnison further explains that “[t]he Bahr is the name which the Humr give to the whole of this dry season watering country” and “the Goz” is the area “to the north [of the Bahr].”732 In light of Cunnison’s definitions, the SPLM/A emphasizes the importance of the following factors:

a. the Ngok Dinka agro-pastoral way of life was well-adapted to the fertile soil and the extreme climatic conditions of the Bahr region and the goz;

b. the Ngok sorghum is well-suited to the Bahr region, and parts of the goz, because it is ‘drought resistant’ – a distinct advantage given the region’s climatic conditions;

c. the Ngok Dinka cattle were well-suited physically to the conditions and diseases of the region, particularly during the rainy season;

d. the Ngok Dinka animal husbandry practices (e.g., constructing substantial cattle byres (luaks or dugdugs)) were adapted to protecting their livestock from the region’s climate;

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731 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1114 quoting I. CUNNISON, THE HUMR AND THEIR LAND 51, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 4/5. See also SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 37/12 et seq.

e. the soil in the area of Muglad is a non-cracking red clay intersected by numerous sand ridges (described as the “Baggara Repeating Pattern”), ill-suited for agriculture; 733

f. the Misseriya engaged in little agriculture (thus having no reason to avail themselves of the fertile soil of the Bahr region), with their only crop being millet, which was best grown in the sandier, drier soil near Muglad, rather than in the damper conditions of the Bahr region;

g. the Misseriya’s nomadic lifestyle included living in temporary shelters, without protection from rainy conditions for either themselves or their cattle, which “do not have the faculty for moving in the mud that Dinka cattle possess;” and

h. the nomadic Misseriya herders and their lifestyle were best (and only) suited to the dry, sandy regions to the north of the goz. 734

367. Importantly, as pointed out by a wide range of authorities,735 including Professor Cunnison,736 the Ngok Dinka moved south of the Bahr river system with their cattle in the dry season, and north of it during the wet season.737 Similarly, while the Misseriya lived in settled camps to the north of Babanusa in the wet season, they then “moved south through the extensive sandy Goz to the area called the Bahr” and “lived in scattered camps across this region during the summer months.”738

368. Although the MENAS Report does not identify contemporary satellite evidence showing perennial water sources in the goz in the dry season, the SPLM/A points to early 20th
century maps, including Lloyd’s 1907 map,\textsuperscript{739} which indicate the existence of water in the area.\textsuperscript{740}

369. The SPLM/A goes on to argue that the GoS’s few comments relating to environmental and demographic evidence are all demonstrably wrong, to the point that most of them have been abandoned.\textsuperscript{741}

370. Thus, contrary to the GoS’s contention, the Bahr el Arab/Kir has never been a “physical barrier,” and was easily forded.\textsuperscript{742} Similarly, the GoS’s claim that “in the wet season [Sultan Rob and the Ngok Dinka] went south to the River Lol, not north”\textsuperscript{743} is clearly disproved by a wide range of authorities.\textsuperscript{744}

371. Lastly, the SPLM/A dismisses as mere conjecture the GoS’s contention that the Ngok Dinka in 1905 “might” have “numbered less than 5,000 in total.”\textsuperscript{745} The SPLM/A draws the Tribunal’s attention to Marchand, Bey and Lloyd’s higher, more contemporaneous figures\textsuperscript{746} on the basis of which the SPLM/A concludes that there would have been around 50,000 Ngok Dinka in 1905. It recognizes that they have “no inherently more or less credibility than the figures cited by GoS, except that they were published much closer to 1905.”\textsuperscript{747} The SPLM/A contends that the 1955 national census, which counted 31,135 Ngok Dinka, used a much criticized sample probability method\textsuperscript{748} likely to produce huge

\textsuperscript{739} Map 38 of SPLM/A Map Atlas, vol. 1 (Kordofan: Map of Dar Homr, Watkiss Lloyd, 1907).
\textsuperscript{740} SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1319.
\textsuperscript{741} SPLM/A Rejoinder, paras. 610, 620 \textit{et seq}. See also SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 1321 \textit{et seq}.
\textsuperscript{742} See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1359 quoting Second Daly Expert Report, at p. 25, Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial. SPLM/A also refers to MENAS Expert Report, at para. 110, Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial. See also SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 149/13-20 (Mr Allan characterizing the Kiir/Bahr el Arab as a “discontinuous river”).
\textsuperscript{743} See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1322 quoting GoS Memorial, at para. 359.
\textsuperscript{744} See also SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 167/16 \textit{et seq}.
\textsuperscript{745} SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1368 quoting GoS Memorial, para. 339.
\textsuperscript{746} SPLM/A refers to Bulletin du Comite de l’Afrique Francaise “De L’Oubangui au Nil : Les missions Liotard et Marchand, Octobre 1898, at p. 329, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 17/20; Letter dated 30 January 1906 from Albert Cook to Mr Baylis, a representative of the Church Missionary Society resident in Bor, Sudan, Church Missionary Society Archives, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 17/20; Sudan Intelligence Report No. 171, October 1908, Appendix D, at p. 52, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 17/31. On the basis of the 1908 Sudan Intelligence Report, SPLM/A obtains a figure in the region of 50,000.
\textsuperscript{747} SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1371.
\textsuperscript{748} See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at paras. 1371-1373.
discrepancies between estimated and actual population figures and to over-represent nomadic groups.\textsuperscript{749}

(d) The probative value of post-1905 witness evidence based on oral tradition in relation to early 20\textsuperscript{th} century events

(i) GoS Arguments

372. The GoS generally questions the probative value of the witness evidence based on oral tradition presented by the SPLM/A. It argues that these have been contradicted by the documentary and map evidence to the point of being “demonstrably untrue.”\textsuperscript{750}

373. The GoS insists that the goal of oral evidence, which depends upon repetition,\textsuperscript{751} is not “to tell a history of events,” but rather “to construct a present tribal identity and to connect that to an indefinite past.”\textsuperscript{752} The goal is certainly not to help a commission or a tribunal delimit a boundary, since “[s]tate boundaries are created by state means, not by oral tradition.”\textsuperscript{753} It recalls that the ABC Experts, considering that the oral testimony did not conclusively prove either side’s position, sought to find “as much evidence from contemporary records” as possible.\textsuperscript{754} The GoS also insists that the SPLM/A has not disclosed the methodology used in gathering the oral evidence.\textsuperscript{755}

374. The GoS goes on to identify five specific grounds upon which the SPLM/A’s witness evidence should not be given any weight.

375. First, the witness statements put forward by the SPLM/A refer to past events to which the witnesses cannot personally testify.\textsuperscript{756} This constitutes hearsay evidence and should be excluded.\textsuperscript{757}

\textsuperscript{749} See SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at paras. 1373-1374.
\textsuperscript{750} GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 327.
\textsuperscript{751} GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 333.
\textsuperscript{752} GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 72/09-16. \textit{See also} GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 331.
\textsuperscript{753} GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 73/01-02.
\textsuperscript{754} GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 328-329.
\textsuperscript{755} \textit{See} GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 75/09-77/06.
\textsuperscript{756} \textit{See} GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 48-53.
\textsuperscript{757} \textit{See} GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 52.
376. Second, the GoS submits that the witness statements provided by the SPLM/A concern time periods which are not relevant to the year 1905.\textsuperscript{758} They refer to events that might have happened in the 1940s or later on.\textsuperscript{759} The GoS asserts that in previous boundary disputes in which the need arose to have recourse to oral tradition, “no weight was given to allegations regarding a different period than that relevant to the dispute.”\textsuperscript{760}

377. Third, the GoS asserts that the SPLM/A witness statements are too vague to give any clear indication as to what territory was considered to be the Abyei area in 1905.\textsuperscript{761}

378. Fourth, the GoS submits that the SPLM/A has relied heavily on witness statements taken directly from persons interested in the outcome of the Abyei dispute.\textsuperscript{762} The GoS warns that “any relationship between the witness and the party on behalf of which it testifies should be taken into account by a court or tribunal.”\textsuperscript{763}

379. Finally, the GoS insists that the oral evidence presented is not corroborated by the contemporary documentary and cartographic record.\textsuperscript{764} Relying on the writings of Vansina, the GoS argues that oral tradition should be used “in conjunction with writings, archaeology, linguistic or even ethnographic evidence.”\textsuperscript{765}

380. The GoS mentions, among other examples, the rest house at Tebeldiya (at 10°35’N), which six of the nine Ngok Dinka tribes describe as the actual border between the Ngok and the

\textsuperscript{758} GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 54-56.

\textsuperscript{759} GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 54. See SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statement of Arop Deng Kuol Arop, (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 9); Witness Statement of Mijok Bol Atem, para. 15 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 23); Witness Statement of Ring Makuac Dhel Yak, para. 17 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 11); Witness Statement of Mijak Kuot Kur, paras. 13-17 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 12); Witness Statement of Ajak Malual Beliu, para. 7 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 13); Witness Statement of Jok Deng Kek, paras 13-15 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 14); Witness Statement of Belbel Chol Akuei Deng, paras. 15-16 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 15).

\textsuperscript{760} GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 55-56; See Island of Palmas (1928) 4 UNRiAA 831 at 851 and 865.

\textsuperscript{761} GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 57-58.

\textsuperscript{762} GoS Counter-Memorial, paras 63-65, 326.


\textsuperscript{764} GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 60-62, referring, \textit{inter alia}, to United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Reports 1980, para. 13; See also GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 37-38, 45-46, 357; See also GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, 74/07-75/08.

\textsuperscript{765} GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 355, quoting VANSINA, J., ORAL TRADITION AS HISTORY (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1985), pp. 159-160.
It points out that this proposition is in blatant contradiction with the relevant Condominium trek reports and scholarly writings. It points out that this proposition is in blatant contradiction with the relevant Condominium trek reports and scholarly writings. It points out that this proposition is in blatant contradiction with the relevant Condominium trek reports and scholarly writings.

(ii) SPLM/A Arguments

The SPLM/A argues that, contrary to the GoS’s position, oral tradition is considered a valuable source of information by historians, especially in oral or part-oral societies. In addition, courts and tribunals confer a “crucial role” to oral tradition. SPLM/A cites to the Supreme Court of Canada and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to show that oral tradition of tribal peoples is admitted and relied upon by the courts, “and placed on an equal footing with the types of historical evidence that courts are familiar with, which largely consists of historical documents.”

The SPLM/A goes on to address the GoS’s five objections to its witness evidence.

The SPLM/A first denies that the Ngok witness statements have no value on the ground that they refer to events to which they cannot personally testify. Contrary to the GoS’s assertion, hearsay evidence may be admitted in arbitration and tribal knowledge provides “the most reliable proof of the existence of property rights entitled to protection under a state’s legal system.”

Second, the SPLM/A argues that the GoS’s claim that the witness statements relate to time periods which have no bearing on the year 1905 is wrong as a matter of fact. The SPLM/A insists that it has presented statements by chiefs and elders who described the occupation of the region by “their fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers – before and

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766 GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 344-353 and refers to witness statements of tribesmen of the Alei, Abyior, Achaak, Anyiel, Bongo and Diil chieftdoms.

767 See GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 354 referring to the reports of Wilkinson, Mahon, Comyn, Willis, Hallam, Heinekey, Dupuis and Henderson and the writings of Cunnison, Santandrea, Sabah and Beswick. For other examples, see GoS Counter-Memorial, paras. 331-354.

768 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 643.

769 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 644.

770 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 651.


773 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 670.
around 1905 on the basis of first hand accounts passed down through one or two generations.

385. Third, the SPLM/A rejects the GoS’s argument that its witness evidence has no value because it is vague as to the specific territory to which it refers. In contrast to the GoS’s unreliable witness statements, the SPLM/A points out that the testimony provided by its witnesses is very detailed and descriptive, as well as remarkably consistent. While they do not provide geographical coordinates, the Community Mapping Project achieves this degree of precision.

386. Fourth, the GoS argument that the SPLM/A Ngok Dinka witnesses are interested parties and that this should be taken into account in assessing the probative value of their testimony, is unacceptable. While international arbitration does not prevent a party being a witness, it will be in any event for the Tribunal to determine the value of the evidence.

387. Fifth, the SPLM/A also denies the GoS allegation that oral evidence is deprived of its probative weight if it is contradicted by documentary evidence and the SPLM/A points to a leading author’s comment that “at times, oral tradition may prompt significant revisions to the written record that have falsely misconstrued a past occurrence.”

388. More generally, the SPLM/A denies the GoS’s contention that any of the statements contained in the testimony have been shown to be untrue in light of contemporaneous evidence.

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774 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 671; See para. 672 for examples of witness statements that relate to the Ngok Dinka’s occupation of the Abyei area during the times of the witnesses’ fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers.

775 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 671.

776 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 685.

777 See inter alia SPLM/A Rejoinder, paras. 729-739.

778 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 687.

779 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 700.

780 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 689.

781 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 703.

782 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 675.


784 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 705.
389. The SPLM/A thus maintains, on the basis of the witness statements, that the Ngok were responsible for clearing the road from Abyei Town to Tebeldiya, the border with the Misseriya.\(^{785}\) Although these statements relate to events that occurred in the mid-20\(^{th}\) century, the SPLM/A insists that “there is no reason to conclude that materially different circumstances existed at the beginning of the 20\(^{th}\) century […].”\(^{786}\)

390. The SPLM/A agrees that evidence provided on the basis of oral tradition must be examined with care.\(^{787}\) However, it insists that oral history, which is very specific in this case,\(^{788}\) is the way in which the Ngok Dinka record their past, and must be respected as such.\(^{789}\)

(e) **Probative Value of the SPLM/A “Tribal Maps” and Community Map**

(i) **GoS Arguments**

391. The GoS also questions the probative value of the SPLM/A’s “tribal maps,” the sources of which are unidentified.\(^{790}\) In particular, the area of each of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms shown on Maps 13-22 are in most cases “grossly distended in a northerly direction”\(^{791}\) and utterly inconsistent with the tribal references gathered from all of the historical maps produced with the Parties’ memorials.\(^{792}\)

392. The GoS also submits that the Community Mapping Expert Report should be given no weight. Most importantly, the study area did not include Abyei Town\(^{793}\), and did not go up to 10°35’N. In addition, the Mapping Team was made up of interested parties\(^{794}\) who hastily produced a map\(^{795}\) on the basis of leading questionnaires,\(^{796}\) without establishing how features located in 2009 correlated with their locations in 1905.\(^{797}\)

\(^{785}\) SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 517, footnote 645.

\(^{786}\) SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 722.

\(^{787}\) SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 67/16-17.

\(^{788}\) SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 64/12-15.

\(^{789}\) SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 67/02-25.

\(^{790}\) See GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 374.

\(^{791}\) See GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 377. See also GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 119/04 et seq.

\(^{792}\) GoS Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 95/08-09. (Dr. Poole’s cross-examination).

\(^{793}\) See GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 377; Figure 20, p. 153; Figure 21, p. 154, and Figure 22, p. 155; GoS Maps 1-12 of GoS Counter-Memorial Map Atlas.


\(^{795}\) Id. at paras. 14-16; See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 90/15-91/25 (Dr. Poole’s cross-examination).
(ii) SPLM/A Arguments

393. The SPLM/A maintains that the validity of its maps of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms remains unaffected by the GoS’s purported criticism.798 The GoS’s overlaid labels in Maps 20, 21 and 22 of its Counter-Memorial Map Atlas are based on the inaccurate coordinates of the historical maps, founded on limited and dry season observations, and do not align the tribal labels with the river system.799

394. The SPLM/A contends that community mapping is a recognized method of determining the historical location of people and tribes who do not have written records and has been accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.800 The SPLM/A emphasizes that, although the project was limited in scope due to time constraints and other obstacles, the Mapping Team “drew on the resources of some 200 Ngok Dinka to identify specific sites in the Study Area, [...] “tagging” each with a GPS coordinate.”801 One may criticize the method but it is a way “to harness modern technology with pre-modern knowledge of an area” in order to identify, in the absence of written records, where people live.802

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797 Id. at paras. 28-29.
798 See SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 608, et seq.
799 SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 609.
800 See SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 72/23-73/08. See also SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 72/04-07.
801 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1378. See also SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, at para. 1379.
802 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 73/03 et seq.
CHAPTER IV – ANALYSIS OF THE TRIBUNAL

A. THE TRIBUNAL’S TASK PURSUANT TO THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

1. The Two Stages of Review Under the Arbitration Agreement

395. At the outset, a few preliminary observations regarding the Tribunal’s own mandate are in order. The tasks and competence of the Tribunal are based on the Parties’ consent, as expressed in the Arbitration Agreement. The critical passage is Article 2, which, as will be recalled, defines the “Scope of Dispute” in the following manner:

The issues that shall be determined by the Tribunal are the following:

a. Whether or not the ABC [E]xperts had, on the basis of the agreement of the Parties as per the CPA, exceeded their mandate which is “to define (i.e. delimit) and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905” as stated in the Abyei Protocol, and reiterated in the Abyei Appendix and the ABC Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure.

b. If the Tribunal determines, pursuant to Sub-article (a) herein, that the ABC [E]xperts did not exceed their mandate, it shall make a declaration to that effect and issue an award for the full and immediate implementation of the ABC Report.

c. If the Tribunal determines, pursuant to Sub-article (a) herein, that the ABC [E]xperts exceeded their mandate, it shall make a declaration to that effect, and shall proceed to define (i.e. delimit) on map the boundaries of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905, based on the submissions of the Parties.

396. In addition, the preamble of the Arbitration Agreement explains, in its penultimate recital, that “the Parties differed over whether or not the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate as per the provisions of the CPA, the Abyei Protocol, the Abyei Appendix, and the ABC Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure.” It is this dispute that the Parties have “agreed to refer … to final and binding arbitration.” Given these provisions, the Tribunal’s initial function is to determine whether, in light of its lex specialis (Article 3 of the Arbitration Agreement, which, among others, refers to the CPA, the Abyei Protocol and the Abyei Appendix), the ABC Experts’ conduct and findings “exceeded their mandate.”

397. In accordance with Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement, the Tribunal is to proceed in two distinct and contingent stages, comprising two distinct juridical tasks. The first enterprise under Article 2(a) is for the Tribunal to determine whether the ABC Experts exceeded their
mandate. The second task, which is to be undertaken under Article 2(c) only if it determines “that the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate,” requires the Tribunal to reach its own findings on the specific question that had been submitted to the ABC. The contingent nature of Article 2(c) is somewhat obscured by the consolidated nature of these proceedings, such that the Parties have adduced evidence and presented arguments with respect to an Article 2(c) determination before the Tribunal had made its Article 2(a) determination. Nevertheless, the Tribunal is mindful of the need to maintain the separation between the distinct modes of inquiry called for with respect to Article 2(a) and Article 2(c). It will now turn, as it must, to an examination of the scope and limitations of its Article 2(a) mandate.

2. The Tribunal’s Task pursuant to Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement is Limited

(a) The Sequence of Article 2 Prohibits a de novo Review of the ABC’s Findings under Article 2(a)

398. The contingent sequence and distinct inquiries required by Article 2’s partition of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction provide an important indication of the levels of scrutiny that the Parties intended the Tribunal to undertake with respect to subparagraphs (a) and (c) of Article 2. A de novo review of all relevant evidence is sought by the Parties only under Article 2(c), that is, in the event that the Tribunal has found that the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate. Conversely, it appears that the Parties did not expect or authorize the Tribunal to make any definitive substantive determination – for the purpose of its analysis under Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement – as to the ABC Experts’ correctness of fact or law with respect to its delimitation of the Abyei Area in 1905.

399. Had the Parties, when drafting the Arbitration Agreement, inverted the sequence of Article 2, thereby charging the Tribunal with first determining the “correct” extension of the Abyei Area and necessarily confirming or correcting the ABC Experts’ decision as appropriate, the Tribunal may well have arrived at a different determination from that of the ABC Experts’ Report (not least because the Tribunal’s composition and fields of expertise are so different from those of the ABC Experts as to virtually ensure a different result). Yet the Parties did not invert the sequence. As Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement stands, the

Typically, international courts and tribunals would “bifurcate” proceedings to isolate unrelated substantive points (such as liability and quantum). That option was precluded by the Arbitration Agreement.
Tribunal must conclude that the Parties contemplated the possibility that the Tribunal (or some of its Members) might incline to the view that one or more of the ABC Experts’ findings were erroneous as a matter of law or fact, without however concluding that the ABC Experts had for that reason exceeded their mandate.

400. The sequence of Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement therefore indicates that the extent of permissible “excess of mandate” analysis pursuant to Article 2(a) is limited: regardless of whether the Tribunal, in 2009 and with the benefit of the Parties’ submissions (including factual evidence and expert opinion not submitted to the ABC in 2005), would have reached similar conclusions, the Tribunal must limit itself to considering whether the ABC Experts’ definition of the Abyei Area in their 2005 Experts’ Report can be understood as a reasonable, or at least a not unreasonable, discharge of their mandate. By contrast, the question of the correct location of the boundaries of the Abyei Area as the Tribunal sees it is outside the scope of permissible Article 2(a) review and will only be addressed should the Tribunal conclude that the ABC committed an excess of mandate.

(b) Legal Principles of Institutional Review Suggest that the “Correctness” of a Decision Is Beyond Review

401. The foregoing conclusion, which is based principally on the wording and sequence of Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement, is confirmed by general principles of international law. In their discussions of “excesses of mandate,” both Parties drew upon these general principles in analogizing and comparing the Tribunal’s function with that of a court or tribunal reviewing a prior decision of a different and independent institution for excès de pouvoir (or excess of jurisdiction). Given the paucity of authority on what “excess of mandate” concretely represents in law, the Tribunal agrees that principles of review applicable in public international law and national legal systems, insofar as the latter’s practices are commonly shared, may be relevant as “general principles of law and practices” to its Article 2(a) inquiry.805

402. National courts’ process of judicial review in relation to administrative bodies (specifically, regulatory bodies imbued with quasi-judicial and rule-making powers) commonly involves an assessment of whether the original decision-maker exceeded its powers. In situations involving review of the findings of expert groups and specialized bodies, many jurisdictions

805 Arbitration Agreement, Article 3(1).
permit courts to defer to the expertise of those groups and bodies. In the United States of America, for example, the review of agency decision-making and rule-making is marked by a high degree of deference.\textsuperscript{806} The judiciary defers to the agency’s presumed expertise, instead of conducting a \textit{de novo} review.\textsuperscript{807} Such judicial restraint is also practiced in the United Kingdom, provided that an issue is within the particular expertise of the prior decision-maker.\textsuperscript{808} Certain continental European legal systems, including Germany, accord a more limited degree of deference to the original decision-maker, extending only to the decision-maker’s appreciation of the facts and its choice among various permissible decision options.\textsuperscript{809} However, this more limited deference presumably results from the fact that in these jurisdictions, the review is conducted by specialized administrative courts which themselves have both substantive expertise and superior knowledge of the legal rules applicable to pertinent areas of activity. The Tribunal notes this national practice only to indicate the extent to which patterns of deference to the decisions of expert bodies are widespread and general.

403. In public international law, it is an established principle of arbitral and, more generally, institutional review that the original decision-maker’s findings will be subject to limited review only. The relevant case law draws a clear distinction between an appeal on the merits – to determine whether the original decision was legally and factually “right or wrong” – and a review of whether the decision-maker that rendered a decision exceeded its powers. A reviewing body that is seized of the issue of putative excess of powers will not “pronounce on whether the [original] decision was right or wrong,” as this question is legally irrelevant within an excess of powers inquiry.\textsuperscript{810}

\textsuperscript{806} \textit{Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council}, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), 843-44 (if Congress has expressly given the agency authority to elucidate a statutory provision through regulations, then such legislative regulations are given controlling weight “unless ...arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” If Congress’ statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the issue in question, then the court must simply ask whether the agency’s interpretation is based on a “permissible construction of the statute.”)

\textsuperscript{807} \textit{Skidmore v. Swift & Co.}, 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944), noting that agencies formulate policy “based upon more specialized experience and broader investigation and information than is likely to come to a judge.”

\textsuperscript{808} \textit{R v. Social Fund Inspector, ex p Ali} (1994) 6 \textsc{ADM}IN LR 205, 210E (Brooke, J). The English courts have been reluctant to interfere when Parliament has entrusted an expert body, whether the expert body be tribunals or civil servants, or a combination of civil servants and independent inspectors, with the task of fulfilling the intentions of Parliament in a specialist sphere.

\textsuperscript{809} See Judgment of the Federal Supreme Court in Administrative Matters of May 28, 1965, BVerwGE 21, 184.

\textsuperscript{810} \textit{Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906}, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1960, p. 192, 214. Cited with approval in \textit{Case concerning the Arbitral Award of July 31, 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal)}, ICJ Reports 1991, p. 62, para. 25.
404. Legal authorities on arbitral review do not directly apply to the present proceedings, because (as will be discussed further infra) the ABC was not an adjudicatory body strictu sensu, such that it would be inapposite to transpose, without appropriate qualification, the legal principles governing excesses of jurisdiction of powers to the ABC. That said, the established case law regarding excès de pouvoir of arbitral tribunals, which was relied on by both Parties in their submissions, may mutatis mutandis inform the interpretation of “excess of mandate” pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement.

405. There is no dearth of international case law confirming that the remedy of annulment of arbitral awards is granted only under exceptional circumstances. Reviewing bodies have noted that only “weighty” or “exceptional circumstances” will justify a finding of invalidity and that the party seeking to impugn an arbitral award bears a “very great” burden of proof. In addition, reviewing bodies have limited their review to “clear” cases and have noted that the reviewing body must “not intrude into the legal and factual decision-making of the [original decision-making body].” This body of case law suggests that the scope of review in international proceedings leading to the annulment of a prior decision is generally very limited.

406. It is clear that a reviewing body’s task cannot take the form of an appeal with respect to the correctness of the findings of the original decision-maker when the reviewing body’s methodology differs from that of the original decision-maker. Otherwise, the reviewing body would be prone to strike down the findings of the original decision-maker. The fact that the original decision-making body (the ABC Experts) and the reviewing body (this Tribunal) are each programmed to assess the facts using quite different methodologies (i.e. the methodology of science vis-à-vis the methodology of law) distinguishes these proceedings from proceedings in which the annulment of arbitral awards is sought – the classic field of application of the doctrine of excès de pouvoir. This unusual feature further underscores the inappropriateness of applying a standard of correctness in these proceedings.

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811 See the compilation of case law in the SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, paras. 613-621.
813 CDC Group plc v Republic of the Seychelles, Decision on the Application by the Republic of the Seychelles for Annulment of the Award dated December 17, 2003, June 29, 2005, Case No. ARB/02/14, para. 70.
407. The Tribunal’s task under the Arbitration Agreement is essentially a legal one. This is made clear in the “applicable law” clause of Article 3 of the Arbitration Agreement (see discussion infra), which requires the Tribunal to apply a variety of legal instruments as well as “general principles of law.” The Tribunal’s proceedings were to be conducted within the framework of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), using a set of Rules prepared for “Arbitrating Disputes Between Two Parties of Which Only One Is a State.” While the Arbitration Agreement does not specify, in terms, that the arbitrators were to be international lawyers, it was agreed that only persons on the PCA’s list of arbitrators or persons who had served as arbitrators in PCA proceedings would be eligible for nomination to the Tribunal. Moreover, in the appointment of the Presiding Arbitrator, Article 5(8) of the Arbitration Agreement provides that “he/she shall be a renowned lawyer of high professional qualifications, personal integrity and moral reputation.” Consistent with these provisions, the Parties selected jurists and scholars of international law as arbitrators. The clear implication was that a Tribunal composed of international lawyers will adjudge, using legal standards, whether the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate and, if this is found to be the case, delimit “on map” the Abyei Area by applying the Parties’ lex specialis.

408. Now plainly, this methodology is not, and was not meant to be, the same as that of the ABC Experts. Section 2.2 of the Abyei Appendix provided for the nomination of “five impartial experts knowledgeable in history, geography and any other relevant experience.” No mention was made of lawyers or international lawyers. Section 4 of the Abyei Appendix provided, in relevant part, that “[i]n determining their findings, the Experts in the Commission shall consult the British Archives and other relevant sources on Sudan wherever they may be available, with a view to arriving at a decision that shall be based on scientific analysis and research” (emphasis added). The Experts’ decision was intended to be guided by scientific, rather than legal, principles. As such, like this Tribunal, the ABC Experts were subjected to methodological constraints – only different ones. The ABC Experts were intended to apply the methodologies of their respective fields of expertise – particularly history and geography.

409. The difference in methodology between the ABC Experts and the Tribunal confirms that, in addressing the question in Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement, this Tribunal cannot have been expected or authorized to determine whether the ABC Experts’ findings were “correct.” Had the Parties intended to have the correctness of the ABC Experts’ findings reviewed, they would have presumably selected a panel of scientists with relevant
methodological expertise to review the ABC Experts’ Report in the light of scientific principles. If this Tribunal were to determine the “correct” answer in addressing the question in Article 2(a) by application of the applicable law in Article 3 of the Arbitration Agreement, it would almost certainly reach a different conclusion from that of the ABC Experts, for it would be “retro-applying” a method different from that applied by the ABC. That would render the exercise under Article 2(a) the same as Article 2(c) and would fail to give meaning to an arrangement that the Parties had deliberately established.

(c) Conclusion

410. In all instances of institutional review, a delicate balance must be struck between the desire of one Party to decide all matters anew and the interest of the other Party in the finality of litigation. In the present case, the Tribunal has not been authorized to determine where that balance lies. The Parties themselves calibrated the scales for this question through Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement. The two-stage sequence of Article 2 and the use of the terms “whether the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate” (rather than “whether the ABC Experts’ decision was correct”) are unequivocal. Thus, the Tribunal’s task cannot credibly be interpreted as having required, from the outset, an analysis of the substantive correctness of the ABC Experts’ conclusions.

411. Tellingly, neither Party has asked the Tribunal to assume a review function akin to a “court of appeals,” a clear demonstration of their continued wish to circumscribe this Tribunal’s jurisdiction. If the Tribunal were to engage at the outset in an omnibus re-opening of the ABC Experts’ appreciation of evidence and their substantive conclusions, then the Tribunal would itself be committing an excès de pouvoir. As a creature of the Parties’ consent, the Tribunal cannot and must not allow itself to stray down this path. Indeed, the Parties’ agreement that this Award be final and binding is explicitly presaged on the Tribunal’s “determining the issues of the dispute as stated in Article 2 of this Agreement.”814 In fealty to the Parties’ limited allocation of authority, the Tribunal must adhere to the strict limits and sequence of Article 2.

814 Under Article 9(2) of the Arbitration Agreement, “[t]he Parties agree that the arbitration award delimiting the “Abyei Area” through determining the issues of the dispute as stated in Article 2 of this Agreement shall be final and binding.”
3. The Scope of the Tribunal’s Authority under Article 2 to Declare an Excess of Mandate Respecting Certain Parts of the ABC Experts’ Report, while Retaining the ABC Experts’ Core Conclusions

412. One further clarification of the scope and limits of the Tribunal’s mandate under Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement is in order. Because the ABC Experts’ Report is a substantial document in itself, being composed of over 250 pages (including a number of substantive annexes) with a number of distinct substantive conclusions, the Tribunal must consider whether Article 2 requires it, if it were to find a discrete excess of mandate in the ABC Experts’ Report, to set aside the entire Report, including those findings and conclusions that were within the ABC Experts’ mandate, or, in such a case, whether the Arbitration Agreement empowers it to annul only the excessive portions of the ABC Experts’ Report without annulling those discrete parts of the Report which did not exceed the mandate. (For convenience, the Tribunal will refer to this latter possibility as “partial nullity” or “severability”).

(a) The Arbitration Agreement, Properly Interpreted, Permits Partial Nullity Under Appropriate Circumstances

413. In its Memorial, the GoS states that “if the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate in any respect,” the Report must be “set aside entirely and the task of determining the boundaries … becomes one for the Tribunal.” In contrast, the SPLM/A would have the Tribunal annul those parts of the award which are in excess of mandate but “to leave the remainder of the [ABC Experts’] Report intact.” It submits that the nullified parts could be “disregarded as void ab initio and the remainder of the [ABC Experts’ Report] treated as valid and within the ABC Experts’ mandate.”

414. These arguments rest on two divergent approaches to the interpretation of the Arbitration Agreement. One view of Article 2 would find dispositive the phrase “whether or not” in Article 2(a) and would highlight the wording of Articles 2(b) and 2(c) to conclude that the Tribunal can only provide a binary answer to its Article 2(a) inquiry (i.e., if “no” to whether there was an excess of mandate, then Article 2(b); if “yes,” then Article 2(c)). In contrast, a teleological view of the Arbitration Agreement would affirm the Tribunal’s authority to

815 GoS Memorial, para. 95 (emphasis in original).
816 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 661.
817 Id.
determine, on an issue by issue basis, whether the ABC Experts have exceeded their mandate under Article 2(a), and then to apply Articles 2(b) and 2(c) to each instance accordingly. This teleological interpretation would lead to the severance of those parts of the decision which were in excess of the mandate while retaining those parts found to be within the ABC Experts’ mandate.

415. The Tribunal believes that the teleological interpretation allows for the proper fulfillment of its task in that it allows for partial severance of discrete findings found to be in excess of mandate, insofar as the most significant findings of the ABC Experts are found to be within the mandate. Unlike a finding of fraudulent conduct which would taint an entire decision, it would be contrary to the object and purpose of the Arbitration Agreement itself (read as a whole) if a discrete excess of mandate on a particular issue were to result in setting aside all those parts of the ABC Experts’ decision which were within their mandate. This would involve the Tribunal’s reconsideration of all of the evidence pertaining to the borders of the Abyei Area and the displacement of the Experts’ prescribed methodology, which had been reasonably and plausibly applied with the different methodology and, most likely, different conclusions of the Tribunal. The sequence of Article 2 makes clear that the ABC Experts – not the Tribunal – were the preferred “arbiters of fact” as to the 1905 boundaries of the Abyei Area. The Tribunal is only secondarily entrusted with this task, if the original decision cannot stand due to an excess of mandate. Moreover, the Tribunal’s skills relate more to the legal task involved in the discharge of Article 2(a) than to the task of Article 2(c), for which the skills of the Experts were specifically selected. It would be difficult to reconcile this preference for the ABC Experts’ decision, built into the structure of the Arbitration Agreement, with an obligation to annul even those sections of the ABC Experts’ Report that were discrete and were plausibly within their mandate.

(b) Relevant General Principles of Law and Practices Permit Partial Nullity Under Appropriate Circumstances

416. The “general principles of law and practices” that the Tribunal must apply to these proceedings pursuant to Article 3 of the Arbitration Agreement also require the annulment of only those parts of the ABC Experts’ Report that are in excess of mandate without setting aside those discrete parts of the Report which were within the mandate. Partial annulment of a decision or award has long been recognized by international jurisprudence as within the authority of a court or arbitral tribunal seized with a review function. In *The Orinoco Steamship Company Case*, a PCA-administered arbitration, the arbitral tribunal was asked,
in a *compromis* framed in similar terms to that in the present dispute, to determine “whether the decision of Umpire Barge … is not void, and whether it must be considered so conclusive as to preclude a re-examination of the case on its merits. If the [a]rbitral [t]ribunal decides that said decision must be considered final, the case will be considered … as closed; but on the other hand, if the [a]rbitral [t]ribunal decides that said decision … should not be considered as final, said [t]ribunal shall then hear, examine and determine the case and render its decision on the merits.”\(^8\) The tribunal considered that:

> following the principles of equity in accordance with law, when an arbitral award embraces several independent claims, and consequently several decisions, the nullity of one is without influence on any of the others, more especially when, as in the present case, the integrity and the good faith of the Arbitrator are not questioned; this being ground for pronouncing separately on each of the points at issue.\(^7\)

417. The principle of severability was judicially considered in the *Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989* before the International Court of Justice (“**ICJ**”). The minority judges considered that the arbitral tribunal’s failure to demarcate the exclusive economic and fishery zones was an *excès de pouvoir infra petita*. Judge Weeramantry (dissenting) emphasized that “a duty lies upon the court making the declaration of nullity to keep to a minimum the scope of that nullity.”\(^8\) He recognized the existence of “cases, including boundary disputes, where different segments of the total matter in dispute can be decided as separate and discrete problems, the answers to which can stand independently of each other. In such cases the segments of the dispute that have been properly determined can maintain their integrity though the findings on other segments are assailed or do not exist.”\(^8\) Severability was inappropriate on the facts of that case, as the issues were so intrinsically connected that it was clear the Parties had intended that the circumstances be determined in a “composite process.”\(^\)\(^\) However, the principle enunciated was unchallenged.

418. Similarly, in *Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic*, an ad hoc annulment committee, in interpreting Article 52 of the ICSID

\(^8\) *The Orinoco Steamship Company Case* (United States/Venezuela), October 25, 1910, XI RIAA 227, 234.

\(^7\) *Id.* at 238.


\(^8\) *Id.* at 168.

\(^8\) *Id.* at 169.
Convention,\textsuperscript{823} found that the extent to which an award can be annulled is a matter to be determined by the deciding body itself. The committee wrote:

Thus where a ground for annulment is established, it is for the \textit{ad hoc} committee, and not the requesting party, to determine the extent of the annulment. In making this determination, the committee is not bound by the applicant’s characterization of the request, whether in the original application or otherwise, as requiring either complete or partial annulment of the award. This is reflected in the difference in language between Articles 52(1) and 52(3), and it is further supported by the \textit{travaux} of the ICSID Convention. Indeed, Claimants in the present case eventually accepted this view.\textsuperscript{824} (emphasis added)

419. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the “\textit{Vienna Convention}”), which provides for the severability of treaty provisions that comply with certain criteria, is indicative of a general international policy favoring the severance of offending portions of legal instruments from their non-offending portions. These criteria are:

If the ground solely relates to particular causes, it may be invoked with respect to those clauses where:

(a) the said clauses are separable from the remainder of the treaty with regard to their application;

(b) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that acceptance of those clauses was not an essential basis of the consent of the other party or parties to be bound by the treaty as a whole; and

(c) continued performance of the treaty would not be unjust.\textsuperscript{825}

420. The same economic approach is found in investment and commercial arbitrations. The 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards provides that recognition of an award may be refused where:

The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which

\textsuperscript{823} See Article 52 of the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States.


\textsuperscript{825} \textit{Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties}, Article 44(3).
contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced.\textsuperscript{826} (emphasis added)

The 1961 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration,\textsuperscript{827} the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration,\textsuperscript{828} the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,\textsuperscript{829} the 1966 European Convention providing a Uniform Law of Arbitration,\textsuperscript{830} and the 1987 Convention \textit{Arabe d'Amman sur l'Arbitrage Commercial},\textsuperscript{831} to which Sudan is a party, contain provisions to similar effect.

421. The rationale for such an approach is clear. As summarized succinctly in the \textit{travaux préparatoires} of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the \textit{“1958 New York Convention”}), there is a possibility that “the extraneous matter introduced by the arbitrator into the award might be of a very incidental nature. If the enforcing court was not authorized to sever that matter from the remainder of the award and was obliged to refuse enforcement altogether merely because a small detail fell outside the scope of the Arbitration Agreement, the applicant might suffer unjustified hardship.”\textsuperscript{832} Thus, there is a presumption that bodies of review are both authorized and expected to sever “deficient” parts from “non-deficient” parts of a decision, provided that this exercise does not lead to the separation of “fundamentally interrelated elements.”\textsuperscript{833}

422. The terms of the Arbitration Agreement (and, in particular, the stringent timeframe to which the Parties have subjected these proceedings) also coincide with the general principle of \textit{economy} applied in appellate adjudicatory proceedings, in which a reviewing authority declines to disrupt the \textit{reasonable} factual and legal findings of the initial decision-maker in

\textsuperscript{826} 1958 New York Convention, Article V(1)(c).
\textsuperscript{827} See Article IX(1)(c).
\textsuperscript{828} See Article 5(1)(c).
\textsuperscript{829} Revision 2006. \textit{See} Model Law, Article 34(2)(iii).
\textsuperscript{830} \textit{See} Uniform Law, Article 26; Explanatory Note to Article 26.
\textsuperscript{831} \textit{See} Article 34(4).
order to promote efficiency in the conduct of adjudicatory proceedings. Delimiting an entirely new boundary is a complex task that cannot be vested upon the Tribunal lightly, especially in these proceedings, where the Parties have agreed that the Tribunal’s first and potentially only mode of inquiry is Article 2(a)’s “excess of mandate” review. Accordingly, if and to the extent that the ABC did not exceed its mandate in substantial parts of its decision, it would not be proper for the Tribunal to reconsider the entire boundary of the Abyei Area ab initio because of a possible excess of mandate in a discrete part of the ABC Experts’ Report.

423. Now it is entirely possible for parties to contract out of the applicability of the general principle of law allowing for severability and partial nullity. But given international law’s general approach to this matter, such a limitation on the Tribunal’s powers would have to be evidenced by a clear and unequivocal expression of intention of the Parties. That is certainly not the case here. Quite to the contrary. The Arbitration Agreement itself, and in particular, the framework of inquiry provided under Article 2, indicate that the Parties intended to allow for the possibility of a finding of partial excess of mandate.

424. For all these reasons, the Tribunal will comply with its duty under general principles of law to keep to a minimum the scope of nullity, subjecting only those parts of the ABC Experts’ findings which are discrete and severable to an independent and separate analysis. In accordance with Judge Weeramantry’s opinion (quoted above) that “boundary disputes, where different segments of the total matter in dispute can be decided as separate and distinct problems, the answers to which can stand independently of each other,” if an excess of mandate is found to have occurred with respect to a particular finding or conclusion of the ABC Experts, “the segments of the dispute that have been properly determined can maintain their integrity though the findings on other segments are assailed.

834 For a recent application of the principle of economy, see Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Judgment, 18 November 2008, para. 89, where the ICJ held that "judicial economy" was "an element of the requirements of the sound administration of justice" and provided a justification for disregarding jurisdictional defects, if they could be easily cured by the subsequent action of the applicant or respondent. See also the use of the principle of economy to determine the order in which a court or tribunal considers the various issues before it: Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) ICJ Reports 2002, p. 3, paras 45-46; and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Morelli, Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd (Belgium v. Spain), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 1964, p.6, at p.97, cited with approval in Iran-US Claims Tribunal Case No. 823, Award No. 595-823-3 of 16 Nov. 1999, para. 37. See also the use of the principle of judicial economy in the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body, where it stands for the proposition that the Appellate Body does not need to rule on every single claim made by complaining parties, but only on those required to settle the dispute in question: Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, 3 March 2005, para. 510.
or do not exist.” If the Tribunal should find that certain discrete and severable findings or conclusions of the ABC Experts are rendered in excess of mandate but which are not fundamentally related to other findings or conclusions, it will set aside only those conclusions, while confirming those parts of the ABC Experts’ Report which prove to have been within their mandate.

4. The Applicable Law Governing these Proceedings

425. Article 3 of the Arbitration Agreement prescribes the law and instruments that must be applied by the Tribunal in the exercise of its mandate:

1. The Tribunal shall apply and resolve the disputes before it in accordance with the provisions of the CPA, particularly the Abyei Protocol and the Abyei Appendix, the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan, 2005, and general principles of law and practices as the Tribunal may determine to be relevant.

2. This Agreement, which consolidates the Abyei Road Map signed on June 8th 2008 and the Memorandum of Understanding signed on June 21st 2008 by the Parties with the view of referring their dispute to arbitration, shall also be applied by the Tribunal as binding on the Parties.

426. In contrast with the ABC Experts (who were required to arrive at their decision “based on scientific analysis and research”), Article 3 makes clear that the Tribunal shall decide, by applying legal methods, whether the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate under Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement and, if and to the extent that it finds that there were such excesses, the delimitation of the boundary of the Abyei Area under Article 2(c).

427. In addition to the provisions of the CPA (particularly the Abyei Protocol and the Abyei Appendix) and the Interim National Constitution, the Tribunal must also apply “general principles of law and practices” which it determines to be relevant. Neither the CPA nor the Arbitration Agreement is a treaty. They are, rather, agreements between the government of a sovereign state, on the one hand, and, on the other, a political party/movement, albeit one which those agreements recognize may – or may not – govern over a sovereign state in the near future. But, in addition to the reference to “general principles of law and practice,” there are a number of other indications that the Parties intended that international law play a crucial role in the resolution of this dispute.

428. First, the essential purpose of the ABC Experts’ delimitation exercise (and of the Tribunal’s should it have to proceed to an Article 2(c) inquiry) was to determine a boundary that could
potentially become an international boundary. If, during the 2011 referendum prescribed by the CPA, the residents of the Abyei Area were to choose to join Southern Sudan, and further, if the people of Southern Sudan were to elect to exercise their right to self-determination so as to become independent, the boundaries of the Abyei Area would form part of the northern boundary of a new, independent, separate, and sovereign State. Thus the Parties appreciated that the determination of the boundaries of the Abyei Area was, *in posse*, an international legal exercise.

429. Second, the Parties’ chosen method and forum for settling the dispute also manifests their intention to have international law apply. The Parties opted for arbitration administered under the auspices of the PCA, an international dispute resolution organization, and in accordance with the PCA Rules. Moreover, the Parties insisted that the four party-appointed arbitrators be “current or former members of the PCA or members of tribunals for which the PCA acted as registry.” Each of the Parties was entitled to designate two arbitrators and each designated well-known international lawyers and scholars.

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835 Article 1 of the Arbitration Agreement provides:

Rules, Tribunal, Registry and Appointing Authority

1. The Parties agree to refer their dispute to final and binding arbitration under this Arbitration Agreement (Agreement) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of Which Only One Is a State (PCA Rules), subject to such modifications as the Parties agreed herein or may agree in writing.

2. The Parties shall form an arbitration tribunal (Tribunal) to arbitrate their dispute in accordance with this Agreement and the PCA Rules; provided that the PCA Rules shall not apply when excluded or modified by this Agreement.

3. The Parties agree on the International Bureau of the (PCA) to act as the registry and provide administrative support in accordance with this Agreement and the PCA Rules.

4. The Parties designate the Secretary General of the PCA as the appointing authority to act in accordance with this Agreement and the PCA Rules. (emphasis in original)

836 Article 5 paragraphs (1) to (5) of the Arbitration Agreement provide:

1. The Parties agree that the Tribunal shall be composed of five arbitrators. Each Party shall appoint two arbitrators, and the four Party-appointed arbitrators shall appoint the fifth.

2. The Parties shall not designate as Party-appointed arbitrators persons other than current or former members of the PCA or members of tribunals for which the PCA acted as registry who shall be independent, impartial, highly qualified and experienced in similar disputes.

3. The Secretary General of the PCA shall provide the two Parties, within five days of depositing this Agreement with him, with a full list of members and arbitrators (PCA Arbitrators List) as stated in section 2 herein. The PCA Arbitrators List shall also include information on qualifications and experience.

4. Each Party shall appoint, within thirty days of receiving the PCA arbitrators list, two arbitrators from the list by written notice to the Secretary General of the PCA.
430. Third, and particularly important, there is a widely shared understanding that reference to “general principles of law” within the context of boundary disputes includes general principles of international law. This is especially true in the case of intra-State disputes, where municipal law does not typically make provision for such matters. The tribunal in the *Dubai-Sharjah Arbitration*, for example, held that “in a question concerning the boundaries between members of a Federal State, the applicable law must be Federal law, and, if such does not exist or is incomplete, then recourse must be made to international law.” It elaborated:

... it is scarcely surprising that the constitution of the United Arab Emirates contains no provisions that relate to the law applicable to territorial disputes between the member Emirates; this would be true of the constitutional documents of the majority of Federations. Such territorial disputes are almost always resolved by reference to international law, even though certain tribunals have made such reference by analogy and not directly.

431. Notably, the *Dubai-Sharjah* tribunal relied upon Swiss Federal Court jurisprudence, which confirmed its practice of analogous application of international law in the relations between the Swiss Cantons in the 1980 *Nufenenpass* judgment:

Finally, [the Court] designates the principles of public international law as applicable in a subsidiary manner. According to the unanimous view in Swiss doctrine and jurisprudence, public international law comes into play in the relationships among Cantons when both federal law and inter-Cantonal contract and customary law are exhausted on a particular disputed issue. In this respect, however, one will appropriately speak of a merely analogous application of international law, not an original one.

432. Fourth, not only did neither Party object to the use of international law but, in fact, both advocated its use and cited to it extensively in their written and oral pleadings.

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5. In the event that a Party fails to name one or both Party appointed arbitrators within the specified time, the Secretary General of the PCA shall make, within ten days, such appointment from the PCA arbitrators list. (emphasis in original)


838 *Id.* at 586-87.

433. Finally, the Parties selected arbitrators with expertise and experience in public international law. The Parties have similarly appointed counsel expert in international law and dispute resolution.

434. But international law is only one part of the applicable law. The Tribunal is mindful of the entire *lex specialis* prescribed by the Parties and the interrelations between its component parts. Article 3(1) prescribes a functional hierarchy among the applicable sources of law that reflects the specific concerns of the Parties: the CPA (particularly those components of the CPA that directly bear upon Abyei within the North-South peace process) takes precedence in application, followed by the Interim National Constitution, followed by “general principles of law and practices.” It should also be emphasized that Article 3(2) explicitly calls for the Tribunal to apply the Arbitration Agreement, and Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement plays a central role in clarifying the scope and limits of the Tribunal’s juridical inquiry.

435. The Tribunal is sensitive to the extent to which principles and practices of international law, insofar as they prove applicable, must be adapted to the specific context of this dispute. As the following sections will demonstrate, the special character of the ABC Experts and the specific object and purpose of the ABC’s constitutive instruments within the broader Sudan peace process, and a particular source’s place in the hierarchy of applicable law sources, will affect the role which legal principles and precedent from other areas of law are to play. Although it is permissible to apply relevant international law where appropriate, the Tribunal will be particularly attentive to the wording, context, object and purpose of the Abyei Protocol, the Abyei Appendix, the Interim National Constitution and the Arbitration Agreement.

B. INITIAL MATTERS: ALLEGED PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS; WAIVER, ESTOPPEL, RES JUDICATA ISSUES

1. Alleged Procedural Violations by the ABC Experts

436. Before proceeding to the key aspects of the Tribunal’s analysis, a number of issues raised by the Parties may be dealt with in short order. The first of these relates to the alleged procedural violations which one of the Parties claims the ABC Experts committed.

437. The GoS argues that certain acts and omissions of the ABC Experts violated the procedures specified by the Parties in the Abyei Appendix, Terms of Reference, and Rules of
Procedure, to wit: (1) they allegedly took evidence from Ngok Dinka informants without procedural safeguards and without informing the GoS; (2) they allegedly unilaterally sought and relied on an e-mail from an official of the United States Government to establish their interpretation of the mandate; and (3) they allegedly failed to act through the ABC (i.e. the Commission as a whole) in reaching their decision and failed to seek a consensus before rendering their Report (collectively, the “alleged acts and omissions”).

Emphasizing that the Parties specifically defined the issues to be addressed by the Tribunal with reference to the Abyei Appendix, Terms of Reference, and Rules of Procedure, the GoS asserts that the Tribunal should interpret a violation of procedures specified in these instruments as an excess of mandate.

438. The SPLM/A rejects this view, contending that a dispute regarding an excess of mandate does not extend to procedural complaints and that, alternatively, a party seeking to invalidate an arbitral award on procedural grounds must demonstrate serious prejudice.

439. Having considered the Parties’ arguments, the Tribunal finds, as explained below, that the alleged acts and omissions do not individually or collectively fall within the scope of “excess of mandate” review under Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement, which does not permit the review of alleged procedural violations.

440. Article 2(a) restates the ABC Experts’ mandate in clear terms: “to define (i.e., delimit) and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905.” To aid in the “Functioning” of their mandate, the ABC Experts were guided by procedural rules expressed in the Abyei Appendix, Terms of Reference, and Rules of Procedure. These rules are not intrinsic components of the mandate itself; rather, they provided for a

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840 See discussion on “Procedural Excess of Mandate” in the summary of the Parties’ arguments, supra paras. 141 to 163.

841 See Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement at para. 395 supra.

842 Notably, a clear distinction between “Mandate” and “Functioning” exists within the text of the Terms of Reference (an instrument drawn up and agreed upon by both Parties). The ABC’s “Mandate” as provided in the Terms of Reference is:

1.1 The Abyei area is defined in the Abyei Protocol in article 1.1.2 as “The area of the Nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905.” The ABC shall confirm this definition.

1.2 The ABC shall demarcate the area, specified above and on land.

A subsequent section in the Terms of Reference, captioned “Functioning of the ABC,” defines the principal procedures to be followed by the ABC Experts. See Section 3 of the Terms of Reference, with the caption “Functioning of the ABC.” Among others, the listed procedures pertain to public hearings, consulting third-party sources, and the preparation of the final report.
The Tribunal further emphasizes that for a majority of its members, even assuming *arguendo* that the alleged acts and omissions occurred and were departures from rigidly-enforceable procedural rules, such improprieties did not amount to an excess of mandate, not having individually or collectively resulted in a violation of the fundamental rights of either Party. A procedural irregularity alone cannot invalidate a decision; a *significant injustice* must have also have occurred as a result of the irregularity. For the majority,

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843 See Terms of Reference, Sections 3.3 and 3.4; Rules of Procedure, Sections 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, and 11. See further infra at paras. 468.

844 See SPLM/A Counter Memorial, p. 76, para. 298, citing J. Lew, L. Mistelis & S. Kröll, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶25-37 (2003) ("The prevailing view is that a procedural irregularity or defect alone will not invalidate an award. The test is that of a significant injustice so that the tribunal would have decided otherwise had the tribunal not made a mistake."); C. Schreuer, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY Art. 52 ¶230 (2001) ("In order to be serious, the departure must be more than minimal. It must be substantial. In addition, this departure must have had a material effect on the affected party. It must have deprived that party of the benefit of the rule in question. … if it is clear from the circumstances that the
this “prejudice” requirement has not been met, as the GoS has not demonstrated that any of the alleged procedural violations would have affected the decision outcome. Thus, the GoS’s submissions on this point cannot be sustained, not having met the “significant injustice” standard.

2. Waiver, Estoppel, and Res Judicata Arguments

444. The Tribunal also considers it convenient to discuss, at this early stage, two specific objections which the SPLM/A raised in connection with the Tribunal’s ability to review the ABC Experts’ Report.

(a) Waiver/Estoppel

445. The SPLM/A argues that the GoS effectively waived its objections to the ABC Experts’ Report because it agreed, as provided in the ABC’s constitutive instruments, that the Report would be “final and binding.” The GoS counters that the entire point of these proceedings is to allow the Tribunal to determine whether or not the ABC Experts committed an excess of mandate; hence, in the GoS’s view, the Arbitration Agreement precludes the SPLM/A from raising this waiver argument.

446. The claim of a waiver of the GoS’s right to seek a review of the ABC Experts’ Report is hardly consonant with the GoS’s subsequent recourse to this arbitration, to which the SPLM/A has also consented. Moreover, from the initial presentation of the ABC Experts’ Report, the GoS has been clear in expressing its disagreement with the ABC Experts, and no evidence of waiver can be found or implied by the course of its conduct.

447. Insofar as there is any ground for a claim of estoppel (which is doubtful), the Tribunal would agree with the GoS that the SPLM/A, as a party to the Arbitration Agreement and, in particular, its Article 2, is estopped from objecting to the Tribunal’s review of the ABC

party had not intended to exercise the right [said to be breached], there would be no material effect and the departure would not be “serious” under this analysis.”); D. SUTTON, J. GILL & M. GEARING (EDS.), RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION ¶8.106 (2007) (“If ... correcting or avoiding the serious irregularity would make no difference to the outcome, substantial injustice will not be shown.”); R. MERKIN, ARBITRATION LAW ¶20.8 (update 2008) (“there is substantial injustice if it can be shown that the irregularity in the procedure caused the arbitrators to reach a conclusion which, but for the irregularity, they might not have reached ...”).

845 Section 5 of the Abyei Appendix, text at supra note 107.
Experts’ Report. As provided in the Arbitration Agreement, the scope of the dispute submitted to arbitration is covered by Article 2.\textsuperscript{846}

448. The language of Article 2 makes clear that both the GoS and the SPLM/A have submitted to the Tribunal the question of whether or not the ABC Experts had exceeded their mandate. To the extent that the Tribunal finds that this is not the case, the Tribunal will make a declaration that no excess of mandate was committed. To the extent that the Tribunal does find that an excess of mandate occurred, it will proceed to the delimitation of the Abyei Area. The mandate of the Tribunal, as agreed by both Parties in the Arbitration Agreement, necessarily requires a review and (if necessary) an annulment and revision of parts of the ABC Experts’ decision. This thus estops the SPLM/A from arguing that the ABC Experts’ Report was final and binding. Indeed, by agreeing to Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement, the SPLM/A has specifically accepted the authority of the Tribunal to review the Report, and if necessary, to declare an excess of mandate and proceed with a revision of the findings of the ABC Experts.

(b) Res Judicata

449. The SPLM/A further contends that the ABC Experts’ Report enjoys \textit{res judicata} status and hence, cannot be impugned by the GoS. It asserts that inasmuch as the ABC conducted itself in the manner of an adjudicative body and rendered an adjudicative decision, the Report’s findings are \textit{res judicata} for both Parties. The GoS disagrees, arguing that by agreeing to the Arbitration Agreement, the Parties understood that there was still the possibility that the border was not definitely settled, and that issue is to be finally determined by the Tribunal.

450. The Tribunal sees no need to enter into an extended discourse on whether, as a matter of legal theory, the ABC Experts’ Report is of such a juridical nature that \textit{res judicata} can attach to it. The critical question is whether the fact that the Parties agreed to the finality of the Report in 2005 precluded them from consenting to submit questions about it to another Tribunal. Whatever the status of the ABC Experts’ Report, the Arbitration Agreement concluded by the Parties in 2008 had the effect of reopening questions that had been accepted as “final and binding,” thus novating the issues for decision in accordance with the contingencies in Article 2.

\textsuperscript{846} See text at para. 395 \textit{supra}. 
451. When both Parties consented to this arbitration, that consent extended to all the matters provided under Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement, and had the effect of re-opening the ABC Experts’ Report to “excess of mandate” review under Article 2(a) and a potential new delimitation exercise under Article 2(c).

C. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ABC

452. Through the Arbitration Agreement, the Parties have asked that the Tribunal determine whether another body (the ABC Experts) exceeded its mandate. As the ABC is quite singular in character, there is no neatly established standard against which to assess the ABC Experts’ conduct. Instead, the ABC’s nature must be ascertained from its constitutive instruments, its composition, the conduct of the Parties, and the function to be performed by the ABC in the larger peace process. These factors will form the basis for ascertaining the normative framework and proper conduct of the ABC Experts in fulfillment of their mandate.

453. In international law, the spectrum of entities designed to engage in dispute settlement varies widely in terms of institutional permanence, composition, and the procedural regimes according to which these entities operate. Some, such as the ICJ, are composed of legal professionals and have a highly articulated procedural regime. At the other end of the spectrum, entities (often established on an ad hoc basis) include non-lawyers and follow very informal procedures, which may not be fully articulated in writing. What is procedurally permissible in some of the decision entities is prohibited in others. Thus, for example, mediators are expected to meet each of the disputing parties separately and to respect, in full confidence, what one party may say, while an arbitral or judicial body would be prohibited from entertaining such ex parte communications. International law is creative and innovative in these matters and may sometimes graft some of these procedures onto others in combinations that may appear anomalous to those unfamiliar with international law. For example, in the Taba arbitration (discussed in further detail below), three of the five arbitrators were also to function as mediators and to seek a compromise settlement while serving as arbitrators.

454. It is clear from its constitutive instruments that the ABC was designed by the GoS and the SPLM/A, along with others who participated in the process of conceiving and establishing it, to make a specified decision according to criteria specified in the texts. Although the Parties committed themselves to accept the Report as “final and binding,” a formulation
often found in arbitration agreements, the ABC was plainly not an “arbitration tribunal” and certainly not an international arbitration tribunal. None of the constitutive texts referred to it in those terms. Yet, along with the criteria for making a final and binding decision, the ABC also had a quasi-mediatory role, for its expert members were authorized to try to seek a consensus between the disputing parties in parallel; mediators, as noted above, operate according to procedures very different from those of arbitrators.

455. Taking account of the ABC’s constitutive instruments as well as contextual factors, a majority of the members of the Tribunal has no difficulty to conclude that the ABC Experts’ essential function was to reach a final decision with regard to the boundaries of the Abyei Area, even in the face of scarce factual evidence. In ascertaining the nature of the ABC, one of the Tribunal’s members, Professor Hafner, did not share the view of the other members, preferring to see the ABC as a fact-finding body with a more limited nature (his views are explained in some detail infra). Nevertheless, these different views on this matter do not affect the substance of the Tribunal’s conclusions.

1. The Non-uniform Nature of Boundary Commissions

456. The mere fact that the ABC was termed a “boundary commission” does not by itself clarify the scope and nature of the ABC’s mandate. Historically, many bodies, with many different titles, have been endowed with the specific task of delineating and/or demarcating boundaries. The role and mandate of such bodies differ as a function of the parties’ agreement on what each particular “boundary commission,” “boundary committee,” “mixed commission,” etc. was designed to do.

457. Thus, the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission, though charged with delimitation and demarcation, was clearly in the nature of an international arbitral tribunal; it was composed of international lawyers and jurists and its mandate, functions, and procedures meticulously followed those of a formal arbitral proceeding. 847

458. By contrast, a chamber of the ICJ in the Frontier Dispute, Burkina Faso v. Mali848 constituted a commission of three experts for the specific purpose of demarcating the


boundary delimited by the ICJ chamber itself; the commission did not undertake any adjudicatory or arbitral functions.

459. Uniquely, in the *Taba Arbitration*[^849] (referred to above), before the tribunal constituted to determine the boundary dispute rendered a decision, some of the arbitrators were required to “explore the possibilities of a settlement of a dispute,” and the “boundary commission” thus undertook a parallel conciliation function.

460. The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, constituted to implement the ICJ ruling in *Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Equatorial Guinea intervening)*[^850] had as part of its mandate (in addition to demarcating the land boundary) the development of projects to promote joint economic ventures, troop withdrawal from relevant areas along the land boundary, and the reactivation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission[^851].

461. Finally, despite its name, the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission arguably performed delimitation functions as well[^852].

462. These examples demonstrate that the term “boundary commission” has encompassed bodies with a wide spectrum of functions, their mandates, with varying degrees of formality, ranging from pure fact-finding to full adjudication (and many with facets of both). Like other boundary commissions, the ABC is best considered a singular entity whose nature is to be derived from its own, specific features.

2. **The ABC’s Singular Characteristics**

   (a) **The Positions of the Parties**

463. While both Parties have characterized the ABC as a *sui generis* body[^853], each Party has sought to emphasize different aspects of its *genus*.

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[^849]: See Egypt–Israel Arbitration Tribunal: Award in Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taba Area, 27 ILM 1421 (1988).
464. The GoS agrees that “the ABC was composed in an unusual manner, was governed by special rules of procedure, and was supposed to base its decision on factual findings precisely described by its constitutive instruments.”\textsuperscript{854} However, in the GoS’s view, the outcome of the ABC’s work was similar to that of an arbitral award, and the decision given by the ABC could therefore be challenged on the same grounds as those which may be invoked against arbitral awards.\textsuperscript{855} For the GoS, the general principles concerning the validity and annulment of arbitral awards should therefore apply.\textsuperscript{856}

465. The SPLM/A also believes that the ABC had adjudicatory characteristics.\textsuperscript{857} However, it submits that the ABC was a boundary commission and not an arbitral tribunal or court, and was therefore not expected to follow either a specific set of arbitration rules or some hybrid blend of “general” arbitral practice.\textsuperscript{858} It asserts that the only competence granted to the Tribunal is specified in the Arbitration Agreement,\textsuperscript{859} and the GoS cannot attempt to import particular rules from specialized legal regimes applicable to other institutional arbitral frameworks.\textsuperscript{860}

466. Before analyzing the Parties’ arguments in detail, it is appropriate to first recall some of the ABC’s defining characteristics.

(b) The ABC’s Composition

467. The Abyei Appendix prescribes the ABC’s distinct composition,\textsuperscript{861} including five GoS representatives, five SPLM/A representatives, and five independent experts collectively

\textsuperscript{854} See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 23, 2009, Transcr. 41/06 and SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 163.

\textsuperscript{855} GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 59/07-12.

\textsuperscript{856} GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 129.

\textsuperscript{857} See also para. 115 supra. The Tribunal takes note of the important fact that neither Party voiced any objection concerning the composition of the ABC Experts prior to the ABC Experts’ Report being presented to the Sudanese Presidency. Both Parties fully participated in the proceedings before the ABC Experts, and neither sought to impugn the credibility or competence of any of the individual [ABC Experts] nor the integrity of the proceedings at any time while the ABC Experts were conducting their work. Given the absence of any directed objection towards the ABC’s composition, it can be safely inferred that both Parties accepted the ABC Experts’ membership and believed that the ABC Experts collectively had the expertise required to carry out their mandate.
nominated by the United Kingdom, and the United States, and the IGAD (i.e., the ABC Experts). The ABC Experts were individuals known and recognized in the fields of Sudanese and African history, geography, politics, public affairs, ethnography, and culture.\footnote{The ABC Experts were: (1) Mr. Donald Petterson, the former U.S. Ambassador to Sudan from 1992 to 1995, with decades of experience working for the U.S. Foreign Service in Sudan and other countries in Africa; (2) Professor Douglas Johnson, a professor of History at Oxford University who has some 40 years of research experience on Sudan; (3) Professor Godfrey Muriuki, a pre-eminent African historian and professor of African History at the University of Nairobi; (4) Professor Kassahun Berhanu, one of Africa’s leading political scientists and a professor of Political Science at the Addis Ababa University; and (5) Professor Shadrack Gutto, who has published widely on “subjects of regional and international, legal and political economy” and has been, as of 2008, Professor and Chair of African Renaissance Studies and Directors of the postgraduate Centre for African Renaissance Studies at the University of South Africa. See SPLM/A Memorial, paras. 596-601.}

(c) The ABC’s Procedural Framework

468. The skill set of the Experts appointed to the ABC is also an important indicator of the procedural expectations of the Parties. Had international lawyers been appointed, the absence of any reference to institutional arbitration rules would not necessarily have imported a desire to give the ABC broad procedural freedom; international jurists could be expected to carry with them a model of international legal procedures, for in \textit{ossibus inhaerent}. But the Parties deliberately selected a group of historical, geographical, ethnographical and cultural experts along with a professor of African land law. Those experts were, moreover, to apply the procedures of “scientific analysis and research.” There was no reference to the application of international law, whether substantive or procedural.

469. Unlike traditional judicial or arbitral proceedings, the ABC’s procedures were markedly informal (“informal yet businesslike”),\footnote{See Rules of Procedure, Section 2.} the proceedings were not conducted in a confrontational fashion, and an atmosphere of cooperation was sought.\footnote{See \textit{e.g.} Section 8 of the Rules of Procedure which provides:

At each meeting with the public, the Chairman will explain the purpose of the Commission noting that the said purpose is limited to defining and demarcating the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905. The Commission will, of course, pay deference to the members of the public and not try to sharply limit the topics brought up by the public.

\textit{See also} Section 3 of the Abyei Appendix which provides:

The ABC shall listen to representatives of the people of Abyei Area and the neighbours, and shall also listen to the presentations of the two Parties.}

470. The ABC’s constitutive instruments imposed only a few mandatory procedural obligations on the ABC Experts. In particular, these were the constitution of a tribunal of experts with
specified expertise;\textsuperscript{865} a time limit for submission of the ABC’s final report;\textsuperscript{866} presentations by the Parties of their respective positions;\textsuperscript{867} hearing representatives of the peoples of the Abyei Area;\textsuperscript{868} and consultation of the British Archives and other relevant sources wherever available.\textsuperscript{869} The ABC Experts themselves were to and did prepare the Rules of Procedure, which set out a limited number of additional, more specific procedural provisions, principally of a logistical nature.\textsuperscript{870}

471. None of the foregoing provisions of the Parties’ agreements or the Rules of Procedure imposed prohibitions or limitations on the ABC Experts’ procedural, investigatory, or fact-finding actions. Although the constitutive instruments set forth a variety of provisions to grant the ABC Experts affirmative access to different types of information – people, sites, documents, archives – nothing in any of the instruments forbade the ABC Experts from taking further or additional actions insofar as they were, in their reasonable view, necessary for the fulfillment of their tasks. The ABC Experts were not restricted to evaluating the evidence offered by the Parties; they were explicitly authorized to investigate the matters they thought relevant in determining the boundary\textsuperscript{871} and, without the necessary participation of the entire ABC,\textsuperscript{872} to draft the final report\textsuperscript{873} and to present it to the Sudanese Presidency.\textsuperscript{874}

472. While many of the ABC’s defining characteristics are markedly different from most arbitral tribunals or adjudicatory bodies, certain other aspects of the ABC proceedings were akin to those associated with adjudicatory bodies. The constitutive instruments of the ABC

\textsuperscript{865} See Abyei Appendix, Section 2.

\textsuperscript{866} See Abyei Appendix, Section 5.

\textsuperscript{867} See Abyei Appendix, Section 3 and Terms of Reference, Section 3.1.

\textsuperscript{868} See Abyei Appendix, Section 3 and Terms of Reference, Section 3.2.

\textsuperscript{869} See Abyei Appendix, Section 4 and Terms of Reference, Section 3.4.

\textsuperscript{870} Abyei Appendix, Section 4. See also the “Program of Work” in the Terms of Reference.

\textsuperscript{871} Section 3.4 of the Terms of Reference provides:

The [ABC Experts] shall consult the British archives and other relevant sources on the Sudan wherever they may be available, with a view to arriving at a decision that shall be based on research and scientific analysis.

\textsuperscript{872} Section 4 of the Abyei Appendix, text supra at note 131.

\textsuperscript{873} Section 5 of the Abyei Appendix, text supra at note 107. See also the “Program of Work” in the Terms of Reference.

\textsuperscript{874} The “Program of Work” in the Terms of Reference provides that “the [ABC Experts] present in the presence of the whole membership of the ABC their final report to the Presidency” on May 29, 2005.
incorporated a number of due process-related principles such as equality of treatment,\textsuperscript{875} contradiction,\textsuperscript{876} and neutrality/impartiality\textsuperscript{877} of the ABC Experts in both their fact-finding and decision-making functions.

(d) The ABC’s Function within the Sudanese Peace Process

473. Finally, the ABC’s function cannot be dissociated from the Sudanese peace process as a whole. Pursuant to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, as implemented through the specific terms of the Abyei Protocol and the Abyei Appendix, the ABC was created with the specific purpose of establishing a necessary “missing link” in the framework of the CPA. While the CPA prescribed numerous specific steps towards peace, including guarantees of the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan, the Parties were unable to reach agreement on the precise location of the border between the north and the south of the country in the Abyei Area. In the absence of such agreement, the Parties tasked the ABC to determine the geographic boundaries of the Abyei Area.

474. The ABC’s decision was a necessary step within the sequence of the implementation of the CPA. As provided in the Abyei Protocol, it was only after the ABC Experts had come to a decision as to the definition and demarcation of the Abyei Area that the Presidency of Sudan could “take necessary action to put the special administrative status of Abyei Area

\textsuperscript{875} See Section 3 of the Abyei Appendix, text \textit{supra} at note 864. Likewise, Section 4 of the Rules of Procedure provides:

Beginning at 9.00 a.m. 12\textsuperscript{th} April, the parties, in the order they agree upon will make their presentations. After each presentation the [ABC Experts] will ask questions or make comments as they deem appropriate. Subsequently, a general discussion can take place.

Section 10 of the Rules of Procedure also states:

In addition to talking with the public, the Commission shall visit sites in the field based on the recommendation of the two sides and any other information that becomes available to the Commission.

\textsuperscript{876} This is apparent in Section 3.5 of the Terms of Reference which state:

The ABC shall thereafter reconvene in Nairobi to listen to the final presentations of the two parties, examine and evaluate evidence received[,] and prepare their final report that shall be presented to the Presidency in Khartoum[.]

Similarly, Section 13 of the Rules of Procedure provides:

[T]he [ABC Experts] will examine and evaluate all the material they have gathered and will prepare the final report.

\textsuperscript{877} As opposed to the other members of the ABC, who were representatives of either the GoS and the SPLM/A and were necessarily partisan, the ABC Experts were “impartial experts knowledgeable in history, geography and other relevant expertise” appointed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the IGAD. See Section 2 of the Abyei Appendix.
into immediate effect.” 878 No alternative method for putting the special administrative status of the Abyei Area into effect was agreed upon.


475. In the Tribunal’s view, the ABC’s role is best assessed in relation to its two essential features: the ABC’s fact-finding powers and the ABC’s powers to reach a final and binding decision.

(a) The ABC’s Function Went Beyond That of Historical Fact-Finding Bodies

476. A considerable part of the ABC’s mandate was undoubtedly to determine facts. Bodies mandated to ascertain facts are common; such “fact-finding commissions” establish particular facts that are unclear, unknown, or disputed. Examples of such fact-finding commissions are the “International Commissions of Inquiry” created under Title III of the 1907 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (the “1907 Hague Convention”) 879 and the PCA Optional Rules for Fact-Finding Commissions of Inquiry (the “Optional Rules”). 880 Commissions of Inquiry constituted under the auspices of the PCA include those relating to Loss of the Dutch Steamer Tubantia 881 and The Red Crusader (1961). 882 The Commissions in these cases were mandated to ascertain particular facts and did not adjudicate, arbitrate, or make any sort of final judgment as to the legal consequences that would follow from these facts. 883

878 See Abyei Protocol, Section 5.3.

879 Article 9 of the 1907 Hague Convention provides:

In disputes of an international nature involving neither honour nor vital interests, and arising from a difference of opinion on points of fact, the Contracting Powers deem it expedient and desirable that the parties who have not been able to come to an agreement by means of diplomacy, should, as far as circumstances allow, institute an International Commission of Inquiry, to facilitate a solution of these disputes by elucidating the facts by means of impartial and conscientious investigation. (emphasis added)

880 Article 1 of the Optional Rules provides:

These Rules shall apply when the parties have agreed to have recourse to a Fact-finding Commission of Inquiry (‘Commission’) pursuant to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (‘PCA’) Optional Rules for Fact-finding Commissions of Inquiry, to establish, by means of an impartial and independent investigation, facts with respect to which there is a difference of opinion between them. (emphasis added)


883 In Loss of the Dutch Steamer Tubantia, a Commission of Inquiry was asked to ascertain whether a German submarine launched a torpedo which sank a Dutch steamship. The Commission limited its determination to finding
477. The ABC Experts were not tasked to merely ascertain the facts surrounding a particular incident. Rather, a complex constellation of historical, anthropological and geographic facts (many of which remain obscure to this day) could potentially impact the extension of the “area of the Nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred in 1905.” The Experts were tasked to scientifically research, select and weigh such facts on the basis of a Formula that was susceptible to several, contradictory interpretations, with a view to arriving at a “final and binding” decision\textsuperscript{884} that “defined (i.e., delimited) and demarcated”\textsuperscript{885} the Abyei Area.

478. Thus, the ABC Experts’ role went beyond that of historical Commissions of Inquiry in two ways. First, the selection, weighing and processing of substantial, often inconclusive factual evidence required the ABC Experts to exercise a higher degree of judgment in the performance of their duties than is customary with fact-finders. Second, the ABC Experts’ decision extended to the consequences of their factual findings; the ABC Experts’ decision was intended to be constitutive of the boundaries of the Abyei Area, rather than merely declaratory of certain historical facts occurring in 1905.

(b) The ABC’s Role in the Peace Process Required a Final and Binding Decision

479. In addition, the ABC’s founding instruments as well as the comportment of the Parties during the ABC proceedings demonstrates that the ABC Experts were commissioned to arrive at a conclusive decision that would resolve a specific dispute between the Parties. This implies that the ABC Experts were precluded from returning a factual non-liquet based on the paucity of evidence.

480. The inadmissibility of such a non liquet becomes particularly clear when the ABC’s role in the larger Sudan peace process is taken into account. Not only was the ABC Experts’ decision a necessary step for putting the special administrative status of the Abyei Area into

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\textsuperscript{884} See Section 5 of the Abyei Appendix.

\textsuperscript{885} As explained by Professor Schofield, there are three stages in a boundary’s evolution: allocation, delimitation and demarcation. Allocation deals with allocating territory and not the actual boundary, while demarcation simply physically marks out the boundary on the ground. Delimitation, quite differently, is when the line is established and specified. It requires “an executive act” of determining where the actual boundary line should be, and calls for a detailed description of the location of a boundary line. See SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 121/03-122/02.
effect. The need for the ABC proceedings to result in a final and binding decision is also underscored by the ultimate political objective of delimiting the boundaries of the Abyei Area – to determine the residents of the Abyei Area who would be entitled to vote in the 2011 plebiscite on whether the Abyei Area should retain its special administrative status in the north, or whether it should instead be part of the province of Bahr el Ghazal in the south.\textsuperscript{886} No “back-up plan” was contemplated in the event that the ABC Experts found themselves unable to complete their assigned mandate. Considering this important objective, it was imperative that clear boundaries would be drawn by the ABC Experts as a result of the proceedings.

(c) The ABC’s Composition Does Not Exclude a Decision-Making Function

481. The Tribunal notes that the composition of the ABC does not preclude the attribution of a conclusive decision-making role to the ABC. In the \textit{Treaty of Lausanne Advisory Opinion},\textsuperscript{887} the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) was asked to determine whether a decision by the Council of the League of Nations drawing the boundary line between Turkey and Iraq would be in the nature of an arbitral award, a recommendation, or simple mediation. The PCIJ explained that even if the Council of the League of Nations was a political body and not an arbitral tribunal, it could still be called upon to give a definitive and binding decision in a particular dispute, especially as the agreement of the parties (\textit{i.e.}, the Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923) sought “to insure a definitive and binding solution of the dispute” which was “the final determination of the frontier” between Turkey and Iraq.

482. Parallels with the ABC Experts can be drawn here. The ABC Experts, though not a tribunal composed of legal experts or arbitral practitioners, were called upon by the Parties to \textit{define} and demarcate the boundary of the Abyei Area. In so doing, the Parties agreed that the decision of the ABC Experts would be “final and binding” upon them. Consequently, by being given the task of defining and demarcating a definite boundary line, the ABC Experts, in addition to their fact-finding function, also had to reach a decision on the basis of these facts. The term “define” clearly laid out the Parties’ intention that the ABC Experts delimit the Abyei Area regardless of the strength or weakness of the evidence they uncovered. As

\textsuperscript{886} See Abyei Protocol, Section 1.3.

\textsuperscript{887} Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier between Turkey and Iraq) (Advisory Opinion), PCIJ Rep Series B No. 12 (1925).
discussed *infra*, this task was essentially a new task, as the borders of the Abyei Area had not been defined and demarcated previously.

4. **Conclusion**

483. Given the ABC’s singular characteristics, a majority of the Tribunal has no difficulty in concluding that the ABC possessed important decision-making powers in addition to its fact-finding functions. While the ABC Experts were not lawyers but persons recognized in the fields of “history, geography and other relevant expertise,” they were required to arrive at a final and binding decision. Although the Parties did not require the ABC Experts to apply international law or legal reasoning to the delimitation of the boundaries of the Abyei Area but scientific methods, they did require the ABC Experts to arrive at a decision that would resolve the dispute with final and binding consequences. It is this essential decision-making function that, in the view of the Majority, is a defining characteristic of the ABC.

484. Having said this, the Tribunal wishes to record that one of its Members, Professor Hafner, does not wholly share the Majority’s conclusions on the nature of the ABC. In Professor Hafner’s view, the ABC is not a “boundary commission” within the contemplation of the *Treaty of Lausanne Advisory Opinion*. Rather, the ABC’s nature is more akin to that of a pure fact-finding body, as its mandate was limited to ascertaining a set of historical facts and arriving at a final and binding judgment based solely on those facts. For Professor Hafner, the fact that the ABC Experts’ decision was binding is not sufficient evidence that they possessed any powers beyond those vested in a fact-finding body (Article 35 of the 1907 Hague Convention and Article 24(2) of the PCA Optional Rules for Fact-finding Commissions of Inquiry both provide for the possibility that the decisions of fact-finding bodies can be made binding).

485. Thus, according to Professor Hafner, the ABC Experts were not empowered to make any decision having an *ex nunc*, constitutive effect. In his view, the final and binding effect of the ABC Experts’ Report resulted directly from Article 5 of the Abyei Appendix; it did not result from the mandate of the ABC itself. Furthermore, he does not share the view that the ABC Experts were obliged to delimit the Abyei Area even in the absence of sufficient evidence; a factual *non-liquet* was one possible decision the ABC Experts could have taken, and they would not have acted *infra petita* had they chosen to do so. Nevertheless, as Professor Hafner agrees, none of the foregoing observations affects the substance of the conclusions drawn by the Tribunal.
D. Reasonableness is the Applicable Standard for Reviewing the Interpretation and Implementation of the ABC Experts’ Mandate

486. Recalling the limited scope of the Tribunal’s review authority over the ABC Experts’ Report under Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement, a consideration of what such a limited review entails in relation to the GoS’s alleged grounds for finding an “excess of mandate” is in order. This section will therefore discuss the standard of review that the Tribunal must apply with respect to the ABC Experts’ interpretation and implementation of their mandate. These two aspects – interpretation and implementation – raise slightly different issues, and will be discussed in turn.

1. Standard of Review Regarding the ABC’s Interpretation of Its Mandate

487. The Tribunal has no doubt that a fundamental misinterpretation by the ABC Experts of the instruments establishing the ABC’s competence could in principle qualify as an excess of mandate. This view is consistent with the position taken in international arbitral awards such as the Orinoco Steamship Company arbitration, where the tribunal found that an excessive exercise of powers could arise from “misinterpreting the express provisions of the relevant agreement in respect of the way in which [the arbitrators] are to reach their decisions.”

488. While the Parties seem to agree in principle that a misinterpretation of the ABC Experts’ mandate can amount to an excess of mandate, the Parties have put forward different conceptions of the standard of review that the Tribunal should apply in determining whether the ABC Experts in fact “misinterpreted” their mandate.

(a) The Parties’ Positions

489. A first indication of the Parties’ respective positions follows from the way that they chose to structure their arguments: The GoS discussed the interpretation of the “Formula” as a preliminary matter before addressing whether the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate (thus implying that this Tribunal must first determine the “correct” meaning of the Formula before examining whether the Experts complied with it), whereas the SPLM/A presented its views on the interpretation of the Formula under the heading of delimitation (thus implying...
that the correct meaning of the Formula is irrelevant for this Tribunal’s task pursuant to Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement).

490. In its Counter-Memorial, the SPLM/A argued that the ABC Experts’ interpretation of their mandate “would at a minimum be entitled to a substantial presumption of correctness and could only be invalidated in rare and exceptional cases.”\(^889\) In support of its position, the SPLM/A relied heavily on judgments by national courts and scholarly commentary concerning the setting aside of arbitral awards pursuant to Article V(1) of the 1958 New York Convention. In response, the GoS argued that, in its view, “this is not a case where one party has unilaterally applied to annul or oppose the enforcement of a prior decision of an adjudicating body.” Therefore, in the GoS’s view, precedents allocating the burden of proof regarding annulment for excess of powers to the applicant “are completely inapposite” in these proceedings.\(^890\)

491. In addition, the SPLM/A argued that the standard of “glaring,” “manifest” or “flagrant” excess must also apply to the ABC Experts’ interpretation of their mandate (as opposed to its execution).\(^891\) In oral argument, the GoS presented the contrary view, contending that this Tribunal must assess the ABC Experts’ findings against what it determines to be “their real mandate,” not their “self-assigned” or “imaginary, self-given mandate.”\(^892\) According to the GoS this Tribunal is “under a strict duty to ensure that the ABC Experts’ mandate has been complied with in all and every respect” and that, since “the mandate was a condition for the whole peace settlement,” “[t]here cannot be any question that it could be left erroneously interpreted. Its interpretation must have been correct.”\(^893\) The GoS further argued, with regard to the particular issue of the interpretation of the ABC’s mandate, “that the standard for appreciating whether or not they have complied with their mandate is the same standard as the one you would have to apply on the appeal.”\(^894\)

492. Hence, according to the GoS, the Tribunal should determine, first, what the ABC’s mandate meant and, second, whether the ABC Experts, in implementing these instructions, exceeded

\(^889\) SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 613.
\(^890\) GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 74.
\(^891\) SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 622.
their mandate. The SPLM/A, by contrast, asks the Tribunal to determine whether the ABC Experts’ findings as a whole, from the initial appreciation of the Experts’ task to the concrete boundary lines proposed, can be considered a discharge of the ABC Experts’ mandate. According to both approaches, the question whether the Experts’ implementation of their task exceeded their mandate is subject to a reasonableness test. However, with regard to the interpretation of the mandate, the GoS’s approach would require this Tribunal to hold the Experts’ understanding of their task against what this Tribunal considers the “real” (or “correct”) meaning of the mandate, whereas the SPLM/A’s approach would merely authorize this Tribunal to verify that the Experts’ understanding of their task was reasonable.

(b) The Tribunal’s Interpretation of Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement

493. In the Tribunal’s view, the structure of Article 2 and the object and purpose of the Tribunal’s review of the ABC Experts’ findings require the application of the same reasonableness standard both to the ABC Experts’ interpretation and the ABC Experts’ implementation of their mandate.

(i) The Wording and Structure of Article 2

494. The phrase “[w]hether or not the ABC Experts had, on the basis of the agreement of the Parties as per the CPA, exceeded their mandate” is ambiguous, allowing the Parties to argue, respectively, that the ABC Experts’ interpretation of their mandate “must have been correct” or need only be reasonable. The Arbitration Agreement could have resolved the ambiguity by explicitly instructing the Tribunal to determine “what the ABC Experts’ mandate means in light of the ABC’s constitutive instruments and whether the ABC Experts have exceeded that mandate” (implementing the GoS’s proposed approach) or, alternatively, instructing it to determine “whether the ABC Experts reasonably interpreted and applied their mandate” (implementing the SPLM/A’s proposed approach). As it stands, however, the specific wording of Article 2(a) does not, of itself, provide a conclusive answer.

495. But text must be read in context and the Arbitration Agreement, taken as a whole, throws considerable light on the matter. As discussed earlier, the overall structure of Article 2 indicates that two distinct and different modes of inquiry were intended for the Tribunal: Article 2(c), which calls for a de novo analysis of all the evidence adduced by the Parties and a new delimitation exercise, is deliberately placed after Article 2(a), which confines the
Tribunal, at that phase, to the question of whether the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate. Thus, Article 2 indicates that the Tribunal can only make a positive determination of what the mandate’s correct interpretation is within the context of an Article 2(c) inquiry; to interpret Article 2(a) as requiring the Tribunal to already decide what the correct interpretation of the mandate is would eliminate the distinction between Article 2(a) and 2(c).

496. The proper reading of Article 2(a) in, and consistent with the context of Article 2 as a whole, is that, at that phase, the Tribunal must confine itself to determining whether the ABC Experts’ interpretation of their mandate was reasonable. However, the Tribunal must stop short of deciding whether one or the other interpretation proffered by the Parties is more correct; the question of which interpretation the Tribunal deems correct is not a question of “excess of mandate” but rather a component of the Tribunal’s contingent delimitation inquiry under Article 2(c).

(ii) The ABC Experts Had the Authority to Interpret Their Mandate

497. Contextual as well as teleological analyses support the conclusion of the confined inquiry required by Article 2(a). The ABC Experts possessed the authority to interpret their mandate and, thus, the limits of their “jurisdiction,” and the Tribunal is required to defer to that interpretation within the context of its Article 2(a) analysis.

498. In an arbitral context, a tribunal’s power to interpret the instrument on which its jurisdiction is founded is typically discussed under the heading of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. Pursuant to this doctrine, which is accepted with certain variations in most national arbitration laws and is a postulate in international arbitration, an arbitral tribunal must be deemed competent to determine the limits of its own jurisdiction. Allocating decision-making authority to the party-selected arbitrator rather than the courts is more respectful of the parties’ intention to have specially-appointed arbitrators (often possessing specific expertise in a particular area) decide disputes over their relationships.

499. In international arbitral proceedings, Kompetenz-Kompetenz is even a necessity, as no higher court of law with compulsory jurisdiction exists to adjudge the limits of a tribunal’s competence when one of the parties disputes it. Without a principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, any form of third party decision in international law could be paralyzed by a party which challenged jurisdiction.
500. The authority of international tribunals to declare their own competence and, to that end, interpret the *compromis* and other relevant documents was already enshrined in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions.\(^{895}\) In its first judgment in the *Nottebohm* case dealing with Guatemala’s jurisdictional objections, the ICJ affirmed the *Kompetenz-Kompetenz* principle as accepted in international law:

> Since the *Alabama* case, it has been generally recognized, following the earlier precedents, that, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, an international tribunal has the right to decide as to its own jurisdiction and has the power to interpret for this purpose the instruments which govern that jurisdiction.\(^{896}\)

501. Other notable expressions of the *Kompetenz-Kompetenz* principle subsequent to the ICJ’s pronouncement can be found in the 1953 Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure of the International Law Commission (ILC),\(^{897}\) the 1958 ILC Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure,\(^{898}\) the PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States,\(^{899}\) the PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of Which Only One Is a State,\(^{900}\) the 1965 ICSID Convention,\(^{901}\) the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules\(^{902}\) and the UNCITRAL Model Law.\(^{903}\)

502. As noted, because international law lacks a hierarchy of courts endowed with compulsory jurisdiction, the operation of any of the range of decision institutions could be paralyzed by an objection to its competence, if it, too, did not have some form of *Kompetenz-Kompetenz*. Thus, the fact that the ABC was not an adjudicatory body *strictu sensu* does not mean that it lacked *Kompetenz-Kompetenz*. Moreover, a number of features of the ABC proceedings

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\(^{895}\) Article 48 of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1899, 1 BEVANS 230; 1 AJIL (1907) 103; Article 73 of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1907, 1 BEVANS 577; 2 AJIL SUPP. (1908) 43.

\(^{896}\) *Nottebohm Case* (Preliminary Objection), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1953, p. 111, 119.


\(^{898}\) Article 9, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1958, vol. II.

\(^{899}\) See Article 21. These rules are available at at http://www.pca-cpa.org.


\(^{901}\) Article 41, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 575 UNTS 159.

\(^{902}\) Article 21, UN Doc. A/RES/31/98; 15 ILM 701 (1976).

\(^{903}\) Article 16, 24 ILM 1302 (1985).
suggest that the ABC was intentionally endowed with the authority to interpret the provisions of its constitutive instruments, which define the scope of its own competence:

- The Parties, faced with a daunting evidentiary situation and unable to resolve the issue themselves, agreed on a specialized – and singularly composed – expert body to delimit the Abyei Area based on a difficult evidentiary situation that they were evidently incapable of doing themselves. In so doing, the Parties knew that neither established case law nor institutional control mechanisms would assist the ABC throughout the proceedings in determining what its mandate meant.

- The ABC was not subjected to the guidance of an institution that could pass judgment on the meaning of its mandate in the event of controversy between the Parties’ representatives. In this respect, the ABC’s position was comparable to that of an international tribunal, and the presumption established by the ICJ in *Nottebohm* is germane.

- Without the authority to determine its own competence, the ABC could have been paralyzed by argument over its powers. Such paralysis would be incompatible with the Parties’ desire to have the dispute definitively settled, following long and difficult negotiations during the peace process. Indeed, arguments ostensibly over competence were really arguments over the essential questions posed in Article 2.

503. For the reasons above, the Tribunal concludes that the ABC was vested with the competence to interpret, and thus necessarily determine the bounds of, its own mandate.

(iii) *The Tribunal Must Defer to the Interpretation of the ABC Experts, as Long as that Interpretation Is Reasonable*

504. To what extent, if any, is the Tribunal, in the exercise of its own review mandate, obliged to defer and accord special weight to the ABC Experts’ interpretation of their mandate? As is clear from the discussion above, the sequential character of Article 2 precludes a *de novo* examination under Article 2(a) but it does not explain, in terms, how much deference is to be accorded to the ABC Experts’ determination of their own mandate. Some guidance is available from the cognate situation of a court seized with the request to set aside an arbitral award on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded his or her jurisdiction. In an arbitral context, the decisive question in such cases is whether the doctrine of *Kompetenz-Kompetenz* encompasses an obligation upon the reviewing court to accord deference to the
original decision-maker’s interpretation of the instrument establishing that decision-maker’s jurisdiction.

505. The practice of courts and tribunals in public international law is broadly supportive of the proposition that an instance of review must defer, and give special weight, to the interpretation of a jurisdictional instrument by the decision-making body designated under that instrument. The ICJ’s judgment in the Case concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 is particularly instructive.\(^{904}\) In that case, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau requested the Court to declare an arbitral award null and void because the original arbitral tribunal allegedly “did not comply with the provisions of the Arbitration Agreement.”\(^{905}\) The Court reaffirmed its previous distinction between appellate review – that the Court is “called upon to pronounce on whether the arbitrator’s decision was right or wrong”\(^{906}\) – and the requested review of the validity of the award. On this basis, the Court noted that, in the context of a recours en nullité, it

has simply to ascertain whether by rendering the disputed Award the Tribunal acted in manifest breach of the competence conferred on it by the Arbitration Agreement, either by deciding in excess of, or by failing to exercise, its jurisdiction.\(^{907}\) (emphasis added)

506. In addition to confirming the applicability of the “manifest breach” standard to decisions on jurisdiction, the Court specifically noted that the reviewing body must accord deference to the original decision-maker in its interpretation of its own competence. The Court noted that “[b]y its argument set out above, Guinea-Bissau is in fact criticizing the interpretation in the Award of the provisions of the Arbitration Agreement which determine the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, and proposing another interpretation.” The Court rejected Guinea-Bissau’s argument and ruled that it was not competent to determine which of several plausible interpretations of the original arbitration agreement was the correct one, explaining that “the Court does not have to enquire whether or not the Arbitration Agreement could, with regard to the Tribunal's competence, be interpreted in a number of ways, and if so to consider which would have been preferable.”\(^{908}\)

\(^{904}\) The Tribunal notes that both Parties repeatedly relied on this judgment in their submissions, thus making the judgment an appropriate consensual reference point.

\(^{905}\) Arbitral Award of July 31, 1989, ICJ Reports 1991, p. 56, para. 10.

\(^{906}\) Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain, ICJ Reports (1960), p. 214.

\(^{907}\) Arbitral Award of July 31, 1989, ICJ Reports 1991, p. 69, para. 47.

\(^{908}\) Arbitral Award of July 31, 1989, ICJ Reports 1991, p. 56, para. 47.
507. In the Tribunal’s view, the ICJ’s analysis in the Case concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, which is based on explicitly reasoned legal principles that apply by analogy to these proceedings, provides the best method for establishing the appropriate standard of review. The review of arbitral awards on grounds of excess of powers serves to protect the parties from the rendering of binding third-party decisions to which they have not consented. Consistent with this fundamental principle of consent, third-party jurisdictional determinations against the will of the parties cannot stand. But as long as a decision can still be reconciled with the parties’ consent, the arbitrators who were appointed by the parties constitute the preferred forum for settling the substantive disagreement between the parties, as it is they who were specifically entrusted with this task on the basis of their specific expertise.

508. In this case, the purpose of the review conducted by the Tribunal pursuant to Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement is to determine whether the ABC Experts’ conduct and decision are within the range of what the Parties could have expected when consenting to the delimitation and demarcation of the Abyei Area by the ABC. To the extent that the ABC Experts’ findings can still be squared with the Parties’ consent, the ABC – not the Tribunal – should remain the preferred forum for the delimitation of the Abyei Area. As noted above, the ABC Experts were carefully chosen by the Parties for this task. The ABC Experts also had detailed knowledge of the context in which they would operate (the peace process) and were expected to understand their mandate in light of the Parties’ expectations. Moreover, the Parties, too, were members of the ABC and were thus able to bring to the attention of the ABC Experts their own understanding of the ABC mission. In sum, the ABC Experts were indeed considered best placed to interpret the mandate that was entrusted to them.

509. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal is mindful that Parties may, by consent, agree to override the principles of strict review laid out in the Arbitral Award judgment and require the Tribunal to adopt another standard in its Article 2(a) inquiry instead. Such consent cannot be lightly inferred, however, and must be demonstrated through explicit evidence of such an agreement. Nothing in the “excess of mandate” language of Article 2(a) or in the Arbitration Agreement read as a whole suggests that this is the case.

909 See, for example, CDC Group plc, Case ARB/02/14, para. 40. For the overriding importance of the Parties’ consent in the interpretation of jurisdictional instruments more generally, see also Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1985, p. 13, 23 and Arbitral Award of July 31, 1989, ICJ Reports 1991, p. 53, 70.
510. For these reasons, the Tribunal sees no justification for departing from the standard of review established by the ICJ in the *Case concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989*. Under Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement, the Tribunal must limit itself to assessing whether the ABC Experts’ findings can be understood as a not unreasonable discharge of their mandate, that is, as an exercise that does not amount to a manifest breach of the competence assigned to them. To that end, the Tribunal will not inquire into whether another interpretation of the ABC’s constitutive instruments would have been preferable. Rather, the Tribunal must assess whether the ABC Experts’ interpretation of its mandate remained within the range of not unreasonable and defensible interpretations.

2. **Standard of Review Regarding the ABC’s Implementation of Its Mandate**

511. The question of the ABC Experts’ interpretation of its mandate must be distinguished from the question of execution or implementation of that mandate. The implementation by the ABC Experts of their mandate, in turn, is potentially subject to review from various angles, including with regard to the question whether the ABC Experts’ decision was manifestly incorrect and the question whether the ABC Experts stated appropriate reasons for their decision. The Tribunal finds that only the latter type of review is within the Tribunal’s competence pursuant to Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement.

(a) **Review for “Substantive Errors” is Outside the Tribunal’s Competence**

512. With regard to substantive error as a potential ground for annulment, the “general principles of law and practices” applied by international tribunals undertaking a review function do not appear to be entirely consistent. On the one hand, relevant international treaties (including the 1958 New York Convention and the 1965 ICSID Convention) and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration do not recognize “manifest error” as a ground for setting aside an award. Recent arbitral decisions within the context of ICSID annulment proceedings confirm the irrelevance of substantive errors at the review stage. On the other hand, the relevance of “essential errors” or “manifest error[s]”

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910 Maritime International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Government of Guinea (Guinea). ICSID Case ARB/84/4, Decision on the Application by Guinea for Partial Annulment of the Arbitral Award dated January 6, 1988, see especially para. 4.04 and para. 5.08; AMCO Asia Corp. v. The Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case ARB/81/1, Decision on the Application by Indonesia for Annulment of the Arbitral Award dated November 20, 1984, May 16, 1986, para. 23.
of law or fact was acknowledged in several, especially older, decisions, including the *Trail Smelter* case\(^\text{911}\) and the *Drier* case.\(^\text{912}\)

513. For purposes of the present proceedings, however, the question of whether substantive errors are altogether outside the scope of its review or subject to review in “manifest” cases is academic and without relevance for the Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal notes that while the GoS believes the ABC Experts’ findings to be substantively incorrect, these perceived errors are not as such the basis for GoS’s excess of mandate claim. The GoS does not ground its claim on “essential error” or “manifest error” but on the proposition that the ABC’s findings – whether substantively right or wrong – went beyond or failed to accomplish what the Parties agreed to.\(^\text{913}\)

514. This characterization of the GoS’s claims was again confirmed during the oral hearings, when the GoS explained that:

> while an essential error of law or fact of an arbitral tribunal is a ground for nullity of the award, this Tribunal has probably no jurisdiction to that effect… In other words, the [ABC Experts] have made an essential error of interpretation, but this error … bears upon the mandate itself, not on its implementation, not on the answer to the question.\(^\text{914}\)

515. Thus, leaving aside other, distinct grounds for excess of mandate (such as alleged procedural violations and failure to state reasons) and criticism of its substance, the GoS’s disagreement with the ABC Experts’ Report is in essence a disagreement concerning the ABC Experts’ *interpretation* of the mandate, not with its *implementation*. Similarly, the SPLM/A has consistently argued during these proceedings that substantive errors are beyond the Tribunal’s jurisdiction of review.\(^\text{915}\)

516. The Tribunal sees no reason for departing from this understanding of its mandate, which is consensual between the Parties. As noted above, the Parties have defined the Tribunal’s mandate as comprising two distinct juridical and intellectual tasks, and the first of these tasks, pursuant to Article 2(a), does not authorize the Tribunal to ascertain the correctness

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\(^\text{913}\) In its Rejoinder, the GoS groups these allegations under the headings of “Decisions *Ultra Petita*” and “*Infra Petita*.”


\(^\text{915}\) SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 44.
of the ABC Experts’ findings. The interpretation of the scope of a decision-making body’s competence is analytically distinct from the use of that competence, and the Parties authorized the Tribunal, for purposes of the present proceedings, to review only the former but not the latter.

517. The Tribunal’s review of the ABC Experts’ findings, under Article 2(a), will thus extend neither to the appreciation of evidence by the ABC Experts nor to the ABC Experts’ substantive conclusions (except for the determination of an excess of mandate). Consistent with its mandate, the Tribunal will not engage in an academic excursus into the ABC Experts’ reading of the evidence or their conclusions.

(b) Failure to State Reasons for a Decision May Lead to an “Excess of Mandate”

518. A final consideration relates to the GoS’s contention that the ABC Experts’ committed an excess of mandate by allegedly failing to state reasons for some of their findings. As with the other alleged grounds for excess of mandate, the Tribunal will discuss, as a preliminary matter, to what extent it is authorized to review the cogency of the reasons advanced by the ABC Experts under Article 2(a). To that end, the Tribunal must address two questions: first, were the ABC Experts under a duty to state the reasons for their decisions in the first place? If so, then what is the threshold that determines when deficient reasoning amounts to an excess of mandate?

(i) The ABC’s Mandate Included the Duty to State Reasons

519. Both Parties, relying on arbitral precedent as, presumably, an expression of “general principles of law and practices,” disagree as to whether the ABC Experts were under an obligation to state reasons. The GoS averred a requirement incumbent upon arbitrators to explain the basis for their decision. The SPLM/A adduced evidence of legal systems that stipulate no reasoning requirement.

520. In the Tribunal’s view, the primary and secondary authorities adduced by the Parties are not dispositive of the question of whether reasons were required, nor do they establish a presumption that, absent an express agreement by the Parties to the contrary, the ABC Experts were under such an obligation. Whether reasons had to be presented is not conclusively resolved by “general principles of law and practices” but by evidence of the Parties’ expectations, which may be inferred from the context in which the ABC was intended to operate and from the function it had been assigned within the peace process.
The ABC was created as part of an extraordinarily complex political process, which is not comparable to ordinary commercial or investment arbitrations. Whether reasons are required is therefore a question of proper interpretation of the ABC’s constitutive instruments in light of their ordinary meaning and object and purpose.

521. An initial, textual argument (reiterated by the GoS throughout the proceedings) relates to the instructions by the Parties that the decision taken in the ABC Experts’ Report be “based on scientific analysis and research.” The preference for a scientific methodology suggests that the Parties expected the ABC Experts to disclose the fruits of their research in some manner appropriate to their respective fields of scientific research. While there is nothing in the relevant instruments requiring a comprehensive analytic discussion of all the evidence found, an exposition of the key evidence in support of the ABC Experts’ “final and binding decision” was clearly imported in the words “based on scientific analysis and research.”

522. The clear purport of the text is confirmed by the object and purpose of the ABC’s constitutive instruments. The principal consideration in these instruments is the important role played by the ABC in the context of the Sudan peace process; after years of uncertainty as to the location and boundaries of the Abyei Area, which in turn contributed to the untold hardship of millions of victims in the Civil War, the ABC was to definitively determine the boundaries of the Abyei Area. It was obvious that the ABC Experts’ Report, whatever its conclusions, would have a major political impact on the country and especially on the life of Misseriya and Ngok Dinka in and around the Abyei Area. Stakeholders were entitled to know on what grounds the ABC Experts’ decision was made. Indeed, such knowledge could be critical to the legitimacy and acceptability of the decision.

523. An additional indication of the expectation of a reasoned decision is found in the contradictory nature of the ABC proceedings. It would be unusual to invite the Parties to make extensive presentations to the ABC and then take a decision that in no way assesses the Parties’ respective presentations.

524. Finally, in the absence of a standing and compulsory body in which an appeal may be lodged (which is the normal situation in international law), the requirement to state the reasons on which a decision is based also functions as an informal control mechanism.

916 Section 4 of the Abyei Appendix.
917 See Section 3.1 of the Terms of Reference.
Since the ABC Experts’ findings were not subject to appeal, an explanation of the rationale for the decision would dispel any hint of arbitrariness and ensure the presence of fairness which is indisputably necessary for the acceptability and successful conclusion of the peace process.

525. It follows that a failure to state reasons on the part of the ABC Experts would amount to the contravention of an obligation that was integral to their mandate and, as explained immediately below, could constitute an excess of mandate.

(ii) Lack of Any Reasons or Obviously Contradictory or Frivolous Reasons Would Amount to an Excess of Mandate

526. This does not yet answer the question as to the appropriate minimum standard that applies to the ABC Experts’ reasoning. In their submissions, the Parties were in agreement that, assuming that the ABC Experts were required to provide reasons, the Tribunal’s review of the “quality” of the ABC Experts’ reasons would be constrained. Both Parties quoted (with approval) the standard of review endorsed by the *Vivendi v. Argentina* annulment committee,\(^\text{918}\) and the GoS explained:

\[
\text{[T]he GoS maintains the absolute relevance of the *Vivendi v. Argentina* annulment decision according to which the failure to state reasons will only constitute grounds for the annulment of a decision if – but only if – it leaves “the decision on a particular point essentially lacking in any expressed rationale” and if that point itself is necessary to the decision.}^{919}\]

527. Under general international law, the number of relevant precedents dealing with the minimum standard of “motivation” of arbitral awards is limited. The most authoritative decision in this respect is the ICJ’s judgment in the *Case concerning the Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906*. In that case, Nicaragua challenged the award handed down by the King of Spain, *inter alia*, for the alleged lack or inadequacy of reasons. The Court flatly rejected Nicaragua’s argument, noting that

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\text{an examination of the Award shows that it deals in logical order and in some detail with all relevant considerations and that it contains ample reasoning and explanation in support of the conclusions arrived at by the arbitrator. In the opinion of the Court, this ground is without foundation.}^{920}\]

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918 GoS Memorial, para. 164; GoS Rejoinder, para. 156; SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 740.
919 GoS Rejoinder, para. 156.
920 *Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain*, Judgment of November 18, 1960, ICJ Reports 1960, p. 216.
528. The most extensive international judicial treatment to date on the scope of the reasons requirement can be found in a series of decisions by ICSID annulment committees pursuant to Article 52 of the 1965 ICSID Convention. While the level of scrutiny applied by different annulment committees has varied, some important points of agreement may provide the beginning of a *jurisprudence constante* in international investment law.

- First, annulment committees are not authorized to compare the original tribunal’s reasons with what the committee considers the “correct” or “ideal” argumentation. “It is not for the Committee to imagine what might or should have been the arbitrators’ reasons, any more than it should substitute ‘correct’ reasons for possibly ‘incorrect’ reasons.”[921] Rather, annulment committees must ascertain whether the award is sufficiently reasoned – a standard considerably lower than “fully reasoned.”

- Second, there seems to be consensus that ICSID tribunals are not required to deal in a reasoned manner with each and every argument raised by a party. Rather, reasons should “be the basis of the Tribunal’s decision, and in this sense ‘sufficient.’”[922]

- Third, annulment committees have tended to assess the adequacy of the reasons in support of each decision made in an award, rather than judging the adequacy of the argumentation in an award as a whole.[923]

- Fourth, it is common ground that, in assessing whether the decisions contained in an award are based on reasons, annulment committees must be particularly mindful not to turn annulment proceedings into appeal proceedings.[924]

529. In applying these consensual principles, the annulment committee in *Klöckner* conducted a very strict review, verifying in essence whether the tribunal came to legally defensible conclusions. Subsequent committees declined to follow the *Klöckner* example. The *MINE* annulment committee suggested that:

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922 *Id.* at para. 118. See also *Lucchetti v. Peru*, Decision on Annulment, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4 (2007), para. 127.

923 *Klöckner*, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2 (1983), para. 130.

the requirement to state reasons is satisfied as long as the award enables one to follow how the tribunal proceeded from Point A. to Point B. and eventually to its conclusion, even if it made an error of fact or of law. This minimum requirement is in particular not satisfied by either contradictory or frivolous reasons.  

530. The MINE standard was later confirmed by the Mitchell committee, which added that “a failure to state reasons exists whenever reasons are purely and simply not given, or are so inadequate that the coherence of the reasoning is seriously affected.” In relation to the danger of conflating annulment with appeal, the committee noted that contradictions in the reasoning of a tribunal would have to be obvious – “to a point that the ad hoc Committee cannot be reproached for engaging in an analysis of the merits.” Similar standards were enunciated by the annulment committees in Amco and Vivendi.

531. As the standards endorsed by the ICJ and the more recent ICSID annulment committees significantly converge, it is possible to draw a tentative conclusion regarding the “general principles of law and practices” applicable to the setting aside of arbitral awards on the ground of failure to state reasons. To meet the minimum requirement, an award should contain sufficient ratiocination to allow the reader to understand how the tribunal reached its binding conclusions (regardless of whether the ratiocination might persuade a disengaged third party that the award is substantively correct). As to the substantive issue, awards may be set aside for failure to state reasons where conclusions are not supported by any reasons at all, where the reasoning is incoherent or where the reasons provided are obviously contradictory or frivolous.

532. Given the very specific context of these proceedings, which do not easily analogize to annulment proceedings in the area of investment arbitration, the Tribunal considers it appropriate to examine the standard it has derived from practice in light of the object and purpose of the ABC’s constitutive instruments.

533. The Parties subjected the ABC Experts to significant time constraints. Both Parties clearly expected the ABC Experts to be able to complete their Report within the allotted short time frame of three months (from the beginning of their fact-finding procedure until the
rendering of the Report).\textsuperscript{929} This suggests that the Parties could only have expected a short and concise Report that would be limited to elucidating the key reasons on which the conclusions were based. Even under time constraints, however, the Parties were entitled to expect that the Experts’ reasons would be clear, coherent, and free from contradiction.\textsuperscript{930}

534. Whatever the constraints the ABC Experts may have experienced in terms of methodology or timing, the Parties reasonably expected and were entitled, as a matter of fairness, that each of the Report’s essential rulings be supported by sufficient reasons. The degree of reasoning provided in the Report for each of its conclusions had to be commensurate with the importance of those conclusions, as the articulation of reasons is the principal way by which reviewing bodies such as this Tribunal may ascertain reasonableness. A standard that liberally permits derogation from the obligation to state reasons due to external constraints could not have been expected in the absence of truly unforeseen and compelling reasons (or the Parties’ explicit consent that the decision not be reasoned, which is not the case here). The Tribunal realizes, of course, that much of the evidence in this case is marked, in varying degrees, by some imprecision and is often circumstantial, and to that extent, the subjective assessment necessary when evaluating such evidence can be taken into account. This does not dilute the necessity of articulating reasons in itself, however.

535. For these reasons, the Tribunal considers that the foregoing standard, quite similar to the one endorsed by both Parties, is appropriate for the present proceedings. The Tribunal must verify whether the ABC Experts’ Report contains sufficient explication to allow the reader to understand how the ABC Experts reached each conclusion of their “final and binding decision” (regardless of whether these explanations are persuasive or the decision was right). The ABC Experts will have exceeded their mandate if some or all of their conclusions are unsupported by any reasons at all, if the reasoning is incoherent, or if the reasons provided are obviously contradictory or frivolous.

\textsuperscript{929} The Abyei Protocol initially provided that the ABC should complete its work “within the first two years of the Interim Period.” (Abyei Protocol, Section 5.2). This schedule was subsequently revised by the Parties, who required that the ABC instead present its final report to the Sudanese Presidency “before the end of the Pre-Interim Period.” (Abyei Appendix, Section 5) The Parties gave their preliminary presentations on April 12, 2005, and the report was presented to the Sudanese Presidency approximately three months later, on July 14, 2005. The Terms of Reference, drawn up by the Parties, also prescribe this three month schedule, though the actual schedule followed was delayed by approximately fifteen days. (See “Program of Work” in the Terms of Reference).

\textsuperscript{930} Indeed, despite similar time constraints, the Parties have obliged this Tribunal to “comprehensively state the reasons upon which the [A]ward is based.” Arbitration Agreement, Article 9(2).
E. ASSESSING THE REASONABLENESS OF THE ABC EXPERTS’ INTERPRETATION OF THE FORMULA

537. Having established that reasonableness is the proper standard by which the Tribunal should review the ABC Experts’ Report, the Tribunal must now determine whether the ABC Experts’ interpretation of their mandate can be considered a reasonable one. The Tribunal stresses that its assessment of the ABC Experts’ construction of the Formula must remain within the confines of the reasonableness standard, and cannot amount to a de novo decision on the correct meaning of the Formula.

538. Mindful of the limits of its Article 2(a) inquiry, it also bears mentioning that the Tribunal has had the benefit of a full discussion of all issues relating to both Article 2(a) (excess of mandate) and Article 2(c) (delimitation), which overlap to some extent when one addresses the issue of interpretation of the Formula. The Tribunal also has received considerable factual and opinion evidence submitted to it over the course of these proceedings, some of which were not presented before the ABC. While the Tribunal does not believe that any new evidence that has come to light is outcome-determinative, it is aware that certain evidence adduced in these proceedings could not have been part of the ABC’s reasonableness calculus and hence, would (while not being relevant in an Article 2(a) inquiry) become relevant if the Tribunal were to advance to an Article 2(c) inquiry.

539. In order to ascertain whether the ABC Experts interpreted their mandate (“to define (i.e. delimit) and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905”) in a reasonable manner, the Tribunal considers it useful to first highlight the Parties’ divergent interpretations of the ABC Experts’ mandate as they were submitted to the ABC.
540. Secondly, the Tribunal will consider what the ABC Experts themselves understood the mandate to mean. The ABC Experts did not spell out in a separate section of their Report what they considered to be the meaning of the mandate, but they made specific comments on what they conceived the mandate to be and, of course, drew conclusions from the analysis of the Parties’ various propositions and the evidence they submitted. These elements reveal quite clearly what their interpretation of the mandate was.

541. The Tribunal will then move on to assess the reasonableness of the Expert’s construction of the mandate, having regard not only to the text, context, object and purpose of the ABC’s mandate as it was set out in the 2004 Abyei Protocol, but also to other means of interpretation such as the historical context of the transfer (abundantly discussed by the Parties), the travaux préparatoires (also relied upon by the GoS and the SPLM/A), and the further agreements between the Parties that led to the Arbitration Agreement. The reasonableness of a predominantly territorial interpretation will also be examined in a subsequent section.

542. The Tribunal will present both possible interpretations of the mandate to demonstrate that a reasonableness calculus can lead to more than one reasonable interpretation of the Formula, especially in view of the paucity of available factual evidence, much of which is also imprecise. That imprecision leaves some considerable margin for interpretation, which in turn, has allowed for a diversity of views on the part of the Tribunal as to what the “correct” interpretation of the Formula would be had the Tribunal been empowered to conduct that form of inquiry under Article 2(a) (which it is not). As will be discussed in some detail, Professor Hafner, in particular, is of the opinion that the predominantly territorial interpretation is a more “correct” appraisal. The other members of the Tribunal do not share that view but believe that such substantive assessments are not relevant to an Article 2(a) inquiry. In any event, divergences of opinion in this regard do not change the Tribunal’s conclusions on this matter.

543. To begin the analysis, the Tribunal will first revisit the interpretations of the Formula put forward by the Parties in their submissions to the ABC, as well as the ABC Experts’ own construction of the mandate in their Report.
1. The ABC Experts’ Interpretation of the Formula

(a) The Parties’ Interpretation of the Mandate Before the ABC in its Proceedings

544. Counsel for the GoS coined the phrases “territorial” and “tribal” to characterize the GoS’s and the SPLM/A’s respective interpretations of the mandate in these proceedings, the former referring to the 1905 transfer of a specific area and the latter to the transfer of a people that same year.931

545. This nomenclature is certainly convenient and helpful, but it may obscure the fact that these interpretations are not entirely mutually exclusive. Whatever the interpretation, the application of that interpretation necessarily results in the definition of an Abyei “Area” – a spatially defined territory. A transfer of people has territorial effects; a transfer of territory has an effect on the people who inhabit it. This applies to the Parties’ submissions to the ABC, and may explain why their respective interpretations do not fall squarely within the “tribal” and the “territorial” categories and why each party’s interpretation drew from both aspects of the transfer. This being said, the GoS’s submissions can still be reasonably understood as supporting a predominantly territorial interpretation of the Formula, and the SPLM/A’s as placing the emphasis on the Ngok Dinka people.

(b) The SPLM/A’s Interpretation Before the ABC

546. The SPLM/A’s submissions to the ABC show quite clearly that the SPLM/A placed great emphasis on the Ngok Dinka people and the territory occupied and used by the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred in 1905. The SPLM/A thus stated in its preliminary presentation to the ABC that the “Abyei area as stipulated in the [Abyei Protocol] is the homeland of the Ngok Dinka, comprising the nine sections of Abior, Achaak, Achueng, Alei, Anyiel, Bongo, Diil, Mareng and Manyuar”932 and “was administered as part of the Bahr el Ghazal province” prior to the 1905 transfer.933

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931 See, e.g., GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 25/07 et seq.

932 The SPLM/A Preliminary Presentation on the Boundaries of the Abyei Area (First SPLM/A Presentation), April 10, 2005, p. 3, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/1; the SPLM/A Final Presentation on the Boundaries of the Abyei Area, May 14 - 16, 2005, p. 18, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/13.

933 See also the SPLM/A Final Presentation on the Boundaries of the Abyei Area, May 14 - 16, 2005, p. 3 (“[…] the Ngok Dinka were administratively carved into Kordofan from Bahr el Ghazal in March, 1905, and continued to be part of Kordofan till the present time.”) SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/13.
547. In the section of its final presentation to the ABC concerning “[t]he Inclusion and the Retention of the Ngok Dinka in Kordofan,” the SPLM/A again expressed its understanding of the transfer as concerning the Ngok Dinka people as a whole, while only “part of the Twic Dinka” were transferred at the same time. More specifically, the SPLM/A argued with reference to the March 1905 SIR that “[a]s a result of complaints received from the Dinka, it was decided to transfer the Ngok and part of the Twic Dinka from the administration of Bahr el Ghazal to Kordofan, so that they would be placed under the same governor with the Arabs of whose conduct they complained.”

548. Referring to the traditional boundaries of the Ngok Dinka, the SPLM/A defined them repeatedly by reference to neighboring tribes, thereby evincing a predominantly tribal reading of the Formula. Having contrasted the Ngok Dinka’s traditional boundaries with the provincial boundaries, which “were not surveyed” at the time of the transfer, and underscored the “lack of accuracy” in the location of the “Bahr el Arab” river, the SPLM/A invited the ABC to examine the true location of “the Ngok Dinka people of Abyei,” who were part of Bahr el Ghazal before the transfer, and whose presence extended not only south but also north of the river Kir and beyond the river Ngol.

549. In the section of its final presentation entitled “Land use in Abyei Area,” the SPLM/A further explained that both the Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka moved and used the land in accordance with the seasons. It also emphasized that “each tribe has its own area of

934 The SPLM/A Final Presentation on the Boundaries of the Abyei Area, May 14 - 16, 2005, p. 6, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/13.
935 Id. at p. 7. (Emphasis added.)
936 Id.
937 The SPLM/A Preliminary Presentation on the Boundaries of the Abyei Area (First SPLM/A Presentation), April 10, 2005, p. 5, 7 (Conclusion), SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/1. See also Transcript of discussion between ABC Members during meeting at La Mada Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya, April 12, 2005, p. 10 (Minister Deng Alor stating that “[s]ince 1905, we have been in Kordofan, but, we have distinct boundaries between us and the Misseriya.”); p. 14 (Mr. James Lual stating that “[o]ur mission is actually to demarcate the boundaries between the Dinka Ngok and the Misseriya”); p. 33 (Mr. James Ajing stating that “[…] we and the Misseriya were neighbours”) SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/5a; The SPLM/A Final Presentation on the Boundaries of the Abyei Area, May 14 – 16, 2005, p. 19, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/13.
938 See also The SPLM/A Final Presentation on the Boundaries of the Abyei Area, May 14 – 16, 2005, pp. 16, 20, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/13.
939 Id. at p. 13.
940 Id. at p.12.
941 Id. at p. 13.
942 See id. at 15. See also id. at p. 14-17 for a list of the authorities relied upon by the SPLM/A to argue that the Ngok Dinka people were located throughout the Bahr, in an area extending to the north of the Ngol.
permanent habitation,” distinct from grazing land, and that “the ownership is to the permanent dwellers.”\footnote{\textit{Id.} at p. 18.} The SPLM/A concluded on the basis of Dinka oral history and testimony that “Ngok ownership of the land extends up to latitude 10 degree 35 minutes.”\footnote{\textit{Id.} at p. 19.}

(c) The GoS’s Interpretation Before the ABC

550. The review of the GoS’s submissions to the ABC reveals that their primary focus was on the territory of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms and the provincial boundary between Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal in 1905, the Bahr el Arab/Kir, considered as the northern limit of the transferred area.

551. Referring to the mandate, the GoS argues that the ABC has to “[d]efine the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms territory transferred to Kordofan in 1905.”\footnote{GoS First Presentation to the Abyei Boundaries Commission, April 11, 2005, Slide 52, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/2.} The “pivotal part of this definition is that the concerned area was a southern area transferred to the north in 1905; i.e. it is not any area that was in Kordofan before 1905.”\footnote{GoS First Presentation to the Abyei Boundaries Commission, April 11, 2005, Slide 29, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/2.}

552. The GoS insists that it was clear that the Bahr el Arab was the provincial boundary between Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal\footnote{GoS Additional Presentation Abyei: A History of Coexistence, June 17, 2005, Slide 15, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/17.} and that its “exact nature and location” had been determined “immediately before the transfer.”\footnote{Transcript of discussion between ABC Members during meeting at La Mada Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya, April 12, 2005, p. 20, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/5a. \textit{See also} GoS First Presentation to the Abyei Boundaries Commission, April 11, 2005, Slides 33-40, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/2.} Similarly, “the alteration of boundaries [after the transfer] in 1905 was very, very specific and clear.”\footnote{Id. at Slide 20 and GoS First Presentation to the Abyei Boundaries Commission, April 11, 2005, Slide 29, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/2.} In fact, according to the GoS, “both the people and the natural boundary were accurately defined before the decision to transfer,” each being identically bounded in the north by the Bahr el Arab.\footnote{GoS Final Presentation to the ABC, June 16, 2005, Slide 21, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/18.} The GoS submits that the Ngok Dinka settled in areas north of the river Bahr el Arab only after 1905.\footnote{GoS Final Presentation to the ABC, June 16, 2005, Slide 18, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/18. \textit{See also} \textit{Id.} at Slide 20 and GoS First Presentation to the Abyei Boundaries Commission, April 11, 2005, Slide 29, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/2.} The GoS concludes that “the territory of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms...
transferred to Kordofan in 1905” is the triangle that now lies to the South of Bahr-el-Arab.”

553. The GoS also stresses that the ABC “shall not invent a new parameter other than the yardstick of the year 1905.” In the GoS’s view, the “ingenuity of the USA Proposal” was to have chosen “the year 1905, as the date where land rights were vested.” As a consequence of the ABC Experts’ scientifically based decision, “[t]he local communities shall know their boundaries as they stood in 1905, i.e. before they moved into each other territories.”

(d) The Parties’ Criticism of the Other Side’s Interpretation of the Mandate Presented to the ABC Experts

554. Each Party maintains that the other side had in fact adopted the interpretation which it thinks is the correct one in the ABC proceedings. The GoS thus argued before this Tribunal that the SPLM/A was focusing on the area of the Ngok Dinka, rather than the Ngok Dinka people, and relied on the SPLM/A’s statement in its preliminary presentation that the “[t]he Protocol […] defines [the] Abyei area as an area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms that was transferred to Kordofan in 1905,” insisting that the use of the phrase “that was transferred” evinced a territorial approach. The GoS also points to references to “specific Dinka lands” being shifted to Kordofan and “Dinka areas” being moved administratively.

555. The Tribunal would note that this particular argument is not persuasive. Suffice it to note that, when the agent of the GoS commented on the SPLM/A’s preliminary presentation, he

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953 GoS First Presentation to the Abyei Boundaries Commission, April 11, 2005, Slide 51, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/2. See also Notes on the Mandate of the Abyei Boundaries Commission, April 12, 2005, p. 2, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/5.
954 GoS First Presentation to the Abyei Boundaries Commission, April 11, 2005, Slide 47, SM Annex 77, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/2. See also Notes on the Mandate of the Abyei Boundaries Commission, April 12, 2005, p. 1, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/5.
955 GoS First Presentation to the Abyei Boundaries Commission, 11 April 2005, Slide 50, SM Annex 77, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/2. See also Notes on the Mandate of the Abyei Boundaries Commission, April 12, 2005, p. 1, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/5.
956 The SPLM/A Preliminary Presentation on the Boundaries of the Abyei Area (First SPLM/A Presentation), April 10, 2005, p. 2, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/1.
957 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 32/17 et seq.
958 GoS Rejoinder, para. 36 quoting SPLM/A Preliminary Presentation on the Boundaries of the Abyei Area (First SPLM/A Presentation) p. 4, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/1.
was pleased to see that “the Abyei Protocol that was signed defined the Abyei area as the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms that were transferred to Kordofan in 1905.” In the informal context of the ABC proceedings, these statements cannot be taken in isolation to conclude that either party changed its approach to the mandate. In the same way, the SPLM/A’s comment that “the reasons for the transfer of the two areas and not the people are explicitly stated” in the March 1905 SIR derives not from a newly adopted “territorial” approach, but from a rather unconvincing attempt to criticize the GoS’s position, in contradiction with the SPLM/A’s own interpretation of the same document, clearly set forth a few pages earlier in its presentation.

556. Equally unpersuasive are the SPLM/A’s efforts to show that the GoS’s presentations proved that it understood the Formula to focus on the people and not on the area transferred. The fact that the GoS repeatedly referred before the ABC to “[t]he Decision to Transfer the ngok dinka [sic] and twij [sic] to Kordofan,” or to the transfer of “groups,” “the Ngok and the Twic” in its Memorial, may well amount to acknowledging that the March 1905 SIR was couched in tribal terms, but does not allow the inference that the GoS’s own conception of its interpretation of the mandate was not primarily territorial. It does illustrate, however, that the so-called “territorial” interpretation has implications for the people.

557. To conclude, there is little doubt that the GoS’s interpretation was to be understood as focusing on the transfer of a clearly delimited area with an impact on the Ngok Dinka tribe, and the SPLM/A’s as centered on the transfer of a tribe with territorial consequences. The

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959 Transcript of discussion between ABC Members during meeting at La Mada Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya, April 12, 2005, p. 6, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/5a. (Emphasis added)

960 The SPLM/A Final Presentation on the Boundaries of the Abyei Area, May 14 – 16, 2005, p. 27, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/13. See also GoS Rejoinder, para. 37.

961 See GoS Rejoinder, paras. 37-38.

962 See supra para. 547.

963 SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 216/16 et seq. quoting GoS First Presentation to the ABC, Slide 31, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/2, CB-113. See also the GoS reference to “The Decision to Transfer the Ngok and the Twic To Kordofan” in GoS first Presentation to the ABC, Slides 31-32, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/2 and GoS Final Presentation to the ABC, Slide 24, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/18.

964 SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1549 quoting GoS Memorial, paras. 357, 359. See also SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 805.
GoS’s and the SPLM/A’s interpretations were therefore not dissimilar to those expounded before this Tribunal.\textsuperscript{965}

2. The ABC Experts’ Interpretation of the Mandate

558. While acknowledging the strengths of the GoS’s construction of the Formula, the ABC Experts ultimately did not consider that territorial considerations alone were sufficiently dispositive in the interpretation of their mandate.\textsuperscript{966} Given the lack of any precise administrative boundary, the ABC Experts focused on the tribal dimension of the transfer and relied on the Ngok Dinka’s occupation of land to determine what had been transferred in 1905.

(a) The Provincial Boundary Was Not the Determining Factor in the Experts’ Analysis of the Formula

559. The ABC Experts pointed out that “[a]t first glance, the evidence adduced by the government in support of its interpretation of the 1905 boundary is persuasive”\textsuperscript{967} and “strong.”\textsuperscript{968} However, when the ABC Experts confronted the evidence of “what the local administrative understanding and practice of the day was on the ground,”\textsuperscript{969} it discovered in contemporary reports that there was “considerable geographical confusion” about the location of the real Bahr el Arab river in 1905, and more generally “about the Bahr el Arab and Bahr el Ghazal regions for the first two decades of Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule.”\textsuperscript{970} The administrative record and its full context reveal that the Ragaba ez Zarga, and not the Bahr el Arab, was treated as the province boundary.\textsuperscript{971} In addition, the boundary was not shown on the map after the transfer, which suggests that “the area had not yet been surveyed.”\textsuperscript{972}

\textsuperscript{965} See supra the summary of Parties’ arguments on the interpretation of the Formula before this Tribunal, paras. 223 \textit{et seq.}

\textsuperscript{966} ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, pp. 17-18, 35-41.

\textsuperscript{967} \textit{Id.} at Part I, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{968} \textit{Id.} at Part I, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{969} \textit{Id.} at Part I, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{970} \textit{Id.} at Part I, pp. 18, 37.

\textsuperscript{971} \textit{Id.} at Part I, p. 39.

\textsuperscript{972} \textit{Id.}
560. The ABC Experts concluded that the GoS position, though “understandable,” was “incorrect.” Because of its inaccurate and approximate nature, the provincial boundary was not considered by the ABC Experts as having the decisive role that the GoS sought to confer upon it; it was not seen as the decisive factor in delimiting the transferred area.

(b) The ABC Experts’ Emphasis on the Tribal Dimension of the Transfer

561. The ABC Experts considered, in addition to the evidence supporting the territorial interpretation, other evidence highlighting the tribal dimension of the transfer and its territorial consequences, and adopted an interpretation focusing on land occupation and “land rights of the people constituting the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms as at 1905.”

562. At the very beginning of their Report, the ABC Experts observed that there existed no document from the year 1905 describing or showing the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan at that time:

No map exists showing the area inhabited by the Ngok Dinka in 1905. Nor is there sufficient documentation produced in that year by Anglo-Egyptian Condominium government authorities that adequately spell out the administrative situation that existed in that area at that time.

563. The ABC Experts therefore had no choice but to “avail themselves of relevant historical material produced both before and after 1905, as well as during that year, to determine as accurately as possible the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms as it was in 1905.”

564. Having made those remarks regarding their research methods, which manifested their intention to ensure that 1905 was maintained as the year of reference, the ABC Experts offered their analysis of what occurred in 1905 and emphasized that the transfer concerned the Ngok people:

What occurred in 1905 was that because of Dinka complaints about Humr raids, the British authorities decided to transfer the Ngok and part of the Twich Dinka from the administrative control of Bahr el-Ghazal Province to Kordofan Province. This action

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973 Id. at Part I, p. 18.
974 Id. at Part II, App. 2, p. 21.
975 Id. at Part II, pp. 21, 22.
976 Id. at Part I, p. 4.
977 Id.
put the Ngok and the Humr under the authority of the same governor (a fact cited in both the GOS and SPLM/A presentations).978

565. In the course of the proceedings, the ABC Experts paused to “focus again on what our mandate is”979 and emphasized that:

The Peace Agreement, that was mentioned, speaks specifically about the nine sections of the Ngok Dinka. The Peace Agreement refers to the Abyei area that was occupied by the nine sections of the Ngok Dinka. […] When the British came, a decision was made to make this area part of Kordofan. But we are also looking at the area of the nine sections of the Ngok Dinka. […] We want to find out where people lived, where they took their cattle, and where they shared grazing and water with other people.980

The area to be defined is described in the protocol as the area of the 9 Ngok Dinka chiefdoms – no one else. And we are supposed to discover what territory was being used and claimed by those 9 chiefdoms when the administrative decision was made to place them in Kordofan.981

566. These statements, along with the above reference to the March 1905 SIR, clearly confirm that the Formula’s focus, in the ABC Experts’ view, was more on a transfer of people with territorial implications, rather than on a transfer of an area south of the approximate provincial boundary.

567. The ABC Experts then considered evidence of Ngok presence north of the Bahr el Arab before the transfer, and concluded that the Ngok Dinka occupied not merely the area south of the Bahr el Arab described by the GoS, but also the area that extended from the Kir/Bahr el Arab north to at least the Ngol/Ragaba ez Zarga982. The ABC Experts also examined post-1905 evidence and came to the conclusion that it could be used to establish the location of the Ngok Dinka in 1905, since “[t]he administrative record of the Condominium period and testimony of persons familiar with the area attest to the continuity of Ngok Dinka settlements in, and use of, places north of the Bahr el-Arab between 1905 and 1965.”983 They relied, inter alia, on the testimony and writings of Mr. Tibbs and Professor Cunnison, the latter being “definite in stating that the general area in which the Ngok maintained their

978 Id. at Part I, p. 15. See also id., p. 21.
979 Id. at Part II, App. 4, p. 129.
980 Id. at Part II, pp. 129-130 (emphasis added).
981 Id. at Part II, pp. 155-156 (emphasis added).
982 See id. at Part I, p. 18, pp. 39-40. See also id. at Part II, App. 4, pp. 167-173 and App. 5, pp. 196-203.
983 Id. at Part I, p. 21. See also id., pp. 18-19, 35, 41-44. See also id. at Part II, App. 5, pp. 200-203.
permanent settlements remained the same over the years.”

The ABC Experts further referred to Professor Cunnison for the propositions that “the Bahr, or the Bahr al ‘Arab” should not be regarded as a single and separate river but as a region encompassing “all river beds between the Regeba ez Zerga and the main river [i.e. the Kir/Bahr el Arab],” and that “much of the Bahr has permanent Dinka settlements […].”

The ABC Experts then analyzed the evidence in terms of “land rights of the people constituting the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms as at 1905,” so that the boundaries between the Ngok and the Misseriya may reflect “the two communities’ effective connection to land.” The reasons offered to take an approach based on occupation and land rights included the following “sociological and historical facts as well as the terms of the CPA:”

- the provincial boundary was not precisely delimited and an uncertain administrative boundary “did not (and could not have) coincided exactly with the boundaries of land use rights of sedentary or pastoral peasant communities whose tenure rights and obligations overlap in the absence of concrete walls separating the communities;”
- The land used by the communities was “always affected by and responded to variable seasonal rain patterns and climatic changes;”
- The Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal Annual Reports immediately before and after 1905 may draw lines but “hardly ever demarcate actual boundaries in terms of land rights and population dynamics on the ground;”
- The armed raids on the Ngok Dinka, “the official principal reason for the transfer of the 9 Ngok Dinka chiefdoms to Kordofan” (recorded in the March 1905 SIR), “must have greatly destabilized the Ngok Dinka and thus affected the land use patterns of the two communities prior to the announcement of the transfer;”

984 Id. at Part I, p. 19. See also id. at Part II, App. 4, p. 162.
985 Id. at Part II, App. 5, p. 172.
986 Id. at Part II, App. 4, p. 161, and App. 5, p. 172.
987 Id. at Part II, App. 2, p. 22.
988 Id. at Part II, p. 21.
990 Id. at Part II, App. 2, p. 22.
991 Id.
992 Id.
993 Id. at Part II, App. 2, p. 23.
• Section 1.1.3 of the Abyei Protocol recognizes “‘secondary rights’ of access and use of land by one community in the territory of another community that enjoys ‘dominant rights’.”

• The Notes on the Mandate of the Abyei Boundaries Commission, which record the Government’s concern that 1905 was chosen as the year when land rights were vested, “also refers to the issue of co-existing land rights and land use […].”

569. Considering that the notion of “land rights” is better adapted to the communities’ “multiple forms of occupation and use rights” than the colonial concept of “land ownership,” the ABC Experts stressed the importance of the “sociological fact that by 1905 there existed three main categories of […] occupation, land rights and land use.” They were the following:

• Dominant occupation that was exclusive;

• Dominant occupation that allowed non-members of the community to acquire seasonal rights;

• Shared secondary occupation, in the so-called no man’s land (the goz).

570. On the basis of the evidence before them, the ABC Experts concluded that the territory where the Ngok Dinka had established dominant occupation “fell squarely within the boundaries that were transferred in 1905” and extended to the 10°10’N line. They also divided the zone between 10°10’N and 10°35’N, which they defined as a shared secondary occupation area and placed the northern boundary of the Abyei Area at 10°22’30’’N.

3. The Tribunal’s Appreciation of the Reasonableness of the ABC Experts’ Interpretation

571. The Tribunal must now assess the reasonableness of the ABC Experts’ interpretation of their mandate, “which [was] to define (i.e. delimit) and demarcate the area of the nine
Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905’ as stated in the Abyei Protocol, and reiterated in the Abyei Appendix and the ABC Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure.” In a subsequent section, the Tribunal will also assess the reasonableness of the primarily territorial interpretation of the mandate.\footnote{See infra paras. 665 et seq.} Again, it should be emphasized that the Tribunal’s task at this stage (an Article 2(a) inquiry) is limited to the assessment of the reasonableness of the mandate’s interpretation. Its correctness, a matter over which the Tribunal is not of one view, falls outside the Tribunal’s Article 2(a) mandate.

Both Parties agree, and the Tribunal considers it appropriate, to use the rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention as part of the general principles referred to in Article 3 of the Arbitration Agreement.\footnote{See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 24/17 et seq.; SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 20, 2009, Transcr. 80/17 et seq.} The Tribunal will thus seek to establish the ordinary meaning of the text of the mandate in its context, in particular the Abyei Protocol, and in light of its object and purpose.

The Parties also extensively explored the historical context in 1905 in order to shed light on the natural meaning of the mandate. In addition, they relied on the drafting history of the Abyei Protocol to determine what the mandate was intended to mean. For the sake of completeness, the Tribunal will therefore examine the meaning of the mandate in its broader context.

4. “Chiefdoms” as the Appropriate Object of the Transfer

As a first question, the Tribunal will discuss whether the ABC Experts could reasonably interpret the Formula as relating to the transfer in 1905 of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms (as opposed to a defined area of land).

(a) Textual Interpretation of the Formula

In accordance with the Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, the Tribunal must interpret the text of the Formula by initially looking at the ordinary meaning of the terms used. The Tribunal recalls that the Parties have diverging opinions as to the grammatical meaning of the text. While the GoS acknowledges that the word “transferred” is equally capable of
qualifying the noun “area” as the phrase “nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms.”\footnote{GoS Rejoinder, para. 32. \textit{See also supra} the summary of the GoS’s arguments, para. 225.} the SPLM/A insists that “transferred to Kordofan” relates to the noun “chiefdoms.”\footnote{SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1107. \textit{See also supra} the summary of the SPLM/A’s arguments, paras. 232-233.} The Tribunal is of the opinion that both interpretations are tenable.

576. The Tribunal notes that the ICJ was faced with a similar situation in the \textit{Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran)}. In that case, the Court had to interpret the text of a Declaration made by the Imperial Government of Iran regarding the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with Article 36(2) of its Statute. The relevant text, in the original French version, read as follows:

\begin{quote}
Le Gouvernement impérial de Perse déclare reconnaître comme obligatoire, de plein droit et sans convention spéciale, vis-à-vis de tout autre État acceptant la même obligation, c’est-à-dire sous condition de réciprocité, la juridiction de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, conformément à l’article 36, paragraphe 2 du Statut de la Cour, sur tous les différends qui s’élèveraient après la ratification de la présente déclaration, au sujet de situations ou de faits ayant directement ou indirectement trait à l’application des traités ou conventions acceptés par la Perse et postérieurs à la ratification de cette déclaration…\footnote{Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran) (Preliminary Objections) Judgment of July 22, 1952, ICJ Reports 1952, p. 93, 103. The translated English version reads: “The Imperial Government of Persia recognizes as compulsory \textit{ipso facto} and without special agreement in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, that is to say, on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, in any dispute arising after the ratification of the present declaration with regard to situations or facts relating directly or indirectly to the application of treaties or conventions accepted by Persia and subsequent to the ratification of this declaration…”}
\end{quote}

577. Both Parties agreed that the Declaration applied to conventions or treaties accepted by Iran. However, the Parties had opposing views as to whether, based on the grammatical interpretation of the Declaration, the jurisdiction of the Court extended to treaties or conventions accepted by Iran only after the ratification of the Declaration or accepted by Iran at any time. While the Government of Iran claimed that the words “et postérieurs à la ratification de cette déclaration” (“and subsequent to the ratification of this declaration”) applied to the immediately preceding words “traités ou conventions acceptés par la Perse” (“treaties or conventions accepted by Persia”), the Government of the United Kingdom argued that the expression “et postérieurs à la ratification de cette déclaration” rather referred to the words “au sujet de situations ou de faits” (“with regard to situations or facts”).\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 104.}
578. The Court observed:

If the Declaration is considered from a purely grammatical point of view, both contentions might be regarded as compatible with the text. The words “et postérieurs à la ratification de cette déclaration” may, strictly speaking, be considered as referring either to the expression “traités ou conventions acceptés par la Perse,” or to the expression “au sujet de situations ou de faits.”

But the Court cannot base itself on a purely grammatical interpretation of the text. It must seek the interpretation which is in harmony with a natural and reasonable way of reading the text, having due regard to the intention of the Government of Iran at the time when it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. (emphasis added)

579. After a careful analysis of the natural reading of the text and the circumstances in which it was adopted by the Government of Iran, including the reasons behind Iran’s adoption of a rather restrictive formula, the Court accepted the interpretation proposed by the Government of Iran as reflective of its manifest intention to limit the jurisdiction of the Court to treaties or conventions accepted by Iran after the ratification of the Declaration.

580. With respect to the Formula establishing the ABC Experts’ mandate, the Tribunal notes that a purely grammatical approach to the interpretation of these terms, using for example the rule of proximity or simple euphony, does not yield any determinative conclusion as to their ordinary meaning. There is no conclusive method for determining, by recourse to the text alone, whether “transferred” relates to “area,” suggesting a territorial dimension, or whether it relates to “the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms,” suggesting a more tribal dimension. Both propositions are equally tenable.

581. The Tribunal notes that the Arabic version of the Formula as found in Section 1.1.2 of the Abyei Protocol is identical to the English text and does not provide further support for either of the two grammatical interpretations.

582. Given the possible interpretations of the Formula, and the textual support for each of them, the Tribunal concludes that the ABC Experts’ own construction was not unreasonable and accordingly did not constitute an excess of mandate.

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1007 Id.
1008 Id. at 104-107.
(b) The Object and Purpose of the Formula Within the Meaning of Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention

583. In accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, the Formula must also be interpreted in the context of the relevant instruments in which it was set out and in the light of their object and purposes.

584. As a preliminary matter, the Tribunal notes that the GoS has taken a somewhat restrictive approach to the interpretation of the Formula. The GoS insists that the Tribunal should confine itself to examining the historical event that occurred in 1905 – the administrative transfer of an area – and the clear intention of the Anglo-Egyptian officials at the time, as evidenced by the contemporaneous transfer documents.\textsuperscript{1010} Any detailed discussion of the provisions of the Abyei Protocol, including those relating to the Abyei Referendum, is dismissed on the ground that “[…] the mandate of the [ABC Experts], as of the Tribunal, is not to consider areas according to their demographics, but rather to delimit an area that was transferred from the Bahr el Ghazal to Kordofan in 1905.”\textsuperscript{1011} The GoS goes on to argue that:

\[\text{[…] the very issue that the Parties could not agree in the Abyei Protocol – the limits of the disputed area – should [not] be influenced by other factors, not mentioned in the relevant provisions of the Protocol and having nothing to do with the way in which the resolution of the definition of the “Abyei Area” was agreed to be determined. If the intention of the Parties had been to include all Ngok Dinka, regardless of where they live, in the “Abyei Area” and thus subject to the referendum, the Parties would have said so and drafted the Formula accordingly. They did not.}\textsuperscript{1012}

585. By contrast, the SPLM/A argues that instead of focusing on the purpose of the transfer in 1905, one should examine the Parties’ purposes in 2004, when they concluded the Abyei Protocol.\textsuperscript{1013} The SPLM/A emphasizes, in particular, that:

\[\text{[…] the central purpose of the definition of the Abyei Area was to specify that region whose residents would be entitled to participate in the Abyei Referendum […] on the question whether or not they would be included in the South or the North, simultaneous to the main Southern Referendum.}\textsuperscript{1014}

\textsuperscript{1010} See GoS Rejoinder, paras. 10-19; paras. 41-59.
\textsuperscript{1011} GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 110. See also GoS Rejoinder, para. 57.
\textsuperscript{1012} GoS Rejoinder, para. 58. See also supra the summary of the GoS’s arguments, paras. 249 et seq.
\textsuperscript{1013} See SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 849.
\textsuperscript{1014} SPLM/A Memorial, para. 1124. See also supra the summary of the SPLM/A’s arguments, paras. 255 et seq.
586. The Tribunal agrees with the GoS that the Formula invited the ABC Experts to determine what was transferred in 1905, and not at any other date. It also agrees that the 1905 transfer documents and “the object and purpose of the transfer” are relevant to the interpretation of the Formula and these will be examined in due course. However, the Tribunal cannot ignore the fact that the ABC Experts’ mandate was agreed upon by the Parties and enshrined in the Abyei Protocol in 2004, and subsequently reiterated in the Abyei Appendix, the Terms of Reference and the Rules of Procedure, as recalled in Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement. The CPA, which incorporates the Abyei Protocol, and the Interim National Constitution, which echoes its main provisions, should also be taken into account. This context also informs the meaning of the Formula. The Abyei Protocol, and more generally the CPA, whose aim is to achieve durable peace in Sudan, require the Tribunal to interpret the mandate in light of the object and purpose of these contextual instruments.

587. The ABC’s task of defining and demarcating the Abyei Area, as provided for in the Abyei Protocol, was an important step towards achieving the resolution of the conflict and, ultimately, the goals of the broader peace process contemplated in the CPA. Indeed, the Abyei Protocol - the agreement where the Formula first appeared - is one of the six fundamental texts recorded and reconfirmed in the CPA. The Chapeau of the CPA states that the Parties, the GoS and the SPLM/A, “MINDFUL of the urgent need to bring peace and security to the people of the Sudan […].” reached agreement on these texts…

[...] IN PURSUANCE OF [their] commitment [...] to a negotiated settlement on the basis of a democratic system of governance which, on the one hand, recognizes the right of the people of Southern Sudan to self-determination and seeks to make unity

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1015 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 115.
1016 See infra paras. 616 et seq.
1017 See Abyei Protocol, Section 1.1.2 and Section 5.1; Abyei Appendix, Section 1; Terms of Reference, Section 1.1; and Rules of Procedure, Section 1.
1018 See CPA, Chapter IV.
1019 See Interim National Constitution, Article 183.
1020 See in particular Section 1.1.2 and Section 5.1 of the Abyei Protocol. The ABC was one of the four “priority joint task teams” that the Parties agreed to establish for the implementation of the CPA (See Chapeau of the CPA, p. (xiii), para. (6)).
1021 See Chapeau of the CPA, p. (xi). The Abyei Protocol is the fourth Chapter of the CPA. The five other chapters include the Machakos Protocol dated July 20, 2002 (Chapter I); the Agreement on Security Arrangements dated September 25, 2003 (Chapter VI of the CPA); the Agreement on Wealth Sharing dated January 7, 2004 (Chapter III of the CPA); the Protocol on Power Sharing dated May 26, 2004 (Chapter II); the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict In Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States dated May 26, 2004 (Chapter V).
attractive during the Interim Period, while at the same time is founded on the values of justice, democracy, good governance, respect for fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, mutual understanding and tolerance of diversity within the realities of the Sudan.\textsuperscript{1022}

588. The Interim National Constitution confirms the duty of the Government of National Unity to implement

[…] the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in a manner that makes the unity of the Sudan an attractive option especially to the people of Southern Sudan, and pave the way for the exercise of the right of self-determination according to Part Sixteen of this Constitution.\textsuperscript{1023}

589. In furtherance of these objectives and commitments, the Abyei Protocol lays down, at the very beginning of its first section, the following three general principles of agreement on Abyei:

1.1.1 Abyei is a bridge between the north and the south, linking the people of Sudan;

1.1.2 The territory is defined as the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905;

1.1.3. The Misseriya and other nomadic peoples retain their traditional rights to graze cattle and move across the territory of Abyei.

590. Thus, the Abyei Protocol first specifies the nature and function that the Parties ascribe to the Abyei Area (serving as a bridge to link the people of Sudan and fostering reconciliation), and only then provides the definition of the Abyei Area itself (“the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905”). The text finally recognizes the “traditional rights” of the Misseriya and other nomadic tribes to graze cattle and move across the Abyei Area.

591. The Abyei Protocol, in combination with the Abyei Appendix,\textsuperscript{1024} divides the peaceful resolution process of the Abyei conflict into three phases. The first phase culminates in the

\textsuperscript{1022} See Chapeau of the CPA, p. (xi).

\textsuperscript{1023} See Interim National Constitution, Article 82(c). The Preamble of the Interim National Constitution also recalls, \textit{inter alia}, that the people of Sudan are committed to the CPA and “to establish a decentralized multi-party democratic system of governance in which power shall be peacefully transferred and to uphold values of justice, equality, human dignity and equal rights and duties of men and women.”

\textsuperscript{1024} The Abyei Appendix is also referred to as the Abyei Annex (see ABC Experts’ Report, Part II, App. 1, p. 12). Section 1 of the Abyei Appendix reiterates the mandate of the ABC Experts.
presentation of the ABC Experts’ Report to the Presidency, the Commission being tasked “to define and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905, referred to herein as Abyei Area.”

Originally, the ABC was to complete its task within two years of the “Interim Period,” which commenced on July 9, 2005. However, the Parties agreed to move the deadline to an earlier date, the end of the “Pre-Interim Period,” a six-month phase directly preceding the six-year long Interim Period. The tightening of the original timetable confirms both the urgency and the importance of delimiting the Abyei Area for the purposes of the peace process.

The second phase starts when the Presidency establishes “the administration of Abyei simultaneously with the Government of South Sudan and the Governments of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States by the beginning of the Interim Period.” During that period, the residents of the Abyei Area will be citizens of both Western Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal and elect a local Executive Council in charge of administering the Area. Abyei’s special administrative status also provides, inter alia, that net oil revenues from the Area will be shared between six different groups and entities, in accordance with a specific formula.

The third phase corresponds to the “End of Interim Period.” At this stage, the residents of the Abyei Area will be offered the opportunity to vote in a referendum to decide whether “Abyei retains its special administrative status in the north” or becomes part of Bahr el Ghazal. The “residents of Abyei Area” are defined, in Section 6.1. of the Abyei

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1025 See Abyei Protocol, Section 5.1.
1026 See Abyei Protocol, Section 5.2.
1027 See Interim National Constitution, Article 226(4).
1028 See Abyei Appendix, Section 5.
1029 The Machakos Protocol (Chapter 1 of the CPA) distinguishes two periods in the transition process: a Pre-Interim Period during which “[t]he institutions and mechanisms provided for in the Peace Agreement shall be established” (Machakos Protocol, Part B, Article 2.1) and an Interim Period during which “[t]he institutions and mechanisms established during the Pre-Interim Period shall be operating in accordance with the arrangements and principles set out in the Peace Agreement.” (Machakos Protocol, Part B, Article 2.3) See Abyei Appendix, Section 6.
1030 See Abyei Protocol, Section 1.2.1. See also Interim National Constitution, Article 183(2).
1031 See Abyei Protocol, Section 1.2.2. See also id., Section 2.2.
1032 See Abyei Protocol, Section 1.2.3. See also id., Section 3.1.
1033 Abyei Protocol, Section 1.3.
1034 Abyei Protocol, Section 1.3. See also id., Section 8.2; Interim National Constitution, Article 183(3).
Protocol, as “the Members of Ngok Dinka community and other Sudanese residing in the area.” Section 6.1 significantly singles out “the members of Ngok Dinka community,” and merely makes a general reference to “other Sudanese,” without mentioning any other specific community, such as the Misseriya (referred to in other provisions of the Abyei Protocol).

594. The Abyei Referendum will be conducted simultaneously with the referendum of Southern Sudan. At the end of the Interim Period, the people of South Sudan will be asked either “to confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement” or “to vote for secession.” While the residents of the Abyei Area will be called upon to cast their separate ballot irrespective of the results of the Southern Referendum, these results will be highly relevant to the consequences of the choice made by the residents of the Abyei Area. Indeed, they may find themselves north or south of an international boundary if South Sudan secedes. The stakes are therefore considerable and should be born in mind when examining the meaning of the Formula laid down in Section 1.1.2. of the Abyei Protocol.

595. According to a predominantly territorial approach, it would be acceptable and within the logic of this line of interpretation to define the area regardless of the actual proportion of the people of the nine Ngok Dinka sections located in that area, the 1905 provincial boundary (assuming that it could be precisely identified) being the determining criterion. The people would follow the territory only in so far as they reside in that territory. While such a territorial interpretation is entirely plausible as a textual matter, its rigid application could result in splitting the Ngok Dinka community depending on the outcome of the envisaged referendum. A predominantly territorial approach could thus lead to a definition of the Abyei Area that potentially risks defeating the main purpose of the referendum, to empower “[t]he Members of the Ngok Dinka community and other Sudanese residing in the area”

1036 The Abyei Protocol does not establish the criteria of residence. These criteria will be determined by the Abyei Referendum Commission. (See Abyei Protocol, Section 6.1)
1037 Abyei Protocol, Section 1.3. and Section 8.1.
1038 Machakos Protocol (Chapter 1 of the CPA), Part B, Article 2.5. See also Interim National Constitution, Part Sixteen.
1039 Abyei Protocol, Section 1.3. and Section 8.1.
1040 Abyei Protocol, Section 6.1(a).
to choose whether the Abyei Area should retain its special administrative status in the north or be part of Bahr el Ghazal in the south.  

596. In light of the structure and purpose of the Abyei Protocol’s key provisions, it was not unreasonable to interpret the Formula in a predominantly tribal manner, that interpretation being more likely to encompass the whole of the Ngok Dinka people. The Tribunal recognizes and holds that the object and purpose of the CPA can reasonably be taken to counsel in favor of a tribal perspective.  

(c) The Context of the Formula 

597. In addition, other provisions of the relevant instruments, which are pertinent to the interpretation of the Formula as context pursuant to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, equally confirm that the predominantly tribal interpretation proposed by the ABC Experts is not unreasonable. 

598. Most importantly, the fact that the Parties agreed that the “ABC shall listen to representatives of the people of Abyei Area and the neighbours” and “should have free access to the members of the public […] at the location to be visited” can reasonably be interpreted as an invitation to explore fully the tribal dimension of the Formula, rather than to discern where the uncertain provincial boundary was located in 1905. As the ABC Experts themselves put it, they conceived these interviews with the people of the region as an instrument “to find out where people lived, where they took their cattle, and where they shared grazing and water with other people.”  

599. Thus, having examined the Formula in its context and in light of the relevant instruments’ purposes, the Tribunal concludes that the ABC Experts’ interpretation of the Formula was reasonable. 

1041 For an examination of the reasonableness of the predominantly territorial interpretation, see infra at paras. 665 to 672. 

1042 The Tribunal would note that taking this risk into account does not substitute present-day demographical considerations to the actual text of the mandate. Rather, it acknowledges the connection between the purpose of the Abyei Protocol in 2004 and the Formula’s reference to the 1905 transfer.  

1043 Abyei Appendix, Section 3. See also Terms of Reference, Section 3.2.  

1044 Rules of Procedure, Section 7. See also id., Section 8.  

1045 ABC Experts’ Report, Part II, App. 4, p. 130.
(d) The Drafting History of the Abyei Protocol

600. That the ABC’s interpretation of the Formula was a reasonable one is further confirmed by the drafting history of the Abyei Protocol.

601. It is clear from the record and the Parties’ submissions that when the peace negotiations resumed in the late 1990s and developed in the following years, the GoS’s and the SPLM/A’s views as to how the Abyei Area should be defined differed sharply. While the GoS insisted that “Abyei, homeland of the Ngok Dinka, Misseria and other people is not part of the South,” the SPLM/A requested a referendum “for the people of Abyei” to choose “whether to be part of Southern Sudan or remain in the North,” claiming that “[t]he Dinka Ngok people and the territory of Abyei shall therefore be administered as part of Southern Sudan” which had been granted the right of self-determination.

602. Significantly, however, the Parties do agree on the origin of the mandate. Both the GoS and the SPLM/A refer to Dr. Johnson’s presentation to the negotiating Parties at a symposium in January 2003 (the “Johnson Presentation”). This presentation elaborated, among other things, on the key passage of the March 1905 SIR, which, according to both Parties, led to the formulation of the mandate. Although the Parties did not agree immediately on a formula for the Abyei Area, it is very useful to dwell on the actual content of the Johnson Presentation to understand in what context the Parties were introduced to the March 1905 SIR.

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1046 See GoS Memorial, para. 43; SPLM/A Memorial, para. 451. For a summary of the Parties’ arguments on the drafting history of the Abyei Protocol, see supra paras. 261 et seq.

1047 See GoS Memorial, para. 49 quoting Second Meeting of the Political Committee between Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Nairobi, 26th February, 2000, p. 7.

1048 See GoS Memorial, para. 48 quoting First Meeting of the Political Committee between Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Nairobi, 15th-20th January, 2000, p. 4. See also, for example, the Abyei Peace Committee’s submission that “Ngok-Dinka of Abyei area are indisputably part of the Dinka people of southern Sudan and present a natural extension of their shared land, tradition and culture. (APC Paper, The Popular Demand of Ngok-Dinka on Abyei Question, dated October 10, 2002, at p. 4, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 9/18.)

1049 See GoS Memorial, para. 51; SPLM/A Memorial, para. 461 referring to D. Johnson, Conflict Areas: Abyei - A summary and elaboration of points raised in the presentation and discussion on Abyei, January 18, 2003, at the KCB Management Center, Karen, Nairobi, pp. 1-12, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 10/13.

1050 See GoS Memorial, para. 359; SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 1547. The March 1905 SIR and its relevant extract have already been discussed in the previous section and will not be repeated here. Suffice it to recall that the terms of this document could reasonably be interpreted in its historical context as referring to the transfer of tribes, rather than a fixed territory.
603. The Tribunal notes that Dr. Johnson spoke of the transfer in clearly tribal terms. Having stated that “[t]he Ngok and the whole of the Bahr al-Arab system were initially administered under Bahr al-Ghazal,” Dr. Johnson explains that:

In 1905 it was decided to transfer both the Ngok and the Twic to the jurisdiction of Kordofan, the better to deal with their complaints against the Humr.1051

604. Dr. Johnson quotes the key passage from the 1905 March SIR and further points out that:

Altogether three different Dinka groups have been administered by Kordofan at different times: the Ngok, the Twic and the Ruweng.

[...] The Ngok remained an anomaly as the only Dinka group outside the boundaries of the southern provinces.1052

605. It is significant that Dr. Johnson also told the Parties where the Ngok Dinka and the Humr were located and what had been their traditional dividing line. The tribes were described as occupying and using the region’s territory as follows:

The northern part of the region, Dar Humr is composed of four main zones: Babanusa in the north, which is the rainy season pasturage of the Humr; the Muglad is the main cultivation area; the Qoz, or central sandy area, is crossed as a means of getting from one set of pastures to another; and clay plains of the Bahr, or river area, which is used for dry season grazing.

It is the Bahr which is also the area of permanent habitation for the Ngok. It is composed of a network of khors, streams and rivers between the Bahr al-Arab, or Kiir, and the Raqaba al-Zarqa, or Ngol. Along the banks and between these streams are numerous sandy ridges on which permanent villages and cultivations are sited. The Ngok make use of dry season pastures further south, between the Kiir and the Lol.1053

606. Dr. Johnson further indicated that the “dividing line” between Humr and Ngok territory “has usually been taken to be the line where the sand of the Qoz meets the clay plains,” this division of territory being “of such long duration that it is even reflected in the breeds of cattle” of these two people.1054

607. According to Vice-President Taha, it is after this presentation – which unambiguously explains that the Ngok people, who occupied the Bahr and were administered by Bahr el

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1051 Johnson Presentation, p. 9, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 10/13.
1052 Id., p. 10.
1053 Id., p. 7.
1054 Id., p. 7.
Ghazal, were transferred to Kordofan in 1905 – that the SPLM/A began to refer to 1905.\textsuperscript{1055} However, after a further round of talks in October 2003, the Parties were still unable to agree on key issues. They still disagreed on “[t]he definition of the [Abyei] area, the nature of its social complex and its administrative history” and “[w]hether the area shall remain in Western Kordofan or be annexed to Bahr-el-Ghazal.”\textsuperscript{1056} The question as to “[w]hether to guarantee full rights for all the citizens or to guarantee only grazing rights for non-indigenous pastoral communities” remained a “grey” area.\textsuperscript{1057}

608. Both Parties agree that US Special Envoy Senator Danforth broke the deadlock with the presentation on March 19, 2004 of “Principles of Agreement on Abyei”\textsuperscript{1058} (the “Danforth Proposal”). Section 1 of the Abyei Protocol reproduces word for word the Danforth Proposal.

609. Before the Principles of Agreement on Abyei were finally adopted, four additional proposals were exchanged by the Parties in March and May 2004. They contained the following definitions for the Abyei Area:

[...] Abyei Area shall be understood as the land owned and inhabited by the nine sections of the Ngok Dinka (Abyor, Achaak, Achieng, Alei, Anyiel, Bongo, Dill, Mannyuar, Mareng) and which was administratively carved out of Bahr el Ghazal Province and annexed to Kordofan Province in 1905 for security and administrative reasons. It is the Area referred to in the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and which was administered from 1974 to 1978 under the President's Office during the currency of the said Agreement.\textsuperscript{1059}

For the purposes of this agreement Abyei Area is defined as the land owned and inhabited by the nine Ngok Dinka sections of Abyor, Alei, Achiak, Anyiel, Achieng, Bongo, Dill, Mannyuar, Mareng. It is the Area referred to in the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and which was administered from 1974 to 1978 under the President's Office.\textsuperscript{1060}

\textsuperscript{1055} See Witness Statement of Vice-President Taha, para. 10 (SCM WS 2).
\textsuperscript{1057} See Id., p. 2. (Emphasis in original)
\textsuperscript{1058} See GoS Memorial, para. 53; Witness Statement of Vice-President Taha, paras. 16-17 (SCM WS 2); SPLM/A Memorial, paras. 479-480, 1175-1176.
\textsuperscript{1059} Draft Agreement Between the Government of the Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement on The Outstanding Issues of the Three Conflict Areas and Power Sharing, dated March 21, 2004, p. 3, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 12/7a.
\textsuperscript{1060} Draft 1 Agreement between The Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army on The Resolution of Abyei Conflict, Based on the USA Principles of Agreement on Abyei dated March 2004, p. 3, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 12/8. The same definition was included in Draft Agreement
For the purposes of this agreement Abyei Area is defined as the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905. It is the Area referred to in the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and which was administered from 1974 to 1978 under the President's Office.\(^{1061}\)

610. Vice-President Taha observes that both before and after the Danforth Proposal was submitted, the SPLM/A referred to later dates in its own draft proposals and suggests that the SPLM/A was uncomfortable with the reference to the year 1905 and faced with a dilemma:

If [the SPLM/A] were to accept the boundary of the annexed area as in 1905, they knew that it would exclude the area in Kordofan into which the Ngok Dinka had expanded after the 1905 transfer. Conversely, they were also finding it difficult to ignore the 1905 transfer and insist on the whole territory covered by the Ngok Dinka up to 1965, the year which witnessed the maximum expansion of the Ngok, and later years, if they want to claim to an exemption from the 1.1.1956 north/south boundary rule in the new context of self-determination.\(^{1062}\)

611. The declarations of Minister Deng and General Sumbeiywo point to a different conclusion. Minister Deng indeed stated that:

[w]e understood [the definition of Abyei in Article I (b) of the Danforth Proposal] to define Abyei as encompassing all of the land and people over which the Paramount Chief Arop Biong and then Kuol Arop exercised their tribal authority and jurisdiction, no matter where his people and his lands were located.\(^{1063}\)

612. General Sumbeiywo confirms Minister Deng’s understanding of Article I (b) in the Danforth Proposal:

1905 was selected because that was when the historical record indicated and the parties understood that the nine Ngok chiefdoms and the entirety of the Ngok people had been transferred to Kordofan.\(^{1064}\)

613. In addition, this understanding of the Formula is very much in line with the Johnson Presentation, the content of which does not remotely suggest that the reference to the 1905 transfer would be detrimental to the Ngok Dinka.

\(^{1061}\) Draft Agreement Between The Government of Sudan (GoS) and The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army on the Abyei Area, p. 2, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 12/10.

\(^{1062}\) Witness Statement of Vice-President Taha, para. 13 (SCM WS 2).

\(^{1063}\) Witness Statement of Minister Deng Alor Kuol, para. 57 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 1).

614. It appears that the reason for repeatedly mentioning the area “referred to in the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and which was administered from 1974 to 1978 under the President’s Office” derives from different concerns than those advanced by Vice-President Taha. As he himself rightly pointed out, “the Addis Ababa Agreement did not designate Abyei or any other area outside the three southern provinces by name.” Nor did the Agreement “determine any boundary for Abyei.” The inclusion of a reference to the Addis Ababa Agreement did not have any practical significance for the delimitation of an area. However, it did have a symbolic meaning. Not only was it an undefined reference to the Ngok Dinka people and their strong cultural ties with the “Southern complex,” but it also recalls 1972’s missed opportunity of a referendum that never took place. The preambles of SPLM/A’s four draft proposals and the Johnson Presentation itself corroborate this analysis.

615. There is no indication in the record that these draft proposals, or indeed any other draft agreements on Abyei, were submitted to the ABC Experts. The ABC Experts’ Report merely states that “[d]uring the negotiations, there was a disagreement between the [GoS] side and the [SPLM/A] side, on what was meant by the Abyei area.” In any event, the drafting history of the Abyei Protocol does not show that the SPLM/A was dissatisfied with the Danforth Proposal as it was drafted. The SPLM/A was the first to suggest the reference to 1905 on the basis of the Johnson Presentation and eventually did accept the Danforth Formula. What the drafting history reveals, rather, is that despite Dr. Johnson’s description of a tribal transfer, each side, including the GoS, seemed to be convinced that it knew the true meaning of the Formula and that it was in line with their views and interests. This does not alter, and in fact confirms, the Tribunal’s conclusion that the ABC Experts’ own interpretation of the Formula was reasonable. The analysis of the historical context of the 1905 transfer itself, to which the Tribunal now turns, sustains this conclusion.

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1065 Witness Statement of Vice-President Taha, para. 11 (SCM WS 2).
1066 Id.
1067 See Johnson Presentation, pp. 5-6, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 10/13.
1068 ABC Experts’ Report, Part II, App. 4, p. 129.
5. The Predominantly Tribal Interpretation of the Formula is Reasonable in Light of the Historic Facts of 1905

616. This Tribunal agrees with the Parties that the historical context in which the 1905 transfer took place, and the objective of the Condominium officials at the time, shed light on the interpretation of the formula. It is appropriate at this juncture to recall the key passage of the March 1905 SIR, relied upon by the ABC Experts and the Parties (both before the ABC and this Tribunal), which describes the transfer:

[j]t has been decided that Sultan Rob, whose country is on the Kir river, and Sheikh Rijan of Toj, mentioned in the last Intelligence Report, are to belong to Kordofan Province. These people have, on certain occasions, complained of raids made on them by southern Kordofan Arabs, and it has therefore been considered advisable to place them under the same Governor as the Arabs of whose conduct they complain.

617. As stated above, the ABC Experts interpreted the above text as referring to a transfer of administrative control over a people from one province to another. Several important factors, in particular the confusion surrounding the location and course of the Bahr el Arab and the uncertainty of the provincial boundary, the lack of effective administration and governmental knowledge regarding the extent of territory occupied and used by the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms, as well as the stated object and purpose of the 1905 transfer, converge to confirm that it was reasonable for the ABC Experts to adopt this interpretation.

(a) The Uncertainty of the Provincial Boundary

618. As indicated earlier, the GoS had argued before the Commission that the northern limit of the area transferred was the Kordofan - Bahr el Ghazal provincial boundary which ran along the Bahr el Arab. The examination of the evidence led the ABC Experts to find that there was confusion as to the identity and location of the Bahr el Arab, a fact which both Parties recalled before this Tribunal (although they disagreed as to the actual extent of the confusion). The ABC Experts thus observed that Wilkinson and Percival mistook the Ragaba ez Zarga for the Bahr el Arab, the latter being distinguished from the Kir. They

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1069 In accordance with Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement, the review of the historical context of the 1905 transfer is carried out at this stage in the analysis for the sole purpose of assessing the reasonableness of the ABC Experts’ interpretation.

1070 For a summary of the arguments of the Parties on this point, see supra paras. 223 et seq.

1071 See summary of the GoS’s position before the ABC supra paras. 538 et seq.; see also ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, p. 36.

did note that “Lt. R.C. Bayldon, R.N. first correctly identified the Kir as the Bahr el-Arab in his survey in March 1905.” However, “local administrators continued to confuse the two waterways” after 1905 and “it was not until 1908 that they consistently described the Ragaba ez Zarga/Ngol as the Bahr el Homr in their official reports.” As pointed out to this Tribunal, Governor-General Wingate himself recognized in 1905 that there was still uncertainty surrounding the Bahr el Arab and other rivers of the region, despite Bayldon’s discoveries:

In the Northern portion of this Province [Bahr el Ghazal] some light has been thrown on the much-vexed question of the Bahr el Arab and Bahr el Homr by the march of Captain Percival (to which I referred in my last Report as well as to the reconnaissances of Lieut. Bayldon R. N.) but much of the course of these rivers is still unknown and a doubt still exists as to the correct names of the intricate waterways which intersect this part of the Sudan.

619. Wingate’s reference in the same Memorandum to “the Arab, the Lol, [and] the Kir” indicates that he still thought that the Bahr el Arab and the Kir were two separate rivers, thus suggesting that the confusion surrounding the Bahr el Arab was yet to be cleared. This is in line with ABC Experts’ reference to evidence from 1912 warning that “[t]he course of the Bahr el-Arab is entirely unsurveyed.”

620. The ABC Experts went on to observe that this uncertainty was echoed by the provincial boundary’s own indefiniteness. Indeed, they emphasized that “the boundaries of the Ngok Dinka that were transferred to Kordofan for administrative reasons in 1905 were, like most boundaries in the Sudan at the time, not precisely delimited [...]” and maps before and after 1905 did not show the provincial boundary.

621. Again, the Parties have made submissions to this Tribunal confirming the reasonableness of the Experts’ approach. The GoS points out in its Memorial that “provincial boundaries at

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1075 Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan, Annual Report (1905), Memorandum by Major General Sir R. Wingate, p.10 (SM Annex 24, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/13). For the view that Bayldon’s findings could be reasonably understood as putting an end to the confusion surrounding the location of the Bahr el Arab, see infra paras. 665 to 672.
1076 Id. at 11.
this period [before and after 1905] were not laid down or recorded in any formal way, and they were often stated to be approximate.”

Similarly, Professor Daly notes in his First Report that “[m]ost of the internal and external boundaries of Sudan at the beginning of the twentieth century were poorly defined.”

This leading historian of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium further states that “[s]outhern district boundaries hardly existed” and adds that “[i]t is indeed arguable that prior to 1905 the boundary between Kordofan and Bahr al-Ghazal was the least definite provincial boundary in the Sudan.”

622. In addition, both Parties also agree that provincial boundaries continued to be uncertain even after the 1905 transfer. Having explained that “the southern limits of the transferred areas were not defined in 1905, either in Wingate’s Memorandum or elsewhere,” the Government itself observed that the 1911 edition of the Anglo-Egyptian Handbook clearly states that the northern boundary of Bahr el Ghazal is not yet delimited, while the southern boundary of Kordofan in the 1912 edition is described “somewhat indefinitely.” The post-1905 indeterminacy of the boundary is further reflected at Figure 14 of the GoS Memorial. The Tribunal notes that these continued changes to the provincial boundary are consistent with the fate of other boundaries in Sudan at that time, given the “general geographic confusion” which existed in “the whole of Sudan […] for the first two decades of Condominium rule.”

Professor Daly remarked that many new provinces were created or divided until 1917, classifications of provinces as first-class or second-class were changed and later abolished, and districts were frequently transferred from one province to another. The Tribunal refers to the example of the Khartoum Province, which was first subdivided into the provinces of Khartoum City and Khartoum Gezira in

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1080 GoS Memorial, para. 368.
1081 Daly Expert Report, p. 28, Appendix to SPLM/A Memorial.
1082 Id. at 31.
1083 Second Daly Expert Report, p. 6, Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial.
1086 See GoS Memorial, para. 378; See also Kordofan and the Region to the West of the White Nile, Anglo-Egyptian Series (1912) p.7 (SM Annex 27, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 3/8a), which qualifies the northern boundary of Kordofan as approximate.
1088 Daly Expert Report, pp. 31-32, Appendix to SPLM/A Memorial.
In 1903, the borders of Khartoum City were again modified to account for the re-transfer of some parts of the Gezira Province. Its borders were again changed in 1914 and 1915, to be finally settled in 1917.\(^{1090}\)

Accordingly, it was not unreasonable for the ABC Experts to assume that, despite the progress made by Bayldon in the identification of the true Bahr el Arab before the transfer, the lack of precise knowledge as to the location and course of the different rivers and streams persisted in this area and made the existence of a well-established boundary on the Bahr el Arab appear unlikely. The ABC Experts’ conclusion that the administrative officials “treated” the Ragaba ez Zarga as the provincial boundary was tantamount to recognizing the existence of a mere working boundary, which they did not see as a decisive factor in the 1905 context. This Tribunal sees no ground for concluding that the ABC Experts’ interpretation of this aspect of the transfer was unreasonable.

(b) The lack of effective administration

Evidence of a very limited administration in this area in 1905 further confirms that it was not unreasonable for the ABC Experts to assume that British officials were not primarily concerned with the definition of internal borders. As pointed out by the ABC Experts, “no British official ever visited the Ngok in the rainy season.”\(^{1091}\) The remoteness and isolation of the region surrounding Abyei town, especially during the rainy season floods, made any attempt at effective administration difficult and ineffectual in the early years of the Condominium. The reclusiveness of the provinces of Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal is further highlighted in the documentary record submitted by the Parties. Kordofan is described as a “wild and remote province” by the authors of the 1904 Report on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of Sudan,\(^{1092}\) while Wingate in his 1904 Memorandum states in reference to Bahr el Ghazal that: “[u]nless this region is visited, it is almost impossible to convey an impression of its utter desolation…”\(^{1093}\) Even in the 1950s, access to the region was considered difficult by Condominium officials. In his witness statement, Michael Tibbs, who was the last British District Commissioner for Dar Misseriya, remarks that:

\(^{1090}\) Id.

\(^{1091}\) ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, p. 18.

\(^{1092}\) Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of Sudan, Annual Report (1904) 142 (SM, Annex 23, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/3 and FE 2/4).

\(^{1093}\) Id. at 113.
Movement around the district was difficult. Its size was vast and there were no made up roads though we still moved around the district by lorry for the most part. In the southern part of the district, the seasonal change in weather was extreme. The dry season was parching and, in the rainy season, the roads quickly became impassable, the vast and complex river system flooded and much of the land was water logged.\(^\text{1094}\)

625. This is in line with Professor Daly’s comment that “[u]ntil long after 1905 there was no British administrative process or presence of any kind in southwestern Kordofan,”\(^\text{1095}\) with only three visits by officials in the Abyei region before 1905.\(^\text{1096}\) In addition, as the ABC remarked, the Ngok Dinka never paid any taxes to the Bahr el Ghazal Province.\(^\text{1097}\) Relying on Mahon, the ABC further noted that “[t]he administration made a conscious decision not to collect tribute before closer administration could be established.”\(^\text{1098}\)

626. The lack of effective administration was also recognized by Wingate himself, who stated in his 1905 Memorandum under the section on “Population and Labour”:

I have already remarked that for many reasons I do not think the time opportune for making a census of the Sudan. The absence of an entirely reliable administrative system, and the incomplete Government still existing in the out-lying districts of Kordofan, the Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile and other Provinces, would make it practically impossible to arrive at any really accurate results.\(^\text{1099}\)

627. The evidence also provides indications that the Condominium administration’s role was limited to the maintenance of law and order, and to repeat Professor Daly’s words, “[a]s long as the colonial government heard no reports of tribal fighting, the British stayed away.”\(^\text{1100}\) It appears indeed that the British government’s attempts at pacification consisted mostly in the dispatch of punitive patrols in the different provinces in response to

\(^{1094}\) Witness Statement of G. Michael Tibbs, para. 10 (SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 3).

\(^{1095}\) SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 101/12-17. See also Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan, Annual Report (1905), Annual Report, Bahr-el-Ghazal Province, p.10 (SM Annex 24, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/13), which clearly states that they are no civil hospitals in Bahr el Ghazal and the note by the Senior Medical Officer of Bahr el Ghazal that he did not consider the time was ripe for the construction of such a hospital.

\(^{1096}\) SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 103/20 et seq.


\(^{1098}\) ABC Experts’ Report, Part 1, p. 33. See also ABC Experts’ Report, Part 2, Appendix 5, p. 182; See also Sudan Intelligence Reports, No. 104 (March 1903), p. 19 (SM Annex 5 and SPLM/A Memorial FE 1/21) in Mahon notes: "It would not be the slightest use trying to collect tribute from them until there is a Mamur and a post in that direction."


\(^{1100}\) SPLM/A Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 103/10-11.
recalcitrant or disobeying tribes who sought to defy governmental authority. For example, Wingate notes in his 1904 Memorandum that a punitive patrol was sent in Kordofan against the Nubas at Jebel Daier after the chief had refused to pay tribute and had subsequently fled. Wingate also observed that Sir R. von Slatin had commented that:

Further similar trouble in Southern Kordofan is always possible, but I think the motives which give rise to it may be attributed rather to ignorance than to deliberate hostility to Government, as these districts are not yet fully subject to Government control.

628. In addition, the different reports produced by British officials at the time suggest that they were still in the process of developing and exploring the country in an attempt to establish the infrastructure necessary for effective administration. However, it is quite clear that by 1905, they were still trying to attain that goal. The sudd cutting expeditions on the Bahr el Arab and the explorations by survey parties carried out around 1905 are a good illustration. In spite of the progress made by Lieutenants Bayldon and Walsh, the Report explains that:

To thoroughly open up and deepen the river, a further expedition will be necessary, but before undertaking this it has been decided to despatch a small exploring party under Lieutenant Walsh to penetrate as far as possible along the various waterways known locally as the Arab, the Lul, the Kir, and an unnamed river which the natives state leads to Wau […] On the return of this expedition the Government will be in a better position to decide on the steps to be taken to open up these apparently important rivers, with a view to establishing navigable waterways to the North-Western districts of the Bahr el Ghazal and Southern Kordofan Province.

629. The Tribunal further notes the February 1906 Sudan Intelligence Report’s revelation that Walsh’s sudd cutting operations on the Bahr el Arab made little headway. This entry, read in conjunction with Professor Daly’s conclusion that “[e]xpeditions and patrols up the tributaries of the Bahr al-Ghazal (river) and Bahr al-Arab had not reached the Ngok from the south before 1905, mainly because sudd blocked the channels,” confirms the

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1101 See Daly Expert Report, p. 34, Appendix to SPLM/A Memorial.
1102 Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of Sudan, Annual Report (1904) 10 (SM, Annex 23, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/3 and FE 2/4).
1103 Id.
1104 See Daly Expert Report, p. 34, Appendix to SPLM/A Memorial.
1105 Id.
1107 Sudan Intelligence Report No. 139, February 1906, Appendix F (Progress Reports – Bahr-el-Arab Reconnaissance, by Bimb. Huntley Walsh, 11.1.06) (SM, Annex 11, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 17/21, SPLM/A MD Exhibit 61).
1108 Daly Expert Report, p. 34, Appendix to SPLM/A Memorial.
Tribunal’s view that as of 1905, even the minimal infrastructure required for effective administration (such as transport and communication channels) was yet to be put into place.

630. In light of this administrative context, it is indeed reasonable to infer that the importance of internal boundaries in Sudan, including the Kordofan-Bahr el Ghazal boundary, was secondary, at least during the early years of the Condominium period. In line with the ABC Experts’ finding, the indication of boundaries in official documents, such as annual reports, was reasonably understood as a mere reference to a working boundary easily modified or replaced, and not to a boundary in the traditional sense.

(c) **Limited Knowledge of the Extent of Territory Used and Occupied by the Ngok Dinka**

631. A consequence of the region’s remoteness and of limited administrative presence is the lack of knowledge of the full extent of the territory occupied by the Ngok Dinka. Hence, the official reports’ imprecise references to “Sultan Rob” or Sultan Rob’s “country,” or Sultan Rob’s “people” in the record.1107 The few trek reports that were available to, and examined by, the ABC Experts1108 and the Parties in the present proceedings provide only snapshots of what was actually occurring in the region. These treks were conducted during the dry season, when the area was most easily accessible to the officials.1109 As further noted in the Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 178 (October 1908), “[t]he whole country is difficult to traverse at any time, as during the rains it is swampy and covered with high grass, and in the dry season the surface soil shrinks, and, as a result, traveling with horses or other animals is rendered dangerous by the large cracks that have appeared.”1110

1107 See for example Sudan Intelligence Reports, No. 128, p.3 (March 1905) (SM Annex 9, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/8; Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan, Annual Report (1905) Report for Kordofan, p. 113 (SM Annex 24, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/13).

1108 See ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, p. 18 (last paragraph), p. 43.


1110 Sudan Intelligence Reports, No. 171 (October 1908), p. 60 (SM Annex 18, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 3/5; See also Kordofan and the Region to the West of the White Nile, Anglo-Egyptian Series (1912) p.74 (SM Annex 27, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 3/8a); Even later sources describe the isolation and inaccessibility of the region during the rainy season: see D. COLE & R. HUNTINGTON, *BETWEEN A SWAMP AND A HARD PLACE: DEVELOPMENTAL CHALLENGES IN REMOTE RURAL AFRICA*, pp. 94-95 (1997), which qualifies the rainy season as the “period when Abyei is cut off from the outside” and further adds that “[f]or many town folk the rainy season is an ordeal. Civil
632. Given the limited nature of the information gathered during these dry-season treks, the British officials around 1905 do not seem to have been fully aware of the seasonal character of the Ngok Dinka’s movements and land use patterns and therefore did not have a comprehensive understanding of the extent of Ngok Dinka territory. In that sense, the ABC reasonably concluded that:

We do not have a detailed and systematic description of Ngok settlement and land use patterns throughout the Condominium period, because of the seasonality of administrative visits to Ngok territory. Since officials came only in the dry season (between December and April: Tibbs in Appendices 5.7 and 5.13), what few descriptions we do have are of Ngok dry season activities, which were concentrated around the rivers.¹¹¹¹

633. The ABC Experts’ Report went on to note that:

But there are suggestions from the beginning of the twentieth century that administrators were aware that Ngok Dinka territory extended further north (Mahon 1903, Willis 1909 in Appendix 5.13), and this seems to have been the basis on which settlement and grazing patterns were condoned and managed by subsequent generations of administrators throughout the Condominium period, following the general principle of reviving tribal homelands.¹¹¹²

634. In the Tribunal’s view, this additional factor which the ABC Experts took into account when examining the meaning of the formula also indicates that their interpretation was reasonable.

(d) The Reasons for the 1905 Transfer Effectuated by the Condominium Administration

635. The uncertainty of the provincial boundary and its secondary role in the transfer, the existence of a limited administration and knowledge of the Ngok Dinka people’s exact location, help in turn to understand the object and purpose underlying the transfer. It appears that the transfer was essentially motivated by three considerations: (i) pacification – to protect the Ngok Dinka in order to pacify the area and end the Humr attacks on the Ngok Dinka; (ii) display of authority – to demonstrate to the inhabitants of the area that a new sovereign was exerting control over them; and (iii) administrative rationalization – to bring feuding tribes under the same administration.

 servants from the north serving their time in this outpost despise the rains as a period of intense isolation and boredom amidst an alien cultural and physical setting.”

¹¹¹¹ ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, p. 43.
¹¹¹² Id.
636. The Tribunal first notes that the ABC (like the Parties in these proceedings)\textsuperscript{1113} understood the transfer to be a response to Ngok and Twic Dinka complaints of Humr raiding:

What occurred in 1905 was that because of Dinka complaints about Humr raids, the British authorities decided to transfer the Ngok and part of the Twich Dinka from the administrative control of Bahr el-Ghazal Province to Kordofan Province. This action put the Ngok and the Humr under the authority of the same governor (a fact cited in both the GOS and SPLM/A presentations).\textsuperscript{1114}

[...]

The reasons for considering the land rights of the people constituting the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms as at 1905 include, amongst others, sociological and historical facts as well as elements of the terms within the CPA. In particular, the following are relevant:

[...]

(iv) armed raids on the Ngok Dinka by the Misseriya that were the official principal reason for the transfer of the 9 Ngok Dinka chiefdoms to Kordofan must have greatly destabilized the Ngok Dinka and thus affected the land use patterns of the two communities prior to the announcement of the transfer...\textsuperscript{1115}

637. The Tribunal further notes that Condominium officials had recorded Humr attacks on the Ngok Dinka as early as 1903. Sudan Intelligence Report No. 110 (September 1903) notes:

Two runners who arrived at Fashoda on 13th September, from the Dinka district of Gnak (Sheik Rob Wad Rung), reported that some Homr under one Mohammed Khada had raided their district about a month previously, and had killed two men and carried off 30 men and 1,000 head of cattle. The Mudir of Kordofan investigated and settled this case. The Dinkas received back their men and cattle. One of the Homr was killed in the fighting.\textsuperscript{1116}

638. Sudan Intelligence Report No. 127 of February 1905, which is the last Intelligence Report published prior to SIR No. 128, indicates the following:

Sheik Rihan Gorkwei, of the district of Tweit or Toj, which he says is situated between the Kir and Lol Rivers, reported to Bimbash Bayldon on the 29th January that a party of Homr Arabs, under Sheikh Ali Gula, armed with some 15 rifles and many spears, had come and raided his district, saying they were sent to collect cattle for Government. Sheikh Rihan, after a journey of 23 days to Taufikia, came into Kodok to see a representative of the Government. The Governor sent him on to Khartoum, where

\textsuperscript{1113} See GoS Memorial, paras. 356-358 and SPLM/A Memorial, paras. 346-351.

\textsuperscript{1114} ABC Experts’ Report, Part 1, p.15.

\textsuperscript{1115} ABC Experts’ Report, Part 2, Appendix 2, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{1116} Sudan Intelligence Reports, No. 110 (September 1903) , p. 1 (SPLM/A Annex FE 1/24).
he arrived on the 26th February. He repeated his story of the raids by the Homr, who he says captured some 16 boys of the Toj Dinkas whilst the latter were out fishing. The Camel Corps Company, now in the Bahr el Ghazal, will investigate the case on their return to Kordofan.

639. The Tribunal observes that the administrative desire to pacify the relations between the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya is consistent with the limited presence of governmental control in the area and with the Condominium’s circumscribed role of maintaining law and order identified above.\footnote{Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 127 (February 1905), p. 2 (SM, Annex 8, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/6).}

640. The Tribunal notes that the second purpose of the 1905 transfer – the display of British governmental authority – is interconnected with the goal of pacification, as during the early years of the Condominium, many punitive patrols were sent to isolated or troublesome regions in order to show the locals who was in charge. In connection with the punitive patrol sent against the Nubas at Jebel Daier alluded to above, Wingate quotes Slatin Pasha who stated:

I consider that the primary cause of the punitive measures taken against Jebel Daier in October was their disobedience and open defiance of Government Authority. It is most important to show these Nuba mountaineers that we intend to have our orders obeyed, and that in case of necessity, we are able to enforce our authority.\footnote{See supra, paras. 623 et seq.}

641. In his 1905 Memorandum, Wingate also refers to disturbances caused by semi-independent tribes in the southern Kordofan. He notes that the military officer responsible for punitive patrols in the region had reported on:

several other small affairs in which the semi-independent Meks of the Southern Districts have been guilty of raiding on each other, of occasionally defying Government authority, and of generally disturbing the peace, but he [did] not advocate a succession of punitive measures though he rightly consider[ed] that a population so wild and ignorant as those in Southern Kordofan can only be impressed with a sense of their comparative insignificance by a display of force and that they should, when necessary, be given a tangible proof of the power of Government to asserts its authority.\footnote{Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan, Annual Report (1904), Memorandum by Major General Sir R. Wingate, p. 10 (SM Annex 23, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/3 and 2/4) (emphasis added). Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan, Annual Report (1905), Memorandum by Major General Sir R. Wingate, p. 15 (SM Annex 24, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/13) (emphasis added).}
642. As noted by Professor Daly in his First Report, British officials were sent on expeditions to the Bahr el Ghazal Province as early as 1900 with an express mission: to display governmental authority. For example, Sudan Intelligence Report No. 76 (November 9 – December 1900)\textsuperscript{1121} describes the composition of the expedition party and clearly states that: “[t]he object of the Expedition is to demonstrate practically, by its presence, the right of the Sudan Government to re-occupy the Bahr el Ghazal Province.” Professor Daly further observed that: “[t]his demonstration was for the benefit not only of local people encountered along the way, but also for the Belgians, whose established interest in the Upper Nile and the regions of the Congo-Nile watershed Wingate viewed as dangerous.”\textsuperscript{1122} Professor Daly’s analysis is confirmed by the March 1905 SIR, in which the British concerns over the incursion of Belgian troops in the territory of Bahr el Ghazal are discussed.\textsuperscript{1123}

643. Finally, the ABC Experts reasonably interpreted the transfer as designed to achieve administrative rationalization, the transfer being made, in the ABC Experts’ words, “for reasons of administrative expediency.”\textsuperscript{1124} Given the tribal tensions between the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya, it made more sense to the British officials to manage these inter-tribal quarrels through a single provincial administration. This is consistent with what Professor Daly terms the “hallmark of British imperialism all over the world, dealing with local peoples from whichever post or barracks was closest or most convenient when the need arose.”\textsuperscript{1125}

644. The Tribunal notes that the British government’s practice of transferring a tribe for reasons of administrative expediency was not limited to the 1905 transfer of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms. In 1914, the jurisdiction over the Hawawir tribe of Kordofan was transferred to the province of Dongola “to bring them under more effective control,” in response to their “lawless behaviour on and across the western frontier.”\textsuperscript{1126} The Hawawir had been observed wandering and grazing outside the borders of Kordofan. This is consistent with Professor

\textsuperscript{1121} Sudan Intelligence Report No. 76 (9 November – 9 December 1900) (SPLM/A Memorial, MD Exhibit 53).
\textsuperscript{1122} Daly Expert Report, p. 33, Appendix to SPLM/A Memorial.
\textsuperscript{1123} March 1905 SIR, p. 3
\textsuperscript{1124} ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{1125} SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 102/08-12).
\textsuperscript{1126} Letter from F.T.C. Young, Inspector, Southern District to Governor, Merowe, 9 January 1914, SGA, INTEL 2/46/393, and other correspondence in the same file, (SPLM/A Memorial, Exhibit MD-45).
Daly’s statement to the effect that “whole tribes were handed off from one British inspector to another as local habits and administrative convenience dictated.”\textsuperscript{1127}

645. As illustrated above, transfers of tribes from the control of a given province to another, based on concerns of administrative rationalization, were not infrequent. The practical approach of the Condominium government is further reflected in its practice of administering the Sudanese through tribal chiefs, as opposed to relying solely on territorial districts. Indeed, the review of the documentary record suggests that the British administrators had few contacts with the majority of the locals and preferred to deal only with the ruling chiefs. For example, in the 1904 Annual Report on the Finances, Administration and Conditions of Sudan, Major Boulnois (the Moudir of the Bahr el Ghazal Province) described the attitude of the chiefs toward the British government and stated: “[t]he Chiefs, through whom the Government administers, are beginning to grasp their responsibilities…”\textsuperscript{1128} In a similar fashion, the March 1905 SIR suggests that Sultan Rob, the Ngok Dinka’s Paramount Chief, was the administration’s contact and the authority through which government control was exercised. The Tribunal notes that Professor Daly shares this analysis of the government’s administration techniques:

\begin{quote}
Although the administration was technically “direct,” legally empowering only its own officials, in practice it was almost everywhere indirect, with Sudanese tribal shaykhs responsible to British provincial authorities for the governance of their tribes.\textsuperscript{1129}
\end{quote}

The Anglo-Egyptian regime, like other colonial governments, looked for local notables through whom it could govern. (This would eventually form the basis of Indirect Rule or Native Administration.)\textsuperscript{1130}

646. Mr. Tibbs’ Witness Statement also confirms that the Ngok Dinka were administered through their chiefs until at least 1944:

\begin{quote}
Although there was a small police presence in Abyei, until the Ngok joined the Dar Messeria Rural Council in January 1944, the Ngok’s administration was carried out by Chief Deng Majok Kwal. Disputes within the tribe would be dealt with by him and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1127} Daly Expert Report, p. 31, Appendix to SPLM/A Memorial.

\textsuperscript{1128} Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan, Annual Report (1904), p. 142 (SM Annex 23, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/4) (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{1129} Daly Expert Report, p. 28, Appendix to SPLM/A Memorial (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{1130} Daly Supplement Expert Report, p. 7.
any disagreements between the Ngok and Messeria were sorted between Deng Majok and Babu Nimr, the Nazir Umun of the Messeria…

647. The Tribunal further observes that the very notion of “Indirect Rule,” a British governmental policy which “relied on local and traditional tribal and other mechanisms for most aspects of administration” and which started with The Power of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance 1922, is additional evidence that the British officials considered it more expedient to exercise their administration through tribal mediation. This policy was in line with the approach that had been previously adopted by the government by which, for example, “tribal shaykhs were left in place but held responsible for collecting taxes levied by the government.”

648. In light of the above-noted observations, the language of the March 1905 SIR and its references to Sultan Rob, Sheikh Rihan of Toj and “these people” can reasonably be interpreted not as reflecting the officials’ intent to transfer a clearly delimited, fixed area, as there was none in 1905, but rather, as evincing the British administration’s intention to place the totality of a semi-nomadic tribe, who moved between two provinces according to the seasons, under a single jurisdiction, in order to protect the whole of the Ngok Dinka people at all times, regardless of where they might have been located in each season of the year.

649. The foregoing suggests that it was entirely plausible for the ABC Experts to choose the tribal view as a reasonable and, indeed, the more probable interpretation of what the officials intended when they engaged in the 1905 transfer. Obviously, the Tribunal recognizes that ascertaining the intent of the Condominium officials in 1905 introduces an element of subjectivity in the interpretation of SIR 128 and related texts (especially since there are so few records to parse through). However, a full appreciation of the context of the transfer suggests that the ABC Experts’ ultimate interpretation of what occurred in 1905 – a tribal transfer – is not unreasonable.

1132 SPLM/A Memorial, para. 358.
1133 Daly Expert Report, p. 45, Appendix to SPLM/A Memorial.
1134 Daly Expert Report, p. 13, Appendix to SPLM/A Memorial.
6. The Interpretation of the Formula in Light of the 2008 Negotiation and Signing of the Arbitration Agreement

650. A full analysis of the contextual interpretation of the Formula must include a final and important element not considered by the ABC: the 2008 negotiations, as reflected in The Road Map for Return of IDPs and Implementation of Abyei Protocol, Khartoum, June 8, 2008 (hereinafter, the “Abyei Road Map”), the Joint NCP-SPLM Understanding on Main Issues of the Abyei Arbitration Agreement, June 21, 2008 (hereinafter, the “Abyei Memorandum of Understanding”) and the Arbitration Agreement (collectively, the “2008 Agreements”).

651. The 2008 Agreements were designed to bring a final settlement to the Parties’ dispute over the Abyei Area, thus reaffirming the Parties’ pledge to achieve peace as contemplated in the CPA. The Abyei Road Map provides for security arrangements, the return of IDPs to their “former homesteads,” interim arrangements for the administration of the Abyei Area, and arrangements for the final settlement of the Parties’ disputes over the findings of the ABC. The Abyei Memorandum basically sets out the procedures for the arbitration and the mandate of the Tribunal, while the Arbitration Agreement is a further elaboration of the Abyei Memorandum and consolidates the Parties’ agreement to arbitrate, as expressed in the Abyei Road Map and Abyei Memorandum of Understanding.

652. The Tribunal is permitted to take account of these 2008 Agreements in order to determine the reasonableness of the ABC Expert’s interpretation of their mandate by virtue of Article 3 of the Arbitration Agreement. As indicated above, Article 3 of the Arbitration Agreement defines the law applicable to these proceedings, which includes, inter alia, the CPA, particularly the Abyei Protocol and the Abyei Appendix, the Interim National Constitution and, most relevant for this part of the discussion, the Abyei Road Map and the Abyei Memorandum of Understanding. The 2008 Agreements are also relevant for the interpretation of the CPA by virtue of Article 31(3)(b) or, in any event 31(3)(c), of the Vienna Convention.

653. Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention states:

3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
   …
   b. Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
   c. Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
654. In the Tribunal’s view, the 2008 Agreements serve to clarify the meaning of provisions of the CPA as “subsequent practice” pursuant to Article 31(3)(b). The phrase “subsequent practice” has been widely interpreted and is not restricted to specific, interpretative treaties. The 2008 Agreements constitute relevant subsequent practice, since the Agreements make specific reference to sections of the CPA: the full title of the Abyei Road Map refers to the “Implementation of the Abyei Protocol,” while both the Abyei Memorandum of Understanding and the Arbitration Agreement emphasize the applicability of the CPA, the Abyei Protocol and the Abyei Appendix. As such, these 2008 Agreements reaffirm the relevant provisions of these elements of the CPA and must be taken into account in interpreting the CPA. The 2008 Agreements are thus admissible and relevant for purposes of assessing the reasonableness of the ABC Experts’ interpretation of the Formula as expressed in the Abyei Protocol.

655. Even if one were to consider that the 2008 Agreements do not constitute relevant “subsequent practice,” the 2008 Agreements would still inform the interpretation of the CPA as “relevant rules … applicable in the relations between the parties” pursuant to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention.

656. It follows that the above discussion regarding the reasonableness of the ABC Experts’ interpretation in light of the CPA and associated instruments (see supra paras. 517 et seq.) is equally applicable to these 2008 Agreements. Indeed, the 2008 Agreements lend further support to the Tribunal’s conclusion that it was not unreasonable for the ABC Experts to adopt a predominantly tribal interpretation of the Formula. As stated above, an approach that primarily focuses on the transfer of all the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms as opposed to a specific territory can reasonably be interpreted as furthering a key objective of the CPA, which is to submit, through a referendum, to the whole Ngok Dinka community the choice of either retaining the Abyei Area’s special administrative status in the north or joining the South in the event that the South were to secede. The purpose of the 2008 Agreements thus further supports the reasonableness of incorporating in the Abyei Area the entirety of the community that is expressly mentioned in the definition of the Abyei Area as found in Section 1.1.2 of the Abyei Protocol and specifically referred to in Section 8 of the Abyei Protocol (which describes the process of the Abyei Referendum).

657. In addition, the 2008 Agreements (especially the Abyei Road Map) demonstrate an additional commitment by the Parties to the objectives of peace and reconciliation as primarily expressed in the CPA. Indeed, Section 9 of the Abyei Protocol reads:

Upon signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Presidency shall, as a matter of urgency, start peace and reconciliation process for Abyei that shall work for harmony and peaceful co-existence in the area.

658. Similarly, Sections 3.7 and 3.8 of the Abyei Road Map state:

3.7 The Presidency shall initiate the peace and reconciliation in the area in collaboration with the administration of the area and the surrounding communities.

3.8 The Presidency shall work at making Abyei area a model of national reconciliation and peace building.

659. In light of these objectives, the adoption by the ABC Experts of a predominantly tribal approach, which would result in the inclusion and the participation in the 2011 referendum of most members of the targeted community, the Ngok Dinka, can plausibly be regarded as furthering the stated goals of peace and reconciliation.

7. Respect for the Date of 1905

660. As a final question, the Tribunal will consider whether the ABC Experts took sufficient account of the temporal dimension of their mandate, which was tied to a historical event that had occurred in 1905. The Tribunal understands that both Parties accept that, under a predominantly tribal interpretation, in order to determine the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905, the location of the Ngok Dinka in 1905 must be established. The ABC Experts consistently repeated that their analysis of the evidence was solely based on the attempt to determine the area predominantly occupied by the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred in 1905:

• In assessing the territorial boundaries between the Ngok (who were in Bahr el-Ghazal) and the Misseriya (who were in Kordofan in 1905), the two communities’ effective connection to land, evidenced by established land use patterns, must be taken into consideration.\footnote{ABC Experts’ Report, Part 2, Appendix 2, p. 21 (emphasis added).}
The reasons for considering the land rights of the people constituting the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms as at 1905 include […]\(^{1137}\)

It is critical in interpreting the established occupation, land rights and land use of the two communities to appreciate the sociological fact that by 1905 there existed three main categories of such occupation, land rights and land use.\(^{1138}\)

After evaluating the evidence gathered from the maps, the historical records, published studies and the testimonies, the [ABC Experts] have drawn the conclusion that where the territory of the Ngok Dinka had established occupation, land rights and land use of the first and second categories, such areas fell squarely within the boundaries that were transferred in 1905.\(^{1139}\)

Therefore, the ABC Experts had ample legal basis (or what might be referred to figuratively here as the necessary “margin of appreciation”) to consider other elements to fulfill their mandate, such as post-1905 evidence and patterns of dominant occupation and land use. The ABC Experts’ reasons for examining post-1905 evidence to determine the continuity of the Ngok Dinka historical title are clearly stated at the beginning of the Report: after noting that there was no 1905 map showing the location of the Ngok Dinka in 1905 and no sufficient official documentation, they stated that “it was necessary for the [ABC Experts] to avail themselves of relevant historical material produced both before and after 1905, as well as during that year, to determine as accurately as possible the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms as it was in 1905.”\(^{1140}\) Moreover, for purposes of admissibility of evidence, it was reasonable to assume continuities in practices in a traditional society operating in an unchanged ecology in the absence of indications to the contrary.

Similarly, the ABC Experts took careful note of the variations in the seasonal grazing territories of both the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya that occurred in the Condominium period after 1905. The ABC therefore rejected the subsequent southern expansion of both tribes as evidence of their occupation in 1905. For example, the ABC Experts observed:

The Ragaba Lau is unquestionably a Ngok Dinka primary settlement area; it was not visited by the Humr at the beginning of the century; the Humr were able to expand their seasonal use of the area only later in the Condominium period, as a result of the

\(^{1137}\) Id. at 22 (emphasis added).

\(^{1138}\) Id. at 24 (emphasis added).

\(^{1139}\) Id. at 25 (emphasis added).

\(^{1140}\) ABC Experts’ Report, Part 1, p. 4 (emphasis added).
663. Finally, when conducting interviews with residents of the Abyei and surrounding areas, as well as in Khartoum, the ABC clearly explained to the speakers and the attendees of the meetings that their purpose was to ascertain the location of the Ngok Dinka in 1905:

- Ambassador Petterson, Abyei Interviews, April 14, 2005: “We would like to remind you that the mandate of the Abyei Boundary Commission is simply to define and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to the Kordofan Province in 1905 from Bahr el-Ghazal province. As we told the other groups we met yesterday and today, that you can confine what you say as much as possible to that topic. And again, what areas were the permanent areas for the Ngok Dinka people a hundred years ago?”\(^\text{1142}\)

- Ambassador Petterson, Muglad Interviews, April 17, 2005: “I want to emphasize that our job is solely to define and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan province from Bahr el Ghazal in the year 1905.”\(^\text{1143}\)

- Ambassador Petterson, Muglad Interviews, April 17, 2005: “My question is that we have heard today and we have heard from other Misseriya before coming here that the Ngok Dinka were never in Bahr el-Ghazal province and yet the language of the peace treaty, a part called Protocol states that the authority over the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms was transferred to Kordofan Province from Bahr el Ghazal Province in 1905. So that is my question, how do we reconcile this?”\(^\text{1144}\)

- Professor Godfrey Muriuki, Umm Bilael Interviews, April 17, 2005: “Our purpose is to decide on the boundaries that existed in 1905 between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka.”\(^\text{1145}\)

- Ambassador Petterson, Agok Interviews, April 18, 2005: “Our job is to define and demarcate the area of the Nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms, which were transferred to Kordofan Province from Bahr el Ghazal Province in 1905.”\(^\text{1146}\)

\(^{1141}\) Id. at 35 (referring to Appendix 5.9); see also pp. 27-28, where the ABC Experts examine the southern expansion of both tribes in the 1920s and 1930s.

\(^{1142}\) ABC Experts’ Report, Part 2, Appendix 4, p. 142. Throughout the course of these interviews, Ambassador Petterson reminds the audience twice to answer the question posed in their mandate, and not to provide information regarding other aspects of the dispute (see p. 145-146).

\(^{1143}\) Id. at 79.

\(^{1144}\) Id. at 94.

\(^{1145}\) Id. at 53.

\(^{1146}\) Id. at 58.
664. Hence, far from losing sight of the critical date of 1905, the ABC Experts faithfully focused on what was transferred that particular year. In so doing, they respected the temporal dimension of the mandate and thus acted reasonably.

8. Reasonableness of the Predominantly “Territorial” Interpretation of the Formula

665. In the Tribunal’s view, the foregoing discussion establishes that the ABC Experts’ recourse to an interpretation of the Formula that focused on tribal elements, rather than on what the Condominium administrators considered to be the province boundaries, was reasonable in light of the wording, object and purpose and context of the Formula. The Tribunal is not bound to go any further, as its Article 2(a) mandate does not authorize a review beyond the threshold of “reasonableness.” Having said that, the Tribunal considers it important to state that the ABC Experts could also have reasonably understood the Formula as expressing a predominantly “territorial” meaning.

666. Indeed, one member of the majority of this Tribunal, Professor Hafner, believes that, while the decision of the ABC Experts in this regard was not unreasonable as a substantive matter, the predominantly territorial interpretation which they eschewed was more “correct.” Clearly, a territorial appreciation of the Formula would not lead to any of the conclusions made by the ABC in respect of the Abyei Area’s northern boundary. Nevertheless, Professor Hafner considers the Tribunal bound strictly by the limits of its Article 2(a) mandate, which in his opinion requires that the Tribunal not review the ABC Experts’ findings to the extent that they are not unreasonable, and go no further in matters of substance.

667. As an initial matter, the Tribunal notes the ABC Experts’ express recognition that “[t]he evidence presented supporting the [GoS’s] interpretation of the 1905 boundary [between the provinces of Bahr el Ghazal and Kordofan having ran along the Bahr el Arab] is strong.”

668. However, due to the considerable confusion surrounding the location of the Bahr el Arab at the relevant period of time, the ABC further considered that “administrative officials mistook the Ragaba ez-Zarga/Ngol for the Bahr el-Arab, and treated it as the boundary between Kordofan and Bahr el-Ghazal.” Based on this reasoning, the ABC Experts

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1147 ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, p. 36.
concluded that “[t]he government’s claim that only the Ngok Dinka territory south of the Bahr el-Arab was transferred to Kordofan in 1905 is therefore found to be mistaken” and went on to consider “[e]vidence of the Ngok presence north of the Bahr el-Arab before 1905” in order to define the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905.\footnote{1149}

669. As the Tribunal has noted above, uncertainty as to the frontier between the provinces of Bahr el Ghazal and Kordofan undeniably remained in 1905, and it was therefore not unreasonable for the ABC Experts to take such an approach. At the same time, the Tribunal would also note that the March 1905 SIR can be interpreted as evidence in favor of a “working boundary” situated along the Bahr el Arab, despite the uncertainty surrounding the exact location of the river. This official document can be seen as endowed with a certain probative value since it was signed both by the Assistant Director of Intelligence as well as the Director of Intelligence and can therefore arguably qualify as an official document by a state organ. The Report makes reference to the transfer by noting:

It has been decided that Sultan Rob, whose country is on the Kir river, and Sheikh Rihan of Toj, mentioned in the last Intelligence Report, are to belong to Kordofan Province.\footnote{1150}

670. Annex C of the March 1905 SIR contains a report by Bimbashi Bayldon, who was tasked by Governor General Wingate to reconnoiter the course of the Bahr el Arab.\footnote{1151} Bayldon’s observations annexed to the official description of the transfer identify the true Bahr el Arab as being the Kir river:

The River Kir is the real Bahr el Arab. It being called Kir by the Nuers and El Gurf by the Riseigat Arabs, who live close to it, on its higher reaches.\footnote{1152}

and:

The river usually spoken of as the Bahr el Arab (I do not refer to the mouth at its junction with the Bahr el Ghazal, but up country) is really the Bahr el Homr. Running

\footnote{1149} ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, p. 39.  
\footnote{1150} Sudan Intelligence Report No. 128 (March 1905), p. 3 (submitted as FE 2/8 by SPLM/A, SM, Annex 9).  
\footnote{1151} Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan, Memorandum by Major General Sir R. Wingate (1904), p. 8 (SM, Annex 23, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/3 and 2/4).  
\footnote{1152} Summary of Bimbashi Bayldon’s Report on the Bahr el-Arab Sudd, Sudan Intelligence Report No. 128 (March 1905) Appendix C, p. 11 (SM, Annex 9, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/8).
through practically uninhabited country but to which in dry weather the Homr Arabs used to come down with their cattle.\footnote{Summary of Bimbashi Bayldon’s Report on the Bahr el-Arab Sudd, Sudan Intelligence Report No. 128 (March 1905) Appendix C, p. 10 (SM, Annex 9, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/8).}

671. Although the documentary record shows that “local administrators continued to confuse the two waterways” after 1905,\footnote{ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, p. 39. See also supra paras. 606-607.} Bayldon’s report could be reasonably understood as having ended the uncertainty pertaining to the Bahr el Arab’s course by the time the transfer occurred. Further, Governor General Wingate’s observation that “[t]he districts of Sultan Rob and Okwai, to the South of the Bahr el Arab and formerly a portion of the Bahr el Ghazal province, have been incorporated into Kordofan” could likewise be interpreted as indicating that Wingate knew where the Bahr el Arab was, and considered it to be both the provincial boundary and the northern limit of “Sultan Rob’s district.”\footnote{Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan, Memorandum by Major General Sir R. Wingate (1905), p. 24 (SM Annex 24, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 2/13).} In view of the uncertainty, the Tribunal acknowledges that a “territorial interpretation” of the Formula, pursuant to which more significance would have been conferred to the provincial boundary (albeit approximate and uncertain), could also have been reasonably justified. However, although the probative value of the March 1905 SIR was not contested during the proceedings, it cannot be established that the transfer of the territory in question was performed in full knowledge of Bayldon’s report.

672. The fact that the ABC Experts chose one reasonable interpretation of the Formula “the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905” over another reasonable one cannot be considered an excess of mandate. Even if equally persuasive or even better arguments were to favor a predominantly territorial interpretation according to which the Bahr el Arab would be the northern frontier of territory transferred in 1905 (a conclusion that the Tribunal does not, and is not required to, draw in these proceedings), an error in the evaluation of contemporary documents would not amount to an excess of mandate but to a mere substantive error. As such, it is not within the limits of this Tribunal’s authority, pursuant to Article 2(a) of the Arbitration Agreement, to set aside the decision of the ABC Experts relating to the definition of the northern boundary of the Abyei Area as running along latitude 10°10’N.
F. Failure to State Reasons in the Implementation of the Mandate

673. As discussed earlier, the Tribunal’s Article 2(a) mandate does not permit the Tribunal to subject the ABC Experts’ reasoning to a “test of correctness.” It is not for the Tribunal to confirm (or reject) the substantive conclusions of the ABC Experts on the basis of a full review of the evidence, and it is certainly not the Tribunal’s task under Article 2(a) to substitute its own judgment for the ABC Experts. Nor will the Tribunal consider whether the reasons provided by the ABC Experts are scientifically sound, sensible, or even just adequate; the Tribunal’s review role is carefully circumscribed. One of the limited criteria of permissible review for the Tribunal is whether each of the binding decisions by the ABC Experts is supported by sufficient reasoning to allow the reader of the ABC Experts’ Report to appreciate the key elements of the ABC Experts’ justification. Thus, the Tribunal will now turn to examining whether the ABC Experts, when implementing their mandate on the basis of a tribal interpretation, stated reasons in support of their definition of the northern, southern, western and eastern boundaries of the Abyei Area and remained within their mandate.

1. The Northern Boundary of the Abyei Area

674. While the ABC Experts provided sufficient reasons for their decision to adopt latitude 10°10’N as the northern limit of the Area of permanent Ngok Dinka habitation, the motivation for drawing the northernmost limit of a “shared rights’ area” at latitude 10°35’N (and, by implication, the northern limit of the Abyei Area at latitude 10°22’N) is deficient.

(a) The ABC Has Provided Sufficient Reasons for Its Determination of the Area of Permanent Ngok Dinka Habitation

(i) The Rejection of the Bahr el Arab and the Ragaba ez Zarga

675. As an example of the ABC Experts’ alleged failure to state reasons, the GoS argues that the ABC Experts first established that the Ragaba ez Zarga (which historically was often confused with the Bahr el Arab) was treated as the provincial boundary and then, as its succeeding step, abandoned their own conclusion without motivation and drew the northern boundary line of the Abyei Area further north. The GoS’s argument points to an instance of allegedly contradictory reasons, which would be within the Tribunal’s scope of review.

1156 See supra paras. 618 et seq.
676. In the Tribunal’s view, however, no internal contradiction follows from the fact that the ABC Experts did not consider the line that was treated as the provincial boundary by the Condominium officials to be the boundary of the Abyei area. According to the ABC Experts’ interpretation of their mandate (see supra. Chapter IV Section E), knowledge of where the Condominium officials may have thought the boundary of Kordofan was located was not sufficient or dispositive of their mission. As the ABC Experts conceived of their mandate, they were to determine the extension of the Ngok Dinka’s territory (meaning the area where the Ngok had permanent settlements), and the provincial boundary as it was conceived of by the Condominium officials was only one of many indicators (and not necessarily the determinative one). Consistent with that understanding, the ABC Experts proceeded in Propositions 8 and 9 to examine patterns of population settlements and concluded that Ngok Dinka settlements were also located north of the Ragaba ez Zarga (“along the Ragaba ez-Zarga and the area to its north”).

677. One may agree or disagree with the ABC Experts as to whether such geographical evidence should prevail over historical evidence of the Condominium officials’ conception of the Kordofan boundary. However, a disagreement on this point would be a disagreement of substance and not a failure to state reasons. The reasons for the rejection of the Ragaba ez Zarga as the relevant boundary line between the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya are evident in the ABC Experts’ Report and in a sufficiently clear manner.

(ii) The Adoption of 10°10’N as the Limit of Ngok Dinka Permanent Settlements

678. In addition, the GoS argued that “[t]here is simply no justification for latitude 10°10’N in [the ABC Experts’] Report.” In the Tribunal’s view, however, the ABC Experts’ reasoning on this point is clear enough. As a first step, the ABC Experts observed that above a particular, still unspecified line, the dominant use of land by the Ngok Dinka gives way to shared land use. In the summary discussion of Proposition 8, the ABC Experts noted:

From the above evidence it stands to reason that the Ngok had established dominant rights of occupation along the Ragaba ez-Zarga and the area to its north, while the Misseriya enjoyed established secondary rights of use in the same region. Further to

1158 GoS Memorial, para. 260.
the north, however, the two communities exercised equal secondary rights to use of the
land on a seasonal basis.\textsuperscript{1159}

679. Where exactly the line between the two types of areas should be drawn is then explained in
the summary discussion of Proposition 9:

The [ABC Experts], having examined the evidence presented in the preceding
propositions, are confident that the area south of latitude 10°10’ N contains the territory
in which the Ngok have dominant rights, based on permanent settlements and land
use.\textsuperscript{1160}

680. The more extensive discussion of Proposition 8 later in the Report adds some additional
detail as to the evidentiary basis for the ABC Experts’ findings. The Experts concede that
there is “no clear independent evidence establishing the northern-most boundary of the area
either settled or seasonally used by the Ngok.”\textsuperscript{1161} In the absence of such evidence, the
ABC Experts explain that they sought indicators and clues in administrative records as well
as human geography – the fact that the goz was not settled by anybody – to draw what
seemed the best defensible line under the circumstances.

681. In the Tribunal’s view, the Expert’s reasoning regarding the selection of latitude 10°10’N is
comprehensible and complete. Where the line between Ngok Dinka “dominant rights” and
Misseriya and Ngok Dinka “shared rights” runs is a factual question, which the ABC
Experts determined based on permanent settlements and land use, as it appeared from
administrative records and clues from human geography. The GoS’s argument that, on the
basis of this evidence, the ABC Experts were not entitled to reach the conclusion that that
line should run at latitude 10°10’N, is in reality a disagreement with the ABC Experts’
appreciation of the evidence. It is not related to a failure by the ABC Experts to state
reasons.

682. The additional considerations presented by the GoS under the same heading also relate to
alleged errors of substance. For example, the GoS’s argument that the summary overview
of the evidence contained in the appendices to the ABC Experts’ Report does not contain
any reference to latitude 10°10’N goes right to the heart of the ABC Experts’ substantive
decision function: the connection between evidence and binding conclusions. Similarly, the

\textsuperscript{1159} ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{1160} Id.
\textsuperscript{1161} ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, p. 43.
observation that the ABC Experts may not have taken account of the fact that some of the
villages referred to may have moved relates to the ABC Experts’ scientific methodology.\footnote{1162} The Tribunal is not prepared to review these findings under the heading of an alleged “failure to state reasons.”

(b) \textit{The Line Along Latitude 10°35’N Is Unsupported By Sufficient Reasons}

683. In contrast to the ABC Experts’ adequately explained reasoning up to latitude 10°10’N, aspects of the motivation provided in support of the ABC Experts’ definition of the shared-rights area, stretching from latitude 10°10’N to latitude 10°35’N, are deficient.

684. The problematic issue under the heading of “failure to state reasons” is not the ABC Experts’ use of the concept of “secondary rights” or “shared rights” as such. The relevant sections of the ABC Experts’ decision on this point are cogently reasoned. In the section of the ABC Experts’ Report relating to Proposition 9, the Experts concluded that dominant rights by the Ngok existed only up to latitude 10°10’N and that the area north of that line “therefore represents the area of secondary rights shared between the Ngok and the Misseriya.” Reasons for the Experts’ recourse to the category of “shared rights” can in turn be found in Points 4 to 6 of Appendix 2. In this section, the ABC Experts set out their understanding of secondary rights as a category of land rights requiring a less intensive connection with the land, based on principles of African land law. Hence, as far as the use of the concept of shared rights is concerned, it cannot be said that the ABC Experts’ decision came “out of the blue.”\footnote{1163}

685. What is problematic, however, is the ABC Experts’ reliance on latitude 10°35’N as the northernmost area of Ngok Dinka and Misseriya “shared rights.” While not initially part of the GoS’s submissions, the GoS later adduced the ABC Experts’ reliance on latitude 10°35’N as a further example of the perceived lack of reasons. In the GoS’s words:

\begin{quote}
The same [that a finding made without any scientific analysis of the available documentation constitutes an excess of the Experts’ mandate] holds true mutatis \textit{mutandis} concerning the 10 degrees 35 minutes north line which corresponds to nothing but to the extreme claim to the north of the SPLM/A…\footnote{1164}
\end{quote}

\footnote{1162} GoS Memorial, para. 261. 
\footnote{1163} GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 149/11. 
\footnote{1164} GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 152/01-04; \textit{see also} the discussion in the GoS Rejoinder, para. 161.
686. This northern-most point is crucial to the ABC Experts’ decision, as the limit of the “shared-rights area” directly and the location of the Abyei area boundary indirectly depend on it. In this respect, it should be recalled that the ABC Experts “calculated” the boundary line of the Abyei Area by bisecting equally the band between latitude 10°10’N and the northernmost point.\textsuperscript{1165} Given the importance of the location of the northern-most point for the definition of the shared rights area and the boundary itself, an exposition of the ABC Experts’ reasons similar to the justification of latitude 10°10’N could be expected.

687. As the GoS concedes,\textsuperscript{1166} the ABC Experts do point out that the line drawn at latitude 10°35’N coincides to some extent with Dinka names on certain maps reviewed by the ABC Experts, and in particular with the settlement of Tebeldia.\textsuperscript{1167} Given the permissive standard of review to be applied by the Tribunal, this statement in the ABC Experts’ Report, read in isolation, could potentially be considered sufficient for satisfying the reasons requirement. However, in the following paragraph of the Report, the ABC Experts themselves noted that they did not consider the fact that several Dinka names appeared on maps close to latitude 10°35’N to constitute sufficient evidence for any boundary line:

> In the absence of a copy of the presidential decree, or verbatim quotation from the text, and a more precise location of the sites mentioned, it is impossible to accept this definition as conclusive.\textsuperscript{1168}

688. Similarly, in the section entitled “Conclusion,” the ABC Experts noted:

> The [ABC Experts] considered the presentation by the SPLM/A that their dominant claim lies at latitude 10°35’N, but found the evidence in support of this to be inconclusive.\textsuperscript{1169}

Hence, the strongest reason for the selection of latitude 10°35’N was expressly disqualified by the ABC Experts themselves, and it cannot serve as a justification for that line.

689. The only remaining justification that the Tribunal is able to find for latitude 10°35’N in the Report is contained in the following short sentence:

\textsuperscript{1165} ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, pp. 44-5.
\textsuperscript{1166} GoS Oral Pleadings, April 18, 2009, Transcr. 152/04-07.
\textsuperscript{1167} ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{1168} Id.
\textsuperscript{1169} Id. at p. 21.
Taking latitude 10°35’N as the northern limit to the Ngok Dinka claims, and noting that the Goz belt is roughly contained within these limits, it is reasonable to treat the Goz as a transitional zone where there are shared secondary rights...

690. The statement just quoted must be read in conjunction with the observation that “the band of Goz intervening between Humr permanent territory and the Ngok permanent settlements is settled by nobody;...and that there is regular seasonal use of the Goz by both peoples.”

691. Hence, the only reason offered in support of the northern limit of the shared rights area and, by implication, of the Abyei Area boundary calculated on the basis of that limit, is the northern extension of the goz. In the Tribunal’s view, this single reference to the goz does not amount to a reasoned justification.

692. The Tribunal would not want to exclude as a general matter that the location of geographical phenomena can be part of a rational justification for a boundary marker or even an entire boundary line. By their very nature, boundary delimitation decisions must be capable of practical implementation, requiring on occasion deference to geographical necessities. However, if a decision-maker wishes to base its decision on geographical features, some additional explanation is in order as to why that geographical feature should be determinative for the location of the boundary, thereby overriding other evidence that may have been presented by the parties.

693. The ABC Experts’ Report provides no indication why the northern extension of the goz should be relevant for the limits of the Abyei Area. In fact, the Experts’ own method of enquiry regarding the extension of the “area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms” required them to determine the northernmost limit of permanent Ngok Dinka settlements. In the Experts’ view, if there was no conclusive evidence of such permanent settlements north of latitude 10°10’N, it is difficult to understand why the Abyei Area was nonetheless extended further north, beyond that line up to latitude 10°22’30”N.

694. The ABC Experts do not provide any reasons for shifting from a “permanent settlement” perspective to a geographical perspective. Nor can it be said that the relevance of the northern limit of the goz would be self-explanatory. To the contrary, if the ABC Experts

1170 Id., at p. 44.
1171 Id., at p. 43.
were satisfied that permanent settlements existed (only) up to latitude 10°10’N, and that latitude line presents the southern limit of the goz, the most intuitive conclusion to draw from these observations is that latitude 10°10’N then represents the northern limit of the Abyei Area.

695. Thus, the ABC Experts’ justification of latitude 10°35’N (and, by implication, the northern limit of the Abyei Area at latitude 10°22’30”N) rests on the mere observation that the SPLM/A’s northernmost claim happens to coincide in an approximate manner with the northernmost limit of the goz. Such coincidence, however, cannot replace a searching inquiry and principled decision as to the northernmost area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred in 1905, as was the ABC Experts’ task.

(c) Conclusion

696. In conclusion, the Tribunal is satisfied that the ABC Experts’ principal finding that

[t]he Ngok have a legitimate dominant claim to the territory from the Kordofan-Bahr el Ghazal boundary north to latitude 10°10’N […]

is supported by sufficient reasons. Insofar as this finding is concerned, the GoS’s arguments must therefore be rejected. However, it has to be recalled that according to one member of the Tribunal, Professor Hafner, the applicability of latitude 10°10’N as the northern boundary of the transferred territory follows exclusively from the fact that the Tribunal is precluded by its mandate from reviewing it.

697. As far as the ABC Experts’ selection of latitude 10°35’N and 10°22’30”N is concerned, their decision is not supported by sufficient reasons.

2. The Southern Boundary of the Abyei Area

698. The ABC Experts’ Report provides that “[t]he southern boundary shall be the Kordofan-Bahr el-Ghazal-Upper Nile boundary as it was defined on 1 January 1956.” The southern boundary of the Abyei Area was clearly not the focus of dispute between the

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1172 In light of the Tribunal’s limited scope of review in the present proceedings, the Tribunal is not called upon to ascertain the correctness of this conclusion. The Tribunal would note, however, that the cartographic evidence adduced by the SPLM/A during these proceedings does not seem to show the northern limit of the goz at latitude 10°35’N (see the satellite images of the “Abyei Area” and the Bahr region in SPLM/A Map Atlas vol. 2, Maps 66 to 70).

1173 ABC Experts’ Report, Part 1, p. 22.
Parties over the course of the ABC proceedings. Having reviewed the evidence, the ABC Experts adopted this boundary as the southern limit of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred in 1905. There is no submission that this conclusion exceeded the mandate and indeed, it does not.

699. The Tribunal recalls that the southern boundary of the Abyei Area remained uncontroversial in these proceedings. As provided in the GoS Counter-Memorial:

Both Parties accept that the 1956 provincial boundary, which continues to be the boundary today, constitutes the southern limit of the area transferred in 1905. There is accordingly no dispute on this aspect of the case.

700. The GoS further confirmed in the course of the hearings that:

[…] there’s no dispute between the parties in this case as to what those southern limits are. They are identical in each of our submissions.

701. Thus, irrespective of the Parties’ concurrence on the manner by which the Formula is interpreted, the Tribunal sees no need to examine the matter any further, and agrees that, to the extent that the 1956 Kordofan southern boundary meets the eastern and western boundaries delimited by this Tribunal below, the southern boundary of the Abyei Area was defined in compliance with the ABC Experts’ mandate.

3. The Eastern and Western Boundaries of the Abyei Area

702. The ABC Experts’ Report and the Parties’ pleadings both present arguments and evidence relating to the northern and southern boundary lines of the Abyei Area. In stark contrast, the Tribunal observes that the eastern and western boundaries of the “area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905” were barely discussed. This is surprising, given the fact that the delimitation of these western and eastern lines were just as integral to the ABC’s mandate as other components of the Abyei Area. Having carefully

1174 See SPLM/A Final Presentation, p. 18, second paragraph (SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/13) referring to latitude 9°21’N, which corresponds in part to the 1956 Kordofan southern boundary, as the southern limit of the area claimed; GoS First Presentation, slide 46 (SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/2) referring to the “current triangle to the south of the Bahr el-Arab [representing] the ‘area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905’”; GoS Memorial, Figure 5, p. 17. The Parties did disagree, however, as to the definition of the western, eastern, and northern boundaries, as well as the location of the Ngok Dinka north of the Bahr el Arab.

1175 See, inter alia, ABC Experts’ Report, Part 2, pp. 18, 22, 36, 45.

1176 GoS Counter-Memorial, para. 505. See also, for example, SPLM/A Rejoinder, para. 885(c).

considered the evidence presented relating to these boundaries, the Tribunal finds that the ABC Experts’ decision regarding the eastern and western boundary lines is insufficiently motivated; this absence of sufficient reasoning constitutes, in turn, an excess of mandate concerning those parts of the ABC Experts’ findings. This insufficiency on the part of the ABC Experts may be traced, to an extent, to the scarcity of the evidence, but that of itself does not suffice to validate the findings of the ABC Experts in respect of the eastern and western boundaries.

703. Proposition 9 of the ABC Experts’ Report states:

The Abyei Area is defined as the territory of Kordofan encompassed by latitude 10°35’N in the north to longitude 29°32’E in the east, and the Upper Nile, Bahr el-Ghazal and Darfur provincial boundaries as they were at the time of independence in 1956. (SPLM/A Presentation, Appendix 3.2)\(^{1178}\)

704. The ABC Experts attempted to explain the eastern boundary line by indicating that it was reasonable to adopt longitude 29°32’E since neither “the Ngok nor the SPLM/A had presented claims to the territory east of longitude 29°32’15.”\(^{1179}\) This terse statement does not constitute a sufficiently reasoned justification of the eastern boundary; rather, it is a mere summary of one of the Parties’ positions (the SPLM/A’s). The Report remains silent on the GoS’s arguments concerning this point, and the ABC Experts do not indicate any independent conclusions that they would have drawn as a result of their analysis.

705. The only other possible justification of the eastern boundary that the Tribunal can discern from the Report stems from the ABC Experts’ analysis of a sketch map produced by the SPLM/A. The ABC Experts briefly refer to the sketch map produced by the SPLM/A during their final presentation to the ABC before proceeding to state that this evidence is “inconclusive” (given the absence of a copy of a 1974 presidential decree). However, although the ABC Experts themselves do not ascribe much probative value to the sketch map, they nevertheless seem to rely on this very map to determine that the villages presented by the SPLM/A as Ngok villages were mostly “contained within the area of latitude 10°35’N and longitude 29°32’15”E…”\(^{1180}\) While the appreciation of evidence by the ABC Experts is beyond the Tribunal’s review mandate under Article 2(a), it is

\(^{1178}\) ABC Experts’ Report, Part 1, p. 44.

\(^{1179}\) Id. at 45.

\(^{1180}\) Id. at 44.
contradictory (not to mention inappropriate in its failure to articulate reasons based on the best available evidence) for the ABC Experts to base their decision exclusively on evidence which they themselves have qualified as inconclusive. Beyond these contradictory reasons, the Tribunal finds no further explanation from the ABC Experts relating to the eastern boundary.

706. With respect to the determination of the western boundary line, this Tribunal notes that the selection of the 1956 Kordofan–Darfur boundary is entirely unreasoned. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the ABC Experts did not make any specific pronouncement as to the location of the western boundary line of the Abyei Area; instead, the ABC Experts stated that: “[a]ll other boundaries of the area that coincide with the provincial boundaries as they were at independence on 1 January 1956 shall remain as they are.”

No supporting evidence is presented, and no analysis is provided which would expose the line of reasoning adopted by the ABC Experts to reach the conclusion that the 1956 boundary between the provinces of Kordofan and Darfur also represents the westernmost limits of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905. While the Tribunal understands the importance of the 1956 boundaries in the broader context of the peace process and the possible secession of South Sudan (should it choose to do so in the exercise of self-determination), as indicated by Sections 1 and 8 of the Abyei Protocol, reliance

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1181 Id. at 45.
1182 Sections 1.3 and 8 of the Abyei Protocol read:

1.3 End of Interim Period;

Simultaneously with the referendum for southern Sudan, the residents of Abyei will cast a separate ballot. The proposition voted on in the separate ballot will present the residents of Abyei with the following choices, irrespective of the results of the southern referendum:

a. That Abyei retain its special administrative status in the north;

b. That Abyei be part of Bahr el Ghazal.

1.4 The January 1, 1956 line between north and south will be inviolate, except as agreed above.

8. ABYEI REFERENDUM COMMISSION

8.1 There shall be established by the Presidency an Abyei Referendum Commission to conduct Abyei referendum simultaneously with the referendum of Southern Sudan. The composition of the Commission shall be determined by the Presidency.

8.2 The residents of Abyei shall cast a separate ballot. The proposition voted on in the separate ballot shall present residents of Abyei with the following choices; irrespective of the results of the Southern referendum:

a. That Abyei retain its special administrative status in the north;

b. That Abyei be part of Bahr el Ghazal.

8.3 The January 1, 1956 line between north and south shall be inviolate, except as agreed above.
on the Darfur-Kordofan boundary without any supporting analysis does not allow the Tribunal and the readers of the Report to understand how the Experts arrived at this conclusion.

707. The Tribunal takes note of the ABC Experts’ reference in Proposition 9 to the SPLM/A Presentation before the ABC (Appendix 3 of ABC Experts’ Report, Part 2). However, Appendix 3 sheds no light on how the ABC Experts arrived at their conclusions regarding the eastern and western longitudes up to 10°10’N. Rather, the SPLM/A Presentation as reproduced in the Report exposes the SPLM/A’s claims regarding the presence of the Ngok Dinka north of the river Kir, and makes no attempt at identifying the 1905 location of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms on the east and the west.

708. Thus, the ABC Experts did not provide sufficient reasoning with respect to essential elements of the decision, namely the determination of the eastern and western boundary lines of the Abyei Area. As indicated above in Section D 2.(b)(ii), a failure to state reasons constitutes an excess of mandate when it relates to a point “necessary to the tribunal’s decision.” The ABC was expressly tasked with the responsibility of delimiting the Abyei area and the requirement to provide sufficient reasoning with respect to the delimitation of its eastern and western components was an integral part of that responsibility. This Tribunal recalls that the “target audience” of the ABC Experts’ Report were the multiple stakeholders of the Sudanese peace process, ranging from the Presidency to the local residents of Abyei. As such, the failure to state sufficient reasons or indeed, to state any reasons at all, as in the case of the western boundary, does not allow the reader to understand the basis on which the ABC Experts decided on the western and eastern boundaries of the Abyei Area.

709. The Tribunal further observes that the whole section comprising Proposition 9 is rather short given that it raises the most central aspect in this case, i.e. the identification and delimitation of the Abyei Area.

G. THE TRIBUNAL’S DETERMINATION OF THE ABYEI AREA’S EASTERN AND WESTERN BOUNDARIES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 2(C) OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

710. Having upheld the reasonableness of the ABC Experts’ predominantly tribal interpretation of the Formula, this Tribunal considers itself obliged to proceed with the delimitation phase

of the mandate without departing from the same predominately tribal approach. This conclusion applies a fortiori given the Tribunal's determination that the northern limit of the area of permanent habitation of the nine Ngok Chiefdoms transferred in 1905 (i.e., the ABC Experts’ findings and delimitation at latitude 10°10’N) was reasoned and within the ABC Experts’ mandate. As discussed above, the retained northern boundary of the Abyei Area was drawn by the ABC Experts on the basis of a predominately tribal interpretation as opposed to a predominantly territorial interpretation.

711. While the Tribunal finds itself bound to sustain the ABC Experts’ interpretation of the Formula, it did find an excess of mandate on a different ground, the Experts having failed to adequately state reasons in support of some of their findings in the implementation of their mandate. By invalidating the 10°35’N and 10°22’30”N lines while upholding the 10°10’N line, the Tribunal has fulfilled its mandate with respect to the northern limit of the Abyei Area and will not address the issue any further.

712. By contrast, the western and eastern boundaries of the Abyei Area were not drawn by the ABC Experts in compliance with their mandate. Thus, in fulfillment of its own mandate, the Tribunal must now proceed to “define (i.e. delimit) on map” the eastern and western boundaries in accordance with Article 2(c) of the Arbitration Agreement.

713. A careful review of the Parties’ submissions reveals that the evidence remains scanty. There is no map from 1905, or indeed later years, which provides the specific coordinates of the western and eastern limits of the area occupied by the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred in 1905. As both Parties recognize, drawing these limits is not an easy task.

1. Preliminary Remarks on the Appreciation of the Evidentiary Record

714. The Tribunal wishes to emphasize at this stage that it has a duty to render its decision on the basis of what it considers, after careful review and within the confines of the predominately tribal interpretation of the mandate, as the best available evidence. There is no general presumption privileging evidence emanating from Condominium officials or witness evidence (or indeed any other source). In this Tribunal’s view, what constitutes the best evidence remains scanty. There is no map from 1905, or indeed later years, which provides the specific coordinates of the western and eastern limits of the area occupied by the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred in 1905. As both Parties recognize, drawing these limits is not an easy task.

1184 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 63/21 (“It's a very complicated question of fact.”); SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009, Transcr. 134/09-114 (“The truth of the matter is [...]if the Tribunal were to address the question under 2(c) of identifying the precise territory of the Ngok Dinka chiefdoms, that's difficult. It's hard to draw precise lines, we don't deny that.”); See also supra para. 304 and 356.
available evidence on a particular point of fact must be determined in light of all circumstances, and not whether it is in written or oral form.

715. The Tribunal notes that both Parties have looked at the evidence with a critical eye. The SPLM/A has convincingly explained the limits of the Condominium record, especially around the crucial date of 1905, highlighting the fact that the Condominium was still undertaking initial explorations of the region at the time. These exploratory treks followed limited routes and were not necessarily conducted for the purpose of collecting information on the people but rather on the topography or the river system. These expeditions were made in the dry season, at a time when the Humr go down to the Bahr in search of water and pastures and the Ngok Dinka move to the south of the Bahr. The nascent state of the administration and, more generally, a persistent difficulty in accessing the area during the rainy season also account for the lack of clarity and comprehensiveness of the information recorded in their reports or on maps.\textsuperscript{1185}

716. One cannot conclude from the foregoing, however, that evidence emanating from Condominium officials has no probative value. Rather, these reports should be examined taking into account their limits and other sources of evidence.

717. One other potential source of evidence is witness testimony. For its part, the GoS has criticized the reliability of witness evidence.\textsuperscript{1186} This Tribunal agrees that where the witnesses rely on knowledge passed down through one or two generations, the precise dating of the evidence which they supply may sometimes be difficult. Nevertheless, depriving witness evidence per se of all probative value would be unjustifiable. When defining the historic area of a tribe, an inherently difficult exercise, it is reasonable, and indeed quite logical, to seek information from the tribe members themselves. The ABC was explicitly structured by the Parties to hear such evidence. The Terms of Reference of the ABC, which were agreed upon by the Parties, provided that “[t]he ABC shall thereafter travel to the Sudan to listen to representatives of the people of Abyei Area and their neighbors”\textsuperscript{1187} and both Parties did rely on witness evidence before the Commission. The

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1185} See supra the SPLM/A arguments at paras. 273 et seq.
\item \textsuperscript{1186} See supra the GoS’s arguments at paras. 372 et seq.
\item \textsuperscript{1187} Terms of Reference, Section 3.2.
\end{itemize}
ABC Experts themselves, as specialists, felt they had to consider this type of evidence.\textsuperscript{1188} In these proceedings, the Parties again presented and relied on witness statements in support of their arguments. The balanced approach of the Supreme Court of Canada provides useful guidance on the evidentiary value of oral tradition:

\begin{quote}
Notwithstanding the challenges created by the use of oral histories as proof of historical facts, the laws of evidence must be adapted in order that this type of evidence can be accommodated and placed on an equal footing with the types of historical evidence that courts are familiar with, which largely consists of historical documents. This is a long-standing practice in the interpretation of treaties between the Crown and aboriginal peoples.\textsuperscript{1189}
\end{quote}

718. The Tribunal will accordingly admit oral evidence and will assign it the weight proper to it in each instance. It will be duly taken into account, in particular, in so far as it corroborates other sources of evidence.

719. The Tribunal notes, finally, that in contrast to Condominium records and witness statements, the evidence provided by anthropological experts, in particular Howell and Professor Cunnison, has not been questioned by either Party. Because of this unanimity and for additional reasons explained below, their evidence is central to this Tribunal’s decision.

2. **Howell’s Western and Eastern Limits of the Area Occupied by the Ngok Dinka**

720. One document in the record, Paul P. Howell’s “Notes on the Ngork Dinka [sic]of Western Kordofan,” provides specific longitudes for this area. Significantly, the relevant extract of this document was not only submitted to the ABC\textsuperscript{1190} and included in the Report,\textsuperscript{1191} but it was also relied upon by both Parties before this Tribunal.\textsuperscript{1192}

721. Howell, a British District Commissioner and anthropologist,\textsuperscript{1193} located the Ngok Dinka people as follows:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1188} See Transcript of discussion between ABC Members during meeting at La Mada Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya, p. 34, SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/5a.
\item \textsuperscript{1189} Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 87, SPLM/A Exhibit-LE 40/7.
\item \textsuperscript{1190} SPLM/A Final Presentation on the Boundaries of the Abyei Area, p. 17 (SPLM/A Exhibit-FE 14/13)
\item \textsuperscript{1191} ABC Experts’ Report, Part 2, Appendix 5, p. 202.
\item \textsuperscript{1192} See GoS Rejoinder, paras. 419, 434, 444, 454, 484 and SPLM/A Rejoinder, paras. 364, 368, 507, 557 (h) 592; See also GoS Oral Pleadings, April 23, 2009, Transcr. 33/03-12 and SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 22, 2009 Transcr. 34/23-35/06, 52/20-23.
\item \textsuperscript{1193} See ABC Experts’ Report, Part I, pp. 16, 26.
\end{itemize}
The Ngork Dinka occupy the area between approximately Long. 27°50' and Long. 29° on the Bahr el Arab, extending northwards along the main watercourses of which the largest is the Ragaba Um Biero.  

722. While Howell does not mention any specific latitude for the northern limit of the Ngok Dinka and refers to “the main watercourses” north of the Bahr el Arab (i.e. the Ragaba ez Zarga and the Ragaba Umm Biero), he does provide specific indications of where the Ngok Dinka’s western and eastern limits lie.

3. **Continuity of Ngok Dinka Settlements**

723. The Tribunal is well aware of the fact that Howell’s notes are not contemporaneous to the 1905 transfer. Nonetheless, they provide the best and most specific available data, especially in light of the continuity, within a largely unchanged ecology, of the Ngok Dinka’s historic settlements and Humr’s migrating patterns, which the GoS’s witness, Professor Ian Cunnison, convincingly describes. Indeed, on the basis of observations made in the early 1950s, Professor Cunnison explains that the Humr’s locations and migratory “pattern of life is of long-standing” and that “[t]he way in which tribal sections move seems not to have varied much since the Reoccupation.” In addition, Muglad is considered by the Humr as “their home” and that is “where they cultivate and store their grain as their forefathers did.” Professor Cunnison further observes that when the Humr migrated in the dry season, they would go to the Bahr, “the traditional land of Dinka who return there and cultivate during the rains.” In his view, “[t]he substantial nature of Dinka houses means that their settlements have remained similar for a long period – probably from the beginning of the 20th century, or the end of the Mahdiya.”

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1195 Witness Statement of Ian Cunnison, para. 6. See also para. 12: “I believed - and still believe – that the position I describe was of long-standing” (GoS Memorial, pp. 189, 191).
724. It bears recalling that Professor Cunnison, a specialist of social anthropology,\(^{1200}\) lived for more than two years in a Humr camp, which “moved to about sixty fresh sites in the course of each year”\(^{1201}\) and thus extensively explored the region.\(^{1202}\) He also “knew the Dinka leader, Deng Majok,” the Ngok Dinka Paramount Chief, “who was an impressive man.”\(^{1203}\) The Tribunal is therefore inclined to place more reliance on his understanding of the situation on the ground, of how the Humr and the Ngok lived, moved and interacted, than on reports based on more limited dry-season treks. In addition, his analysis has not been challenged by the Parties. Rather, the GoS itself presented Professor Cunnison as a witness and relied on his writings and statements, thereby clearly indicating that his observations, made in the 1950s, could be transposed and were highly relevant to the year 1905.\(^{1204}\)

725. Cunnison’s analysis has also been confirmed by Michael Tibbs, who “[…] responded affirmatively when asked if there was continuity in the Ngok Dinka permanent settlements.”\(^{1205}\) Mr. Tibbs maintained this position in his witness statement: “I believe the descriptions I give of the Humr and Ngok Dinka areas within the province to have existed for some considerable time prior to my arrival in Kordofan, with the obvious exception of the increased Humr cultivation of cotton particularly at Nyama and Subu.”\(^{1206}\)

4. **Evidence Corroborating the Extent of the “Bahr” Region**

726. The reliability of Howell’s western and eastern limits of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms is however not solely based on the continuity of Ngok settlements. His calculations are also confirmed both by earlier sources as well as contemporaries of Howell. While less specific than Howell, all authors have in common the fact that they define the location of the Ngok Dinka by reference to the Bahr region, which they describe in a similar fashion.

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\(^{1200}\) See Witness Statement of Ian Cunnison, para. 1.


\(^{1202}\) Professor Cunnison lived among the Misseriya Humr, the Ngok Dinka’s northern neighbouring tribe, between August 1952 and January 1955 (see First Witness Statement of Professor Ian Cunnison, GoS Memorial, para. 3, p. 189).

\(^{1203}\) Professor Cunnison’s Witness Statement, para. 6.

\(^{1204}\) The SPLM/A endorses Professor Cunnison’s (and Mr Tibbs’s) analysis on the continuity of Ngok Dinka settlements (see supra paras. 343-344). The Government’s criticism focuses on the Experts’ reliance on a 1965 peace agreement to establish continuity (see supra para. 179).

\(^{1205}\) Tibbs interview, ABC Experts’ Report, Part II, App. IV, p. 159.

\(^{1206}\) Witness Statement of G. Michael Tibbs, Appendix to SPLM/A Counter-Memorial, para. 27.
727. Robertson thus depicted the Bahr as “the great semi-circle from Grinti to Keilak on the Bahr el Arab, and its system of tributary wadis (regebas).”\textsuperscript{1207} Howell offers a comparable definition, explaining that the name is taken from “the main perennial river of that region, the Bahr el Arab,” and “used loosely to describe a vast tract of country where many variations of topography and vegetation are found,” extending to Lake Keilak and Lake Abiad.\textsuperscript{1208} As noted by the ABC Experts, Professor Cunnison provides an analogous description of the Bahr:

[t]he southern part of the country, [i]t is the area in which the Humr spend the latter half of the dry-season. It is characterized by dark, deeply crackling clays and numerous winding watercourses all connected eventually with the Bahr el Arab, a tributary of the White Nile. It contains also two almost permanent lakes, Keylak (which lies slightly to the south of east from the Muglad) and Abyad, in the south-east corner of the country. The Bahr is the name which the Humr give to the whole of this dry-season watering country. Within it they recognize different districts: ‘the Regeba’ is the northern part of the Bahr, where the Humr make their earliest dry-season camps […] The ‘Bahr’ proper is the region where the camps are made towards the end of the dry season, mainly around the largest watercourses, the Regeba Umm Bioro and Regeba Zerga.\textsuperscript{1209}

The Humr recognize the following components in [the Bahr]: (i) the watercourses; (ii) higher, non-cracking clay areas, on which Dinka build permanent homestead…\textsuperscript{1210}

728. In a previous article, “The Humr and their Land,” also examined by the ABC Experts, Professor Cunnison had commented on the Bahr el Arab as follows:

The river system is known to the Arabs as the Bahr, although they subdivide the area into the Regaba (consisting of Regeba ez Zarga and the Regeba Umm Bioro); and the Bahr, or the Bahr el ‘Arab, which consists of all river beds between the Regeba ez Zerga and the main river. [Fn 3: The nomenclature is confusing. The river which is generally shown on maps as the Bahr el ‘Arab – and in one section as the Jurf – always known by the Arabs as the Jurf. They point out that it is not the Bahr el ‘Arab, for the Arabs do not normally settle by it at this part, but the Bahr ed Deynka.]\textsuperscript{1211}
729. The Tribunal notes that these descriptions correspond to the satellite photographs of the Bahr region submitted in the file.\textsuperscript{1212} They are also consistent with Professor Allan’s statement that:

\begin{quote}
The Bahr region is hospitable to and consistent with the agro-pastoral lifestyle, and it does extend not only in the area between the two major rivers that we've been talking about [the Kir and the Ragaba ez Zarga], but also in the area to the north and the east.\textsuperscript{1213}
\end{quote}

730. According to Professor Cunnison, “[…] much of the Bahr has permanent Dinka settlements, although during most of the time that the Humr occupy it the Dinka are with their cattle south of the Bahr el Arab.”\textsuperscript{1214} He further observes that

\begin{quote}
Dinka have permanent housing on the Bahr, but Humr do not. Dinka settlements are largely unoccupied during the Humr stay in the south, except for caretakers. The bulk of the Dinka and their cattle move over the Bahr -el-Arab. Arabs, during the dry season, camp by the regebas. By contrast Dinka erect their houses back from the regebas to avoid the flooding during their residence there in the rains.\textsuperscript{1215}
\end{quote}

731. The permanent nature of Dinka settlements in the Bahr region is also highlighted in the following extracts from the ABC Expert’s interview with Professor Cunnison in May 2005:

\begin{quote}
The Humr had no land claims, no permanent settlements, no houses, unlike the Dinka.\textsuperscript{1216}
\end{quote}

732. It should be emphasized at this stage that resorting to a criterion of permanent housing on the Bahr in determining the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905 by no stretch implies that other tribes cannot, or will not be able to, use the Bahr and its pastures. Quite the contrary. Article 1.1.3 of the Abyei Protocol provides that “[t]he Misseriya and other nomadic peoples retain their traditional rights to graze cattle and move across the territory of Abyei.” Consistent with Professor Cunnison’s comment that he “never observed the Humr asking permission from Dinka to come to the Bahr,”\textsuperscript{1217}

\textsuperscript{1212} See Maps 68 (Bahr Region (on Dry Season Satellite Image)) and 69 (Abyei Area: Wet Season Vegetation (Satellite Image)) of SPLM/A Map Atlas, vol. 2.

\textsuperscript{1213} SPLM/A Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 153/02-07 (Professor Allan’s presentation).


\textsuperscript{1215} ABC Experts, ABC Experts’ Report, Part II, App. 4, p. 161 (Ian Cunnison Interview, Hedon, 22 May 2005).

\textsuperscript{1216} ABC Experts’ Report, Part 2, Appendix 5, p. 161 (Ian Cunnison Interview, Hedon, 22 May 2005).

\textsuperscript{1217} Witness Statement of Professor Cunnison, para. 6.
Article 1.1.3 enshrines the right of the Misseriya and other nomadic tribes (not subject to “permission”) to move freely and graze cattle in the Abyei Area.  

733. Earlier sources closer to 1905 confirm the presence of Ngok Dinka in this area. The 1912 Kordofan Handbook provides a full description of the area occupied by the Ngok Dinka, which encompasses at least the Bahr in Cunnison’s terminology:

Country.- To the south of Dar Nuba and living in the open plains (locally called fawa) which extend to the Bahr el Arab there is a considerable Dinka population. In the rains the tribesmen collect for the most part in the neighbourhood of Lake Abiad and near Doleiba, where they have semi-permanent villages and a little cultivation. As the country dries up and the mosquitoes disappear they move slowly south, watering at the various rain pools, to the Arab or Gurf River, along the banks of which they form innumerable small settlements of two or three huts each.

734. The 1913 Anglo-Egyptian Kordofan Province Map reflects this description and places the labels “Dinka” and “Dar Jange” on a territory encompassing approximately Sultan Rob, the Bahr el Arab and the Ragaba ez Zarga (“Bahr el Homr”), up to Lake Abiad. Similarly, other maps such as the 1914 Anglo-Egyptian Sudan War Office Map or the 1916 Darfur War Office Map mark “Dinka” on an area extending from beneath the Bahr el Arab to the northwest beyond the Ragaba ez Zarga up to approximately latitude 10°20’N, past Lake Abiad. The description of the area again roughly corresponds to the arc described above by Robertson.

735. However, a close reading of the evidence shows that an expansive view of the area occupied by the Ngok Dinka, such as to encompass the whole of the Bahr up to, and as far east as, Lake Keilak and Lake Abiad, is not warranted. Rather, the evidence indicates that Ngok territory occupation was concentrated approximately between the longitudes provided by Howell, up to latitude 10°10’N.

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1218 See also infra paras. 748 et seq. the section of this Award addressing the issue of traditional rights.
1220 See Map 49 of SPLM/A Map Atlas, vol. 1; GoS Memorial Map 12 (Kordofan Province, Survey Office Khartoum, 1913).
1222 GoS Memorial Map 16 (Darfur, War Office, 1916).
736. In Cunnison’s analysis, the Ngok Dinka permanent settlements are in fact mostly located around the Bahr river system, which includes the Bahr el Arab, the Ragaba Umm Biero, and the Ragaba ez Zarga, and “numerous winding watercourses all connected eventually with the Bahr el Arab.” 1223. While this area does not go beyond latitude 10°10’N – where, as noted by Professor Cunnison, there is no significant collective presence of the Ngok Dinka (in the northwest, in the goz, in the northeast, in the upper Bahr region (towards lake Keilak and Abiad) – Howell’s lines of latitude do encompass and coincide roughly with much of the three main rivers and intricate network of smaller waterways of this portion of the Bahr, as shown on the Tribunal’s Award Map.

737. This is confirmed by earlier evidence, including the 1912 Kordofan Handbook, which locates the Ngok Dinka in the center and the west of the area extending from the Bahr el Arab to Lake Abiad:

The three main divisions are: - On the east, the Ruweng section under Sultan Anot; in the centre, the followers of the late Sultan Rob, who are now under his son, Kanoni; and to the west a number of Rob’s ex-followers, under another of his sons, named Kwal.1224

5. Evidence Corroborating Howell’s Western and Eastern Limits

738. Taken individually, the western and eastern latitudes indicated by Howell are equally corroborated by additional evidence.

739. Howell’s location of the western boundary is corroborated by Michael Tibbs’ 1954 observation that the area around Grinti, very close to longitude 27°50’E, is “Ngok territory, although the Arabs used to graze in it in the spring.” Mr. Tibbs also notes that “while the Dinka tolerated the Messeria, neither of them wanted the Rezigat from Darfur there.”1225

740. These statements are unambiguous and do contribute to confirming the location of the Ngok people transferred in 1905. The Tribunal notes, similarly, that the 1913 Anglo-Egyptian Kordofan Province Map places the label “Dar Rizeigat” to the west of “Dar Jange,”

1223 See supra para. 727 et seq. See also the rivers and drainage on the Tribunal’s Award Map (Appendix 1).
approximately along longitude 27°10'E. By contrast, Heinekey, who began a trek in Gerinti in March 1918, merely notes the absence of tracks and the necessity to be accompanied by a guide to travel to Mek Kwali's village. Unfortunately, he does not offer, in this very brief report, any information regarding the population inhabiting the area around Gerinti or the relations between the different tribes there. Similarly, Sultan Rob's indication that there are only Humr “west of him” is equally unhelpful. The statement is vague per se and leaves unresolved the task of determining coordinates of the western limit of the area. In light of Mr. Tibbs' observations, Sultan Rob's statement is best understood as referring to the presence of Misseriya (and Rizeigat) Arabs west of the Ngok Dinka people as a whole, Sultan Rob being their Paramount Chief.

741. Turning to the eastern boundary, Howell's longitude of 29°00'E is corroborated by evidence provided by Robertson's study of Western Kordofan from 1933 to 1936. Robertson reports that in June one year after the rains had begun, the people of the Western Nuer District in Upper Nile Province “had crossed the Ragababa and built their big cattle luarks – thatched huts – on the Kordofan side of the river, thereby trespassing on the Ngok Dinka lands.” Robertson further states that he gave orders to burn the Nuer's huts and “make [them] go back to their own tribal lands.” These comments clearly indicate that the tribal boundary between the Nuer and the Ngok Dinka is crossed at the border between Upper Nile and Kordofan around the Ragababa ez Zarga. Again, Robertson's specific meeting point between the two tribes closely coincides with Howell's longitude of 29°00'E, west of which one enters Ngok territory. This description is more useful to this Tribunal than Dupuis' sketch, which merely suggests that the Ngok Dinka's southeastern border is with the Rueng, a border in any event confirmed by Howell. It is also a more reliable

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1226 See Map 49 of SPLM/A Map Atlas, vol. 1; Map 12 in GoS Memorial Map Atlas (Kordofan Province, Survey Office Khartoum, 1913).
1228 GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 91/01.
1230 Id.
1231 See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 106/11 et seq.; Dupuis' 1921 Sketch (see GoS Maps 39b and 39c). As in the case of a number of other maps, Dupuis provides a mere snapshot of the traveler's perception during a single trip in some parts of the region; it does not reflect, among other things, the fact that the Ngok Dinka's occupation and use of land is affected by the very significant changes to the topography of the region brought about by its seasonal ecology. The Tribunal further notes that Dupuis' 1922 brief Note on Dinka of Western Kordofan unfortunately does not provide any useful information or coordinates locating the area occupied and used by the Ngok Dinka (see Dupuis 1922 Report: Note on Dinka of Western Kordofan, SCM Annex 52). The same analysis applies to the 1927 Tribal Distribution Map. The Tribunal observes, however, that the map
and better indication than the village of Etai, which the GoS claims is evidence of the Abyei area’s eastern limit. In fact, Wilkinson, who located Etai, never described it as forming or indicating the Ngok Dinka’s eastern boundary. The Tribunal is similarly very reluctant to equate the eastern and western limits of the area occupied by the Ngok Dinka transferred in 1905 with the 1933 pencil depiction of Ngok Dinka’s dry season grazing area on a sketch map, especially when more comprehensive and specific evidence is available.

742. In addition, the Tribunal notes that the written evidence is corroborated by oral evidence. Naturally, the Tribunal is aware that, like other pieces of evidence submitted in these proceedings, some witness statements lack precision. But this does not mean that they lack all probative value. Indeed, both Parties relied on witness evidence before the ABC and before this Tribunal, knowing that the history of the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya is largely based on oral tradition. Given the paucity of the evidence, the oral testimony of the Ngok Dinka regarding their location in 1905 will be taken into account, especially insofar as it confirms scholarly and documentary evidence, such as that provided by Howell or Cunnison.

743. In the west, for example, several witnesses have identified Maper Amaal, a village near the 27°50’E line, around the northern portion Ragaba ez Zarga, as both an Abyior settlement confirms the Ngok Dinka’s southeastern border with the Rueng at approximately latitude 29°00’E and shows no tribe between the Ngok Dinka and Kordfan’s western boundary (See Map 21 in GoS Counter-Memorial Map Atlas (Kordofan Tribal Distribution Map, Sudan Survey Department, 1927)).


See GoS Oral Pleadings, April 21, 2009, Transcr. 108/06 et seq.; 1933 Grazing Areas Map (GoS Counter-Memorial Map Atlas, Maps 22a and 22b). The minutes of the meeting to which the Grazing Areas Sketch Map is attached do not provide any relevant information on the area inhabited by the Ngok Dinka (see Civsec 66/4/35, “Minutes of Meeting,” October 28, 1933, pp. 92-95, SCM Annex 39). 

The SPLM/A filed twenty-six witness statements from members of all of the nine chiefdoms, including the Ngok Dinka paramount chief, with its Memorial. The GoS also submitted with its Counter-Memorial a substantial number of witness statements, including four witness statements from Ngok Dinka tribe members. As one of the Government’s witnesses indicates, the source of the Ngok Dinka’s history is found in “oral traditions and Ngok Dinka songs.” (Witness Statement of Majid Yak Kur, member of the Bongo Chiefdom, p. 1) 

See, for example, Witness Statement of Deng Chier Agoth, Abyior Elder, para. 16 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 7). Deng Chier Agoth was born in 1930. See also Witness Statement of Kuol Alor Makuac Biong, Abyior Chief, para. 13 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 6). Kuol Alor Makuac Biong was born in 1963.
and a cattle grazing area for members of the Mareng Chiefdom around 1905. Witnesses appearing before the ABC, including members of other Dinka tribes, also indicated that Maper Amaal was considered as a Ngok settlement and place for grazing. Similarly, in the east, oral evidence points to Panyang, a one-day walk west of Pariang, and Pariang itself, being Achaak settlements in 1905.

744. Although there is witness evidence suggesting that there were Ngok settlements west of longitude 27°50'E in such places as Thigei, Grinti, Meiram, and east of longitude 29°00'E in such places as Ajai, Mardhok or Miding. Map 62 of the SPLM/A Map Atlas (vol. 2) confirms that the vast majority of Ngok traditional sites and settlements were concentrated in the portion of the Bahr region located between longitudes 27°50'E and 29°00'E.

1238 See Witness Statement of Kuol Lual Deng Akonon, Former Chief of the Mareng and Mareng Elder, para. 9 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 27). Kuol Lual Deng Akonon was born in 1914.


1240 See Witness Statement of Ring Makuac Dhel Yak, Executive Chief of the Achaak, paras. 5, 11 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 11).

1241 See, for example, Witness Statement of Kuol Alor Makuac Biong, Chief of Abior, para. 13 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 5); Witness Statement of Deng Chier Agoth, Abyior Elder, para. 16 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 7); See also ABC Experts’ Report, Part II, App. 4, pp. 115, 154.

1242 See, for example, Witness Statement of Deng Chier Agoth, Abyior Elder, para. 21(b) (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 7); See also ABC Experts’ Report, Part II, App. 4, p. 154.

1243 See, for example, Witness Statement of Deng Chier Agoth, Abyior Elder, para. 11 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 7); Witness Statement of Alor Kuol Arop, Abyior Elder, para. 10 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 8); Witness Statement of Jok Deng Kek, Achueng Elder, para. 11 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 14); See also ABC Experts’ Report, Part II, App. 4, pp. 48, 148.

1244 See, for example, Witness Statement of Ring Makuac Dhel Yak, Executive Chief of the Achaak Chiefdom, para. 14 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 11); Witness Statement of Mijak Kuot Kur, Achaak Elder, para. 11 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 12); Witness Statement of Nyol Pagout Deng Ayei, Bongo Chief, para. 10 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 20); See also ABC Experts’ Report, Part II, App. 4, pp. 124, 133, 149, 150.

1245 See, for example, Witness Statement of Ring Makuac Dhel Yak, Executive Chief of the Achaak Chiefdom, para. 11 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 11); Witness Statement of Mijak Kuot Kur, Achaak Elder, para. 11 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 12); See also ABC Experts’ Report, Part II, App. 4, p. 150.

1246 See, for example, Witness Statement of Ring Makuac Dhel Yak, Executive Chief of the Achaak Chiefdom, paras. 8, 9 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 11); Witness Statement of Mijak Kuot Kur, Achaak Elder, para. 11 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 12); Witness Statement of Mijok Bol Atem, Diil Elder, para. 10 (SPLM/A Memorial, Witness Statements, Tab 23); See also ABC Experts’ Report, Part II, App. 4, pp. 124, 125, 150, 153, 155.
6. Conclusion

745. In view of the above, the Tribunal defines the western and eastern boundaries of the Abyei Area as indicated on the Tribunal’s Award Map (Appendix 1). The western boundary runs along longitude 27°50’E from latitude 10°10’N south until it intersects with the 1956 Kordofan-Darfur boundary. In order to take into account the fact that the Abyei Area’s southern boundary, as confirmed by this Tribunal, is the prolongation of the 1956 Kordofan-Darfur boundary, the Abyei Area’s western boundary then follows the latter until it meets the former. The eastern boundary of the Abyei Area runs along longitude 29°00’E, from latitude 10°10’N south until it intersects with the Abyei Area’s southern boundary.

746. By delimiting the eastern and western boundaries of the Abyei Area in the foregoing manner, the Tribunal adopts the ABC Experts’ use of lines of longitude in its delimitation of tribal boundaries, as the Tribunal finds that it was reasonable for the Experts to do so for both logical and practical reasons. In cases where a tribunal is required to delimit boundaries based on a meager evidentiary record, the “fewer the points (or points of reference) involved in its definition, the greater the court’s ‘degrees of freedom’ (in the statistical sense).” And indeed, lines of longitude and latitude when delimiting boundaries have been used in appropriate circumstances by international courts and tribunals and is recognized in public international law.

747. The same reasoning applies in this case, as it has proven impossible for the Tribunal to determine every relevant historical and geographical feature in the area, and then proceed to draw authoritative boundaries, from the sparse amount of decisive evidence and the temporal constraint of 1905. As there are few non-topographic circa-1905 features that survive intact today to aid in delimitation, the Tribunal deems it proper to delimit the eastern and western boundaries based on lines of longitude, as the ABC did.

1247 See also Appendix 2, a map comparing the boundary and area delimited by the Tribunal with that of the ABC Experts.

1248 Separate Opinion by Judge ad hoc Abi-Saab, Frontier Dispute, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 554, 662.
H. THE BOUNDARY DELIMITED BY THE TRIBUNAL IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO TRADITIONAL GRAZING RIGHTS

1. The Scope of the Tribunal’s Mandate with Respect to Traditional Rights

748. Through the Arbitration Agreement, the Parties gave expression to their expectation that the Tribunal will bring final resolution to the dispute over the Abyei Area, with all its attendant territorial consequences. As mandated, this Tribunal’s Article 2(c) focus has been the delimitation “on map” of the boundaries of the Abyei Area. The Tribunal’s attention to territorial boundaries should not, however, be taken to imply that the Parties are entitled to disregard other territorial relationships that people living in and in the vicinity of the Abyei Area have historically maintained. Sovereign rights over territory are not, after all, the only relevant considerations in areas in which traditional land-use patterns prevail. As the ICJ noted in the Western Sahara case, there are other “ties which kn[o]w no frontier between the territories” and which are “vital to the very maintenance of the life in the region.”

749. The Tribunal’s limited mandate forestalls consideration of the traditional rights applying within or along the boundaries of the Abyei Area in any comprehensive manner. Nonetheless, the Tribunal must address such traditional rights to the extent that the ABC Experts have decided in Point 5 of the Report’s “Final and Binding Decision” that “[t]he Ngok and Misseriya shall retain their established secondary rights to the use of land north and south of this boundary.” The GoS alleges that the ABC Experts’ pronouncement was rendered in excess of the ABC Experts’ mandate. As explained in the following sections, the Tribunal finds no such excess of mandate with regard to Point 5 of the Final and Binding Decision.

2. The CPA Guarantees Misseriya Grazing Rights and Other Traditional Rights

750. At the outset, the Tribunal notes that the CPA (including the Abyei Protocol), which is part of the Tribunal’s applicable law pursuant to Article 3 of the Arbitration Agreement, confirms the Parties’ intention to accord special protection to the traditional rights of the people settling within and in the vicinity of the Abyei Area.

Most importantly, the Abyei Protocol specifically recognizes the need to safeguard the grazing rights of the Misseriya and other nomadic peoples. Pursuant to Section 1.1.3 of the Abyei Protocol, “[t]he Misseriya and other nomadic peoples retain their traditional rights to graze cattle and move across the territory of Abyei.” Some other provisions of the CPA equally reaffirm the Parties’ intention to protect the exercise of traditional rights.  

Hence, the CPA explicitly guarantees traditional rights acquired by populations within the Abyei Area; these rights will not be affected by the Tribunal’s boundary delimitation.

3. **According to General Principles of Law, Traditional Rights Are Not Extinguished by Boundary Delimitations**

The jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals as well as international treaty practice lend additional support to the principle that, in the absence of an explicit prohibition to the contrary, the transfer of sovereignty in the context of boundary delimitation should not be construed to extinguish traditional rights to the use of land (or maritime resources).

(a) **Case law by international courts and tribunals**

While international courts and tribunals have been reluctant to derive direct territorial title from traditional rights, the ICJ has confirmed that pre-existing traditional rights may

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1251 Section 1.6 of the CPA affirms the application of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, which (among other things) guarantees the right of every individual to leave any country including his own, and to return to his country (Article 12(2)) and the right of all peoples to freely pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen. (Article 21(1)). The legal principles of the continuation of traditional rights enabling lifestyles that necessitate transboundary migration are consistent with these principles. In Section 2.5 of the CPA, the Parties agree that “a process be instituted to progressively develop and amend the relevant laws to incorporate customary laws and practices, local heritage and international trends and practices.” Similarly, Section 2.6.6.2 of the CPA requires the National Land Commission to “accept references on request from the relevant government, or in the process of resolving claims, and make recommendations to the appropriate levels of government concerning: ... Recognition of customary land rights and/or law.” The references to “customary laws and practices” and “customary land rights” in the CPA would seem to include the exercise of traditional rights. Pursuant to Section 3.1.5 of the PCA, land rights are a relevant factor in the allocation and exploitation of natural resources: “Persons enjoying rights in land shall be consulted and their views shall duly be taken into account in respect of decisions to develop subterranean natural resources from the area in which they have rights, and shall share in the benefits of that development.”

1252 In a number of cases, the ICJ considered traditional fishing rights and land rights, without however finding them sufficient to allocate title to territory based on the notion of better established effectivités. See recently, Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, p. 625; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, 40. See also The Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration Award of 2006 (Permanent Court of Arbitration Award Series, TMC Asser Press, forthcoming 2009), also available at www.pca-cpa.org.
result in spatial adjustments when delimiting boundaries.\textsuperscript{1253} In addition, it is an established principle of boundary adjudication that the transfer of territorial sovereignty resulting from the delimitation of a new international boundary does not, in the absence of an explicit intention to the contrary, extinguish traditional rights to the use of transferred territory. An early doctrinal foundation of the principle that customary rights “survive” the transfer of territorial title was provided in the \textit{Right of Passage} case, where the ICJ recognized that Portugal continued to enjoy certain rights of passage over Indian territory that used to be Portuguese.\textsuperscript{1254} Customary rights “run with the land,” and whichever party in international adjudication is assigned title to a particular territory is bound to give effect to these rights as a matter of international law; customary rights are, so to speak, \textit{servitudes jure gentium} or “\textit{servitudes internationales}.”\textsuperscript{1255}

755. With regard to land rights, the PCIJ confirmed that the transfer of sovereignty over a particular territory does not extinguish private rights pertaining to the use of that territory: “Private rights acquired under existing law do not cease on a change of sovereignty,” the PCIJ held, adding that it was unreasonable to assume that “private rights acquired from the State as the owner of the property are invalid as against a successor in sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{1256} In the \textit{Frontier Dispute between Burkina-Faso and Mali}, the ICJ Chamber gave attention to the historical reality that administrative lines drawn by colonial powers often bisected organic living spaces. As a consequence, inhabitants moved across administrative or even colonial boundaries in their daily living:

\begin{quote}
While under the colonial system a village may, for certain administrative purposes, have comprised all the land depending on it, the Chamber is by no means persuaded that when a village was a feature used to define the composition – and therefore the geographical extent – of a wider administrative entity, the farming hamlets had always to be taken into consideration in drawing the boundary of that entity. In the colonial
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1253} In the \textit{Gulf of Maine case}, which concerned a maritime boundary for the continental shelf and fishery zones, the ICJ recognised that boundary delimitations may have “catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the population of the countries concerned” and noted that, in the event of such consequences, adjustments to the median line should be made (\textit{Gulf of Maine (Canada v. US)}, ICJ Reports 1984 p. 246 at 342). Similarly, the ICJ considered in the \textit{Maritime Delimitation (Denmark v. Norway)} “whether any shifting or adjustment of the median line as fishery zone boundary would be required to ensure equitable access to the capelin fishery resources for the vulnerable fishing communities concerned.” In this respect, the Court’s principal concern was whether there existed any delimitation that would “guarantee to each Party the presence in every year of fishable quantities of capelin in the zone allotted to it by the line” (\textit{Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway)}, ICJ Reports 1993p. 38, paras. 72-78).

\textsuperscript{1254} \textit{Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India)}, ICJ Reports 1960, p. 6, 35-43.


\textsuperscript{1256} \textit{Questions relating to Settlers of German Origin in Poland}, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ Series B, No. 6 at 36.
period, the fact that the inhabitants of one village in a French colony left in order to
cultivate land lying on the territory of another neighbouring French colony, or *a fortiori*
on the territory of another *cercle* belonging to the same colony, did not
contradict the notion of a clearly-defined boundary between the various colonies or
*cercles*.

756. The Chamber also ruled that it was not precluded from defining a clear boundary
notwithstanding any transboundary rights that may have been acquired by the inhabitants of
the border region:

The Parties have not requested the Chamber to decide what should become of the land
rights and other rights which, on the eve of the independence of both States, were being
exercised across the boundary between the two pre-existing colonies. If such rights had
no impact on the position of that boundary, then they do not affect the line of the
frontier, and it is this line alone which the Parties have requested the Chamber to
indicate.\(^{1258}\)

757. However, such judicial restraint was not exercised due to the Chamber’s belief that
traditional transboundary rights were of lesser importance. Rather, the Chamber did not
consider itself compelled to address the question of preexisting transboundary rights
because these rights were already safeguarded by bilateral agreements:

From a practical point of view, the existence of such rights has posed no major
problems, as is shown by the agreements which [the parties] have concluded to resolve
the administrative problems which arise in the frontier districts of the two States. For
example, an agreement of 25 February 1964 deals, among other matters, with the
"Problems of land and the maintenance of rights of use on either side of the frontier,"
and it provides that "Rights of use of the nationals of the two States pertaining to
farmland, pasturage, fisheries and waterpoints will be preserved in accordance with
regional custom."\(^{1259}\)

758. The Tribunal would note that the existence of “side agreements” regarding traditional rights
in the *Burkina-Faso v. Mali* case bears close resemblance to the situation in the present
proceedings, in which the Parties committed prior to the arbitration to the safeguard of
certain traditional rights in the CPA.

759. The principle of the continuity of traditional rights has also been invoked, with considerable
frequency, in maritime delimitations in relation to traditional fishing rights. In the 1893
*Behring Sea Arbitration*, the arbitral tribunal was concerned with traditional “rights of the


\(^{1258}\) Id.

\(^{1259}\) Id.
citizens and subjects of either country as regards the taking of fur-seals in or habitually resorting to the said waters..." The tribunal specifically exempted “Indians dwelling on the coasts of the territory of the United States or of Great Britain” from the legal regimes that otherwise applied, so as to guarantee the continuation of traditional fishing techniques.

760. In *Eritrea-Yemen*, a PCA-administered arbitration, the Tribunal, in determining claims of territorial sovereignty over islands in the Red Sea and the maritime boundary delimitation between Eritrea and Yemen, held that the traditionally prevailing situation of *res communis*, which permitted African and Yemeni fishermen to operate with no limitation throughout the entire area and to sell their catch at local markets on either side of the Red Sea, was compatible with and would remain unaffected by the findings of sovereignty over various of the islands. The “traditional fishing regimes,” operating both within and beyond the parties’ territorial waters, “does not depend, either for its existence or for its protection, upon the drawing of an international boundary by this Tribunal.”

(b) International treaties

761. Traditional rights are also recognized in a multitude of international agreements. Early bilateral treaties defining international boundaries have routinely included perpetual guarantees of traditional rights, the exercise of which might otherwise be obstructed by the introduction of an international boundary.

762. Modern treaties governing the delimitation of boundaries contain similar provisions. The 1978 treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea, for example, sets out a special legal

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1260 *Behring Sea Arbitration, Great Britain v. United States*, August 15, 1893, 179 CTS, No. 8, 97 at 98.


1263 See Article 1 of the 1888 Agreement between Great Britain and France, respecting the Somali Coast, signed at London, February, 1888, Hertslét's, Vol. XIX, 204, at 204-205; Article V of the Arrangement between Great Britain and France, fixing the Boundary between the British and French Possessions on the Gold Coast, signed in the French language at Paris, July 12, 1893, Hertslét's, Vol. XIX, 228, at 229-230; Article I of the Treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia, signed by the Emperor Menelek II, and by Her Majesty's Envoy, at Adis Abbaba [sic], May 14, 1897, Hertslét's, Vol. XX, 1 at 2; Article III of the Exchange of Notes between Great Britain and France relative to the Boundary between the Gold Coast and the French Soudan, March 18, 1904, to July 19, 1906, Hertslét's, Vol. XXV, 267, at 271; Convention between Great Britain and France supplementary to the Declaration of March 21, 1899, and the Convention of June 14, 1898, respecting Boundaries West and East of the Niger signed at Paris, September 8, 1919; Convention Supplementary to the Declaration signed at London on March 21, 1899, as an addition to the Convention of June 14, 1898, which regulated the Boundaries between the British and French Colonial Possessions and Spheres of Influence to the West and East of the Niger, Hertslét's, Vol. XXX, 213, 8th para., at 214.
regime for citizens who “maintain traditional customary associations with areas of features in or in the vicinity of the Protected Zone in relation to their subsistence or livelihood or social, cultural or religious activities,” which includes traditional fishing rights.1264 Similarly, in a 1982 agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia, Malaysia recognized the legal regime of the archipelagic state established by Indonesia, while Indonesia accepted the continuation of the existing rights of Malaysian nationals in Indonesia’s territorial sea and archipelagic waters, including traditional fishing rights.1265

763. Although the underlying principle applies to all populations, guarantees of traditional rights are of particular significance for indigenous populations. Convention No. 169 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries enshrines a positive duty on the part of states to safeguard the rights of peoples to their traditional land use.1266 According to Article 13(1),

> governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship.

764. To further this purpose, pursuant to Article 14(1), governments shall take measures
to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities. Particular attention shall be paid to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators in this respect.

765. Finally, to facilitate the protection of traditional rights to land use, including non-exclusive land use, Article 14(2) requires governments to “take steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession.”

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1264 Treaty on Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area between the Countries, December 18, 1978, XVIII ILM (1979) 291 at 293.


1266 Convention (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 72 ILO Official Bull. 59; 28 ILM (1989) 1382. This Tribunal takes note of the fact that the Sudan has not ratified Convention No. 169. In the Tribunal’s view, however, the non-ratification of the Convention does not preclude this Tribunal from taking account of the Convention as one piece of evidence among many of relevant “general principles of law and practices.”
4. Conclusion

766. As a matter of “general principles of law and practices” within the meaning of Article 3 of the Arbitration Agreement, traditional rights, in the absence of an explicit agreement to the contrary, have usually been deemed to remain unaffected by any territorial delimitation. Section 1.1.3 of the Abyei Protocol confirms the continued application of the principle with respect to traditional rights to graze cattle and move across the Abyei Area. For these reasons, the Tribunal finds that the ABC Experts decision that “[t]he Ngok and Misseriya shall retain their established secondary rights to the use of land north and south of this boundary” was reasonable and, thus, within the Experts’ mandate.

I. Final Observations

767. By constituting these proceedings, the Parties have accorded to this Tribunal a crucial role within the greater Sudanese peace process – a process that seeks to end the long conflict between North and South that has affected all of Sudan. Conscious of its paramount obligation to the people within and around the Abyei Area (particularly the needs of the Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka) and to the Sudanese people themselves, this Tribunal has done its utmost to contribute, through the task assigned to it, to a peaceful resolution of the bitter conflict over the Abyei Area within the time limits prescribed by the Arbitration Agreement and strictly within the confines of its mandate. The Tribunal is confident that no objective claim can be made from any quarter that the Tribunal acted in excess of its mandate.

768. Under the Abyei Road Map, “[t]he parties commit themselves to abide by and implement the award of the arbitration tribunal.”\textsuperscript{1267} The Arbitration Agreement reiterates: “[t]he Parties agree that the arbitration award delimiting the “Abyei Area” through determining the issues of the dispute as stated in Article 2 of this Agreement shall be final and binding.”\textsuperscript{1268} Thus, with this Award, a distinct stage in the peace process comes to an end.

769. It is now for the Parties to take the next steps. Pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement, “the Presidency of the Republic of Sudan shall ensure the immediate execution of the final arbitration award.”\textsuperscript{1269} This involves, among other modalities of implementation, the

\textsuperscript{1267} Abyei Road Map, Section 4.3.
\textsuperscript{1268} Arbitration Agreement, Article 9(2).
\textsuperscript{1269} Arbitration Agreement, Article 9(5).
prompt appointment of a survey team to demarcate the Abyei Area as delimited by this Award. The Tribunal’s limited mandate to “define (i.e. delimit) on map” the Abyei Area does not extend to demarcation, but the Tribunal hopes that the spirit of reconciliation and cooperation visible throughout these proceedings, particularly during the oral pleadings last April, will continue to animate the Parties on this matter.
CHAPTER V - DISPOSITIF

A. DECISION

770. Having considered all relevant arguments, the Tribunal concludes that:

(a) **Northern Boundary**

1. In respect of the ABC Experts’ decision that “[t]he Ngok have a legitimate dominant claim to the territory from the Kordofan – Bahr el-Ghazal boundary north to latitude 10°10’N,” the ABC Experts did not exceed their mandate.

2. In respect of the ABC Experts’ decision relating to the “shared secondary rights” area between latitude 10°10’N and latitude 10°35’N, the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate.

3. The northern boundary of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905 runs along latitude 10°10’00”N, from longitude 27°50’00”E to longitude 29°00’00”E.

(b) **Southern Boundary**

1. In respect of the ABC Experts’ decision that “[t]he southern boundary shall be the Kordofan – Bahr el-Ghazal – Upper Nile boundary as it was defined on 1 January 1956,” the ABC Experts did not exceed their mandate.

2. The southern boundary as established by the ABC Experts is therefore confirmed, subject to paragraph (c) below.

(c) **Eastern Boundary**

1. In respect of the ABC Experts’ decision that “the eastern boundary shall extend the line of the Kordofan – Upper Nile boundary at approximately longitude 29°32’15”E northwards until it meets latitude 10°22’30”N”, the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate.

2. The eastern boundary of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905 runs in a straight line along longitude
29°00'00"E, from latitude 10°10'00"N south to the Kordofan – Upper Nile boundary as it was defined on 1 January 1956.

(d) Western Boundary

1. In respect of the ABC Experts’ decision that “[t]he western boundary shall be the Kordofan – Darfur boundary as it was defined on 1 January 1956,” the ABC Experts exceeded their mandate.

2. The western boundary of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905 runs in a straight line along longitude 27°50'00"E, from latitude 10°10'00"N south to the Kordofan – Darfur boundary as it was defined on 1 January 1956, and continuing on the Kordofan – Darfur boundary until it meets the southern boundary confirmed in paragraph (b) above.

(e) Grazing and other Traditional Rights

1. In respect of the ABC Experts’ decision that “[t]he Ngok and Misseriya shall retain their established secondary rights to the use of land north and south of this boundary,” the ABC Experts did not exceed their mandate.

2. The exercise of established traditional rights within or in the vicinity of the Abyei Area, particularly the right (guaranteed by Section 1.1.3 of the Abyei Protocol) of the Misseriya and other nomadic peoples to graze cattle and move across the Abyei Area (as defined in this Award), remains unaffected.

B. MAP ILLUSTRATING THE DELIMITATION LINE

771. The boundary as defined above is illustrated on the map appended to this award on a scale of 1:750,000 and based on the WGS84 datum (see Appendix 1).

C. REFERENCE POINTS

772. The coordinates, in terms of WGS84 datum, of selected reference points mentioned in this Award are specified in the following table:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point</th>
<th>Latitude (N)</th>
<th>Longitude (E)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>9°47' N*</td>
<td>27°50'00&quot; E</td>
<td>Intersection of the Kordofan-Darfur boundary, as it was defined on 1 January 1956, with the line of longitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10°10'00&quot; N</td>
<td>27°50'00&quot; E</td>
<td>Intersection of the lines of latitude and longitude as determined by the Tribunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10°10'00&quot; N</td>
<td>29°00'00&quot; E</td>
<td>Intersection of the lines of latitude and longitude as determined by the Tribunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9°40' N*</td>
<td>29°00'00&quot; E</td>
<td>Intersection of the Kordofan-Upper Nile boundary, as it was defined on 1 January 1956, with the line of longitude</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: these latitude values are approximate only and have been derived graphically from maps submitted by the Parties.

**D. COSTS**

773. Recalling Article 11 of the Arbitration Agreement, the Tribunal finds no need to issue a ruling on costs.
Done at the Peace Palace, The Hague
Dated: July 22, 2009

Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy
Presiding Arbitrator

H.E. Judge Awn Al-Khasawneh

Professor W. Michael Reisman

Professor Dr. Gerhard Hafner

Judge Stephen M. Schwebel

Mr. Aloysius Llamzon
Acting Registrar